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PREFACE
On Thursday, July 17th, 1975, two sm all space c ra f t  maneuvered toward 
each o ther one hundred and fo rty  miles above the  A tlan tic  off Portugal 's  coast, 
joined, and locked. Three hours la te r  a beaming Soviet cosm onaut pushed open a 
ha tch  and, as hundreds of millions w atched  on television belov;, clasped the hand 
o f  an equally beaming American as tronau t .  Am erican-Soviet cooperation had 
li te ra l ly  and figuratively reached  new heights.
But the space sp ec tacu la r  was only the most visible instance of 
A m erican-Soviet in teraction . As the  linked capsules circled overhead, thousands 
of A m erican and Soviet citizens trave led , studied, perform ed and com peted in the 
country  of the  o ther.  Within proscribed lim its , books, magazines and newspapers 
flowed back and fo rth  across the ir  borders, providing both objective knowledge 
and subjective insight to readers  on both sides. Though lacking the  spontaniety  
and la t i tude  charac te r iz ing  A m erica 's  cu ltu ra l rela tions with many countries, the 
in te rac t ion  seem ed to  indicate  th a t  in m a tte rs  cu ltura l,  a t  leas t ,  the two powers 
had found the key to co-existence.
But not all was smiles and handshakes between Washington and Moscow. 
Im m ediately  benea th  the  su rface  old fears  and suspicions lay waiting, ready to
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rise  a t  the leas t  prompting. Indeed, on the day th a t  they  repo rted  the space 
ex travaganza , a number of publications deem ed i t  wise to  run co ncu rren t  a r t ic le s  
pinpointing the  politica l problems dividing the  two and detailing the  sources of 
tension on each side. And in so doing, they  unw ittingly il lu s tra ted  a basic them e 
in A m erican-Soviet rela tions.
While Washington and Moscow have carr ied  on a long standing 
ideological feud, A m erican  and Soviet cu ltu ra l rep resen ta tives  have, a t  the  sam e 
tim e , ca rr ied  on an ac tive , th o i^ h  re s t r ic te d ,  cu ltu ra l in tercourse . Only a t  the 
depths of the  cold war did the  po li t ica l conflic t  becom e so in tense  as to  alm ost 
en t ire ly  e l im inate  cu ltu ra l connections as well, and then only for a short tim e. 
Within th ree  years  of the  low point of th e ir  cu ltu ra l relationship the  two nations 
w ere again exchanging delegations, and within six years had signed a  com prehen­
sive exchange ag reem en t th a t  propelled cu ltu ra l con tac ts  fa r  above previous 
levels.
This study t ra c e s  the course of those con tac ts  from the  Bolshevik 
Revolution to  th a t  f irs t  o ff ic ia l  ag ree m en t,  signed in 1958. In so doing it  defines 
cu ltu ra l  re la tions  in broad te rm s, including within its scope those ac t iv i t ie s  
normally  considered "cultural" in n a tu re —a r t ,  l i te ra tu re ,  music, e t c .—as well as 
coopera tive  and com petit ive  ac t iv i t ie s  in the fields of science, technology, 
tourism , a th le t ic s  and o ther  a reas  in which the  A m erican and Soviet people 
assoc ia ted  as human beings ra th e r  than  as ideological opponents. For regardless 
of the ir  specific  purposes, the  people of both countries  who dea lt  with each o ther 
on a human level necessarily  rec ip ro ca ted  a degree  of knowledge about them ­
selves and the  cu lture  which helped form them .
The ch a ra c te r  and conduct of the rela tionship  between the  two nations 
varied considerably over the  four decades herein encompassed. On the  A m erican
Vside, Washington's en try  into the  cu ltural realm made the  relationship a m a tte r  of 
offic ia l as well as p riva te  concern, while on th e  Soviet side Moscow's policies 
d iffered  in im portan t ways during the  p re-S ta lin is t ,  S talinist and post-Stalinist 
periods even as the fundam ental principles underlying the  Soviet concept of 
cu ltu ra l re la tions  rem ained  the same.
Though lim ited  in comparison to the  re la tions  betw een  A merican 
c itizens and those  of many o the r  nations, th e  A m erican  and Soviet people 
m ain ta ined  more ex tensive co n tac ts  during th e  tw en tie s  and early  th ir t ie s  than 
during any subsequent period prior to  1958. Though Moscow ra re ly  perm itted  
ordinary  c i t izens  to  t rav e l  abroad, Soviet cu ltural rep resen ta tives ,  technica l 
delegations and various kinds of exhibits tou red  A m erican  cities  throughout the 
p re-recognition  period, and A m erican  touris ts ,  technic ians, business rep resen ta ­
t ives  and cu ltu ra l  figures rec ip roca ted  the visits in la rge numbers. But as Stalin 
consolidated his power, purged the P a r ty  and waged an an ti-fo re ign  campaign 
during th e  la te  th ir t ie s ,  th e  f ree  and easy c o n tac ts  began to  change; by the  t im e  
of the  N azi-Soviet P a c t  had dwindled to a trickle. The exigencies of w artim e 
partnersh ip  tem porarily  revived and ex tended th e  fo rm er friendly in tercourse , but 
even before the  fighting was over Stalin began re jec tin g  all A m erican  overtures 
ten d ered  under o ff ic ia l  auspices, and, in the  im m ed ia te  postw ar years, resumed 
both the in terna l purges and the an ti-fo re ign  rhe to r ic  of the  ea r l ie r  period. As 
th e  decade progressed th e  Soviet ruler, p rim arily  for purposes of maintaining both 
P a r ty  and personal power, increasingly iso la ted  th e  Soviet people from outside 
con tac ts ,  c leansed  Soviet life  of w estern  influences and tu rned  th e  nation's 
cu ltu ra l organs into weapons to  a t ta c k  bourgeois civilization. The United S ta tes ,  
perceiving a  th r e a t  in Stalin 's  a t t i tu d e  a t  home, in his policies in eas te rn  Europe,
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in his suspected  designs in Iran, G reece  and Turkey, and in such successive shocks 
as the  Berlin blockade and the Korean War, responded by e rec ting  its  own barriers 
to  co n tac ts  with the Soviets and conducting its  own campaign of purification 
within, doubly insuring thereby  th e  es trangem en t of th e  A m erican and Soviet 
people. By th e  early  f i f t ie s  the cu ltu ra l re la tionship  had reached  an impasse, but 
Stalin 's dea th  in early  1953 provided th e  possibility of change. Though official 
A m erica  rem ained  re t ic e n t ,  individual A m ericans responded to overtu res  coming 
from th e  Soviet side during the  months following the d ic ta to r 's  demise, and 
in i t ia ted  c o n tac ts  of th e ir  own. As th e  cu ltu ra l c l im ate  slowly thawed, the  
hes i tan t  f irs t s teps tow ard  renew ed re la tions  slowly gave way to  more form al
A c c o r d  a t
G eneva in 1955, continued through th e  middle of th e  decade, culminating 
u lt im a te ly  in th e  form al exchange pac t signed in early  1958.
Throughout th e  course of the  rela tionship  the tw o nations proceeded 
from d iffe ren t  principles and, for the  most pa r t ,  pursued d ifferen t aims. From 
th e  m id-tw enties  forward, Moscow organized and controlled  i ts  cu ltu ra l re la tions 
accord ing  to  s ta t e  policies and plans. Though individual Soviet c itizens may well 
have relished  the  human con tac ts  and th e  sharing of common in te res ts  on a 
personal level, Moscow viewed such c o n ta c ts  as assets  to  be manipulated for 
la rge r  ends, or, if  deem ed advantageous, to  be liqu idated  in the in te re s t  of serving 
th o se  sam e ends. C ultu ra l re la tions  cons ti tu ted  a means, not an end, and th a t  
f a c t  necessarily  lim ited  th e  ex ten t  to  which th e  people of the tw o nations could 
e n te r  into the  kind of u n fe tte red  rela tionship  th a t  ch a rac te r ized  the  in terac tion  
be tw een  A m erican c itizens and those of nations less subject to s ta te  control.
Washington's role, as b e f i t te d  a  government whose people prided 
them selves  on the ir  freedom of individual ac tion , was more varied and
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com plicated , and changed considerably over the  years. During the  tw enties  and 
th ir t ie s  the  U nited S ta te s  governm ent played an insignificant ro le  in the  realm of 
cu ltu ra l con tac ts ,  exercising its  minimal influence through the  issuing of visas and 
passports. C ontacts  on th e  A merican side during these years were almost entirely 
m a tte rs  of p riva te  p reference, conducted by individuals and organizations whose 
in te res ts  lay in th a t  direction. Prior to  1933 the  S ta te  D epartm en t occasionally 
frowned on p ro jec ts  th a t  implied recognition  of the Soviet governm ent, but its 
refusal to  recognize the  Moscow regim e proved l i t t le  handicap to  cu ltural 
connections. Serving no official policies and purposes, cu ltura l co n tac ts  rep re ­
sen ted  to  pre-World War H America, as they  properly should have, ends and not 
means.
Washington began changing i ts  role during W^orld W^ ar II. Having 
discovered th e  benefits  of friendly cu ltura l in tercourse in dealing with the  Latin 
A m erican  nations during the la te  th ir t ie s ,  the  S ta te  D epartm en t vigorously 
encouraged the  sam e kind of in te rac t io n  with the  Soviets during th e  war and 
postw ar years, being care fu l all the  while to emphasize its  role of p rom oter and 
coordinator of private  act iv it ies  ra th e r  than th a t  of purveyor of an "official" 
A m erican culture. But as the Soviets withdrew from co n tac ts  with the West in 
th e  postwar years  and as in te rna tiona l tensions rose to  th e  danger point, both the 
S ta te  D epartm en t and Congress played an increasingly negative role in the 
cu ltura l realm. Congress a t ta c k e d  the sam e organizations th a t  had just won 
praise  and es teem  for the ir  w artim e contributions, and passed legislation th a t  
c re a te d  barrie rs  to  cu ltu ra l con tac ts .  The S ta te  D epartm en t tu rned  its  cultural 
re la tions  program, now grown world-wide and official, into a  tool to  fight 
communism. And as for exchanges with the  Soviets them selves. Secre ta ry  of
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S ta te  John F o s te r  Dulles made clear in the  f if t ies ,  he wanted only those programs 
th a t  would allow the  U nited S ta tes  to  infuse "ideas and information" into the 
USSR in order to  encourage the  Soviet people to  resis t the ir  rulers. Washington, 
too, had learned to use cu ltura l re la tions as a means to an end.
But Washington's desire and ability to  manipulate cu ltu ra l con tac ts  for 
po litical ends was lim ited  in re la tion  to  Moscow's. Though the S ta te  D epartm ent 
had its  own goals and aims, i t  ordinarily n e i th e r  prohibited p rivate  A m ericans 
from making overtu res  on the ir  own nor p reven ted  them responding to  in itia tives 
coming from Moscow. And though legislative barr ie rs  posed obstacles to  con tac ts  
in some instances  during the  fifties , by th e  middle of th e  decade even the S ta te  
D epartm en t was helping to  find ways to c ircum vent those barriers. American 
citizens, in short, had the option of engaging in co n tac ts  outside the offic ial S ta te  
D epartm en t fram ework. Moscow, to  be sure, did not perm it th a t  duality.
But to  say th a t  A m ericans and Soviets proceeded from d ifferen t 
premises is not to  say th a t  Moscow's method of conducting con tac ts  was wholly 
without m eri t  or necesarily  inimical to A m erican  in terests . Particularly , i t  is not 
to argue th a t  Soviet cu ltura l rep resen ta tives  w ere ordinarily bent on some 
specific  subversive aim. The Soviet purpose may well have been to promote 
recognition a t  one point, to  gain increased  access  to  American technology a t 
another, or perhaps even a t  o ther tim es  to  reduce in ternational tensions, as the 
Kremlin claimed, bu t w hatever the  aim the in te rac t ion  betw een the tw o  nations 
would have been far  less extensive had not Moscow promoted cu ltura l con tac ts  
pursuant to  its  la rge r  ends. And it  is d ifficult to  believe th a t  the  resulting 
in te rac t ion  played a negative role in the  relationship, for regardless of the 
u lterior Soviet m otive, the  individuals who dealt with each o ther on a personal
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level presumably communicated elements of their common humanity that 
transcended state aims. Only the certainty that all non-official relations between 
American and Soviet citizens worked against American interests would have 
justified rejecting the contacts, for they provided a measure of communication 
that otherwise would not have existed. The choice, then, was to accept Moscow's 
methods and to maintain contacts in a restricted and limited manner, or to reject 
both the method and the contacts, for although Americans could try to influence 
Washington's policies and principles, they could do little about Moscow's.
The same choice—or lack of choice—prevails today, for despite the 
biennial exchange agreements signed by the two nations since 1958, Moscow's 
fundamental approach has not changed. Americans today must still recognize the 
limited possibilities inherent in that approach and make the most of them, for the 
American and Soviet people already know too little about each other to forego 
any opportunities to speak to each other as human beings.
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CHAPTER I 
RESTORING A RELATIONSHIP, 1921-1925
The Russian Revolution rup tured  an h istoric  friendship.^ The United 
S ta te s  and Russia never faced each o ther on a ba t t le f ie ld ,  nor suffered  acu te  
confron ta tions in any a rea .  S ta tesm en  on both sides were aw are  of this friendly 
trad ition , and spoke of i t  often. Washington would have fe l t  more com fortab le  
with a less d ic ta to r ia l  regim e in St. Petersburg , bu t  i t  was no rea l  burden to  be 
friendly to  a tsar. Some la te  n ine teen th  cen tu ry  A m ericans complained about 
tsa r is t  oppression and Siberian prison camps, bu t the ir  com plaints rem ained  
rhe to r ic ,  and though conflic ting am bitions in th e  F a r  East caused concern in 
Washington a t  the  turn  of the  cen tury , the  rivalry never reached  the  crisis s ta te . 
Russian au tocracy  th a t  posed no im m edia te  th re a t  to  the  national in te res t  neither 
aroused th e  fear  nor challenged th e  pride of most Americans.
C ultu ra l friendship was even older than political am ity . Long before 
the  tw o  governm ents  exchanged ambassadors, learned  men from both countries  
noted the ach ievem en ts  of the o ther, exchanged inform ation  of sc ien tif ic  in te res t
1
and traded  memberships in scholarly societies . In the 1750's St. Petersburg 
newspapers rep o r ted  Franklin 's experim ents  with e lec tr ic ity ,  in the  1760's 
Franklin and Ezra Styles of Yale College com m unicated with the scientist Michael 
Lomonosov, and in the  1770's th e  A m erican Philosophical Society began a regular
o
correspondence with the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1771, the  American 
Society e lec te d  its f irs t  Russian member; a few years  la te r  th e  Russian Academy 
rec ip ro ca ted  by choosing Benjamin Franklin. The p rac t ice  begun continued 
throughout the  next century; by the  t im e  of th e  Revolution the  A merican 
Philosophical Socie ty  listed  th i r ty - tw o  Russian mem bers. The American 
Academ y of A rts  and Sciences, founded in Boston in 1780 a t  the  suggestion of 
John Adams, likew ise established con tac ts  with the  Russian A cadem y of Sciences 
and began e lecting  Russians to  i ts  membership as early  as 1782.'^
Several fu tu re  presidents  con tribu ted  to the  developing relationship. In 
th e  1780's George Washington and John Adams, responding to  C atherine  the 
G reat's  request for assis tance in compiling a d ic tionary  of com para tive  languages, 
provided th e  em press with inform ation concerning na tive  A m erican dialects.^  
Je fferson 's  correspondence with Alexander I influenced the  tsar 's  d rafts  of 
proposed consti tu tions  for Russia, and through liberals such as Alexander 
Radischev the  Je fferson ian  ideals of A m erican  dem ocracy  becam e known to 
Russian in te llec tua ls .^  A mbasador John Quincy Adams made extensive personal 
acquain tances  among St. Pete rsburg  learned c irc les , forwarded books to  the 
H arvard  Library and the  A m erican Philosophical Society and, by transm itt ing  the  
resu lts  of Benjamin Rush's medical investigations to  the  Russian Academ y of 
Sciences, played an im portan t ro le  in establishing an exchange of medical 
inform ation  th a t  flourished in th e  n ine teen th  cen tu ry  and continued into the
7
twentieth.
3The near-s im ultaneous deaths of Je fferson , Adams and Alexander 1, 
along with the  accession of Nicholas I, marked an end to  the  early  period of 
burgeoning cu ltura l in te rac tion ; as St. Pete rsburg  in tensified  its efforts  to  
destroy all m an ifes ta t ions  of liberalism a chill crep t into the relationship between
O
the  two nations. But despite the  period of cu ltural coolness, co n tac ts  continued
to  develop throughout the  rem ainder of the century . The American Philosophical
Society and the  Russian A cadem y of Sciences shared inform ation in a number of
fields, p a r ticu la r ly  in astronom y, geology, medicine and the  natura l sciences,
while individual sc ien t is ts  exchanged visits in order to personally observe the
0
investigations and experim ents  of the ir  peers.
C o n ta c ts  between scholars and sc ien tis ts  cons ti tu ted  only a p a r t  of the
cu ltu ra l com m unica tion  betw een  the  Russian and A m erican  people. Books, music
and en te r ta in e rs  trav e led  back and forth  throughout the  1800's, and as the
nineteenth  cen tu ry  tu rned  into the  tv ;en tie th  th e  increasing  influx of Russian
im m igrants into the  U nited S ta te s  fu rther  broadened the basis for cultural
in teraction .^^  Beginning in the  la te  1800's a growing number of Russian
en te r ta iners ,  many of whom made a lasting impression on the  world of American
music and dance, appeared  in th e  United S ta tes .  P yo tr  Tchaikovsky's works won
acclaim  more quickly in New York than in Moscow or St. Petersburg , and upon his
arrival in A m erica  in 1891 the composer was surprised to  find himself, as he wrote
home, "a far  more im portan t person here than in Russia."^^ The grea t basso
Feodor Chaliapin gave perfo rm ances  in several c ities  prior to World War 1, as did
1 2th e  dancers Anna Pavlova, Mikhail Mordkin and Michael Fokine. Rachm aninoff 
perform ed in severa l c i t ies  in 1910, and in the  year  1916 and 1917 the  Diaghilev 
Ballet toured  the  country , fea tu r ing  the fam ed Vasiaw Nijinsky along with other
ce leb ra ted  names from St. Petersburs:'s Imperial Russian Ballet and Moscow's 
Bolshoi Ballet.^  ^
While Russian a r t is ts  en te r ta ined  American audiences, o ther Russians 
urged the ir  countrym en to  study and em u la te  American technological efficiency. 
In 1912, a Moscow U niversity professor urged his country to  send a delegation to 
study the mechanics of American production techniques and th e  psychology of the 
American businessman, while a re turned  Russian school te ach er  p resen ted  lantern  
slide shows on A merican industrial development, likewise impressing upon his 
audiences the  im portance of looking to A m erica for industrial guidance.
Despite the  numerous personal con tac ts  and exchanges ca rr ied  on by 
scholarly bodies, each country neglected  the academ ic study of the  other. At the 
turn of the  century . Harvard began offering courses in Russian language and 
li te ra tu re ,  the  University of California established a D epartm en t of Slavic 
Langfuages, and Samuel Mo Harper tr ied  to  in teres t students in Russian studies a t  
the  U niversity of Chicago, but few followed their lead. When World War 1 erupted 
in Europe only tw o  A merican universities  w ere offering classes in Russian history, 
and only th ree  were teaching  Russian language and li te ra tu re .^^
Nor were the  governm ents of the tw o countries concerned in any 
official capacity  with promoting cu ltural relations. Both Washington and St. 
Pete rsburg  fac i li ta ted  trave l and co n tac ts  through incidental means, but neither 
actively  encouraged organized exchanges. On the other hand, ne ither  placed 
insuperable obstacles before  p rivate  c itizens whose in terests  lay in th a t  direction. 
And given th e  increased emphasis on in ternational understanding and cooperation 
during the  early  1900's, plus the  rapidly improving means of transporta tion  and 
communication, the re  was reason to believe th a t  an increasing number of people 
would in fa c t  become more in te re s ted  in the cu lture  of the o ther.
5The Revolution in terrup ted  this agreeable  s ta te  of affairs. As the 
momentous events  of 1917 swept Russia quickly past liberalism to communism, as 
Russian arm ies w ithdrew from the  struggle against G ermany and as the  Bolsheviks 
encouraged world revolution, the  enthusiasm in the  United S ta tes  turned  to  alarm. 
A merican soldiers occupied Russian soil along with those of England and France, 
giving a t  least the  appearance of a willingness to  assist any promising counter­
revolutionary m ovem ent. Washington denied export licenses and c learance  papers
to  ships bound for Soviet controlled  ports, issued visas and passports  only under
16cer ta in  conditions, and cu t off mail service betw een the  two countries. Nor
v.’ould Washington recognize th e  leg itim acy of the new Soviet rulers. Believing
th a t  the Communist P a r ty  did not tru ly  rep resen t th e  Russian people, th a t  it fe lt
no compulsion to  fulfill in ternational obligations and th a t  it was com m itted  to
world revolution. P resident Wilson refused to  follow the  lead of those nations
17granting recognition to  the  Soviet regim e. For th e  next sixteen years  
Washington had no official re la tions with Moscow.
Moreover, com m unist v ic tory  in Russia helped to  ignite a dom estic 
upheaval in the  United S ta tes . Bolshevik success proved to many th a t  communism 
was indeed a rea l and im m edia te  danger, th a t  its  adheren ts  w ere willing and 
capable of doing more than making speeches and writing pamphlets, th a t  
regardless of th e  conditions in Russia fostering  Lenin’s victory  th e  sam e could 
happen here. From th a t  perspective  the  strikes, bombings and unfortunate  
u tterings of a  few anarch is ts  and sym path izers  during the  im m edia te  postwar 
period assumed a s in ister  meaning, and galvanized the fears  long lying uneasily in 
the  American mind. D em ocracy had just been defended abroad; it must now he 
p ro tec ted  a t  home.
6Thus occurred  the excesses of the  Red Scare. Seized by war m entali ty  
and fr igh tened  by the  ca tac lysm ic  even ts  in Russia, the  nation  tem porarily  
succumbed to  i ts  passions; m om entarily  ignored the con trad ic tions  of violating the 
constitu tion  in the  nam e of defending it .  Thousands of alien anarchis ts ,  socialists 
and com munists  were a rres ted  and hundreds shipped back to  Russia, with or 
w ithout benefi t  of legal proceedings.^® By 1921 the  nation had largely regained 
i ts  equilibrium, but not before the  a rres ts ,  deporta tions , and sporadic outbursts  of 
violence had sa tisf ied  the  urge of all excep t the  m ost zealous to  secure  the  nation 
against communism.
Having p ro te c te d  itse lf  against bolshevism on one level, the  nation was 
ready  to  deal with th e  Soviets on another. Within a year  Americans w ere 
conducting a massive campaign of fam ine re l ie f  in th e  new Soviet s ta te ,  providing 
techn ica l ass is tance  to  its  w ar-ravaged industries, welcoming its  perform ers  and 
trave ling  abroad to investigate  the  new phenomenon for them selves. As 
individuals and organizations re -es tab lished  old ties  and c re a te d  new ones the 
rup tu re  in th e  cu ltu ra l re la tionship  began to heal. Washington and Moscow did not 
speak, but even in the  early  tw en ties  the  A m erican  and Soviet people ta lked  a 
g re a t  deal. And the e f fo r ts  of H erber t  Hoover’s A m erican  R elie f  A dm inistration 
g rea tly  fac i l i ta ted  th a t  conversation.
There is a ce r ta in  irony in th e  f a c t  th a t  H e rb e r t  Hoover, arch-symbol of 
cap ita lism , did so much to  c re a te  an ear ly  feeling of goodwill betw een the  
A m erican  and Soviet people. One of th e  s taunchest supporters of the  non- 
recognition  policy. Hoover nonetheless organized and adm in is te red  the  A m erican 
agency th a t  fed millions of s ta rv ing  Russians betw een 1921 and 1923, solving
J 9the reby  gigantic  problems for Moscow. At th e  height of i ts  operation some one 
hundred and eighty A m ericans supervised th e  feeding of te n  million people per day
Ofi
out of e ighteen  thousand kitchens s c a t te re d  over tw en ty -five  provinces. In
some instances specia l e ffo r ts  w ere made to  assist in te llec tua ls ,  a r t is ts ,  s tudents
91and clergy, all of whom the  Soviet governm ent assigned low priority. Students 
a t  the  U niversity of Kazan were fed a t  le as t  one hot meal a day, and faculty
m em bers provided with supplem entary rations. In Odessa some 107,000 meals
22w ere served in s tuden t dining rooms during a tw o month period. In addition, the
re l ie f  agency equipped hospitals, provided shelters  for children, built san itary
facilit ies  and p reven ted  epidemic outbreaks through a massive innoeulation 
23program.
O ther agencies supplem ented th e  work of the  A m erican  R elief Adminis­
tra t ion .  At le as t  a half-dozen church re la ted  organizations concen tra ted  on re lief  
to  the ir  Russian counterparts ,  while the  Y.M.C.A. and the  Y.W.C.A. focused on 
s tuden ts  and teach ers ,  and the  Volga R elief Society, organized by German groups
in the  U nited S ta tes ,  extended assis tance to  the  G erm an se t t lem en ts  along the 
24Volga River. In addition to  providing im m ed ia te  re lie f ,  the  various agencies
supplied seed grain, purchased horses and im ported t ra c to rs  for the  peasants, and
dis tr ibu ted  clothing and g if t  packages sen t by the ir  congregations and supporters 
25a t  home. With the  withdrawal of the  A.R.A. and its  adm in is tra t ive  support in
1923, several of th e  agencies made individual a r rangem en ts  w ith  the  Soviet
governm ent th a t  allowed them to continue th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  for several months."
The Y.M.C.A., for instance, continued its work until Moscow ordered its represen-
9 7ta t iv e s  out of the  country  in 1926.
The human co n tac ts  involved in th e  fam ine re lie f  e f fo r t  necessarily 
c re a te d  a number of t ie s  betw een th e  A m erican  and Soviet people and, more
8significantly , fo s te red  a friendly and apprec ia tive  a t t i tu d e  tow ard A m erica within
a  large segm ent of the  Soviet population. The D irecto r  G eneral of the A.R.A.
found the people so apprec ia tive  as to cause em barrassm ent, as did a New York
Times rep o r te r  who noted not so much the  in tensity  of the  feeling as its 
28prevalence. Large numbers expressed th e ir  g ra ti tude  in writing, the ir  composi­
tions ranging from childrens' scrawls to  e legant phrases, w ritten  on odd scraps of
29paper and typed under company le tte rheads .
The re l ie f  e f fo r t  con tribu ted  direc tly  to  cultura l co n tac ts  th a t  vitally 
a f fe c te d  the  developm ent of the  A m erican th e a tre .  Through A.R.A. ac tiv it ies  
and reports ,  A m erican en te r ta in e rs  becam e aw are of th e  despe ra te  plight of their 
Soviet coun te rpar ts ;  learned  of the  hunger and the  cold th a t  reduced the proud 
ac to rs  and famous names of tsaris t  days to chopping wood and unloading fre igh t in 
order to survive be tw een  the  perform ances th a t  continued despite the  conditions. 
Only those  backstage, v^rote one A.R.A. official, knew th a t  the  actors  actually
o n
shook from hunger and v;ere weak to  the  point of collapse.
American a r t is ts ,  many with ties to Russia by b irth  or acquaintance,
responded with a number of fund raising ac tiv it ies .  The im presario  Morris Gest,
him self Russian by birth , personaUy raised several hundred dollars which the
A.R.A.'s food re m i t ta n c e  program transfo rm ed  into food parcels  and delivered to
Moscow, prim arily  to m embers of the  Bolshoi Ballet. The recip ien ts  in turn
showered Gest with le t te r s  of apprec ia tion , one for each  food package 
31delivered. And when Gest shortly th e re a f te r  co llaborated  with a Russian 
em igre th e a t r ic a l  group to  s tage  a gala benefi t  perform ance, th e  acting com­
munity 's most noted names con tribu ted  to the  cause. Lillian Gish and Irving
9Berlin early  volunteered the ir  services, as did A1 Jolson, Ed Wynn and the movie
32direc to r  D. W. G riffith . On opening night Jolson ac ted  as doorman and Ed Wynn 
opened car doors for patrons while a number of o ther noted en te r ta iners  checked 
hats and worked as ushers. Those a ttend ing  proved generous with their  money. 
When the  evening was over, eleven thousand dollars had been raised, most of
oq
which went to  the  Moscow Art Theatre .
The connection thus made betw een th e  A m erican  th e a tr ic a l  world and 
the  Moscow A rt T hea tre  had im portan t consequences. In early 1923, a t  the 
invitation of Morris Gest and with the financial backing of th e  industrialist O tto  
Kahn, the fam ed ac ting  company made its  f irs t appearance in the  United
States .^^  In November of the  same year it  re tu rned  for the  1924 season, and la te r
35in the decade portions of its cas t gave fu rther perfo rm ances  in American cities. 
Those visits, especially the  first tv.'o, had an im portan t im pact on the d irection of 
American drama.
Amiericans in teres ted  in the th e a t re  were fam iliar with the Moscow 
company long before it  arrived. They readily  recognized the  names of its 
founders, C onstan tin  Stanislavsky and Vladimir Nemorovich-Bantchenko, and were 
well av.’are  of the organization 's  im pact on the  ac ting  profession in Europe. Trade 
magazines explained th e  "Stanislavsky method" of a c t in g  and wrote extensively 
about the  company's perform ances in Moscow and w estern  European cities. 
A merican visitors made a point of seeing its  perfo rm ances  in much the same way 
th a t  la te r  genera tions flocked to the  Bolshoi B a l l e t . T h e  financial assistance 
rendered  during the  fam ine heightened the feeling of fam iliarity . The announce­
ment of the  impending visit th e re fo re  produced an understandable excitem ent: all 
t ick e ts  to  its New York perform ances were sold six weeks before the company 
reached  the United S tates.^^
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The ac to rs  equalled the ir  reputa tions. During the 1923 and 1924 
seasons the company gave th ree  hundred and eighty perform ances of th ir teen  
productions in tv/elve cities , drawing praise from both c r i t ic s  and audiences who 
a t te s te d  to the  ac to rs ' v irtuosity  despite the  fa c t  th a t  all perform ances were
OO
given in the  Russian language. New York, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia 
accorded particu larly  en thusiastic  welcomes; in Philadelphia a Quaker organiza­
tion s ta r ted  a drive to  ra ise  $100,000 for Russian re lie f  with a dinner given in
O Q
Stanislavsky's honor. The en tire  ven ture  was deem ed so successful th a t  
N em orovich-Dantchenko proposed establishing a joint Russian-American founda­
tion to  finance and stage th e a tr ic a l  productions.^^ Even th e  Russian S ta te  Opera 
and the  Russian K am ernay Theatre , he suggested, might wish to joint the  
foundation.'^^
The perfo rm ances  thoroughly im pressed A m erica 's  leading authority  on 
th e  Moscow A rt  T hea tre ,  v;ho, along with N em orovich-Dantchenko, envisioned an 
" in tim ate  and in t r ic a te  comity" between the th e a tre s  of A m erica and Russia. 
"The Russian thea tre ,"  Oliver Sayler w rote  in 1925, "has found a second home in 
th e  United S ta tes ."  U nfortunate ly , he added in a rem ark  similar to many to  be 
u t te red  during the rem ainder of the  decade, since f ree  aes the tic  in tercourse  
betw een nations presupposed unhampered diplom atic  rela tions, th e  Russian 
th e a tre  would be able to  visit its  second home only when chance paved the  way.'^^ 
And judging from th e  reception  accorded th e  company, many Americans 
undoubtedly agreed  with another c r i t ic  who w ro te  th a t  " the  visit of these  players 
to  A m erica will be educational, for they  will show th a t  Russians have neither  
horns nor ta ils , despite governm ent innuendo. By speaking to  A m erica through 
th e ir  art,  they may be prophets of a new understanding betw een the ir  people and 
ours."'^ ^
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But not all agreed. Weeks before the company arrived  the  American 
D efense League w arned its  countrym en of the  evils inheren t in th e  visit. The 
ac tors ,  the  League implied, were agen ts  of the ir  governm ent; were obliged to  turn 
over the ir  earnings to  Moscow, and w ere  to  rece ive  special favors for propagan­
dizing the  red regime. The A m erican Legion and o ther  pa tr io t ic  organizations. 
League spokesmen suggested, should p ro te s t  the ac to rs ' arrival.^'*
Both A m erican supporters of th e  Moscow players  and Stanislavsky 
h im self vigorously re je c ted  the accusa tions . The p r iva te  opinions of the  com ­
pany's members, Stanislavsky re to r ted ,  were no one's business; they  were a r t is ts ,  
no t politic ians. The only propaganda they  indulged in was "art-propaganda;"  th e  
only money th ey  turned  over to Moscow a s tipu la ted  am ount for fam ine relief.^^  
To dem onstra te  the ir  support and friendship both  th e  A ctors  Equity Association
and the  Producing M anagers Association made honorary m em bers of the  th e a tre 's  
46cas t.  Had i t  been widely known th a t  the  Soviet governm ent considered the
Moscow A rt  T h ea tre  so old fashioned as to  be an unworthy rep re sen ta tiv e  of
Soviet d ram a tic  a r t ,  as one c r it ic  pointed out a t  the  t im e, perhaps the  League
4 7would have been slov,/er to make its  accusations.
D esp ite  numerous offers and inducem ents to  rem ain  in the  United
S ta tes ,  S tanislavsky re tu rned  to th e  Soviet Union a t the  end of the  second tour.
Many of his ac to rs ,  however, joined A m erican  com panies, estab lished  the ir  own
48schools in A m erica  or made the ir  way to  Hollywood and the  movies. All 
propogated Stanislavsky's teachings, and these  disciples, along with an outpouring 
of books and a r t ic le s  concerning his life  and theories , spread  th e  m aster 's  ideas 
throughout the  United S ta tes .  The L i t t le  T hea tre ,  the  Group T h ea tre  and the  
Neighborhood Playhouse School of th e  T h ea tre  all acknowledged the ir  indebted­
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ness to Stanislavsky's genius as did, a t  a la te r  date, the  A ctors  Studio headed by 
Elia Kazan and Lee S trasberg . It was both  " theo re tica lly  wise and p rac tica l ly  
sound" to  speak of the  work done by the  A ctors  Studio as being an adapta tion  of 
the  Stanislavsky system , Kazan w rote, adding th a t  " the  'method' is our version of 
the  s y s t e m . T h o s e  A m ericans who have since employed the  techniques of 
"method" acting, as well as those who have enjoyed the  p leasure of those 
perform ances , owe a g re a t  deal to th e  early  visits  of Stanislavsky and the  Moscow 
Art T hea tre .
While th e  Moscow A rt T hea tre  reaped  p ra ise  and profit ,  less publicized 
a r t i s ts  and perfo rm ers  made the sam e journey during the  early  tw en ties .  In 1921, 
Feodor Chaliapin re tu rned  for the  firs t  of several postw ar perform ances, rece iv ­
ing a friendly w elcom e th a t  co n tra s ted  sharply w ith the  rabid anti-Russian 
sen tim en t of a few months e a r l i e r . T h e  following year the poet Essenine 
accom panied his wife Isadora Duncan to  A m erica . Essenine largely  lim ited  
himself to observing, but his outspoken wife, s till an A m erican citizen despite  
having spent most of her adult li fe  outside th e  United S ta tes  and having 
established a dancing school in Moscow at the  request of the  Soviet government, 
could not res tra in  her enthusiasm for th e  Moscow regim e. The enthusiasm, along 
with revea ling  costum es and uninhibited dancing, annoyed proper Boston, which 
banned any fu r th e r  perfo rm ances  by the  f ree  sp irited  dancer.^^ N evertheless, 
through her acqua in tances  and co n tac ts  in both the  United S ta te s  and the Soviet 
Union, and through her influence on the  developm ent of th e  dance in both 
countries, she reduced  by a t  least a small degree  the  d is tance separa ting  the two 
cultures.^  ^
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In early  1924 a group of Soviet a r t is ts  opened a massive exhibit of 
con tem porary  a r t  in New York's Grand C en tra l  Palace. Comprised of approxi­
m ate ly  one thousand paintings, scu lp tures and hand icraft  items, th e  show was, 
according to  the  New York Times, the  la rgest exhibition of Russian a r t  ever 
staged  in a foreign country. A m erican sponsors included Rockefe lle rs , Goulds, 
Vanderbilts and H arrim ans; the  Soviet delegation acompanying included prominent 
m em bers of the  Soviet a r t  world, among them  the  direc tor of Moscow's Tretiakov 
Gallery.'^ ^
As in the  ease  of the Moscow A rt T heatre , th e  fam ine was a t  least 
partly  responsible for the  exhibit. Through the  show the  a r t is ts  hoped to  raise 
$100,000, ten  per cen t of which was to  be turned  over to  the  Soviet government 
for fam ine re lie f .  U nfortunate ly  for the  a r t i s ts  the exhibit never becam e the 
financial success an tic ipa ted  and the  en tire  venture eventually  degenera ted  into a 
series  of réc r im ina  tions between the  a r t i s ts ,  Russian em igre groups and Paxton 
Hibben, d irec to r  of th e  Russian Red Cross and the person designated by Moscow 
to co llec t its s t ipu la ted  ten  per cenL^^
Financial d ifficu lties  did not lessen the  a r t is t ic  m erits  of the  exhibit; 
indeed, the  opportunity  to  view such a wide collection of con tem porary  Russian 
and Soviet a r t  was a rare  t r e a t  for Americans. Although trade m agazines made 
l i t t l e  mention of the  show, the New York Times gave it extensive and favorable 
coverage, and the  exhibit itself a t t r a c t e d  la rge  crowds."^ Not until the la te  
tw en t ie s  did A m ericans again have the  opportunity  to  view a similar exhibit from 
the  Soviet Union.^®
In 1923, i t  th e re  was specula tion  th a t  one of th e  fam ed Russian ballet 
com panies would appear in the  United S ta te s .  In June th e  d irec to r  of the  S ta te
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T hea tre  of P e trograd  announced tha t,  under c o n tra c t  with Sol Hurok, the company 
would tour A m erica  with a full cast of two hundred m embers, performing a 
reperto ry  of ten  operas and ten ballets . Chaliapin was to serve as its  music 
d irector. Moreover, the  announcement from P etrograd  read, "if A m erica likes our 
work we propose to  establish a perm anent ballet in New York with seventy of our
c 7
best perform ers. Perhaps in o ther  cities also."
The P etrograd  company never arrived, but c ircum stances  seemed more
promising when Theodore Dreiser tr ied  to  bring th e  Bolshoi Ballet to  Am erica in
1928. Under his d irection  a com m ittee  of prominent A m ericans raised seventy
thousand dollars, enlisted the  support of in fluential a r t  patrons, and tr ied  to
establish a corporation  to provide the  financial gua ran tees  requisite  to the 
58venture. A f te r  months of e ffo r t ,  however, the  p ro jec t lost momentum, Dreiser
59resigned, and the  plan folded. Although many of the  famous Russian dancers of
im perial days perform ed in the  United S ta tes  during the  tw en ties  and th irties,
fi 0they were em igres living e i ther  in Europe or America. Soviet balle t in the  
United S ta tes  was still decades away.
A m erican e ffo r ts  to  ease  the  professional plight of Soviet scientis ts  
likewise led to  increasing connections in the  sc ien tific  rea lm . These effo rts  w ere 
particu larly  welcomed, for th e  years of war, revolution, civil war and famine hit 
scien tis ts  and scholars particu larly  hard, isolating them  from con tac t with 
w estern sc ien tific  thought, destroying the ir  labora to ries  and forcing them to 
abandon the ir  researches  to  s truggle  for the ir  own existence.
A m erican sc ien tis ts  were well aware of th e  problems of the ir  Soviet 
colleagues. The Soviet sc ien tis ts  themselves appealed  for help through a number
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of channels, professional publications publicized the ir  plight, and the  relief  
organizations repo rted  extensively on the ir  conditions.®^ To determ ine the 
accuracy of the  repo rts  and the  rea li t ies  of the  problem, th e  A.R.A. sen t Vernon
B. Kellog to  the  Soviet Union as its  special rep resen ta t iv e  in la te  1921. Kellog 
found the  personal plight of the scien tis ts  improving somewhat, but their
fi 9professional problems still unsolved. Particu larly , he determ ined , the sc ien tis ts  
needed recen t sc ien tif ic  l i te ra tu re  th a t  would allow them to  pull abreast of 
w estern  advances since 1914. Consequently, Kellog and severa l others formed the  
American C om m ittee  to Aid Russian Scientists  with L i te ra tu re  and appealed, both 
directly  through personal solic ita tions and indirectly  through professional journals, 
for the  donation of books, periodicals, reprin ts  and the  findings of governm ent and
CO
university  laboratories.
The response to  the  appeal was widespread and generous. During 1922 
and 1923 some th ree  hundred and sixty individuals, insti tu tions and societies  
contributed tw en ty -e igh t thousand pounds of sc ien tific  l i te ra tu re  which the  
A.R.A. shipped to Moscow on behalf of th e  C om m ittee ,  and which a Soviet 
organization represen ting  the  Academy of Sciences d istributed to universities and 
sc ien tific  institutions.®'^ Yale University provided six copies of tw enty-four of its 
f irs t class publications, while Doubleday, Page and Company, in an even more 
generous gesture , in s truc ted  th e  C om m ittee  to  se lec t w hatever t i t le s  it desired 
from its  list of sc ien tif ic  works.®®
O thers con tribu ted  through a l te rn a te  channels. The Y.M.C.A. dis­
tr ibu ted  almost eighty thousand books and supplied th ree  hundred periodicals
prin ted in various languages to  universities and libraries , though the works were
66not necessarily of a  sc ien tif ic  na tu re .  The A m erican A stronom ical Society sent
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money which th e  A.R.A. turned  into food packages and distributed to tw en ty -five
insti tu tions and observatories . Some gave to  th e  Gorki Fund for th e  R elie f  of
Russian Scientis ts ,  and others donated d irec tly  to  acquain tances  and professional
colleagues. H arvard  researche r  W alter B. Cannon, for instance, co llec ted  and
sent two thousand dollars to the  renowned sc ientis t I. P. Pavlov, with whom he
was already carry ing  on a correspondence s tem m ing  from the  s im ilar na tu re  of
the ir  research . A nother sc ien tis t sent a shipment of birchwood essentia l to the
research  being conducted  by a Soviet colleague, and rece ived  a g ra tify ing  reply
for his eforts .  "The consciousness th a t  somewhere the re  were people who though
about and cared  for me touched me," th e  Soviet researche r  w rote, "and a t  a
70m om ent of the  g re a te s t  need dispersed to a g rea t  e x ten t  my dark thoughts."
The connections thus established both developed from and con tr ibu ted
to  a number of personal co n tac ts  during th e  early  tw enties .  As early  as 1919 the
Russian sc ien tis t  Nikolai Borodin journeyed to  the  U nited S ta tes  on behalf  of the
Ministries of Education and Agriculture to a rrange  for cred its  to  purchase
labora to ry  equipm ent, and the  following year  N. I. Vavilov, d irec to r  of th e  Russian
Bureau of Applied Botany and Plant Breeding, m ade the sam e journey a t  the
invitations of th e  U nited S ta tes  D epartm en t of A gricu lture  and the  Am erican
Society of Phytopathologists  in order to  co llec t p lant specim ens and seed 
71samples. And in 1923, Pavlov visited th e  R ockefe lle r  Ins ti tu te  for Medical 
Research  and conferred  with H arvard  re sea rche rs  in Boston, particu la rly  with 
Cannon.^ ^
At least two American Scien tis ts  re tu rned  the  visits. In 1922, Herman 
J. Muller of the  University of Texas, a pioneer in th e  field of genetics  research , 
spent several weeks visiting various Soviet individuals and agencies and
17
fam ilia r iz ing  them with the  fruit fly, Drosophila M elanogaster, a staple of
73Am erican research  in genetics . Having received permission to  en ter  the  Soviet
Union a t  least in par t  because of Borodin's in tervention  on his behalf, Muller's s tay
was made more p leasant and productive because of the fac t th a t  Vavilov, upon his
re tu rn  to  the  Soviet Union, had acquainted many of his colleagues with American
7 4sc ien tif ic  thought through an extensive series  of i l lu s tra ted  lec tu res .  Back in 
th e  United S ta tes , i\IuUer, who like Kellog found the  Soviets hungry for American 
sc ien t if ic  l i te ra tu re ,  published a lengthy list of individuals and organizations 
desiring to  rece ive  in form ation  in the  field of genetics , c rea tin g  thereby  another
7 c
avenue for sc ien t if ic  in terchange.
In 1924, U niversity of Colorado botanist T. D. A. Cockerell, learning of
th e  Siberian discovery of the  fossilized rem ains of a previously unknown insect,
applied for permission to investigate  for himself. Despite assurances from
Washington acqua in tances  th a t  the  "Reds" vjould not g ran t  the  request,  the
76Soviets welcomed him enthusiastically . ‘ Like Muller, C ockerell spent several
weeks in th e  Soviet Union, enjoying both th e  personal and professional hospita lity
of his hosts. Upon departure  the  Soviets presen ted  him with several bags of
sam ples and specim ens as a g ift  to  the  U. S. D epartm ent of A griculture and o ther
sc ien tif ic  agencies. The D epartm en t of A griculture in turn shipped a collection of
7 7ce re a l  seeds to  Moscow.
The personal c o n tac ts  thus established, though lim ited  in number, 
provided a p receden t for continued personal in terac tion  among sc ien tis ts  during 
th e  tw en ties  and th irties. L a te r  in the  decade, to mention only one example, two 
Soviet gene tic is ts  worked w ith Muller a t  th e  University of Texas, and Muller 
him self  took a leave from the  university to  becom e the  head of the  D epartm en t of 
M utations of the  Soviet Ins ti tu te  of Genetics.'^®
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While few A m ericans traveled  to the Soviet Union for s tr ic t ly  a r t is t ic
and sc ien tif ic  purposes during the early tw enties , thousands made the journey for
o ther  reasons. Russian im m igrants  hoping to find revolutionary  Russia a b e t te r
place than the tsa r is t  nation they abandoned, P a r ty  members and sym pathizers
eager to aid the  cause, and those whose curiosity compelled them, all made the
trip. But regardless  of the  motive, each trave le r  necessarily  carried  a bit of
A m erica in his luggage, and necessarily served as a human link between the  two
7 9nations and the ir  cultures.
A few  A m ericans made the  journey to  observe th e  new wonders in old
Russia and to  report  those observations to  th e  A m erican  people. Senator Robert
L aF o lle t te  led a  p a r ty  in 1923, liked much of w hat he saw, and so informed his
8 0reade rs  in L aF o lle t te 's  Magazine. Lincoln S teffens , traveling  in the  senator 's
en tourage, had already  made th e  trip  once, and re tu rned  to u t te r  his oft-quo ted
rem ark  th a t  he had seen th e  fu tu re  and it  worked. In 1924, Lillian Wald accep ted
Moscow's invitation to  inspect Soviet public health  fac ilit ies ,  and in th e  sam e year
Avraham Yarmolinsky, head of the  Slavonic Division of th e  New York Public
8 0Library, spent six months studying the new rea l i t ie s  in his native land. Will 
Rogers, too, decided he must see for himself; he couldn't miss the  opportunity, as 
he phrased it, to "x-ray" Trotsky. U nfortunate ly  for th e  humorist, he never got to 
see th e  com m issar; or perhaps fortunate ly , for th e  occasion added a popular 
phrase  to  A m erican  folklore. It would have been nice to  see Trotsky, he 
re f le c ted ,  for, a f te r  all, "I never m et a man I didn’t  like."^^
If few A m ericans trave led  to the  Soviet Union specifically  for cultural 
purposes prior to  th e  m id-tw enties , American l i te ra tu re ,  motion p ic tures and 
music e ffec t ive ly  t ra n sm it te d  images of American life  to  the  Soviet Union and, in
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so doing, helped maintain the widespread popular adm iration for A m erica and 
A m ericans th a t  th e  famine re l ie f  e ffo rt  had stim ulated.
L ite ra tu re  played a particularly  im portan t role in th e  process, for the 
voracious reading appe t ite  of the  Soviet people gave widespread circulation to  the
ideas of A m erica's g rea t  writers, and those writers, as R obert Magi doff noted,
83"becam e the  m irror of A merican life for Russian readers ."  Jack  London, Upton 
Sinclair, O. Henry and Edgar Rice Burroughs, Maurice Hindus w rote  in 1924, were 
raising even higher the  prestige which the  A m erican  R elief  Administration 
brought to Americans, and were acting  as "Am erica 's am bassadors to Russia...des­
tined  to  wield a m ore profound influence over Russian social in te llec tua l life than 
any official A m erica has ever sen t from Washington to  Petrograd ."  No wonder, he 
concluded in an observation th a t  v/as to  be echoed scores of t im es  over the
following decades, th a t  "Am erica is so highly es teem ed  in Russia and every
8 4American who comes here  is a privileged charac ter ."
Louis F ischer found the  same esteem  for A m erican w riters the  fol­
lowing year. On a popularity  scale  of ten, he com puted . J ack  London received a 
ten  along with Tolstoy and Gorki, Upton Sinclair ra te d  an eight and 0 .  Henry a
six, while, by comparison, Turgenev ra ted  a seven, Dostoevsky a five, Gogol a four
85and Pushkin only a  two. ' In 1924, Soviet publishing houses turned out ten
8fithousand copies of tw en ty  of London's works, quickly selling all. In the  same
year, Upton Sinclair proposed establishing his own publishing house in Moscow,
8 7keeping only enough of the  profits  "necessary for the  living of a poet."  0 . 
Henry's works were both read  and perform ed on the  s tage in th e  early tw enties, 
and, according to  Hindus, "anyone who read anything" read  the  Tarzan  stories  of 
Edgar R ice  Burroughs. "I do not recall a single newsstand a t  any of the  railroad
20
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stations ,"  he wrote in 1924, "but had a prom inent display of Tarzan books." By
1928, Soviet publishers were turning out the  works of some fifty  Americans. By
th a t  year  Jack  London had sold 1,300,000 copies; Upton Sinclair, 485,000. Sinclair
Lev.’is's Main S tree t  had sold 30,000 copies; Sherwood Anderson's Triumph of the 
oq
Egg, 14,000. Eugene O’Neill was likewise popular with the  Soviet public, 
particu la rly  his "Anna Christie" and "The Hairy Ape."^^
Hollywood films were almost as popular and widespread as A merican 
l i te ra tu re ,  s ta r t l ing  visitors who found them in the  most unexpected  places. 
Gloria Swanson played in tiny Caucuses towns; Tom Mix, Corrine G riff i th  and 
William H art s ta r red  in Rostov-on-Don. One Moscow th e a te r  devoted i tse lf  solely 
to  Clara Kimball Young, while Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford, who trave led  
to  the  Soviet Union in 1926 to  personally m ee t their  fans, displayed their screen
91
ta le n ts  all over the city. American films, Paxton Hibben complained in 1925,
"dominate, innundate, glut, overwhelm th e  Russian motion p ic tu re  industry 
92today."
If Hibben was distressed a t  the  abundance of American films in the  
Soviet Union, the  Soviets v/ere not; indeed, the  Soviet film ageny Amkino urged 
Hollywood to increase its  sales in the USSR. A m erican movies were particu larly  
appealing, and the  Soviet Union offered  an unparalle led  m arket for the ir  distribu­
tion, the  d irec tor of Amkino wrote in 1928, for "A m erica .. .represen ts  to  the  
Russians a land of incredible effic iency, and in his desire to  im ita te  its  ideas th e  
Russian is eager for every bit of news of life  in this country." Moreover, the  
official suggested, Hollywood should consider producing films in th e  Soviet Union, 
bo th  independently and in conjunction with Soviet studios. "I have no doubt," he 
s ta ted ,  " tha t we would coopera te  with any group which would want to  undertake a
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program of production in Russia working in close in terchange of ideas and 
suggestions with our studios and our d irec to rs ."  The tw o  nations should also 
consider exchanging films, especially in view of th e  im provem ent in Soviet films 
as exam plified by Sergei Eisenstein 's "Potem kin."  And, the  d irec to r  was careful 
to  suggest, since the  cinem a offered  a universal medium of in te rp re ta t io n  and 
expression from one people to  another, the  ob ject of any such exchange should be
no
a r t i s t ic  in terchange, not propaganda.
The Amkino direc tor 's  rem arks  produced no im m ediate , concre te
results, but th e re  is l i t t le  reason to  doubt th e ir  validity and s inceri ty .  And even
though th e  kind of extensive cooperation he suggested was stil l  decades in the
fu tu re ,  A m erican  and Soviet studios did display an increasing in te re s t  in each
other 's  a c t iv i t ie s  and techniques as the  decade progressed, culm inating  in a tr ip  to
HoHywood by Eisenstein to  produce an A m erican  film.®"^
A m erica ’s jazz  m et an equally favorable  reception. When New Orleans
saxaphonist Sidney B echet and his five man band in troduced jazz  to  Soviet
audiences in 1925, crowds of frenz ied  fans cheered  the  A m ericans  all the way
from Odessa to  the  Soviet cap ita l ,  prom pting pundits to  joke about jazz  coming up
95the  river to Moscow. Alexander Tsfasman, fu tu re  jazz king of th e  USSR, le f t
th e  Moscow Music Conservatory  to  becom e Bechet 's  disciple, and o thers , such as
Odessa singer Lenoid Utesov, form ed the ir  own bands to c re a te  th e  kind of music
96which, prior to  Bechet's  arrival, had only been rumored. During the  mid­
tw en ties  ja zz  becam e th e  rage of th e  Soviet Union, but as the  re la tive ly  relaxed 
years  of th e  New Economic Policy gave way to  the  s tr ic tu re s  of Stalin and the  
production goals of th e  five year plans, th e  new music fell into offic ia l disrepute. 
In 1929 th e  newly form ed Association of P ro le tarian  Musicians banned its
22
perfo rm ance  before Soviet audiences, r e s tr ic t in g  Tsfasman, Utesov and other 
bands to  In tourist ho te ls  and foreign listeners , and thus forcing jazz  to  make the  
firs t jump in its checkered  ca reer  in th e  USSR.^^
By 1925 the  tem porary  r i f t  in cu ltu ra l re la tions  be tw een  the  tw o 
nations was healing itse lf  as th e  disorganized and sporadic co n tac ts  among actors , 
a r t is ts ,  sc ien tis ts  and musicians p reven ted  cu l tu ra l  as well as d ip lom atic  a l iena­
tion. To th a t  point the  con tac ts  had la rge ly  been m a tte rs  of individual and 
p rivate  concern, but th a t  began to  change on the  Soviet side in th e  second half of 
th e  decade.
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CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZED CONTACTS, 1925-1933
From the  m id-tw enties  to the  early  th i r t ie s  the  cultural relations 
betw een th e  United S ta tes  and the  Soviet Union becam e m ore purposeful and 
b e t te r  orgcanized as cu ltu ra l agencies on both sides placed con tac ts  on a more 
sy stem atic  and ra t iona l  basis. On the  Soviet side Moscow played the  role of 
prom oter  and organizer, while in the  U nited S ta te s  p r iv a te  organizations served a 
similar function. As the  tw en tie s  m erged into the  th ir t ie s ,  thousands of American 
tou ris ts  and delegates  flocked to the  USSR, and Soviet visitors in lesser numbers 
journeyed to  the  U nited S ta te s .  Soviet en te r ta in e rs  perfo rm ed  in A m erican cities, 
trave ling  exhibits displayed the  a r ts  and h and ic ra f ts  of the  Soviet people, 
delegations sea rched  for advanced techniques and m achinery , and Soviet s tudents  
s tudied in A m erican universities. Beneath  the official es trangem ent and the 
recrim inations  s tem m ing  from political d ifferences ,  th e  American and Soviet 
people in te rac ted  to a degree  not m atched  again until the  decade of the sixties.
Moscow early  began organizing and controlling its  cu ltu ra l con tac ts  
with foreign countries , f irs t  through the Jo in t Inform ation  Bureau, and, a f te r  
1925, through th e  Socie ty  for C ultura l R ela tions  with Foreign countries, known to
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subsequent millions by its  initials, VOKS.^ Headed originally by Olga Kameneva, 
wife of Kamenev and s is te r  of Trotsky, VOKS coordina ted  cu ltural a ffa irs  on both 
an im port and export basis. Soviet cu ltu ra l agencies dealing v.’ith  o ther countries  
did so largely  through its offices, as did foreigners  in con tac t  with Soviet groups.
In the  1920's VOKS consisted of a number of bureaus, each serving a 
specific function. The C o n tac t  Bureau exchanged inform ation and repo rts  of a 
sc ien tif ic  nature , th e  Book Bureau served its implied function, the  Press Bureau 
supplied a r tic le s  and notes of cu ltu ra l in te re s t  and th e  Russ-Photo  Bureau 
furnished p ic to ria l m a te r ia l  on Soviet life. The Service Bureau for Foreign 
Visitors, destined to  becom e familiar to  la rge  numbers of A mericans, ass is ted  
foreign trav e le rs  in the  USSR. By the  end of 1929 VOKS had established c o n ta c t
O
with most w estern  nations, including the  United  S ta tes .
The Soviet Inform ation Bureau, estab lished  in Washington in 1923 by 
Boris Skirvsky, a m em ber of the  delegation from th e  Far  E astern  Republic, served 
as VOKS' in itia l r e p re sen ta t iv e  in the  United S ta tes .  In early  1925 Skirvsky’s 
bureau sen t le t te r s  to  various American com panies explaining its ro le  and its 
purpose in prom oting  sc ien tif ic  and cu ltu ra l re la tions. The lack of co n tac ts  
p reven ted  sc ien tif ic  and cu ltu ra l  re la tions. The lack of co n tac ts  p reven ted  peer 
groups becom ing fam ilia r  with the ac tiv it ies ,  t rends  and discoveries of the ir  
coun te rpar ts ,  Skirvsky wrote, bu t the  Soviet Inform ation  Bureau, in c o n ta c t  v.’ith 
VOKS and thus with leading  cultural bodies in both  the Soviet Union and other 
countries, could solve the  problem by fac i l i ta t in g  the  exchange of books,
4
periodicals, and persons. In some instances, as in le t te r s  to  the magazines 
Motorship and S afe ty  Engineering, the  rec ip ien ts  w ere asked only to  reprin t 
Skirvsky's l e t t e r  in order to  publicize th e  cause of cu ltu ra l exchange; in o thers  the  
recip ien ts  were asked to  engage in d irec t exchanges with Soviet agencies.^
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VOKS was undoubtedly more in te res ted  in servings Soviet s ta te  in teres ts  
by c rea tin g  a friendly a t t i tu d e  tow ard  Moscow and forwarding the  cause of 
recognition  than  in fostering human rela tionships for their own sake, but it served 
its  u lte r io r  purposes only indirectly. The S ta te  D epartm ent did not deem its 
a c t iv i t ie s  subversive, nor did it  appear par ticu la r ly  concerned about the  overtures 
of Skirvsky's Jo in t  Inform ation Bureau. In response to inquiries, the  D epartm ent
in form ed  rec ip ien ts  of Skirvsky's le t te r s  of his background, but made no fu rther
0
com m en t.  Though A m ericans would have p re fe rred  d irect and f re e  cultura l 
in te rco u rse  with the Soviet people, they  had to s e t t le  for the  rea lity  of v.'orking 
through VOKS or some o ther s ta te  agency. And, considering its offic ial role, 
VOKS served a worthy purpose. By arranging  visits, sponsoring delegations, 
o rganiz ing exhibits  and exchanging cu ltu ra l m a te r ia l  it  provided a le g itim ate  and 
useful channel of com m unication th a t ,  even though res tr ic ted , would not have 
ex isted  otherw ise . It le f t  the more overt  forms of propaganda tv  non-cultural 
agencies, and conducted its  affa irs  in a s tra igh tfo rw ard  manner. There  v.’ere 
many A m ericans who were in te res ted  in th e  Soviet Union without being the  least  
inclined tow ard  adopting or forwarding communism, and it was with these th a t  
VOKS largely  dealt.
Among these  was a group which in 1926 formed the  A m erican Society 
fo r  C u ltu ra l Rela tions with Russia. Holding its f irs t m eeting a t  Lillian Wald's 
F o u r te e n th  S tre e t  S e tt lem en t,  the  Socie ty  e lec ted  William Allen Smith, president 
o f  Smith College, as its f irs t president; chose John Dewey, LiUian Wald, Leopold 
Stokowski and Stephen P. Duggan as  v ice-presidents . William Allen White, Arthur 
G arfie ld  Hays and Jan e  Addams, to  nam e only a few of the prominent members
34
7
who originated the  Society, sa t  on its board of directors. By 1929, the 
organization listed  more than one thousand members, representing  every  s ta te  in 
the  Union, the  possessed branches in several c ities . Paul Douglas headed the
g
branch in Chicago. I ts  purpose, in its own words, v.'as "to  bring toge ther  those 
who are in te res ted  in Russian life  and culture; to  p rom ote  cultura l in tercourse 
betw een the tw o countries, and especially the in terchange of students, doctors, 
scholars, a r tis ts ,  sc ien tis ts ,  and teachers; to  co llec t and diffuse inform ation in 
both countries on developm ents in science, education, philosophy, a r t ,  l i te ra tu re ,
Û
and social and economic life."
The Socie ty  carr ied  on a number of ac t iv i t ie s  and served a varie ty  of 
purposes during the  la te  tw enties . Noted Soviet visitors spoke a t  its  dinners, 
A m erican au thori t ies  on particu lar phases of Soviet li fe  le c tu red  a t  its meetings, 
and visitors re tu rn ing  from the  Soviet Union recoun ted  the ir  experiences before 
its membership.^^ Through its con tac ts  in the  Soviet Union it  placed Americans 
and Soviets with mutual in te res ts  in touch with each other, taking advantage of 
its close working rela tionship  with VOKS in th a t  regard. It sponsored delegations 
to  study specific  aspec ts  of Soviet society , and, along with o thers , arranged  for 
Soviet exhibits in th e  United  S tates.^^
The Society 's library was the  cen te r  of i t s  ac tiv it ies . Through pur­
chases, donations and d irec t exchanges with Soviet agencies, i t  quickly gathered 
a  reputable  co llection of m ateria ls  focusing on A m erican-Soviet re la tions  and
employed a professional librarian  with a knowledge of the  Russian language to
12cata logue and manage the collection. A clipping fi le  of cu rren t events, drawing
on both American and Soviet sources, provided a unique and heavily used source of
information, utilized eventually  by a number of A m erican newspapers, magazines,
13businesses and universities.
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The library  early began a collection of Russian and Soviet music. By 
1929 its music com m ittee ,  which included such musicians as Leopold Stokovjski 
and F r i tz  Reiner, had gathered and indexed some four hundred manuscripts, 
including the music of all the g rea t  composers. Books and new pieces constan tly  
broadened its  holdings and four periodicals regularly  received from Moscow kept 
it ab reast of con tem porary  Soviet music.^^ Members of the c o m m ittee  p resen ted  
programs of Russian music at the  Society 's library, a t  schools and a t  various civic 
functions.^ ^
From the beginning the  Society exhibited a remarkably high degree of 
professionalism, m aintained a low profile and avoided controversy  w henever 
possible. C ultu ra l rela tions, it  believed, should p rom ote  knowledge and mutual 
understanding, not the national in te res t  of any par ticu la r  country. Its ac t iv i t ie s  
re f le c ted  th a t  belief.
While th e  Society for Cultura l R ela tions  with Russia took the  lead  in 
promoting cu ltu ra l in tercourse during the la te  tw enties , o ther  institutions, 
organizations and individuals established co n tac ts  on th e ir  own. The R ockefeller  
Foundation, the  In s t i tu te  of In terna tional Education and California librarian  
H arr ie t  Eddy played particu larly  im portan t roles.
As early  as 1921 the R ockefe lle r Foundation began awarding fellovjships 
to  promising young Soviet scientists , financing th e ir  advanced studies a t universi­
t ie s  in the  United S ta tes ,  w estern  Europe and the  USSR. A partia l  listing of the  
recip ien ts , including only those receiving fellowships and grants  in the  field of
na tu ra l science prior to  1930, indicates  th a t  in this a rea  alone the  foundation
1 fi
awarded tw enty-nine fellowships betw een 1921 and 1929. All the  recipients
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held responsible positions in Soviet universities, re search  in s t i tu te s  and medical
es tab lishm ents  prior to  receiving the  financial aid; all re tu rn ed  to  the  same or
similar positions upon com pleting  the ir  studies. Only th e  re luc tance  of the Soviet
government to  allow its  young scien tis ts  to  go abroad preven ted  the foundation
providing even more ex tensive  assistance. In 1928, for example, the  foundation
was prepared to  grant te n  fellowships, but Moscow would not endorse m ore than a
17third of th a t  figure. Those receiving the  fellowships studied a t  Harvard,
Princeton, Cornell, Johns Hopkins and the  U niversities  of California, Texas,
Michigan and Chicago. Some enrolled in th e  prestig ious universities of England,
1 8France and Germany, and still o th e r  recip ien ts  s tudied a t  Soviet institu tions.
In addition, the  R ockefe lle r  Foundation provided Soviet sc ien tific  
institu tions with m edical and labora tory  equipm ent and helped the  medical 
faculties  of a number of Soviet institu tions to obtain foreign medical publications. 
Between 1923 and 1932 it spent f if teen  thousand dollars supplying medical 
l i te ra tu re ,  and appropria ted  f if ty  thousand additional dollars for th a t  purpose 
betw een 1933 and 1937. During th e  m id-th irt ies , how ever, Moscow began refusing 
both the fellowships and the equipment assis tance, s ta t in g  th a t  it could afford  to 
pay for such things itself.^®
In 1925, Stephen P. Duggan, Columbia U niversity  professor, m em ber of 
the  Society for C ultu ra l Rela tions with Russia, and re c e n t  founder of the  Institu te  
of In terna tional Education, t rav e led  to Moscow a t  the  request of the  Soviet 
government to  es tab lish  a program of s tuden t-p ro fesso r  exchanges. In Moscow, 
Duggan had a number of conferences  with officials  a t  th e  Ministry of Education, 
during which th e  Soviets asked th e  HE to  ex tend  its s tu d e n t - te a c h e r  program and 
its summer s tuden t tours  to  the USSR and to provide th e  opportunity  for Soviet
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s tuden ts  to  study in the  United S ta te s .  As a resu lt Duggan and the  Soviet ministry
agreed  th a t  six Soviet s tudents  would study  in American universities  during the
second half  of the  1925 academ ic year  and th a t  a delegation of Soviet specialists
20would inv es t ig a te  A m erican educational methods during the  1926 te rm . Duggan
was op tim is tic  over the resu lts  of his e ffo rts .  "The res to ra t ion  of Russia to more
reasonable  views of Western a t t i tu d e s  tow ard  human affairs,"  he w rote  a t  the
tim e, "will be g rea t ly  fac i l i ta ted  by th e  visits of our teachers  and s tuden ts  to  her
21in s t i tu tions  and of her s tuden ts  and te a c h e rs  to  our institu tions."  W hatever our
po li t ica l re la t ions  are to be, he concluded, "our educational re la tions  should be the
99sam e as w ith  o th e r  countries."
The ex ten t to which Duggan's agreem en t was ca rr ied  out cannot be
de te rm ined  because, as th e  HE i tse lf  pointed out, no precise reco rds  were kept of
23th e  Soviet s tuden ts  and teachers  who cam e. American universities  enrolled
hundreds of "Russian" s tudents  each year, bu t the  bulk of these  w ere  undoubtedly
emigres. A Soviet professor le c tu red  a t  P rince ton  during the  second half of the
1925 academ ic  year, a t  least a dozen Soviet s tudents  a t te n d e d  Am erican
univers ities  on R ockefe lle r  fellowships prior to  1933, and in 1931 a group of sixty-
four s tuden ts  from the  USSR enrolled in A m erican engineerng and technica l
24schools, bu t fu r th e r  quan tif ica tion  is not possible. During th e  summers of 1934
and 1935 th e  In s ti tu te  of In terna tiona l Education, in co llaboration  with several
Soviet agencies, undertook a much more am bitious p ro jec t but bo th  sides became
25disenchanted  and the venture collapsed.
A m erican  and Soviet lib raries  likewise coopera ted  during the  la te  
tw en tie s  and, largely through the  e f fo r ts  of librarian  H arr ie t  Eddy, th e  United 
S ta te s  m ade a significant contribution  to the  development of a ra tionalized  and 
sy s tem a tize d  Soviet lib rary  system.
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During the  post-revolutionary years  the  number of Soviet libraries  grev/
enormously as Moscow waged a cam paign to  elim inate  il literacy . Schools,
universities, fac to ries ,  villages and clubs estab lished  their own libraries, c rea ting
problems as well as promises in the  process. By 1926 the  system had becom e so
cum bersom e and disorganized as to  be unmanagable. Consequently the  Soviet
Ministry invited  form er University of C aliforn ia  librarian  Eddy, who a t  th e  t im e
was in charge of California 's free  country l ib rary  system , to analyze the  problem
and suggest solutions. Accepting the  challenge, Mrs. Eddy spent six months in the
USSR during 1927, examining more than f i f ty  l ib ra ries  ranging from the  la rgest to
the  sm allest,  and finding herself  am azed  a t  both  the  gigantic e f fo r t  undertaken  by
26Moscow and the  chaotic  conditions within th e  system.
Upon Eddy's re tu rn  to  th e  U nited  S ta tes ,  and a t  her suggestion, the 
Soviet governm ent sent librarian Anna Kravtchenko to  study the California 
system . A f te r  observing its operations for severa l months, Kravtchenko re tu rned  
to  the USSR to  adap t its procedures to  Soviet conditions. By 1930, im plem enta­
tion of the system had progressed to  the  point th a t  the  Soviets needed additional 
advice and ass is tance whereupon Eddy, again a t  Moscow's request, re turned  to 
provide the  necessary  help. In 1931, a model library  which served both as a 
p ro to type and a train ing  school was com pleted  outside Moscow. Librarians from
across the  Soviet Union studied its  operations, as did s tudents  from the  newly
27organized University  Library School a t ta c h e d  to the  Lenin Library. And even 
the  University Library School, which tra ined  librarians for the  Soviet s ta te ,  had a 
s trong  A m erican  influence, for its d irec to r  was an American, a  graduate  of the 
Simmons College Library School and a  fo rm er employee of the  Library of
9 g
Congress."
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The Library of Congress had itself ear l ie r  contributed to library
developm ent in the  Soviet Union. In 1925, the library donated a com ple te
collection of its publications to the  Lenin Library, along with a sample d ic tionary
ca ta logue  of several thousand prin ted  cards. The g ift v/as particularly  welcome, a
Lenin Library official wrote in the  Bulletin of the American Library A ssociation,
for it g rea tly  improved the  Soviet method of cataloging, allowing it to  develop a
29system based largely on the rules of the A m erican Library Association.
A m erican-Soviet cultura l re la tions  during th e  la te  tw enties  and early  
th ir t ie s  consisted in large part  of th e  personal in te rac tion  between c i tizens  of the 
tw o countries, the  ex ten t of which increased d ram atica lly  as scores of A m erican  
de legates  and thousands of A m erican tou ris ts  t rave led  the length and b read th  of 
the  USSR. Many went a t  Moscovj's invitation. Almost all, judging from the ir  
accounts  and com ments, were well received.
That Moscow welcomed the  various delegations represented  a changed 
a t t i tu d e  on its  part.  When Washington in t im a ted  in 1922 th a t  it would like to  send 
a mission to investigate conditions in the  Soviet Union, Moscow indignantly 
refused, s ta t ing  th a t  to  accep t such a mission without some reciprocal a rrange­
ment would place it in an inferior position. Only if  it could send a  similar
delegation to  the  United S tates , Moscow answered in a response im m ediately
30dismissed by Washington, would i t  consider the  proposal. But when Columbia 
professor E. A. Seligman made a similar suggestion in 1928 the  Soviets approved 
the  idea. "A ccura te  inform ation about.. .l ife  in the USSR will c lea r  up many of 
the  points which a t  present s tand in the  way of establishing normal economic 
rela tions betw een the two countries," the  head of the  legal departm en t of the
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Soviet C om m issariat of Trade wrote in the  New York T im es, and therefore  "the
suggestion of professor Seligman th a t  inform ation be obtained by a delegation of
non-partisan American experts  is p e rfec t ly  in accord  with the expressed desire of
31Soviet public opinion to  welcome such a delegation."
No official non-partisan delegation made the tr ip  to Moscow but a
varie ty  of o thers  did. S tudent groups were particularly  numerous. As a result of
Duggan's visit in .1925, VOKS invited several student groups to spend the summer
of 1926 in the  Soviet Union. A num ber of Yale students accep ted  the  invitation,
as did students and teachers  from the  C ity  College of New York, Pennsylvania's
32Pocona College, and a number of others. By 1928, Walter D uranty  reported
from Moscow, the  Soviet capital was flooded with visitors, a la rge  proportion of
33whom w ere A merican students.
Dozens of business and technica l groups, representing  A m erica 's  leading
corporations, trave led  extensively throughout the  Soviet Union, as did delegates
represen ting  labor organizations.^^ In 1927 a labor delegation th a t  included
R exford  Guy Tugwell of Columbia University and Paul Douglas of the  University
35of Chicago exchanged viev;s with top  level Soviet officials, including Stalin.
O thers  exam ined Soviet beliefs and p rac t ices  regarding morals, manners,
m arriage, family, religion, hea lth  education and other a reas  of social life.^^ A
c o m m ittee  of women, represen ting  in par t  the  NAACP and in part  th e  Society for
C ultu ra l Relations with Russia, undoubtedly upset many by rem arking  upon its
re tu rn  th a t  the s ta tus  of women was higher in th e  Soviet Union than in the United 
3 7States .
Most delegations neither a t t r a c te d  a t ten tion  nor c rea ted  controversy, 
but in 1928 a group of educators  did both. Invited by VOKS, sponsored by the
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Society  for C ultu ra l Rela tions with Russia and led by John Dewey, the  tw en ty -
five m em ber delegation, including am ong its numbers the presidents  of A m herst
and the U niversities of Minnesota and Pennsylvania plus professors from various
o the r  universities , spent some th i r ty  days in the  USSR, traveling  freely , visiting
the  p laces in which they  expressed an in te res t  and exchanging views with Soviet 
3 8colleagues. The en tire  stay was warm and friendly and Dewey, whose works
w ere already known and in some instances im plem ented in the  USSR, was a 
3 9p ar t icu la r  favorite .
The high point of the  visit cam e a t  a VOKS dinner which, accord ing  to 
W alter Duran ty , Moscow observers considered the  most s ignificant m an ifes ta t ion  
of A m erican-Soviet rapprochem ent since th e  departu re  of th e  A m erican  R el ie f  
A dm inistration. There was, th e  v e te ran  re p o r te r  w rote , a no ticab le  lack of 
"hoakum propaganda" a t  the  a f fa ir  hosted by K am eneva and Com m issar of 
Education Lunacharsky. And given the  en t ire  teno r  of th e  tr ip , it  is easy to  
believe th a t  K am eneva spoke s incerely  and D uranty  reported  accu ra te ly  her 
closing words. "We do not ask your praise  when you reach hom e, nor fear  your 
blame," she told her American guests, r a th e r  just " te l l  your people th e  fa c ts  and 
le t  them judge. But it is my hope th a t  your visit may con tribu te  tovmrd sweeping 
away the  cloud of prejudice th a t  has long hidden this country from the  A m erican 
people and convince them  th a t  w ith all our fau lts  we are  genuinely striving to  
transform  our backw ard  nation into one of c i t izens  of progressive and enlightened 
humanity."^^
If the  Dewey delegation was highly popular in the  Soviet Union, i t  was 
less so in some q u ar te rs  in the  United  S ta te s .  The president o f  N orthw estern  
University cancelled  his place in th e  delegation before departu re ,  charging th a t  he
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was expected  to w rite  a report favorable to  the Soviets upon his return . Both the
Society for C u ltu ra l Relations with Russia and the individual delegates denied the
charge, and even voted to make no collective  report ,  but the  disgruntled members
still refused  to  go.^^ Another de legate  expressed his reservations concerning the
42venture to the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  and found his reservations  sh a re d . '  The
leadership of th e  A m erican Federation  of Labor was particu la rly  upset about the
Dewey trip, refusing  to allow union newspapers to  carry  any accounts of the
m atte rs .^^  The New York Times, however, was more generous in its e s t im a te  of
the  value of the  tour and the gullibility of those involved. It did not believe, the
paper ed ito ria lized , th a t  men the caliber  of Dewey and P resident Olds of A m herst
44would "m ortgage the ir  opinions or sympathies in advance."
More numerous than delegates  v;ere tou r is ts  who rep resen ted  no 
in te re s ts  o ther than the ir  own; whose aim was prim arily  to  enjoy them selves and 
satisfy  the ir  curiosity . For during the  la te  tw en ties  Moscow discovered the  
benefits  of the  tourist trade ; discovered th a t  tourists  spent money and, if t re a te d  
well, le f t  fr iendlier  than they  arrived.
To a genera tion  only recen tly  acquain ted  with the  possibility of 
traveling  to  the  Soviet Union w ithout explanations and com plications it is 
somewhat surprising to  discover the multip licity  of advert isem en ts  featuring  tours  
of the Soviet Union during the  tw en tie s  and th ir t ies .^^  Tours cam e in all sizes and 
shapes; long, short and medium; em phasized study, p leasure or both; fea tu red  the 
modern s ites  of European Russia or th e  ancien t c ities  of historical in te res t ,  
Leningrad or Samarkand. One company fea tu red  a tr ip  across Siberia; another 
advertised  a visit to  th e  A rc tic  aboard an icebreaker.'^® World Tourists, Open
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Road, A m algam ated  Bank Tours, C unard Lines and American Express were only a
few of the  com panies arranging tours.'^^ Open Road tours becam e so common
th a t ,  as Joseph Barnes wrote, A m ericans in the  USSR were commonly referred  to
as "Open Roadovski" touris ts  regardless  how they traveled. As the tw enties
turned into the  th ir t ie s  th e  numbers involved increased enormously. In 1927
approxim ately  one hundred and fif ty  made the journey; in 1932 th e  figure reached
4 9upward tow ard  ten  thousand.
The Soviets actively  prom oted this burgeoning business, largely by 
simplifying the  adm in is tra t ive  procedures involved. Moscow authorized  ce r ta in  
agencies to  issue en try  perm its , thus  reducing the  com plexities of visa applica­
tions and, a f te r  1928, Intourist provided guides, made trave l a rrangem ents  and 
reserved  rooms, th e  quality  of which depended upon the class and price of the 
tour.^^  In 1931 Intourist even purchased a f le e t  of Lincoln automobiles to move 
trave le rs  around a t  the  "Amerikansky tempo."^^ Particu larly  e labora te  a rrange­
m ents  'were m ade when th e  occasion demanded. A 1929 business delegation 
trave ling  under the  auspices of A m erican  Express and the American-Russian
Chamber of C om m erce ra ted , for exam ple, a special luxury tra in  dating from
52tsa r is t  days, co m ple te  with plentiful q uan tit ies  of champagne and caviar.
The increase  in tourism produced a wave of books and artic les. 
Seventeen of th e  tw enty-one books per ta in ing  to  the  Soviet Union published during 
1928 and 1929 w ere, as P e te r  G. Filene noted, w ritten  by tou ris ts . '  At the same 
t im e  the  number of a r t ic le s  re la ting  to  Soviet affairs  increased enormously, as a 
quick survey of the  R ead e r’s Guide to  Periodical L i te ra tu re  a t te s ts .  The value 
and validity of th e  a r tic le s  varied g reatly , ranging from observations by judicious 
com m enta to rs  to  paeans and diatribes. Some presumed an unw arranted  authority
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based on a few weeks of sightseeing, while others like Oswald Garrison Villard
cautioned his readers  th a t  his com m ents  w ere based s tr ic t ly  upon his view of
Russia from a car  window.^^ Some like Theodore Dreiser made a serious a t te m p t
to  view Soviet rea l i ty  objectively and to  distill some essential tru th  from th a t
reality , but the  inherent contradictions of Soviet life during the tw enties  rendered
the task  impossible. Dreiser particu la rly  found it difficult to  decide if he
approved or disapproved of what he saw. At one moment he fe l t  only contem pt
for the  backwardness and lack of c re a tu re  com forts; a t  the  next only adm iration
55for the  massive e f fo r t  undertaken to  relieve those hardships.' ' But regardless of 
the fa c t  th a t  most viewed the  Soviets through the spectrum  of the ir  own 
prejudices and expectations, the  essential consideration is th a t  they made the 
journey, and in so doing helped reduce by a t  leas t  a small degree the  barrie r of 
unfam iliarity  sepa ra t ing  the  two nations. As Joseph Barnes w rote a t  the  time, 
"with every touris t  who goes to Russia our cultural recognition of the  regime 
becom es more com plete .
There was no corresponding flow of Soviet tourists  to th e  United S tates ,
but noted individuals, performing groups, delegations and cu ltural exhibits did
en te r  the  country. In 1926 the ce leb ra ted  poet Mayakovsky toured the nation,
finding much to  both praise and scorn, and finding a pithy phrase to  cap tu re  the
contrad ic tions  he perceived. "You look like a million dollars," he told Americans,
57"you look like tw o  cents."  In the  same year two Soviet d irectors  visited 
Hollywood, a company of one hundred and tw enty  cossacks performed in 
Philadelphia, th e  Musical Studio of th e  Moscow A rt T hea tre  cap tu red  audiences in 
much th e  sam e way its  parent body had done two years earlier ,  th e  Jewish Habima
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T heatre  trave led  from Moscow to en te r ta in  in several A merican cities, and
Chaliapin re tu rned  to  perform in New York City.^® In 1930 the w rite r  Boris
Pilnyak trave led  across the  country recording his impressions for readers  a t  home,
and the  film producer Sergei Eisenstein, already acc la im ed in the  United S ta tes
for his "Potemkin," arrived to d irec t a film for Param ount Studios.^® From the
first, however, the  d irec tor and the  studio disagreed on the na tu re  of the  film to
be produced. Param ount considered Eisenstein 's proposed version of Dreiser's
American Tragedy too a r t is t ic ,  Eisenstein considered Par am ount's version too
com mercial, and p a tr io t ic  groups considered any version produced by a Soviet
60d irec tor to  be unaccep tab le .  The proposed film was never made, a t  least not in
the  United S ta tes .^^
Soviet technica l delegations toured the country  by the  dozens, usually
in conjunction with techn ica l assistance ag reem en ts  n ego tia ted  with American 
6 2companies. Some cam e primarily to a t te n d  techn ica l and scien tific
conferences. In 1927 the  scien tis t K. D. Glinka headed a tw enty  member
delegation a t tend ing  the  firs t In ternational Conference on Soil Sciences, held in
the nation's capital ,  and afte rv /ard  led the delegation on a lengthy trip across the
country. The "p leasant con tac ts  thus established," a delegation spokesman
rem arked optim istically  upon departure , were only the  beginning of "a firm bond
fi 1o f both professional and personal re la tions with A m erican scientis ts ."  In 1929 
Pavlov re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta tes  as a guest of Walter B. Cannon to  a t ten d  the  
th i r teen th  In terna tional Physiological Conference, held in Boston, and three  years 
la te r  the  A m erican Philosophical Society  e lec ted  the  fam ed physiologist to  its 
membership.®"^ A number of other em inent sc ientis ts ,  including the  d irectors of 
th e  Soviet Geological C om m ittee  and th e  Soviet In s ti tu te  of Botany, also visited 
colleagues in America.®®
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More publicized than these  visits was a series of exhibitions which
displayed various face ts  of Soviet life  to  the  A m erican people. In 1927 an exhibit
of a rch i tec tu ra l  sketches, photographs and plans, shipped d irec tly  from Moscow
and assembled by th e  Society  for C ultural Relations with Russia, appeared a t  New
York's Machine Age Exhibition, to  be followed by a more com prehensive exhibi-
66tion the following year. Sponsored by the  Society  for C u ltu ra l Relations and
the A m erican-Russian C ham ber of Com m erce, and designed to show all phases of
Soviet life, the  1928 exhibit was divided into segm ents  depicting education,
health, agricu lture , industry, transporta tion , th e a t re ,  a r t ,  and o ther aspec ts  of
Soviet cu lture . The firs t exhibit of its  kind to  leave the  Soviet Union, it had
already appeared in Berlin, Paris  and Brussels, and was headed for Japan  upon its
departure  from th e  U nited S ta tes .  Both American and Soviet speakers, including
Columbia professors George S. Counts, au thority  on Soviet education, and Geroid
67T. Robinson, a noted  historian, gave accompanying lec tu res .
Still ano ther  exhibition, sponsored by A m torg  and the  Society for
go
Cultural Relations, appeared  in 1929. Drawing heavily  on the  annual fair a t
Nizhni-Novgorod, which had been a ttended  by a number of A m ericans in the
Soviet Union, th e  exhibit fea tu red  both extensive displays of trad itional Russian
go
handicrafts  and con tem porary  Soviet paintings. " The Musical Studio of the
Moscow A rt T hea tre  and the  Kiev S ta te  Opera s taged  perfo rm ances  a t  the  show,
70which was heavily a t tended . "Just as this exposition will in te rp re t  Russia to  
America," Amtorg president Saul G. Bron com m ented , he hoped to  arrange a 
sim ilar exhibition in the  USSR "which will in te rp re t  the  A m erican a r ts  to  the
71
Russian people."
In addition, th e  Socie ty  for Cultural R ela tions  with Russia sponsored a 
number of smaller, trave ling  exhibitions. In the  early  th ir t ie s  it  arranged, through
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i ts  con tac ts  with Soviet museum authorities, for the showing of valued Russian
ikons in A m erica 's  principal a r t  galleries. Trade magazines and museum bulletins
gave the trave ling  exhibit wide publicity  and c r i t ics  gave it  high praise, though in
72a t  least one ins tance  it drew p ro tes ts  as well. In 1930 th e  Society co llaborated
with Columbia University  to fea tu re  an exhibit of A m erican school work a t
Leningrad's All-Union Pedagogical Exhibition, and tw o years  la te r  the  Soviets
73rec ip roca ted  by sending an exhibit il lus tra ting  Soviet school life.
O ther exam ples of cu ltura l in te rac tion  could be detailed , such as the
appearance of an exhibit of Soviet woodcuts in 1932, and the  partic ipa tion  of
A m ericans in drawing the  a rc h i te c tu ra l  designs for th e  proposed Palace  of Soviets
to  be located  in Moscow, but th e  purpose here is not to en u m era te  every instance 
74of cu ltu ra l c o n ta c t .  Suffice i t  to  say th a t  F rederic  Barghoorn was a l together  
co rrec t  when he wrote th a t  cu ltura l re la tions betw een the  tw o nations "were, in 
many respects , f r e e r  and more spontaneous during th e  1920's...than during any 
o ther  period."
Washington was a silent pa r tn e r  in the  process. While Moscow used 
such agencies as VOKS and Intourist to  encourage and fac i l i ta te  cu ltu ra l con tac ts  
pursuant to its  own purposes, Washington only acquiesced in th e  growing cultural 
in tercourse , and in a l im ited  manner a t  th a t .  The S ta te  D epartm en t firmly 
re jec ted  p ro jec ts  involving the  nation in any official capacity , obviously fearing 
th a t  such par tic ipa tion  might imply an unv/arranted approval of th e  Soviet regime, 
though not specifically  s ta t in g  th a t  reason. In con trast to Moscow, Washington 
neither  engaged in rhe to r ic  concerning the  benefi ts  of cu ltu ra l exchange, nor 
prom oted c o n ta c ts  as a  means tow ard  in ternational understanding. Cultural
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re la tions  as an in s trum en t of foreign policy was still alien to Washington's thinking
in the decade of th e  tw enties .
While i t  g ran ted  the  necessary  passports, the  S ta te  D epartm ent was not
enthusiastic  about e i the r  the  numerous excursions to  the  USSR or the  supposed
Soviet m otive in encouraging those excursions. Moscow's presumable purpose in
promoting and arrang ing  visits  by prom inent Am ericans, a D epartm ent spokesman
replied to  an inquiry from a member of th e  Dewey delegation, v;as th e  fostering
of opinions favorab le  to  th e  Soviet Union, and consequently  the  enhancem ent of
the  possibility of recognition . And, the  offic ia l added, given Moscow's ab ility  to
control the  i t ine ra ry , along with the  usual inability  of the visitors to  speak the
language, it  always stood a good chance of im pressing visitors to a g re a te r  ex ten t
than rea l i ty  w arran ted . Moreover, the  spokesman concluded in a s ta te m e n t
indicating the  D ep ar tm en t 's  position vis-a-vis the  Socie ty  for Cultural R ela tions
with Russia, it was doubtful tha t any tour arranged  by th e  Society could be
7ficonsidered "private"  in nature , since i t  "presumably" was a branch of VOKS.
On a t  le a s t  tw o  occasions the  S ta te  D epartm en t vetoed p ro jec ts
advanced by Soviet agencies, though in each  ins tance it indicated a willingness to
perm it a lesser degree  of cooperation on a more inform al basis. In ea r ly  1930 the
Soviet S ta te  In s t i tu te  of Microbiology and Epidemiology, located  a t  Saratov,
proposed a rec ip roca l  exchange of researche rs  with th e  Hygenic Laboratory  of the
77United S ta te s  Public H ealth  Service. The Hygenic Laboratory, noting th a t  its
cooperation with th e  Soviet Sanitary B acterio log ical L abora tory  a t  Sverdlovsk had
helped estab lish  th e  p resence of a par ticu la r  type  of b ac te r ia  in th e  USSR during
7 8the  previous w inter, forw arded  the request to  the  S ta te  D epartm ent. The la t te r  
re jec ted  the  proposal. "While this D epartm en t is desirous of fac i lita ting , insofar
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as  it  appropria tely  may, collaboration between scientific  institu tions in the  United
S ta tes  and those in Russia," it s ta ted ,  it could not do so on the reciprocal basis
7Qspecified  in the Soviet offer. However, the  D epartm ent reply added, it did not 
object to  the inform ât exchanges of inform ation as had transpired betw een the
on
Hygenic Laboratory and the  Soviet labora to ry  at Sverdlovsk. But to en ter  into 
a rec ip roca l arrangem ent with an agency of the  Soviet government, the  D epart­
m ent's  ansv/er clearly  implied, was to  deal too fully with a governm ent th a t  did 
not officially  exist.
In a somewhat similar instance occurring during the  sam e year, the  
D epartm en t re je c ted  a Moscow proposal to  establish a Soviet sc ien tif ic  agricul­
tu ra l agency in the  United S tates , But, it  assured the D epartm ent of Agriculture, 
it  objected to neither the p resence of Soviet sc ien tis ts  in the  United S ta tes  nor to
th e  Agriculture D epartm ent providing those sc ien tis ts  with whatever fac ilit ies  i t  
81deem ed proper. And when th e  American consul in Berlin refused to  grant visas
to sixty-four Soviet s tudents  because  he believed them to be e i the r  Party
m em bers or sympathizers, Washington reversed the  consul and allowed the
students, who had already arranged for enrollm ent in American colleges, to en ter  
82the  country. Washington may not have been enthusiastic about cultural in te r­
course, bu t it was not a l together  unwilling.
By 1933, con tac ts  between the  American and Soviet ar tis tic ,  scientific  
and in te llec tua l worlds were established and growing despite the  absence of 
offic ial re la tions  between the  two nations. But in ye t another way the  people of 
the  tw o countries  in te rac ted  on a la rge  scale , and in a manner th a t  perm itted  the  
United S ta te s  to  have a significant im pact on Soviet development and thinking.
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And tha t im pact, building on the  favorable im age c rea ted  by the  A m erican R elief 
A dministration and by A merican jazz, l i te ra tu re  and movies, raised even higher 
the  esteem  in which the  Soviet people held A m erica and Americans.
CHAPTER TWO
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CHAPTER III 
THE USSR AND AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY
The heralded successes of the  Soviet five year  plans were in large p ar t  
the  successes of American engineering and technology. A m ericans designed the 
fac to ries ,  supplied the machinery and tra ined  the workers of Soviet industry; they 
ins truc ted  the  fa rm ers  in the  m ysteries  of m echanized agricu ltu re .  American 
help and techn ica l ass is tance , Stalin  told United S ta te s  C ham ber of Comm erce 
P res iden t Eric Johnston in 1944, helped build about tw o-th irds  of the  large 
industria l en terprises  in th e  Soviet Union.^ And in the  process the  Soviets 
absorbed much m ore than techn ica l skills: the  a t t i tu d es  and values th a t  made
A m erica  the  world's leading producer pen e tra ted  deeply into Soviet society as 
well.
That A m ericans con tribu ted  so much to th e  econom ic development of 
th e  USSR was no acc iden t.  Soviet leaders  may have ca s tig a te d  the  social and 
political values of the  U nited S ta te s ,  but they  had long adm ired its  industrial 
e ffic iency  and technological know-how. They were ne ither  h es i tan t  to  seek its 
ass is tance nor, until the l a te  th ir t ie s ,  acknowledge its  contributions. Increasingly 
during the  tw en tie s  and th ir t ie s  th e  Soviets adm ired and em u la ted  th e  American 
emphasis on speed, effic iency  and ra tional production. To be cred ited  with
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running an "Amerikanski office” or working a t  the "Amerikanski tem po” was a 
coveted  form of praise. Americans becam e national heroes in the  Soviet Union: 
Marx and Engels might have understood the  secre ts  of historical evolution, but 
Henry Ford understood the sec re t  of th e  fac to ry . As Bernard Knollenberg noted 
in 1930, "if Lenin is Russia's God today, Ford is its St. P e te r .”^
The Soviet government early  tu rned  to  Americans for assis tance ,
O
offering  a varie ty  of incentives to a t t r a c t  th e ir  capital and the ir  skills. The 
ear l ies t  incentives usually .cam e in the  form of concessions, under the  te rm s  of 
which foreigners  developed and m arketed  Soviet raw m ateria ls  on a p ro f i t  basis 
while Moscow re ta ined  possession of those resources. Concessions a t t r a c t e d  a 
la rge  number of Americans, many of whom were P arty  members or sym pathizers, 
during the  early  tw enties . Some four hundred Americans helped develop the  coal, 
iron ore, t im ber  and other resources of the  Kuznets Basin, using "Am erican" 
methods to  turn  the  defunct operations in the  area  into a productive en terprise . 
Within a short t im e  the Kuzbas colonists were exploiting the  region's iron ore and 
coal deposits; operating  brick kilns, sawmills and shoe factories; building new 
railroads and re-equipping the mines, and, in the  process, am azing  the  local 
population which assured them of the  impossibility of the ir  undertaking.'^
A m erican  farming techniques w ere early valued and sought. Lenin 
wanted to  establish a model American farm on each of the two hundred and fifty  
farm ing d is tr ic ts ,  and tw enty-five  to  th ir ty  were actually  c rea ted , often  assuming 
the names of th e  American cities from which the  se tt le rs  were rec ru ited . These 
communes established "circles” which taugh t American methods, instructing  
Soviet fa rm ers  in horticu lture , seed se lec tion  and o ther wonders of scien tific
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farming.^ As in the  case of the Kuzbas colony, many of these  Americans, a la rge  
portion of whom were sym pathetic  to  the communist cause, were rec ru i ted  by th e  
Society for Technical Aid to Russia, an organization with some th ir ty  branches in 
the United S tates .^
Ideological a ff in i ty  likewise influenced the  early  assis tance th a t  
A mericans gave the  Soviet tex ti le  industry. American workers en tering the  
Soviet Union—both those who trave led  voluntarily and those who made the tr ip  via 
the com plim ents of A tto rney  General Pa lm er—established model te x t i le  plants in 
Leningrad and Moscow and worked to c rea te  a "genuinely Am erican a t t i tu d e"
y
tow ard production in those plants. More im portantly , Sidney Hillman and the  
A m erican C lothing Workers' Union helped modernize the  clothing and te x ti le  
industry in the  USSR, supplying much of the  cap i ta l  and technica l skills while the
g
Soviets supplied the labor and raw m ateria ls .
A number of concessions were devoid of ideological overtones. The
industrialist Armand H am m er produced the  pens, pencils and drawing equipment
used by the  Soviets in the  early tw enties , and A m erican concessionaires repaired
g
houses in Moscow as early  as 1922. In terna tional Barnsdall of New Jersey  
supplied much of the  techn ica l expert ise  to re-open the  devas ta ted  Caucusus oil 
fields, employing A merican drilling, pumping and pipeline construction  techniques 
to  accomplish the task, while a Los Angeles company tra ined  the Soviet pipeline 
welders and supervised them on the  job.^® And the  Caucusus refineries , though 
largely built by British and German companies, employed the  A m erican cracking 
process.^  ^
These early  e ffo rts  were insignificant compared to those th a t  followed. 
As the tw en ties  progressed, concessions increasingly gave way to  technica l
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assis tance c o n tra c ts  under which the Soviets simply purchased the  knowledge,
skills and machinery of the  more advanced nations. Several nations sold in this
m arket, but the United S ta te s  did so to a d isproportionate  degree. Henry Ford
played perhaps the  m ost visible and d ram atic  ro le . Before 1933, Stalin la te r
1 9rem arked, the  Soviet Union had no automobile industry. Ford c rea ted  tha t 
industry.
Ford was a nam e fam iliar to the  Soviets years before the  company
began its  massive tech n ica l  assis tance program. Between 1920 and 1926 the
Soviet governm ent purchased some 25,000 Fordson t ra c to rs  from D etro it ;  by 1927
1 1eigthy per cen t  of the  t ra c to rs  and trucks in th e  USSR w ere  Ford models. 
M aintenance on th e se  machines was e r ra t ic  and Soviet-m ade par ts  inadequate. 
T herefore  in 1926 Moscow invited Ford to  send a delegation  to  design a 
m aintenance system p a t te rn e d  on Ford lines and, more im portan tly , to  examine 
the possibility of e rec tin g  a plant on Ford soil. A group of Ford officials 
subsequently trave led  extensively  throughout the  Soviet Union studying the 
prospects but u lt im a te ly  re jec tin g  the  o ffer  because of a  lack of Soviet 
m anagerial ta len t,  the  possibility of government expropriation and the likelihood 
of political decisions over-ruling  economic considerations.^'^ Similarly, General 
Motors sen t a delegation to  study th e  m erits  of a plant on Soviet soil, and likewise 
decided th a t  the  d isadvantages outweighed the  advantages.^^
If D e tro it  was not v/illing to  go to  the  Soviets, th e  Soviets were willing 
to  com e to  D etro it .  In mid-1928 four delegates  arrived  from Moscow and, a f te r  
com plicated negotiations. Ford agreed to provide the  techn ica l knowledge and 
plant designs necessary  to  e r e c t  tw o  automobile plants in th e  Soviet Union. These 
plants were designed to produce some 100,000 trucks and Model A automobiles per
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year. "Henry Ford manifestly  took a generous position," Allan Nevins wrote of
th e  ag reem en t,  for
his company agreed to give Russia the  full r igh ts  to make, sell and use 
Ford units  throughout the  USSR, to  m ake and use Ford machinery and 
o the r  equipment, and to use all Ford inventions and technical advances 
p a te n te d  or unpaten ted . Ford would furnish de ta iled  drawings of all the  
d ep ar tm en ts  of a com plete  fac to ry , specifications, and schedules of 
m achinery  and operation sheets . The company would supply tw o or more 
de ta iled  sets  of drawings of all tools, jigs, fix tures, and other special 
equipm ent a t  th e  Rouge plant. Ford would perm it access to  A m erican 
p lan ts  by Russian engineers and other employees, to learn by actual floor 
work the methods in use. Finally, the  company would send to  Russia its  
own skilled engineers and forem en to  hMp plan th e  new work, insta ll the  
equipm ent and tra in  the  working force.
Having co n tra c ted  with Ford for the  necessary  designs, pa ten ts ,  and
techn ica l ass is tance to  s ta r t  its autom obile industry, the  Soviets engaged tw o
Am erican firm s to  construc t the  ac tua l physical plants. The A lbert Kahn
Company built one plant a t  Moscow; th e  Austin Company a la rger  one a t  Nizhni- 
1 RNovgorod. As th e  work progressed the human tra f f ic  between D e tro it  and the 
plants increased; a t  Nizhni-Novgorod an American community sprang up, com ­
p le te  with tennis  courts  and other a r t i f a c ts  of A m erican culture. Eventually  a 
body of one hundred and fif ty  workers a rrived  in D etro it for final training, a 
contingent of seven teen  A m ericans le f t  to  in i t ia te  s ta r t-up  procedures, and the  
magic day of production began. "Townspeople wild with elation en te red  in droves 
to  look," Ford official Frank Bennett w ro te  of th e  occasion, "and grave profes­
sional men begged to  help on th e  assem bly line to  see how it  produced its  
19wonders." From Nizhni-Novgorod, B ennett went to Moscow to open th e  smaller
plant. Having accom plished th a t  ta sk  he succumbed to  the  hospitable but
insistent urging of his hosts to take  a Black Sea vacation, only la te r  realiz ing th a t
his gracious hosts w anted to  make sure they  could opera te  the  plant by them selves
20before allowing him to leave the country.
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Measured in te rm s  of im m edia te  gain th e  Soviets undoubtedly rece ived
th e  b e t te r  end of the  Ford bargain. The a rrangem en t assured them a  supply of
autom obiles, trucks, well-equipped fac to r ie s  and care fu l tutoring, while Ford lost
21some $578,000 in the  process. Still Ford was proud of what he had done to
advance Soviet developm ent and believed th e  Soviets wise in looking to  the  United
S ta tes  for ass is tance . The g rea te r  th e  ba lance  among the  world's economies, he
99wrote, th e  b e t te r  for all concerned.
While the  Ford-designed p lants  turned  out trucks and automobiles, o ther 
A m erican-eng ineered  p lan ts  produced farm equipm ent. Failing in the ir  e ffo r ts  to  
produce a copy of the  Fordson by studying Ford  designs and dismantling a number
of the m achines to  m easure  the ac tu a l  par ts ,  the  Soviets c o n tra c ted  with a
23number of A m erican  firm s to  build a series of t r a c to r  plants. The A lbert Kahn
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company built som e of the  factories: McClintock and Marshall built o the rs .“ 
C aterp illa r ,  which had been selling its  equipm ent in th e  USSR for som e time, 
agreed to  bring Soviet engineers to  its  A m erican plants and send its technic ians  to
95
the  Soviet Union to in s truc t in the  use and m ain tenance  of its machines." And in
1929 a number of American companies, working with Soviet engineers, designed a
plant to  produce approxim ate ly  f if ty  thousand C ate rp il la r- type  t ra c to rs  per year
on Soviet soil. A m erican workers built and com ple te ly  assembled th e  plant in the
United S ta tes ,  then disassembled it  and sent it  to  Stalingrad, where five hundred
and seven ty  A m ericans and fif ty  Germans re-assem bled  the  en tire  s truc tu re .  The
26resulting  Stalingrad T ra c to r  Works was the  la rges t  plant of its type in Europe.
By the  1930's the  various plants on Soviet soil were turning out machinery 
p a t te rn ed  on Ford, C aterp illa r ,  In terna tiona l H arvester,  Holt and Farm all 
models.^"^
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While Ford's role was most visible and publicized, o the r  A m erican  firms
con tr ibu ted  in la rge  measure to  Soviet developm ent. The A lbert Kahn Company,
A m erica 's  leading industrial a rch i tec tu ra l  firm and designer of many of the
nation 's  most noted industrial facilit ies , played an ex trem ely  im portan t role.
Undoubtedly its  repu ta tion  prompted the  unprecedented offer which Moscow
p refe rred .  In 1928, a company official w rote , " the  most ex traordinary  commission
ever given an a rc h i te c t  cam e in the  door unannounced. In th a t  year  a group of
engineers from th e  USSR cam e to  the  Kahn office with an order for a $40,000,000
tra c to r  p lant, and an outline program for an additional two billion dollars worth of 
28buildings." The order, Anthony Sutton w rote , "was nothing less than  th e  F irst
29and Second Y ear Plans of socialist reconstruc tion ."  About a dozen of the 
buildings w ere  designed in D etro it;  the  re s t  handled in a special o ff ice  housing 
f if teen  hundred draftsm en in Moscow.
The Soviet iron and s tee l industry also benefited  from American 
technology, largely th a t  of the  Freyn Engineering Company of Chicago, leading 
designer of s tee l  mills. In the  la te  tw enties  Freyn agreed not only to  build 
eighteen new iron and steel mills and rebuild some forty  ou tda ted  m etallurgical 
plants, bu t also to  perm it Soviet engineers access to its archives, and thus to its 
design technology. The Freyn ag reem en t was, according to  Sutton, " the first 
milestone in the  tran s fe r  of western m etallurg ical technology" to  the  Soviet 
Union, and th e  plants it helped design and build form ed "the basis s tru c tu re  of the 
F ive-Y ear Plan."^^
The A rthur McKee Company con tributed  its  share to the  Soviet steel 
industry through its  assistance in designing and building the gigantic s te e l  works 
a t  Magnitogorsk. Basing th e ir  design on the  United S ta te s  S tee l plant a t Gary,
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Indiana—a t  the tim e the  la rgest in tegra ted  iron and s tee l  plant in the  world—some 
four hundred and f if ty  A m erican d raftsm en worked day and night to  accomplish 
the  unprecedented fe a t  of reducing every detail of the Magnitogorsk plant to
o 9
paper, com plete  to  the  las t  nu t and bolt, before construction ever s ta r ted .  Once
designed, American engineers, along with some from Germany, supervised the
ac tua l construction of the  various Freyn and McKee plants, for which General
E lec tr ic  supplied the  e lec tr ica l  technology.  ^ Even the Soviet s ta te  trus t  in
charge of iron and s tee l  production v;as heavily Am ericanized, with Freyn and
34McKee personnel serving as advisers and filling key adm inis tra tive  positions. 
The objective, Henry 1. Freyn wrote in 1930, was to  provide American training, 
knowledge and p rac tica l experience to the end th a t  the  new iron and s tee l  works
OC
"be predominantly of A m erican design and standards."
American techniques also helped mine the  raw m ate r ia ls  th a t  fed the 
s tee l mills, particularly  the  coal. In 1925 the  Soviets, a f te r  comparing th e  coal
mining methods of England, France, Germany and the United S ta tes ,  opted for the
36la t te r .  T hereaf te r  leading A merican firms designed and built mines in the
USSR, supplied supervising engineers and tra ined Soviet mining engineers in the ir  
Am erican offices. The firm of Allen and Garcia, builders of the  world's largest 
mine a t  Peoria, Illinois, cons truc ted  mines for the  Soviets in th e  D onetz Basin,
provided engineers to  run th e  mines and brought Soviet engineers to  the  United
37Sta tes .  S tew art,  J am es  and Cooke carried  out similar con trac ts ,  as did other
38com panies and individual consultants . Still o ther  A merican firm s helped develop
th e  non-ferrous mining and sm elting  industry: by the  end of the  tw en ties  over two
hundred American engineers and specialists were engaged in lead, zinc, copper
39and silver production. The Aluminum Company of A m erica signed an agree-
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m ent in 1926 perm itt ing  it to  explore for bauxite, and the  Allied Dye and 
Chem ical Company rece ived  a concession for the  mining of asbestos.^^ Even the 
Soviet gold mines relied  heavily on A m erican engineers, reported ly  as many as 
four or five for each mine.^^
A m erican companies supplied the  m achinery th a t  American mining 
technology utilized. AUis-Chalmers, Westinghouse and other firms began selling 
equipm ent to  Moscow early  in the  decade, and Soviet purchasing commissions 
scoured th e  U nited S ta tes  for ever-im proving designs.^^ Along with this 
equipm ent went even more A m ericans to install, tra in  and supervise, while Soviet 
specia lis ts  t rave led  to  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  fam ilia r ize  them selves with the  
technology of the  new tools.
Ju s t as e lec tr i f ica t ion  was fundam entally  im portan t  to  Soviet moderni­
zation , A m erican  engineering was fundam entally  im portan t  to  Soviet e lec tr i f ic a ­
tion. A m erican  engineers under the  d irec tion  of Colonel Hugh Cooper supervised 
the  construction  of the  massive dam a t  Dneiprovstroi, la rgest in the world, and 
A m erican firm s helped supply th e  complex equipm ent th a t  re s ted  inside. General 
E lec tr ic  and RCA turned the  e lec tr ica l  c u rren t  thus  produced into a useful 
commodity.
Beginning in the  l a te  tw en ties  General E lec tr ic  supplied the  Soviets
with vast quan tit ies  of equipm ent and technology, sen t company personnel to
Soviet p lants  and trained Soviet engineers in A m erican  facilit ies . To handle the
flow of business and inform ation  G eneral E lec tr ic  opened an office in Moscow,
and the  Soviets opened one in Schenectady.^^ A 1929 ag reem en t calling for a
"broad exchange of pa ten ts  as well as exchange of designing, engineering and
m anufac turing  inform ation," was, Sutton w rote, "by fa r  the  most im portant single
44ag reem en t in the  developm ent of th e  Soviet e lec tr ica l  equipment industries."
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What General E lec tr ic  did for Soviet e lec tr ica l  developm ent, RCA did 
for its e lec tron ic  technology. By the  te rm s  of an ag reem en t signed in 1929, RCA 
agreed to  "grant exclusive right to  the  (Soviet) Trust to  m anufac tu re ,  use and sell 
all pa ten ts ,  applications for p a ten ts  and inventions, owned and /or  controlled  by 
the  Radio  Corporation  of A m erica  and/or General E lec tr ic  and Westing- 
house...."^^ Under this a r ran g em en t and a similar one signed in 1935, Soviet 
engineers visited a num ber of radio  s ta t ions  in the  United S ta tes ,  and RCA 
engineers worked throughout th e  Soviet Union.^®
Soviet tran sp o r ta t io n ,  too, looked to  the  U nited  S ta te s  for help. In 1930 
a th ir ty -fou r  man delegation  m ade an extensive and de ta iled  exam ination of 
Am erica 's  railroad netw ork, finding much to  praise. The Soviets, announced the 
v ice-com m issar who led the  delegation, must adopt th e  advanced  techniques of 
A m erican equipm ent and m anagem ent. Subsequently Ralph Budd, p res iden t of the 
G rea t N orthern  Railroad, trave led  to  the  USSR with the  re tu rn ing  delegation and, 
a f te r  inspecting th e  Soviet system , hired a la rge  number of A m erican  specialists 
to  assist him in th e  task  of reorganizing th e  Soviet railroads, appointing a Reading 
Railroad official as ch ief  consulting engineer for the p ro jec t.  The Baldwin 
Locomotive Works brought a number of Soviet workers, f irem en and engineers to 
i ts  shops for training, and G eneral E lec tr ic  began turn ing  out th e  first e lec tr ic
locom otives for the  USSR; locom otives which form ed the  basis for la te r  Soviet
. . 47designs.
During the  1930's Soviet aviation benefi ted  from A m erican  a i rc ra f t  
technology as a num ber of A m erican companies, including Douglas, Sikorski and 
Glenn Martin, signed techn ica l-ass is tance  co n tra c ts  w ith  Soviet agencies. Those 
co n trac ts  supplied a i rc ra f t ,  p a r ts  and design technology, and frequen tly  s tipulated
6 8
th a t  Soviet a i rc ra f t  designers and engineers be allowed to spend a ce r ta in  amount
of tim e in Am erican facilit ies . Likewise, American designers and technicians
48worked in the  USSR under the ag reem en ts .
Soviet agricu lture also continued to draw on A m erican experience 
throughout the  tw enties ,  as th e  l im ited  lessons of the  communes gave way to  the 
technology of specia lis ts  in la te r  years. As early as 1924 the  Soviet government 
placed an A m erican  named Harold M. Ware in charge of several thousand acres 
near P ia tagorsk  with a specific  assignm ent to " tra in  Russian agricu ltu ris ts  in 
A m erican  methods and organize m odel agricu ltura l en terprises ,"  which Ware 
a t te m p te d  to  do with the  help of f i f te e n  Am erican subordinates  and a number of
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t ra c to r s  given him by the  Ford Motor Company. " In 1929 the  Soviets, noting
th a t  Thom as Campbell farm ed  95,000 Montana acres  with only two hundred
workmen and 109 trac to rs ,  invited th e  American farm er to  advise them  in the
50developm ent of 10,000,000 ac re s  of w heat land, and Campbell accep ted . Even 
th e  vas t Soviet irrigation e ffo r ts  depended upon A m erican personnel and 
technology. Prior to  World War I, A rthur P. Davis, construction consultan t for the 
Panam a Canal, D irec to r  of th e  U.S. R eclam ation  Service and one of the  nation's 
best known irrigation engineers, conducted  a feasibility  s tudy for th e  Russian 
governm ent in the  Steppes of C en tra l  Asia, but heard  nothing fu r the r  until the 
Soviets co n tac te d  him in 1929 and reques ted  tha t he d irec t th e  development of 
irr igation  p ro jec ts  in the area . Davis signed a techn ica l-ass is tance  ag reem en t 
with Moscow, s e t  up an office in Tashkent, hired a number of A m erican engineers 
and began th e  task.^^
The list of techn ica l-ass is tance  con trac ts  and the  myriad ways in which 
A m ericans con tribu ted  to  Soviet developm ent could be ex tended  a t  lenghts.
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Standard  Oil, for example, built a kerosene plant for the Soviets a t  Batum, the 
Seiberling Rubber Company of Akron, Ohio, built a t i re  facto ry  on Soviet soil in 
the  la te  tw enties , and Soviet rep resen ta tiv e s  of the  glass-mkaing industry studies
c 2
A m erican techniques in several cities. O ther rep resen ta tives  examined 
A m erican bridge building methods and harbor designs, while still o thers  studied
C O
the  operations of American cash reg is te rs  and business machines. But to 
en u m era te  fu r ther  is to obscure the esen tia l point. C on trac ts  m eant con tac ts ,  
m eant extensive and prolonged in te rac t io n  betw een Americans and Soviets, and 
consequently m eant penetra ting  to a t  le as t  a degree the barrie rs  of cultural 
e s trangem en t.
By th e  early  th ir t ie s  a t  least  a thousand American engineers and several
tim es  th a t  number of skilled workers and technicians were working on Soviet 
54soil.' Some of the engineers becam e national heroes; one even gained a
55repu ta t ion  as "Russia's m iracle man." Their portrayal in Soviet l i te ra tu re  as 
"eff ic ien t,  m a t te r -o f - fa c t  technicians who knew how to give and rece ive  sarcastic  
rem arks  about the irs  and the  Soviet social order," as Ina Telberg wrote, enhanced 
th e ir  image, and Nikolai Pogodin's d ram atiza tion  using the  "m iracle  man" as the 
model for his American engineer raised even higher the esteem  in which the 
Soviet public held these  p rac tit ioners  of t e c h n o l o g y . F r i c t i o n s  and d ifferences  
ex isted  of course, and on occasion f lared  openly, but the overwhelming evidence is 
th a t  the  A m erican technical assistance, following so closely the  m inistrations of 
th e  A m erican  R elie f  Administration, produced among the  Soviet people a 
genuinely friendly and a ffec t io n a te  a t t i tu d e  tow ard  America and Americans; an 
a t t i tu d e  th a t  never com pletely d isappeared even when official re la tions  la te r  
s tra ined  tow ard the breaking point.
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Even before the Revolution some Russians urged the ir  countrymen to 
look to  A m erica  for inspiration and guidance, for the vision and vigor necessary to  
develop Russia and shape its future. "We must wake from our sleep which has 
been lasting  for centuries,"  a Moscow University professor w rote  in ]912, "we 
must take  a good dose of Americanism." For in America a new race  of men had 
developed, which with a bold hand was writing its nam e on the pages of history. 
Russians must look to  America, asse r ted  the  professor, whose im m edia te  aim was 
to  encourage techn ica l delegations to go there , to  observe the  in i ta t ive  and 
energy of the  businessman, to learn  the  value of t im e  and v.mrk, to  "imbibe the 
A m erican cu ltu re  and bring the  principles of the sam e over to  Russia." Like 
America, Russia possessed vast spaces and resources, but lacked " th a t  ce rta in  
psychology...necessary for a rapid and successful development of the  productive 
powers of the  country." A mericans on the  o ther hand had learned  how to conquer 
distances and harness energies. "It is these  principles of A m erican life," the
C?
professor concluded, " th a t  we must study and...put to  use in our own country."
The following year a Siberian school teacher,  just re tu rned  from a th ree  
year  s tay  in the  United S ta tes , spread a similar message. The zem stvos, he urged 
in p resenta tions  featuring  magic lan te rn  slides portraying American life, should 
send en tire  groups of idealistic Russian youth to learn  the p rac t ice  ways of 
America, for th e re  "the question of happiness and meaning in li fe  are not solved 
by theory, but by p ractice ."  In A m erica the re  were "no unhealthy diversions into 
the  spheres of excessive reasoning, ruining the  nerves; muscles a re  working, and 
one involuntarily ceases to  be a pessimist.
D espite  these urgings and th e  encouragem ent of the  A m erican  consul- 
general in Moscow, the  proposed techn ica l delegation never cam e to  the  United
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S ta tes  nor did the  zem stvos organize excursions of Russian youth to America. 
But it  m a t te re d  l i t t le ,  for within a few years  Am erica was tak ing  its  technology 
to  Russia.
The transition  from tsarism  to communism did nothing to diminish the 
adm iration  of A m erican technique; indeed, it heightened it, for com m unists and 
cap i ta l is ts  shared a belief  in the  virtues of progress. And progress, as Lenin 
rem arked  to  A m erican concessionaire  Armand H am m er, m eant "buildings, inven­
tions, machines, developm ents  of mechanical aids to  human hands."^® Lenin 
sounded as though he had just read th e  Moscow professor's  a r t ic le  when he fu rther  
rem arked  to H am m er th a t  "Russia today is like your country  was in the  pioneering 
s tage. We need th e  knowledge and the  spirit th a t  have made A m erica what it is
C A
today." For th e  Bolsheviks, a G erm an historian w rote in 1926,
Industria lized A m erica  becam e the  promised land. At an earl ie r  period 
the  'in te lligentsia ' s ti l l  looked for the ir  models in Europe; but, 
im m ediate ly  a f te r  th e  Revolution, a wild enthusiasm for A m erica  
s ta r ted ;  th e  m agnificent industrial works of Germ any and the  highly 
p e rfec ted  p lant of F ran ce  and England all a t  once appeared paltry  to 
Soviet Russia; they  began to dream of Chicago and to d irec t th e ir  e ffo rs t 
tow ard  making Russia a new and more splendid America.
In the  country of wasted t im e  and ap a th e tic  men like Goncharov's Oblomov, the
German w rite r  concluded, "Lenin decided to  c re a te  a super-human A m erican
6 2system of labour organization  in which not a grain of energy should be w aster."
Throughout the  tw en tie s  and most of the  th ir ties ,  Soviet officials 
openly admired and praised the technological aspec ts  of A m erican culture. The 
tw o proper e lem ents  of s ta t e  and p a r ty  work, Stalin w rote  in 1924, w ere "the wide 
outlook of the  Russian revolutionist"  on the  one hand and "A m erican p ractica lity"  
on the  o ther. Only a com bination of the  two produced "a finished type of Leninist
72
fi 3w orker, th e  Leninist s ty le  of work." A few years  la te r ,  in an interview with
Emil Ludwig, Stalin again lauded A m ericans for the ir  "business-like cooperation in
industry, l i te ra tu re  and life."®^ Trotsky praised A m erican  mass production
m ethods, and Rykov, speaking before the  F if th  Congress of Soviets in 1931,
expressed apprec ia tion  for the techn ica l aid rendered  by Americans to  Soviet
construction.®^ According to  F reder ic  Barghoorn, Soviet Ambassador Alexander
Troyanovsky rem arked  to P res iden t Roosevelt upon presenting  his credentia ls  th a t
th e re  existed  among his countrym en  "a most n a tu ra l feeling of sympathy, respect
and adm iration  for your country, which they  associa te  with high technical and
scien tif ic  progress and which they  regard  as an im m ense c rea tiv e  force."®®
Making due allow ances for the e lem ent of d ip lom atic  courtesy  re f lec ted  in the
s ta te m e n t ,  Barghoorn concluded, i t  "sum med up the  favorable  aspects  of Soviet
reac tions  to  acqua in tances  with A m erican  engineers, technicians and 
67scien tis ts ."  Shortly a f te r  assuming his duties, Troyanovsky spoke in a similar
68vein to  an audience a t  the  A m erican-Russian Institu te .  The thousands of Soviet 
youths preparing  them selves for techn ica l c a ree rs ,  he rem arked , were "students of 
A m erican sc ien tif ic  ach ievem ents  and techniques." Since his country s tressed  
science, and s ince  144 Soviet sc ien tis ts  belonged to  A m erican sc ien tif ic  organiza­
tions, "a sc ien tif ic  rapprochem ent with the  most advanced western nation is of
go
g rea te s t  in te re s t  to  us."
Soviet delegations arriv ing in the  United S ta te s  likewise voiced the ir  
es teem  for A m erican ach ievem ents . His coun try  g rea t ly  adm ired America's 
technica l ach ievem ents , a v ice-com m issar accom panying the  railroad delegation 
touring the  nation in 1930 com m ented , and could hardly com plete  its railroad 
reo rgan iza tion  plan without availing itse lf  of the  knowledge which Americans
73
70possessed. And even though the Soviet display a t New York's 1927 Machine Age
Exhibition was designed to  im press A m ericans with Soviet achievem ents ,
accom panying spokesmen were not hesitan t to  express a desire for more American
know-how. Should A m erican  engineers and a rc h i te c ts  forward some of their
technica l knowledge to the  Soviet Union, one speaker remarked, " it  would be a
71grea t con tribu tion  tow ard  b e t te r  cu ltu ra l rela tions."
P. A. Bodganov, for five years  d irec to r  of A m torg  in the  United S ta tes ,  
s ta te d  in full what many expressed in f rag m en ta ry  form. Upon returning to  the  
USSR in 1935 Bogdanov becam e, Ambassador William Bullitt informed the S ta te  
D epartm en t,  th e  leader of "those fo rces  in th e  Soviet Union which a re  em phasiz­
ing the  im portance  of Soviet industry looking to the  United S ta te s  for techn ica l 
72guidance." In a series  of speeches, new spaper a r t ic le s  and personal com m ents  to
Embassy personnel, Bogdanov explained a t  length  why many in the  Soviet Union
considered it  necessary  to  look to  A m erica. Since Comrade Stalin " teaches  us to
combine the  wide revolutionary  elan with A m erican  effic iency," he w ro te  in
P ravda , the  USSR should "seek American guidance even more than it has done
hitherto ;"  should apply even more fully th e  A m erican principles of simplicity,
expediency, specia lization , sc ien tif ic  re sea rch  and willingness to  discard con- 
73serva tive  ways. While i t  was true ,  he continued in a disclaimer th a t  sounded
m ore obligatory than real, th a t  "cap ita lis t anarchy  and private  ownership" kept
A m erica from reaching i t s  full po ten tia l ,  th a t  posed no problem for Soviet
socialism. "Am erica,"  he concluded, "must serve  as the m easure by which we
constan tly  check  our te chn ica l achievem ents .. .w e  must adapt A m erican methods
of work to  our conditions; th is  being one of the  ch ief prerequisites  for the  m astery
74of A m erican technic."
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Moreover, Bogdanov wrote a few days la te r  in the Moscow Daily News, 
it was not enough simply to  import and copy A m erican equipment and techniques; 
more im portan t was the  study of "the  techn ic  itse lf ,  its progress, i ts  improve­
m en t," for the  r a te  of development in A m erican technology v/as so fast th a t
"w hatever we had taken from A m erica a fev; years ago seems a lready  to  have 
75becom e obsolete."  The Soviets must m aintain  "constant and system atic  
connections with A m erican engineering," o therw ise  they would lag  in develop­
ment. To accom plish this, Bogdanov suggested, Moscow should stop sending 
commissions and delegations to the  United S ta tes ,  for these merely looked and 
inspected  when the  s itua tion  demanded study and application; ra the r  i t  should stay 
ab reast through establishing "an e ff ic ien t inform ation system, exchanging 
experience be tw een  sc ien tif ic  research  ins titu tions, and by organizing production 
methods similar to  those in the Ford and o ther plants."
A few weeks la te r  Bogdanov re tu rned  to  the  same them e in ye t  another 
Pravda a rtic le .  Noting th a t  the "tens of commissions and hundreds of engineers" 
who had exam ined various European en te rp r ises  "found only in A m erica what
could best be applied to  the Soviet Union," the  fo rm er A mtorg d irec to r  again
77urged closer and m ore perm anent technica l ties  with the  United S ta tes . The
A m erican research  institu tions and societies  of engineers, he wrote, were glad to
exchange the ir  research  and li te rary  works; th e  American Society of Mechanical
Engineers had in fac t  already proposed perm anent relations which Moscow
78unfortunate ly  had failed to  ac t  upon. The solution, Bogdanov suggested, v;as to 
maintain "bases of production" in the  United S ta tes ,  from which American 
methods could be cons tan tly  studied. These bases of production should be secured 
through c o n tra c ts  such as th a t  earlier  signed with Ford, for th a t  con trac t  had
75
affo rded  the opportunity of putting  through the Ford plant "hundreds of our 
engineers and technicians who m aste red  the  organization of production and the  
technological processes of the  modern A merican plant." Such bases of production. 
Bogdanov concluded, should becom e "schools for our workers who would master
*7Q
A merican technique in p ractice ."
Bogdanov's remarks, along with those of other Soviet spokesmen, leave 
l i t t le  doubt of the  accuracy  of Joan Hoff Wilson's assertion th a t  a "fundamental 
though somewhat abtruse reason" for the  Soviet wish to re-estab lish  economic 
re la tions  was the desire to  come into co n tac t  with the m a te r ia l  and pragm atic
on
ach ievem ents  of the  American experim ent in the  new world.
During th e  la te  th irties, as the  techn ica l-assis tance  co n tra c ts  expired,
Soviet in ternal troubles grew and the in ternational situation worsened, the  Soviets
praised America's technique and acknowledged its contributions less and less; even
refused on occasion to allow A m ericans to en ter  the plants they had designed and 
81helped build. ' But even then the re  were occasional expressions of g ra ti tude  and
indications of a continuing desire to  reap  th e  benefits  of American technology.
Speaking before th e  E ighteenth P a r ty  Congress in 1939, A nastas Mikoyan,
recen tly  re tu rned  from inspecting Am erica 's  bo ttling  and canning industry, noted
th a t  th e  USSR had learned much from the  United S ta tes  but was still not
82employing its  technique on a sufficiently  la rge  scale. And as la te  as 1939 
Moscow made a determ ined e ffo r t  to  keep a number of A m erican engineers 
working in the  fuel industry in the  USSR so as to take  advan tage of their 
knowledge.
During World War H th e  Soviets were fulsome in th e ir  recognition of 
A m erica 's  techn ica l contributions and in th e ir  g ra ti tude  for th a t  assistance. The
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president of the USSR Academ y of Sciences acknowledged th a t  his country had
assim ila ted  A m erican technology "on a grand scale" during its years of " technical
reconstruc tion" and academ ician  A. M. Frumkin re fe rred  to the United S ta te s  as a
84"country of mighty technology." The chief adm in is tra to r  of the  Federal Works
Administration, inspecting Soviet war damage a t  the  special request of President
Roosevelt, found A m erica adm ired throughout th e  USSR. "Everywhere," he
informed an A m erican-R ussian  In s ti tu te  audience in 1945, the re  v;as "a burning
desire to  l i f t  up Russian technology to  th e  A m erican  level of efficiency."^'^ Soviet
officials  in the  Soviet C en tra l  In s ti tu te  for Building Research, addressing ARI
members as a de lega te  of th e  Soviet Purchasing Commission in the  United S ta tes ,
spoke a t  length  of the  Soviet adm iration of A m erican  technique and the necessity
86to  em ula te  A m erican technology in th e  building industry. And, as noted above,
Stalin himself acknowledged the trem endous contribution  of the  United S ta te s  to
87Soviet industrial developm ent. F rederic  Barghoorn, whose Embassy duties
during the  war years  included working with cu ltu ra l m a tte rs ,  noted th a t  the  flood
of Lend-Lease products  confirm ed the trad itional Soviet impression of th e  United
S ta tes  as a technological wonderland. The jeep, which the Soviets knew only as a
88"Willys" he w rote, "was a widespread advert isem en t for American know-how."
But perhaps the  u lt im a te  tr ibu te  cam e in a  rem ark  made to  Barghoorn by an
A merican G.I. who worked with Red Army troops. The Soviet soldiers, th e  G.I.
noted, used the  te rm  "Studebaker" as the  superla t ive  form of p ra ise—even to
89describe ladies of th e ir  choice.
Adm iration of A m erica 's  technology tran s la ted  i tse lf  into in teres t in 
and friendliness tow ard  its  people. As early  as 1924, In terna tional Barnsdall
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em ployees expressed surprise  and pleasure a t  the ir  reception  and t re a tm e n t .  "We 
have been received,"  a Barnsdall o ffic ial told Anna Louise Strong, "with the most
unexplained cooperation from the  managers of the  oil fields down to  the oil
90workers." Fam ine re l ie f  accounted  in p ar t  for the friendly a t t i tu d e ,  Strong 
concluded from her observations and in terview s in the a rea  of Barnsdall opera­
tions, but overwhelmingly it s tem m ed from adm iration  of A m erican  skill and 
effic iency. They gave the  nam e "American" to  almost any m ethod th a t  was quick
and tim e saving, she w rote , and every  official w anted an "A m erican  office" like
91Trotsky's. Eugene Lyons, soon to  oppose the  red reg im e even more adam ently
than Strong supported  it, found the  sam e a t t i tu d e .  "Am ericans," he wrote of his
arrival in 1928, "were infin ite ly  fascina ting  to  Russians. For the  older generations
nurtured  on d em ocra tic  hopes, A m erica was the land of vast freedom and
individual opportunity. For the younger people, thrilling  to  the  vision of an
00
industrial fu ture , i t  v;as th e  land of marvelous technique."*' Two years la te r  
Bernard Knollenberg, assessing financial conditions and investm ent possibilities 
for a New York banking consortium , observed th a t  w estern  c lo thes might a t t r a c t  
unfavorable a t ten t io n  in th e  USSR, "but say th e  magin word 'Amerikansky' and the
no
atm osphere  im m edia te ly  changes to  th a t  of friendly  in te res t ."  Fam ine relief,
th e  trad itional Russian-Am.erican friendship and, above all, th e  "canonization  of
A merican industrial eff ic iency ,"  he deduced, all con tribu ted  to  the  a tm osphere of 
94goodwill. F rede r ic  Barghoorn discovered th e  sam e a t t i tu d e  during the war 
years. A dm iration  of A m erican technology, th e  extensive personal con tac ts  of 
th e  preceding decades, and, most im portantly , th e  legacy of th e  engineers, he 
wrote, accounted  for the  goodwill of the  Soviet public.^^ Scores of others, 
including touris ts ,  de lega tes ,  am bassadors and visiting officials  com m ented on the
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Soviet friendliness tow ard  A mericans, and in 1943 Stalin him self confirm ed the
q c
fa c t  during a conversation  with War Production Board Chairman Donald N elson/
If ordinary Soviet c itizens  viewed A m ericans with friendliness and
resp ec t ,  they  looked upon Henry Ford with awe, for Ford rep resen ted  the  epitome
of the  A m erican ideal. "It is really  ex traord inary  how popular Ford has becom e in
Russia," Maurice Hindus w rote in 1927. "Incredible as it may seem, more people
have heard of him than S ta lin ...next to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky, Ford is most
97possibly the  widest known personage in Russia." Fordisimus and Fordizatsia  
becam e te rm s  synonomous with orderly, ra tiona l production and progress. Ford's
My Life and Work sold in large num bers and some Soviet un iversities  and technical
98schools used it  as a tex t.  Workers emblazoned Ford's nam e on processional
banners, ag r icu ltu ra l com m unes adopted  the nam e "Fordson" and Soviet officials
99accorded fulsome tr ibu te .  "Trotsky praised the  Ford production methods," 
Allen Nevins w rote , "and Pravda chronicled the  progress of 'Fordization ' in 
Russian factories ."^^^  And it  is easy to  app rec ia te  the  surprise of U.S. Cham ber 
of Com m erce P res iden t Eric Johnston when during a conversation, Stalin, a f te r  
acknowledging Ford's contributions to  Soviet development, suddenly remarked, 
"may God preserve him."^*^^ For th e  chief com m unist to  praise the  chief 
cap ita l is t  was not unusual, but to  invoke th e  nam e of th e  D eity  in doing so was 
suffic ien t to  surprise any lis tener  not fam iliar with Stalin's past as a seminary 
student.
I t was a  popularity  neither sought nor promoted. "Ford just happens to
be," Hindus w rote in try ing to  explain it, " the symbol of som ething which the
102Russian craves  with all the  flam ing fe rvor th a t  is in his soul." Nevins agreed 
with th a t  assessm ent, adding th a t  th e  Soviets viewed Ford not as  a cap ita l is t  but
79
as a revolutionary  in the a r t  of production, " the  chief economic innovator of the
age, th e  leader who had scrapped established methods and hew ed-out d irec t roads 
103to well being. Perhaps there was something symbolic about a village wedding 
which Hindus a t ten d ed  in the  la te  tw enties .  The bridal c a r t  was pulled to the 
cerem ony by a Fordson, around which the  guests gathered  and proudly discussed as 
an exam ple of Soviet progress. The bride, it seems, was ignored.
In la te  1933, a t  the  height of the  t r a f f ic  in technology and tourism, the  
United S ta te s  g ran ted  diplomatic recognition to  the  Soviet regim e. Though 
Washington’s motives s tem m ed from concerns other than cultural, for many the  
new relationship promised the  heightened level of cultural in terac tion  to  which 
they aspired.
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CHAPTER IV
RECOGNITION AND CULTURAL RELATIONS; A DISAPPOINTING DECADE
Understanding be tw een  peoples, newly appointed Ambassador Alexander 
Troyanovsky to ld  an app rec ia t ive  A m eriean-R ussian  In s t i tu te  audience in early  
1934, was basic to  all in te rna tiona l re la tionships; cu l tu ra l  rapprochem en t as  
im p o r tan t  to  cordia l Sov ie t-A m erican  re la t io n s  as the  diplom atic t ie s  only 
re c e n t ly  established. Ambassadors cam e  and w ent, bu t peoples endured and th e  
various harm onies and discords of in te rna tiona l life  rem ained . "Each of our 
countries ,"  he  em phasized, "must have a b roader understanding  of such wholly 
v ita l  m a t te r s  as the  cu ltu ra l asp ira t ions  and am bitions of the  o ther."  As for his 
country , he- assured  his hosts, i t  would respond with a  "hearty  rec ip roc ity"  to  any 
A m erican  e f fo r ts  tow ard  "those cu ltu ra l in te rchanges  on which rea l  understanding 
be tw een  peoples must rest."^
Troyanovsky's rem arks  could hardly have pleased his l is teners  more, for 
th ey  seem ed  to go fa r  tow ard  tu rn ing  th e ir  hopes into rea l i ty .  With d iplom atic  
re la t io n s  estab lished  and the  Soviet am bassador promising to  support the  cause of 
inc reased  exchanges which they  espoused. In s t i tu te  m em bers le f t  th e  dinner 
honoring Troyanovsky and William C. Bullitt ,  A m erica 's  new am bassador to  the  
USSR, feeling  th e ir  pas t e f fo r ts  v ind ica ted  and  th e ir  optimism about th e  fu tu re  
jus tif ied .
The optimism was misplaced. Recognition  did not bring the  an t ic ipa ted
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inc rease  in cu l tu ra l  in tercourse. Until 1937 tou ris t  travel to the  USSR continued
unabated, th e  A m erican-Russian In s ti tu te  continued  its e ffo rts  tow ard organized
exchanges, and some a r t is ts  and sc ien tis ts  m aintained connections with the ir
coun te rparts ,  bu t th e re  was no increase  in th e  level of in teraction . Washington's
passive a t t i tu d e  tow ard  cultura l m a t te r s  and the Embassy's ir r i ta tion  over official
d iff icu lties  did l i t t le  to  encourage con tac ts ,  but the  real problem lay in Stalin's
growing cam paign  of in ternal repression and an ti-fo re ign  rhetoric . As the  decade
progressed th e  co n ta c ts  betw een th e  tw o  peoples becam e increasingly irregular
and infrequent; by the  tim e of the  N azi-Soviet P a c t  almost non-existent. Russian
balle t and th e a t r ic a l  groups continued to  perform  in the  United S ta tes  throughout
th e  decade, bu t alm ost w ithout exception  the  perform ers  were emigres, not Soviet 
2
citizens. The broadened, sy stem atic  exchanges to  which Troyanovsky alluded 
and for which his l is teners  hoped did not m a te r ia l ize  during the  th irties.
A m erican  touris ts  continued to  t rav e l  to the  Soviet Union through the 
middle of the  decade. Some went s t r ic t ly  to  see the sights, trave ling  e i ther  singly 
or in packaged tours, bu t an increasing number joined small study groups led by 
persons with specia lized  knowledge. The study tours covered almost every aspect 
of Soviet socie ty . Travelers  in te res ted  in a r t ,  dram a, economics, education, 
sociology, psychology, criminology and a number of o ther subjects joined tours 
focusing on th e ir  pa r ticu la r  a rea  of in te res t ,  o f ten  led by Americans em inent in 
th e ir  fields. They trave led  with th e a tre  au th o ri t ie s  H. W. L. Dana and Oliver 
Saylor to  th e  annual Moscow T h ea tre  festivals , joined Harvard professors Samuel 
Cross and M erle Fainsod in trave ling  Soviet sem inars, investigated sociological 
trends with University  of Wisconsin sociologist Edward A. Ross, studied economics
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v«'ith professors from the  Wharton School of Finance and pondered the  educational 
im plications of Soviet p rac tices  with faculty  m em bers from Teachers Collepe,
3
Columbia. Prom inent represen ta tives  of scholarly, religious, journalistic, 
l i te ra ry  and educational circles joined Sherwood Eddy's annual vacation 
pilgrimages, which in 1934 added the USSR to  the ir  itinerary.^ Those in teres ted  
in more varied  and genera l topics accompanied Nation correspondent Louis 
F ischer or CBS news editor H. V. Kaltenborn.^ In both 1934 and 1935, Intourist 
expected  over one hundred such tours; in 1936 an tic ipa ted  a to ta l  of seven to  
eight thousand A m erican  visitors.'
Until the  la te  th ir t ie s  Moscow encouraged and fac ili ta ted  the influx of 
A mericans. In tourist advertised  widely in magazines and newspapers, as did the
7
agencies th a t  delivered the trave lers  to In tourist 's  care . In 1936 the  Soviets 
opened th e ir  borders to  foreign automobiles a t  th re e  points, prompting American
Q
Express to advert ise  motor tours of the  USSR. In the  same year M oscow  added
airline rou tes  to  move trave lers  betw een distant points; provided hydroplane
g
service to  fa c i l i ta te  trave l between reso rt  a reas  along the Black Sea co as t . ’ 
Though they w rote  less about their experiences than  did the  trave lers  of th e  la te  
tw enties , A m ericans in general seem ed well sa tisfied  with both Intourist and the 
general t r e a tm e n t  accorded them in the  USSR, though some found cause to  
complain and o thers  ridiculed both the  Soviets and the ir  fellow tourists.^^ Judging 
from what they w rote upon their  re tu rn , many in the  im m ediate  post-recognition 
years  would have agreed with Walter D uranty 's  rem ark  th a t  individual visitors 
w ere "invariably t re a te d  with kindness."^^
If Moscow encouraged Americans to  come to  the USSR, it remained 
re luc tan t to  allow its ordinary citizens to  trave l to  th e  United S tates . In 1936,
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Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov indicated th a t  an increasing number of Soviets
would be allowed to  go abroad, but th e re  was no noticable increase in the  t ra f f ic
1 9to  the United S ta tes .  While thousands of A m ericans saw both the fea tu red  spots
along the  Intourist t ra i l  and the  eyesores betw een, only a handful of Soviets sav;
the good and bad of America.
In the  la te  tw en ties  the S ta te  D epartm en t expressed the opinion th a t
13Moscow encouraged tourism to  promote recognition. If so, th a t  motive was 
gone a f te r  1933. A f te r  recognition, the  desire for western currency was probably 
a major motive, for American tourists  brought valued dollars Vvuth them . If 
c rea ting  a favorable  image of Soviet progress was a prim ary aim, Moscow was 
taking a large chance, for although Intourist fea tu red  model farms and factories , 
i t  could not hide the  rest of the  country, and apparently  made l i t t le  e ffo r t  to do 
so. Whatever its specific  reasons, Moscow deserved cred it for encouraging the  
tourist travel, for without it the personal co n tac t  between Americans and Soviets 
would have been much less than it was. Though Soviet controls re s tr ic t in g  foreign 
trave l by its  own citizens obviated the possibility, it is difficult to  believe th a t  
Washington would have welcomed up to  ten  thousand Soviet visitors pouring into 
the United S ta te s  each summer.
In addition to  those who trave led  as tourists ,  a number of Americans 
went to  the  Soviet Union during the post-recognition  th ir t ie s  to  exchange ideas 
and inform ation. In 1935 a la rge  delegation of A m erican Scientists  and medical 
men a t ten d ed  the  f if te en th  In terna tional Physiological Congress in Moscow, a t  
which H arvard  professor Walter B. Cannon delivered the first major address. 
When not a t ten d in g  formal sessions th e  A m ericans exchanged notes and made 
acquain tances with Soviet colleagues in the ir  labora tories. "Every conceivable
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kindness was shown and honor done us," w rote  one delegate , "and we had the  best
possible opportunity .. .of making ourselves acqua in ted  with Russian physiologists
and physiology. V.’e cam e away with affec tion  for our Russian colleagues and
deeply touched by the ir  welcome." If the  co n tac ts  made during the congress were
pursued, added another, " i t  might well mark an im portant milestone in the
15developm ent of physiology." During the  same summer Frank Lloyd Wright and a
feUow A m erican a rc h i te c t  a t tended  the  first All-Union Congres of Soviet
A rch itec ts  in Moscow, likewise finding them selves well received and duly
1 Aimpressed with the ideas of the ir  Soviet counterparts .
A few ac to rs  and singers also made the journey. In 1934, black baritone
Paul Robeson, g radua te  of R utgers  and Columbia Law School, lYalter Camp All-
A merican football player and Phi Beta Kappa scholar, made the  f irs t of many
trips to th e  USSR, trave ling  a t  the inv ita tion  of Sergei Eisenstein, who proposed
1 7to  cas t  him in the  role of Toussaint L 'O uverture in a planned film. Two years
la te r  a number of Soviet c i t ies  gave Marian Anderson a tum ultuous welcome,
though she was not quite sure w hether th e  adulation s tem m ed from her singing or
18the  opportunity  it presented  to exploit her race  for propaganda purposes. A
number of rep resen ta tives  from th e  th e a tr ic a l  world studied the  techniques of
Soviet ac to rs  a t  the  Moscow T hea tre  Festiva ls , and in 1 935 the  composer Nicholas
Slonimsky visited a number of Soviet musicians, including D m itri Shostakovich,
19whom he invited to th e  U nited S tates.
Shostakovich never made it to  the  U nited S ta te s  during the  th ir ties ,  but
a handful of Soviets, in addition to  those who cam e as s tudents  or members of
technica l delegations, did make the  journey. The head of Soviet cinema
production cam e in 1936, finding much to  like in technique and much to  dislike in
content, and Serge Prokofiev, making his first visit since re tu rn ing  to live in the
92
2 0Soviet Union, cam e  in 1938. The most visible Soviet presence was th e  exhibit it
s taged  a t the  World F a ir  in New York in 1939. But even a t  th e  fair ,  Americans
and Soviets could not re fra in  from competing. The discovery th a t  the  red star
atop  the  Soviet building tow ered  over the  A m erican flag  proved occasion for
care fu l s tra tegy , cu lm inating  in a maneuver d irec ted  by fa ir  p resident William H.
Standley, naval adm ira l and fu ture  am bassador to  the  USSR, th a t  p laced the  s tars
91and s tr ipes  firmly in com m and atop th e  parachu te  jump.
The p a t te rn  of co n tac ts  begun in the  tw en ties  continued into th e  post­
recognition th i r t ie s  in a number of incidental ways as well. A m erican l i te ra tu re  
rem ained  highly popular with Soviet readers , Soviet w rite rs  such as Mikhail
Sholokhov began a t t r a c t in g  an A m erican audience, and a number of Soviet films
22appeared  in the  U nited  S ta te s .  A f te r  1932, Soviet ja zz  musicians w ere again 
p e rm it ted  to play for Sovie t audiences as well as foreigners, an A m erican jazz
band called  th e  Syncopators perform ed for Soviet enthusiasists , and Soviet
23officialdom stam ped  its approval by c rea ting  the  USSR S ta te  J a z z  Band.
A lexander Tsfasman, disciple of Sidney Bechet and worshipper of A m erica  and its
jazz , becam e overnight the  "uncrowned king of Russia," drav;ing the  kind of fam e
24and fortune  accorded  popular perfo rm ers  in th e  United S ta tes .
For many A m ericans the  closest proxim ity to  Soviet cu l tu re  cam e 
through the ac tiv i t ie s  and exhibits which the  A m eriean-Russian  Institu te  
prom oted  during th e  years  im m edia te ly  a f te r  recognition. In 1934 the  Institu te  
a rranged  for a Soviet sec tion  a t  the  In terna tiona l Exhibition of T h ea tre  Arts a t  
New York's Museum of Modern A rt and sponsored a Soviet display a t  the
nc
In terna tiona l Exhibition o f  Childrens' Paintings a t  R ockefe lle r  C en te r .  In
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conjunction with the  Philadelphia Museum of Modern A rt and the Collesre Art
Association, it sponsored a large exhibition of Soviet a r t  which, a f te r  opening in
Philadelphia in 1934, toured  the country  from coast to coast, appearing in the
nation's la rgest c i ties  as well as in places such as Denton, Texas and Kalamazoo,
Michigan, before closing to  the praise of c r it ic s  in New York in 1936.^^ In 1935
the  In s ti tu te  co llabora ted  with VOKS to  arrange  an e labo ra te  Soviet educational
touring exhibit v;hich opened at the Museum of N atura l History, and in the  same
year sponsored a display of modern Soviet printing a t  the  In terna tional Typograph-
97ical Exhibit in New York City. In la te  1937 a  Soviet exhibit trac ing  the  history
of a rc h i te c tu re  in the  USSR appeared under In s t i tu te  auspices a t Columbia,
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H arvard and other universities."
In addition to  sponsoring exhibits th e  In s t i tu te  arranged dinners, p re­
viewed Soviet films, s taged  concerts  and musical programs, sponsored lec tures
and shipped m ateria l of a cultural nature , such as the  photographs and drawings
29which it sen t to  Moscow's Museum of World A rch itec tu re ,  to  the  USSR. " It was
p articu la rly  ac tive  in honoring the f e te s  of Soviet av ia to rs  and explorers and their
A merican coun te rparts .  In 1929 the  In s ti tu te  honored two Soviet aviators  who
flew across Siberia to the  United S ta tes ,  in 1934 gave a dinner for members of the
Cheliuskin A rc tic  Expedition, and in 1937 paid tr ib u te  to  th re e  Soviet flyers who
30flew across the  N orth  Pole to  America. The l a t t e r  occasion drew a particularly  
luminous crowd from th e  A merican av iation  and exploration world, as well as a 
number from abroad. The explorer Vilhajalmur Stafansson presided, Lowell 
Thomas gave the  principal address and Ambassador Troyanovsky represented  
Soviet officialdom. C harles  Lindbergh, Admiral Byrd and J im m y Doolittle, among 
many o thers , sen t m essages of congratu la tion  and goodwill, all stressing the
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in ternational significance of the flight and its potential for increasing American- 
31Soviet con tac ts .  The Soviet flyers replied in kind, emphasizing the cooperation 
between the  two nations in planning and executing the flight. Not only was it a 
unique ach ievem ent in science and aviation, one rem arked  in the  spirit of the 
occasion, it  also represen ted  a fu rther  s tep  toward "the cultural and economic
09
rapprochem ent of the  Soviet Union and the United States."
During the  early th ir t ie s  a new American-Russian Institu te ,  entirely
separa te  from th e  New York organization, developed in San Francisco. Faculty
members from S tanford  and the University of California, two physicians who had
worked with colleagues in the  USSR during the tw enties , l ibrarian  H arrie t  Eddy
and a number of others founded the Institu te; businessmen in teres ted  in trade
rela tions with the  giant nation lying directly  across the  Pacific  joined and 
33supported it. Vladivostok, one pointed out, was closer to San Francisco than to
Moscow. A lexander Kaun, chairman of the  D epartm ent of Slavic Languages at
the University of California was an early member, as was Stanford  University
professor Holland R oberts,  who becam e the organization 's president in 1943 and
remained in th a t  capacity  for over th ir ty  y e a r s . L i k e  the  New York Institute,
the one in San Francisco  m aintained con tac ts  with VOKS, hosted visiting Soviet
dignitaries, exchanged m ateria l with various Soviet agencies and fea tu red  exhibits
portraying Soviet life, many of which it s taged in the city's leading galleries and 
35museums.
Though sharing the sam e nam e and performing many of the  same 
functions, the  tw o Ins ti tu tes  d iffered  in philosophy. While the  New York Institute 
maintained its  custom ary  neu tra li ty  and im partia lity  tow ard non-cultural relations 
and emphasized objective knowledge as the  proper path tow ard  mutual under-
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standing, th e  San Francisco  organization expressed a more overt approval of and
sympathy tow ard the  Soviet s ta te . Whereas those in New York proceeded from
the  belief th a t  friendly relations between the  two countries would result from
mutual understanding, those in San Francisco operated  on the a priori assumption
th a t  those re la tions  should be friendly, and th a t  its function was a t  least in part to
prom ote th a t  friendliness.
In the  im ediate post-recognition period the Embassy, too, tr ied  to
prom ote more in t im ate  con tac ts .  At his own in itia tive  and expense. Ambassador
Bullitt im ported enough baseball equipment to equip four team s in an e f fo r t  to
transplant the  popular game to the communist cam p, and a t  least a few Soviets
37learned the rudim ents  of the  American pastime, though it never becam e theirs." 
The ambassador likewise taugh t polo to  the  Red Army cavalry, though evidently
for purposes political as well as pleasurable, hoping thereby  to  gain increased
38influence with m ilitary  leaders, especially K ilm ent Voroshilov. Though not 
particu la rly  successful as a means toward broadening con tac ts ,  Bullitt 's e f fo r ts  at 
least ind icated  a willingness and an optimism in th a t  direction before Embassy 
officials  becam e disillusioned and discouraged in th e ir  dealings with the Soviets, 
both of which v;ere developments not long in coming.
If in some ways the  pattern  of cu ltura l co n tac ts  continued the same as 
before through th e  m id-th irt ies , d isappointments marked the  pa tte rn  in others. 
E fforts  to increase  the  level of in teraction  in the  a rea  of education failed, as did 
those aim ed a t  increasing the  exchange of perform ing groups. As the flourishing 
tourist t ra d e  ground to a halt, as the  Am erican engineers le f t  the  USSR and as the  
Soviet delegations departed  the  United S ta tes  upon the  expiration of the technical
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assis tance con trac ts ,  the  personal in teraction  th a t  had charac te r ized  the previous
years  ceased  to exist.
Conditions on ne ither  side were conducive to  con tac ts  in the la te
th irties. The depression le f t  l i t t le  room for such m a tte rs  in the  minds of even the
most in te res ted  A m ericans, and recognition was not sufficient to overcom e the
fears  and suspicions of the  Soviet s ta te  th a t  lingered in the  minds of many. When
the  Cleveland Symphony f irs t s taged Shostakovich's "Lady MacBeth of Mtensk" in
New York C ity  in 1935, for example, it was asked to  ne ither  use the  te rm  "soviet"
in the production nor to  invite the Soviet am bassador or the consul to  the 
g o
perform ance. But conditions on the Soviet side w ere fa r  less propitious. Nev/
York only objected to the  use of the term : Moscow informally but e ffectively
banned the en tire  opera.^*^
Beginning with the  assassination of Sergei Kirov in la te  1934 and
continuing through the  purges a t  the end of the  decade, the  Kremlin t igh tened  its
grip on all phases of Soviet life, including the  cultural.  The re la tive  freedom of
a r t is t ic  expression p revalen t during the  tw en ties  bcam e dangerous and useless
formalism, to  be e rad ica ted  a t  all costs. The new task  for a r tis ts  becam e th a t  of
portraying the  virtues of socialism in such a way as to  con tribu te  to  the co llective
effo r t .  In an epoch of class struggle, w ro te  Andrei Zhdanov in 1934, still some
tw elve years  before the  heights  of his no toreity , "a supposedly unpolitical p o r tra i t
of historical rea l i ty  which does not p ic tu re  the  Soviet system as the  best of all
41systems is not fit for Soviet l i te ra tu re  and a r t ."  . , ^A year  la te r  A. M. Gerasimov,
president of the A cadem y of Arts, s ta te d  even more explicitly the  case for
socialist realism in a r t ,  l i te r a tu re  and music. "Ideology," he wrote, "is the
decisive fac to r  in a r t ,  in th e  science of aes th e tic s  and in criticism . The m ilitant
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struggle to c re a te  an ideo log ica l-artis t ic  li fe  can be the  only accep ted  position for 
4 9our a r tis ts ."  Writers, a r t is ts ,  dancers and com posers  disappeared along v i th
generals and P arty  members. The fam ed th e a tr ic a l  figure Vsevolod Meyer hold.
hero to  th e  Soviets during the tw en tie s  because of his revolutionary th ea tre ,
vanished, and his w ife was brutally  murdered. Boris Pilnyak was sentenced  to
death even though he  publicly repen ted  and asked his readers  to  remove his books
from the ir  shelves; Boris Pasternak  was forcibly silenced and perm itted  to publish
only translations."^^ Music for dom estic  consumption was likewise harnessed to
th e  needs of the  s ta te ,  though the g re a t  com posers were le f t  re la tive ly  free
because the ir  music drew in ternational praise and thus provided proof, a t  leas t  to
the  Soviet leaders , th a t  socialism advanced the a r ts .  Thus Shostakovich's censure
for his "Lady MacBeth of Mtensk" was not long lasting; by the  end of the  decade
4 4
he had worked him self back into good standing. ' But th e  USSR S ta te  J a z z  Band,
ridiculed by the  public because its  music was not rea l  jazz , perished because
Stalin considered its  jazz  a l toge the r  too real."^^
While t igh ten ing  its  inward grip, Moscow undertook an intense an ti-
foreign cam paign which, by 1937, po r trayed  fore igners  in the  USSR as spies and
saboteurs, causing many to disappear along with vanishing legions of Soviet
citizens.^® Though A m ericans fared  well in com parison to  o ther foreigners.
ra re ly  suffering  a r re s t  and im prisonment, th e  c l im a te  thus c rea ted  did l i t t le  to
advance cu l tu ra l co n tac ts ,  and on occasion even A m ericans were a r re s te d  and 
4 7held by the  Soviets.
The an ti-fo re ign  campaign was only one item  in a long list of grievances 
th a t  tu rned  A m erica 's  offic ial re la tions with the  Soviets into a steady s tream  of 
bickering and indignation. R estr ic tions  on co n tac ts  betw een diplomatic personnel
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and Soviet c itizens, obstacles blocking the construction  of a new Embassy
building, d iff icu lties  in securing official visas and the  vexations of Soviet customs
prac t ices ,  though mundane problems in individual instances, c rea ted  in the
agg reg a te  a tension and an ir r i ta t io n  th a t  ca rr ied  over into o the r  m a tte rs .  Failure
to  reach  ag reem en t on the la rger m a tte r  of debts and claims stem m ing from the
revolutionary  period fu rther  s tra ined  the  relationship, and the  Moscow meeting of
the  C om in tern  in 1935, considered by Washington a violation of the Soviet promise
in the recognition  ag reem en t not to  in te r fe re  in A m erica 's  in ternal afairs,
48s tre tc h e d  it  even more. Both Washington's formal p ro tes t against the
C om intern  m eeting  and its less form al com plaints  on the  o the r  m a tte rs  e lic ited
Soviet denials on each of the  points, p rom pting  some officials  to  suggest tha t the
am bassador tem porarily  leave the  Soviet Union, th a t  th e  Embassy s ta f f  be
drastically  reduced or th a t  some other form of action be taken as a form of 
49pro tes t .  None of the  suggestions were followed and the  official relationship 
rem ained  as before, but the words of a S ta te  D ep ar tm en t official seemed to have 
proven prophetic . The experience of o ther  countries , th e  Chief of the  Division of 
Eastern European A ffairs  w rote  in July, 1933, had shown th a t  increased official 
in tercourse  following Soviet recognition seem ed  to  c re a te  division and rancor; 
th a t  it tended  to be " the  source of fric tion and ill will r a th e r  than the mainspring 
of coopera tion  and goodwill."^®
It was within this a tm osphere of offic ia l tensions and Soviet repression 
th a t  A m ericans desiring closer cultura l co n ta c ts  w ith th e ir  Soviet counterparts  
had to o p e ra te  in th e  la te  th ir t ie s .  But unlike a decade la te r ,  Moscow's excursion 
into the  a r t i s t ic  world evidenced i tse lf  not so much in d ram atic  ideological 
a t ta ck s  on A m erican  cultural life  as in day to  day disappointments and f ru s tra -
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tions. P articu larly  was this true  regarding efforts  tow ard increased in teraction  in 
the  field of education.
In the  fall of 1933 a man named I. V. Sollins, representing  himself as a 
New York University professor, approached Institu te  of In ternational Education 
president Stephen P. Duggan in the  nam e of the Soviet government, asking for 
advice as to  the  best means of establishing closer cultural re la tions with the 
United S ta tes .  Specifically, as Duggan informed S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  Cordell Hull, 
Moscow wanted to  ta lk  about exchanging students  and professors, arranging joint 
conferences  on educational m a tte rs ,  and establishing a summer school for 
American students  in Moscov; similar to  those which the  Ins ti tu te  had arranged  a t  
the  University of Berlin and the Sorbonne.^^ With Hull's approval and expressed 
hopes th a t  the  trip would con tribu te  to  "the mutually beneficial re la tions  between 
the  peoples of the  two countries,"  Duggan trave led  to the  Soviet capita l in the
C O
spring of 1934 to  fu rther  pursue the  m a tte r . '
In Moscow Duggan discussed various proposals with Soviet officials  and
made defin ite  a rrangem ents  for a summer school to  open a t  Moscow University in
1934. The arrangem ent gave VOKS, Intourist, Open Road and Moscow University
u lt im a te  responsibility for the  school, p laced one American and one Soviet in
charge of educational m a tte rs ,  and s tipu la ted  tha t all instruction  was to be given
in th e  English language. No m ore than  f if ty  s tudents were to  be enrolled, Duggan
understood, and these  were to be carefully  se lec ted  and rec ru ited  by Sollins, who
53was to  ac t as liaison betw een the  s tudents  and Soviet officials.
During the  negotiations Duggan began to suspect the  motives and aims 
of some of th e  Soviets involved, and upon his discovery back in New York tha t
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Sollins had m isrepresented himself, th a t  he was an expelled s tudent ra th e r  than a
professor, his suspicions becam e even g re a te r .  Consequently, Duggan asked I.
Henry Schapiro, an acquaintance living in Paris, to go to Moscow to make sure
th a t  th e  Soviets properly fulfilled the te rm s of the  agreem ent.
Schapiro found Duggan's fears well founded. Upon Duggan's departure
each of the  Soviet agencies pursued its own aims and in teres ts  with l i t t le  concern
about the  consequences for the summer school. Intourist and Open Road trea ted
th e  en t ire  m a t te r  as a  money-making en terprise ; VOKS as a way to  c re a te  a
favorable  im age of Soviet accomplishments. Only Moscow University viewed the
school from the  angle of education. Instead of the  fifty well chosen s tudents  th a t
Duggan envisioned, Intourist enrolled approxim ately  two hundred people with
widely varied  backgrounds, abilities, in te res ts  and levels of education. Some
considered the venture a cheap vacation, some were ideologues and a few were 
55serious students. The uneven assemblage portended problems; the  s itua tion  in 
Moscow assured them.
Classes began toward the  end of July in a w elter of anger and 
confusion. Those who had not p re -reg is te red  encountered scheduling problems; 
once enrolled, most found the classes e i the r  too easy or too difficult. T ransporta­
tion, laundry and o ther  incidental services provided by Intourist were inadequate, 
even a t  prices th e  s tudents  considered fraudulent.^^  Almost no con tac t  with 
Soviet s tuden ts  was perm itted , which caused some of the  most b i t te r  complaints. 
Schapiro tr ied  to co rrec t  some of the  problems, only to  be scorned and ridiculted 
by Sollins, who was the  source of many of th e  d ifficulties. Having got o ff  to  a
good s ta r t  under the  aegis of a respec ted  organization, Sollins to ld  Schapiro, the
57school no longer needed the  services of e i the r  Duggan or the  Institu te . Duggan
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considered withdrawing from the ag reem en t,  but believing his organization had 
com m itted  i tse lf  too deeply to  withdraw without adverse publicity, se t t le d  for 
tak ing  his com plaints  to the  Soviet Embassy in Washington.^^
If Sollins felt the services and the  nam e of the  Ins ti tu te  of In ternational 
Education were no longer necessary, the  Soviet Foreign Ministry evidently fe lt  
otherw ise. A fte r  Duggan complained in Washington, conditions a t the  school 
improved d ram atically . O fficials from both VOKS and the Foreign Ministry began 
p lacating  Duggan and other In s ti tu te  officials, and even Intourist 's  services took a 
tu rn  for the  b e t te r .
If the  s tudents  had com plaints about other aspects  of the school, they
had only praise for the  quality of instruction and the ir  personal re la tions  with the
university  ins truc tors . Once the  reg is tra tion  problems were overcom e and
students  p laced  in classes appropria te  to  their in te res ts  and background the  school
progressed smoothly. In one area  the ins truc tors  were particu la rly  circum spect.
When presenting  the  Marxist point of view, Schapiro reported , th e  le c tu re rs  made
an obvious a t te m p t  to  be detached, quickly squelching th e  ideologues who t r ie d  to
engage others in debate . By the end of the  school the  s tuden ts  had largely
fo rgo tten  the  early difficulties. "The special e f fo r ts  made of behalf of the
students, th e  la rge number of excursions, the  generosity  of th e  le c tu re rs  with
th e ir  t im e  and the social ac t iv it ies  arranged for them , combined with the  novelty
of life  in th e  Soviet Union," w rote  Schapiro, "combined to  c re a te  a very favorable
61impression on the  majority of th e  s tudents."  When the  school was over the 
s tuden ts  se lec ted  one of th ree  extensive tours of the  USSR as a culmination of 
th e ir  sum m er studies, and most departed  the country sa tisf ied  with the  outcome 
of the ir  e ffo rts .^^
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Given the happy no te  on which the 1934 sum m er school ended,
prospects  for the following sum m er looked bright. In tourist again insisted on
selling t ic k e ts  to the school to anyone desiring to  a t tend , but a sa tisfac to ry
com prom ise was reached  by designating as auditors those not properly qualified
for academ ic  cred it.  Columbia professor George S. Counts, em inently  qualified
for the  position by virtue of his acqua in tance  with Soviet educa tors  and knowledge
of Soviet educational p rac t ices ,  a cc ep ted  the position of A m erican d irec to r  of the
school, bu t  upon being unable to fill the ro le turned it over to  fellow Columbia
fi3professor H eber Harper, likewise well qualified  for the  position. As t im e  for 
th e  school approached. H arper went to  Moscow to  assum e his duties, confident 
th a t  the  lessons of the previous sum m er would prevent similar d ifficu lties  during 
the  com ing session.
The school never opened. Simultaneously with  the arrival of some two 
hundred and tw en ty -f iv e  A m erican s tuden ts ,  the president of In tourist called 
H arper to  his office and announced th a t  the  school had been cancelled.^"^ Intourist 
o ffered  to  refund the  unused fees  for food and lodging which the s tuden ts  had 
been required to pay in advance, and to  allow them  to  trave l anywhere in the 
Soviet Union, bu t would do no more.®'^ Some accep ted  the  o ffer, bu t few were 
sa tisf ied  and many outraged. A t le as t  one tr ied  to re tr iev e  his money through 
appeals to  his congressman and th e  S ta te  D epartm en t,  but to  no avail.®^
The Soviets never gave a  s a t is fac to ry  explanation for the cancellation. 
The P residen t of In tourist to ld  H arper th a t  the newly announced program of 
industrial and agricu ltu ra l expansion required the services of so many faculty  
m em bers  th a t  the  school was fo rced  to  close, bu t according to  rum or. Ambassador 
B ullitt told Washington, th e  reason s tem m ed  from conflic t am ong the  various
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Soviet agencies as to  the  proper aims and goals of the  school. Moreover, the
am bassador added, some Soviet officials w ere blaming the  cancellation  on
in te r fe ren ce  in the  school by the A merican Embassy, an allegation which Bullitt
vigorously denied and denounced as a  ploy to  d irec t the  anger of the students
67away from those responsible.
The closing of the  summer school typ ified  the  changing Soviet a t t i tu d e  
tow ard  co n tac ts ,  and provided a porten t of fu tu re  difficulties. Whatever the  
specific  reason for the cancellation, the  s tuden ts  re tu rned  angry, the  Ins ti tu te  of 
In te rna tiona l Education withdrew from any fu r the r  e f fo r ts  for the  rem ainder of 
th e  decade, and hopes for a significant degree of cooperation in the field of 
education  vanished.
Similar d ifficu lties  prevented A m erican  en te r ta in e rs  appearing in the 
Soviet Union in s ignificant numbers during the  years  im m edia te ly  following 
recognition. In this  instance, however, the  problem s tem m ed  a t least in part from 
the  dubious dealings of a New York booking agen t and the  en te r ta iners '  failure to  
m ake adequa te  inquiries about the  ruble exchange ra te s .
In early  1935, Alexander Easy, head of Amsov, a New York agency with 
connections to  Gomez, th e  Soviet s ta t e  tru s t  in charge of en te r ta inm en t,  trave led  
to  Moscov/ to  arrange  reciprocal perfo rm ances  by A m erican and Soviet e n te r ­
ta iners . Easy p a r ticu la r ly  wanted to bring a Soviet ba lle t  to  the  United S ta tes  but 
Moscow, arguing u n ce r ta in ty  as to  how the  dancers  would be received, refused 
permission. Easy did, however, a rrange for some th ir ty  American groups, 
including vaudeville  troupes, opera singers, a black jazz  band, a girls' jazz band,
CO
acroba ts  and an asso rtm en t of other ac ts , to  appear in the  USSR.
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The co n trac ts  arranged  by Easy were explicit and detailed, but written
in s tra igh tfo rw ard  in easily understood te rm s. The Soviets agreed  to  pay
transporta tion  both ways, t ranspo rta t ion  and lodging while in the  Soviet Union,
and a s tipu lated  monthly salary  to  be nego tia ted  with each group. The con trac ts
specifically  s ta ted ,  in large le t te r s  so as not to be overlooked, th a t  the  perform ers
were to  be paid in Soviet money exclusively, th a t  they could not demand payment
or com pensation in any o ther form, th a t  the  money could not be taken out of the
Soviet Union, and th a t  all disputes arising under the co n tra c ts  w ere  to  be se t t led  
69in Soviet courts. What the  co n tra c ts  did not explain was th a t  Soviet money was
divided into gold or "foreign" rubles worth approxim ately e ighty-eight cents, and
paper or "native" rubles worth about th ree  cents, and tha t the  perform ers  were to
be paid in the  la t t e r  currency. Nor did Easy explain these  fac ts  to  th e  perform ers
even though the Embassy specifica lly  pointed them out, cautioning him par-
7 0ticularly  against the  requirem ent th a t  all disputes be se t t led  in Soviet courts .
The first group, billing i tse lf  the  Mangean Four, arrived  in April,
im m ediately  encountered  the rea l i t ie s  of the  con trac ts ,  and appealed to  the
Embassy for help. The stipu lated  salary of fo rty -f ive  hundred rubles per month,
th e  leader of the  group complained, was insufficient to  buy food, much less to
purchase the furs and jewels which the  group had an tic ipa ted  buying a t  the 
71Torgsin s tores . And even if  the  salary  wœre sufficient, they  discovered, the
72Torgsin s to res  would not accep t native  rubles. In order to warn o ther groups 
preparing to  depart  for Moscow the  Embassy inform ed Washington of the  situation
and, a t  its specific  request,  provided the  Mangean group with an in te rp re te r  to  act
73in an unofficial capac ity  to  help solve i ts  dilemma.
Considering the  fa c t  th a t  the  Mangean singers had signed an explicit 
and binding c o n tra c t ,  the  Soviets w ere by no means unreasonable about the
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m atte r .  Though refusing the Mangean demand for a new co n tra c t  raising its
salary to  tw en ty -f ive  thousand rubles per month while retaining the  o the r  benefits
such as lodging and transporta tion , Gomez did agree to provide food as well as
lodging and to provide transporta tion  to  the  United S tates  a t the end of th ir ty
days, even though th e  c o n tra c t  stipu lated  th a t  the  group must perform  for at least
7 4sixty days in order to  qualify for f ree  re tu rn  transporta tion . When the
Com m issariat of F inance refused to provide the necessary currency to  pay for the
re tu rn  trip  a t  the end of th ir ty  days, Gomez, largely a t  the  diplomatic persuasion
of Embassy official Loy Henderson, w rote  a com plete ly  new co n tra c t  raising the
salary by tw elve thousand rubles, and changing the  da te  on the  new agreem en t to
75make the  sum appear a part of the  original salary. The Mangean Four le f t  the
USSR without fu r ther  incident, though a t  Leningrad they were accosted  by Easy,
just arrived to s tra igh ten  out his problems, who th rea tened  both bodily harm and
in tervention by th e  Soviet sec re t  police if  the  group insisted on leaving.
Had the incident ended a t  th a t  point it would scarcely have deserved
notice, but its repercussions continued. Upon pers is ten t inquiries from repo rte rs
about the  A m erican singers "stranded" in the  Soviet Union, Under S ec re ta ry  of
S ta te  William Phillips explained the ir  problems as reported  by th e  Embassy during
a news conference on April n ine teenth , and the  following day newspapers across
the country  carr ied  accounts of th e  perfo rm ers ' plight as w ritten  by an A merican
77correspondent in Moscow. On the  tw en ty -f i rs t  Billboard gave the  story even 
78wider circulation. The news c rea ted  a furor in the  e n te r ta in m en t world,
particu la rly  among those d irectly  involved. Some one hundred perform ers
storm ed Basy's office demanding the  t ru th  about the ir  con trac ts ,  and a number of
79them  con tac ted  the  S ta te  D epartm ent. Basy in turn, a f te r  b i t te r ly  condemning
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the  D epartm en t for its in te rference , issued a press s ta tem en t  designed to p lacate  
his clients. Gomez had informed him, Basy s ta ted ,  th a t  the  A m erican  Embassy 
had both  specifically  approved the co n trac ts  and determ ined th a t  the  Mangean
0 n
singers w ere well t re a te d  and well satisfied . Embassy offic ia ls  had done 
neither, as Basy la te r  adm itted , but th e  assertion  served to sa tisfy  m om entarily  
those with con trac ts .
Moscow was less satisfied. On May th i r teen th  three groups holding 
Gomez co n tra c ts  con tac ted  the  Embassy from New York, saying th a t  they  wanted 
to  perform  in the  Soviet Union despite the ruble situation, and asking Embassy
Q 1
personnel to  persuade Gomez to provide transporta tion  as promised. Because of 
the  problems and difficultures associa ted  with the Mangean tour, Gomez replied 
to  the  subsequent Embassy inquiry, only one additional group would be p e rm itted  
to  en te r  the  country. Only a f te r  th a t  group had given assurances th a t  it  was fully 
sa tisf ied  v.'ith its  salary and working conditions would o the rs  be ad m itted .  But 
even th a t  arrangem en t failed when the  Com m issaria t of Finance refused  money
QO
for transporta tion , though a t  least  one of Basy's clients made the  trip.
In the  meantim e Basy trave led  to the  Soviet Union to salvage m atte rs ,
a rriv ing just in tim e to try  to  prevent th e  Mangean Four boarding th e ir  boat.
Failing in th a t ,  the  booking agent verbally a t tack ed  Embassy personnel in Moscow,
8 3accusing them of meddling in p riva te  m a t te r s  and ruining his plans. Within a 
few days, however, a con tr i te  Basy appealed to  the  Embassy for support in his 
failing scheme, adm itt ing  while doing so th a t  he had lied about a number of 
m a tte rs ,  including his s ta tem en ts  to  the  press th a t  the  Embassy had approved the 
co n tra c ts  and verified  the  sa tis fac tion  of the  Mangean Four. D espite  Basy's 
effo r ts ,  Gomez refused  to fulfill the- te rm s  of the  remaining co n tra c ts ,  nor would
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i t  allow Basy, who rep resen ted  an A m erican organization willing to pay tw elve
thousand dollars a week to  the  Soviets, to  make arrangem en ts  for a Soviet balle t
85company to  appear in the  U nited S ta tes .
W hether the  Soviets would have fu lfilled  the te rm s of the  con trac ts  had 
not the  f irs t group complained, or w hether they  used the occasion to  cancel the  
rem aining groups under c o n tra c t  for the  sam e reasons th a t  they  cancelled the 
1935 sum m er school, is a question impossible to  answer. There was seemingly no 
valid reason to cancel the appearances  of th e  groups th a t  expressed a desire to  
perform in Soviet c i ties  with the  explicit understanding  th a t  they were to  be paid 
in th re e -c e n t  rubles, and re s tr ic te d  as to where they  could spend those rubles; as 
far as th e  Soviets knew, those groups and individuals understood the  ruble 
situa tion  from, the  f irs t,  and were sa tisfied  with th e  te rm s of the ir  con trac ts .  The 
reason for refusing to fulfill the  ag reem en ts ,  i t  would appear, had as much to  do 
with Moscow's r e t r e a t  from foreign c o n tac ts  as with problems concerning the  
co n trac ts  them selves . But w hatever the  Soviet reasoning, the cancella tion  of the  
Basy co n tra c ts  e f fec t iv e ly  elim inated la rge  sca le  con tac ts  in the  field of 
e n te r ta in m en t just as the  cancella tion  of th e  1935 summer school e lim inated  
organized co n tac ts  in th e  a rea  of education.
N ineteen th ir ty -seven  was to have been a banner year for tourism for
the  USSR. Anniversary even ts  ce leb ra ting  tw en ty  years  of socialist progress were
planned throughout th e  country, and advertised  widely. Intourist and the trave l
agencies booking passengers to  th e  Soviet Union highlighted th e  specia l events,
fea tu r ing  par ticu la r ly  a  series of N orth  C ape cru ises  with short trips to Leningrad 
86and Moscow. Over th ree  thousand A m ericans, In tourist an tic ipa ted , would book
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R7passage on six ships for these  cruises alone. A m erican trave l to the  USSR, 
In tourist rep o r te d  in May, was up forty  per cen t  over the  sam e da te  the  previous 
year.®®
But in Ju ly  th e  friendly a t t i tu d e  tow ard  touris ts  began to cool. Several 
dozen passengers on four d ifferent ships, most of whom were Americans, were 
refused  permission to en te r  Soviet te r r i to ry  with the ir  fellow passengers, even
on
though all possessed e i the r  visas or In tourist en try  perm its . ‘ In la te  July, Soviet
au thori t ies  refused  en try  to f if teen  A m ericans from the H am burg-A m erica liner
R eliance , and ten  from Holland-America's Ro t t e r d a m. A  month la te r  f if teen
w ere barred from the  Swedish liner Gripsholm and fo r ty  "undesirables" aboard the
91Italian  liner R o m a, cruising in the Black Sea, were refused  entry  a t  Y alta. The 
five hundred passengers who were allowed ashore were forced  to stand in line for 
hours while Soviet agents  searched  each one thoroughly, and once ashore were 
p e rm itted  only to  visit the tsar 's  palace  and one res tau ran t.  Westerners not 
accustom ed to  nude bathing, the  Soviets s ta te d  in an explanation th a t  many 
refused to believe, might be offended if  allowed to visit the  beaches. Even more 
infuriating v;as th e  fac t  th a t  they w ere encouraged to  exchange the ir  dollars for 
rubles and, having no opportunity to spend the  money, were refused the
Q O
opportunity to  convert  the  rubles back into dollars . '  Two Americans were
a rre s ted  for tak ing  p ic tu res  of innocent objects, though such a p rac t ice  had
93previously been allowed. The an ti-fo re ign  rh e to r ic  and the  fear  of spies and 
saboteurs  was m anifes ting  itse lf  fully in the  Soviet touris t trade .
A m erican  touris t t ra f f ic  to  th e  USSR fell o ff  sharply th e re a f te r .  
Though Intourist early  in 1938 denied a repo rt  th a t  it was no longer in teres ted  in 
the  A m erican tou ris t  trade ,  and indicated  th a t  it  planned to  place advert isem ents
109
in a dozen magazines and th irty-one newspapers in nineteen cities, a search of the
publications in which the  advert isem ents  usually appeared  revealed none, and in
magazines such as T rave l, which over the previous years had carried  feature
ar tic le s  and short item s about the  USSR, such fea tu res  becam e conspicuous by 
94th e ir  absence. According to  the  New York Tim es, Moscow began reducing the
number of visas issued to  A m ericans in the spring of 1938, lim iting them primarily
to professional men, newspaper reporte rs  and trave le rs  on cruise ships, and
res tr ic ting  them to  the  bea ten  paths.^^ The Embassy increasingly complained
about delays in the  issuance of visas, and by the  fall of 1938 was suggesting th a t
98A mericans with no real need to  be in the  USSR leave the  country. The
flourishing A m erican tourist t ra f f ic  to the USSR lasting  from the  la te  tw enties to
the  la te  th ir t ie s  was over, to  lie dormant for tw o decades.
Nor did the approxim ately  one hundred American delegates  planning to
a t tend  the  seventh  In terna tional Congress of G enetics  ge t to  make the ir  planned
trips to Moscov; in 1936. More than forty  were preparing papers to read a t  the
conference, which was of special in te res t  due to  the  fac t  th a t  Herman J. Muller,
serving as head of the  D epartm en t of M utations of the  Soviet Ins titu te  of
Genetics while on leave from the  University of Texas, was to  be the  chairman of
97th e  program com m ittee .  But the  same in terna l problem s th a t  contributed to
regim enta tion  in a r t i s t ic  life  and to  purges in the  political realm, surfacing in
scien tific  c irc les  in the  form of T. D. Lysenko's a t ta ck s  on classical genetics and
98genetic ists ,  caused th e  Soviets to  cancel the  program.
Minor m a tte rs  fu r ther  discouraged con tac ts .  In the  m id-thirties 
Moscow refused its  young sc ien tis ts  fu rther  R ockefe lle r fellowships and grants, 
s ta t ing  th a t  i t  could affo rd  to pay for such m a tte rs  itse lf ,  though it was willing to
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accep t the  ass is tance provided it  was tendered  through an in ternational agency
such as th e  League of Nations ra th e r  than direc tly  from th e  Rockefeller 
go
Foundation. And when Bibliofilm Services, a non-profit agency operated by 
several United S ta te s  government offices, asked the  Soviets to copy some Voltaire 
manuscripts, they  refused, explaining th a t  they were preparing a cata logue for 
publication and unable to  make microfilm copies a t  th e  tim e. Since th e  Soviets 
had announced the sam e catalogue years before, since microfilm copying v;as a 
rapid process, and since Bibliofilm had perfo rm ed  the same service for th e  Soviets 
on a number of occasions. Bibliofilm officials  pointed out, the Soviets were 
obviously unwilling to  perform the  s e r v i c e . M i n o r  in itse lf ,  the  incident 
provided a fo re ta s te  of fu tu re  difficulties in similar m atters .
Washington did l i t t le  to  encourage the  cu ltu ra l relations th a t  Moscow's 
actions discouraged. D espite the changed official relationship, the  S ta te  D epart­
ment's a t t i tu d e  tow ard cultural m a tte rs  rem ained  the same as during the  
tw enties: willing to acquiesce, unwilling to prom ote. Though not opposed in 
principle, the  ac tive  encouragem ent of cu ltural in tercourse  still lay beyond e ither  
its  authorized or accustom ed function.
When, for example, the  A m erican Council of Learned Societies asked 
th e  D epartm en t to  assign an "in te llec tual a t ta c h e "  to  the  Moscow Embassy to  
serve the sam e function in cultural m a tte rs  as performed by m ilitary  and 
com m ercial a t ta c h e s  in their  fields, the  D epartm en t demurred. R ather ,  it 
suggested, th e  Council should support a  p rivate  rep resen ta tive  in the  USSR for 
th a t  purpose, though a t  the  insistence of Council P residen t Mortimer Graves it did 
agree to in s truc t an Embassy officer to handle such m a tte rs  as long as it  did not
I l l
in te r fe re  with his regular duties, and G raves found some Embassy officials, 
particu la rly  Loy Henderson, helpful and cooperative.^
If Washington did l i t t le  to p rom ote  cultural con tac ts ,  the  nation's 
schools did l i t t le  to  educa te  the country  about the  USSR. Despite the increasing 
im portance  of the  Soviet Union in in te rna tiona l a ffa irs ,  American academ ic study 
of its institu tions rem ained almost non-existen t.  A handful of universities o ffered  
courses in Russian language, l i te ra tu re  and history, and in the  summers of 1934 
through 1937 the  In s t i tu te  of P acific  R ela tions  taugh t intensive language courses 
a t ,  respectively . Harvard, Columbia and the  U niversity  of California, but the
1 09
minuscule na tu re  of the  e f fo r t  only i l lu s tra ted  the  enorm ity  of the  need. " In 
th a t  re spec t  th e  Soviet Union was well ahead, for the ir  schools widely taugh t the
1 no
English language as well as A m erican political, social and economic history. 
Even though the courses were taught from the  Marxist point of view, the  Soviet 
Union did not a t  leas t ,  as Ernest J. Simmons noted, "m ake a virtue of ignorance of 
the  United S ta tes ,  however much it may have cheerfully  an tic ipa ted  the collapse 
of our wav of life."^®^
The N azi-Soviet P ac t ,  the  outbreak  of World War n, and the subsequent 
Soviet moves in to  Poland and Finland destroyed  w hatever hopes rem ained  for 
cu ltu ra l con tac ts  during the  th irties . The re la t ive ly  f ree  and easy re la tions  of the 
p re-recognition  period had proven to  be not a prelude to  more in t im ate  in te rac ­
tion, but to  increasing discord and divisiveness. Only a drastic  change in the  to tal 
re la tionship  be tw een  the  United S ta tes  and th e  USSR could change th a t  reality .
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and re la ted  m ate r ia l  found in the  SF-ARI Files, plus conversations with present 
and form er members of the In s ti tu tes  in New York and San Francisco.
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baseball and the Soviets, see Charles  W. Thayer, Bears in the  C aviar (Philadelphia: 
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Soviet." See Orville H. Bullitt, ed.. For the  President, Personal and Secret; 
Correspondence B etw een  Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston; 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), p. 93. See also B ea tr ice  Farnsworth, William 
C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington; Indiana University  Press, 1967), pp. 
130-131.
39 C lare  R. Reiss, Composers, Conductors and C rit ics  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), p. 144.
^^Seroff, P rokofiev , pp. 213-218.
41 Fuelop-M iller, Mind and Face of Bolshevism, p. 291.
^^Ibid., p. 292.
^^M arc Slonim, Soviet Russian L ite ra tu re ; W riters and Problems, 1917- 
1977 (New York; O xford University Press, 1977), pp. 277-291. See also, Seroff, 
P rokofiev , pp. 256-265, Feulop-MiÙer, Mind and F ace  of Bolshevism, pp. 300-302, 
and Jelagin, Taming of th e  A rts , pp. 208-212.
“^ ^For a par ticu la r ly  good explanation of the  s ta tu s  and trea tm en t of the 
g re a t  composers, see  Jelagin, Taming of the  A rts , pp. 208-212.
^^Ibid., pp. 266-267.
^®U. S., D epartm en t of S ta te ,  Foreign R ela tions  of the  United S tates; 
The Soviet Union, 1933-1939. (Washington; U.S. G overnm ent Printing Office, 
1952),' pp. 388-394, 397-400. C ited  he rea fte r  as FRUS: The Soviet Union, 1933- 
1939.
^"^Ibid.
48 Messages concerning these  problems are s c a t te re d  throughout the 
volume FRUS; The Soviet Union, 1933-1939. For som e of the  more relevant 
messages, see pp. 166, 268, 244-245, 391-400, 446-451, 624-629, 638-663, and 855- 
857.
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Ibid., pp. 250-254, 260-262, 624-627, 642-643. Bullitt suggested in 
re ta l ia t io n  for the  C om in tern  m eeting  the  U nited S ta tes  should s tr ic t ly  apply the 
1918 law excluding com m unists  from the  country; should "refuse  visas to  Soviet 
c i t izens  unless they  p resen t . . .sa t is fac to ry  evidence th a t  they  a re  not and never
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Ibid., p. 254.
^^Ibid., p. 6.
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54 g ta te  D epartm en t Records. RG 59. Decim al F ile  811.42761/13. John 
C. Wiley, Charge d 'Affaires, Moscow, to  Hull. D ecem ber 28, 1934. See 
Enclosure No. 3, containing s ta tem en ts  m ade by Schapiro to  Embassy officers, 
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Ibid., Enclosures No. 1 and No. 3.
^^Ibid.
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^^Ibid.
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S ta te  D epartm en t Records. RG 59. Decim al F ile  811.42761/61.
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^^Ibid.
®®State D epartm en t Records. RG 59. Decim al F ile  811.42761/62.
Congressman Wesley Disney to  Hull, t ransm itt ing  le t te r  from George J . Hooper, 
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G^State D epartm en t Records. RG 59. Decim al File 811.42761/60.
BuUitt to Hull. Ju ly  20, 1935. See Enclosure No. 1, containing Heber's  s ta tem en t
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*^^ Ibid., Henderson to  Hull.
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^^Ibid. See also Decimal F ile  811.42761/59. Hazel Mangean to  Under 
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^^FRUS; The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 389, 590.
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Ibid., August 23, 1937, p. 4.
00
Ibid., Ju ly  29, 1937, p. 1; IbW., July  30, 1937, p. 17.
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Vni (February, 1937), p. 57.
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and Sol M eltzer, "Colleges Need Russian History," Journal of Higher Education. IV 
(October, 1933), pp. 358-359. See also, Kathleen Barnes, "Intensive Study of the 
Russian Language," In s ti tu te  of In ternational Education News Bulletin , Xni 
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103 Ernest J .  Simmons, "N egotia ting  on Cultural Exchange," in Raymond 
D ennett and Joseph E. Johnston, eds.. N egotiating with the  Russians (Boston: 
World Peace Foundation, 1951), p. 243.
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CHAPTER V 
WAR AND INCREASED CONTACTS, 1941-1946
The Nazi invasion of the  Soviet Union instantly  c re a te d  a new 
American-Soviet relationship, replaeinpr much of the  animosity aroused by the 
Nazi-Soviet Pac t with a sense of shared purpose and common danger. Washington 
im m ediately  promised aid; within months s ta r ted  a new flow of equipment and 
technique to  the  USSR. A f te r  Pearl Harbor the  relationship becam e even closer 
as the  two countries  becam e partners  in war. In the  United S ta te s  th a t  
partnership  trans la ted  i tse lf  in to  both a new in teres t in cu ltura l friendship and a 
new emphasis on understanding the  culture of its  ally. Organizations formally 
devoted to  cu ltural re la tions, individuals and groups desiring simply to  share their 
cu ltural achievem ents  and, for the  f irs t tim e, official Washington, all worked 
toge ther  to  heighten th e  level of cu ltu ra l cooperation while the  nation's universi­
ties  and libraries expanded the ir  e ffo r ts  to  provide the means of cultural 
understanding.
The New York A m erican-Russian Institu te  played a leading role in the 
endeavor, both in maintaining con tac ts  with the Soviets and in supplying reliable, 
a cc u ra te  inform ation to  the  A m erican people. In the la t t e r  regard  it served a
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particu la rly  valuable function, for despite the ea r l ie r  t ra f f ic  in tourists, te c h ­
nicians and perform ers, the  United S ta tes  had l i t t l e  system atic , detailed  inform a­
tion with which to assess its new ally.
The sudden and urgent demand for inform ation  about the  Soviet Union 
made painfully apparent th e  pre-World War II academ ic  neglect of th e  USSR. In 
1938 only four universities maintained d epartm en ts  of Slavic languages and 
l i te ra tu re .  In the six years  prior to the  war, A m erican universities av/arded only 
four doctoral degrees in all a reas  of Russian and East European studies; in fo rty  
years  prior to  the war the  University of California  a t  Berkeley produced only five 
Ph.D.'s in Russian a re a  studies, four of whom w ere native Russians and one a 
Yugoslav. Im m ediately  before  the war th e re  were only tw elve specialists  in 
Russian history in the  U nited S tates, and of the  dozen "specialists" employed by 
military in tell igence only tw o knev; the  language and had professional tra in ing  in 
the field. The D epartm en t of S ta te  employed six specia lis ts  on Soviet a ffa irs,  th e  
D epartm ents  of Agriculture and Comm erce one each.^
Individuals, organizations and ins ti tu tions  there fo re  turned to  the  
A merican-Russian Ins ti tu te  for inform ation and assistance; as one In s t i tu te  
researche r  com m ented  during the war, "the phone began ringing the  day H itler
O
invaded the  USSR and has not stopped." The A ssocia ted  Press, United Press and 
the  New York Times paid reta in ing  fees  for its  consulting services, as did T im e,
O
L ife , Newsweek and o the r  publications. Columbia, Yale, the  University of 
California, West Point, the  Naval Academy and the  Army Air Force  Instructor 's  
School sought its  assis tance, along with G eneral E lec tr ic ,  Westinghouse, the  
V eteran 's Bureau, th e  D epartm en t of A gricu lture and similar organizations.^
Having m aintained the  professionalism it exhibited before 1936 as the  
Society for C ultura l Relations with Russia, th e  In s t i tu te  was well qualified to
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serve the  new demands placed upon it. As before ,  the  quality  of its  leadership 
shaped the  quality  of its  efforts .  In 1945 th e  Board of D irectors  included 
M ortim er G raves of the  American Council of Learned Societies, Columbia 
sociologist R obert  S. Lynd, Arthur Upham Pope of th e  Asia Institu te  and Columbia 
professor Ernest J .  Simmons, one of the  nation 's  leading scholars on Russian 
history and l i te ra tu re .^  Ernest C. Ropes, head  of th e  Russian section  of the 
D epartm en t of C om m erce  for more than  tw en ty  years, becam e the board 
chairman upon his re t i r e m e n t  from governm ent serv ice  in 1947.® During the  v.’ar 
the  Ins ti tu te 's  s ta f f  a c ted  as advisers, t ra n s la te rs  and language teachers  in 
military program s. B ernard  Koten, head  of th e  In s ti tu te 's  language school, for 
example, earned  the  Legion of Merit for using his language skills to help cap ture  a 
German division, organized  th e  Russian sec tion  of th e  U.S. Army School a t  
B iarritz , and ac ted  as adviser to  such p ro jec ts  as th e  March 29, 1943, issue of Life
rj
devoted exclusively to  th e  Soviet Union.
As ear l ie r  the  library , which by 1948 con ta ined  over th ir teen  thousand 
volumes and lis ted  over four hundred t i t le s  of Russian language newspapers and 
periodicals, co n s ti tu ted  the  core of the  In s ti tu te .  The clipping file, having 
accum ula ted  som e 350,000 indexed item s since th e  la te  tw en ties ,  continued to  be
g
a heavily used asse t,  y ielding answers to thousands of inquiries. The combination 
of books, periodicals, clipping file and professional s ta ff ,  along with numerous 
exchange a r rangem en ts  w ith various Soviet ins titu tions, made it  perhaps the 
public's best source of inform ation on con tem porary  Soviet a f fa irs  during the  war.
Drawing on its resources, th e  In s ti tu te  issued its  own publications and 
carried  on a number of organized cu ltural a c t iv i t ie s .  In th e  la te  th irties  it began 
publishing the  Russian Review  of the  Soviet Union; in 1946 began issuing the
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Russian R esearch  Technical News, listing Dow Chem ical, Du Pont, Monsanto and
the  Bethlehem  S tee l Company among its  subscribers.® Bell Telephone, L ife , Time
and the Wilson Library  used its  translation  services, as did individuals such as John
Hersey, who com missioned the  Institu te  to  p repare  a com plete  transla tion  of a
Moscow symposium on his novel, A Bell for Adano.^® The Institu te 's  language
school, no ted  for its  quality  and professionalism, enrolled as many as one hundred
and eighty s tuden ts  per session during the  war years, in courses ranging from
elem en tary  to  highly specialized.^^ Along v;ith th e  N ational Council of A m erican-
Soviet Friendship, th e  ARI sponsored in-serv ice courses covering various aspec ts
1 2
of Soviet life  for New York C ity  school te ach e rs .  Similar classes acqua in ted
Soviets living in the  U nited S tates, most of whom were serving in some war
re la ted  capac ity ,  with the com plexities of A m erican life. In both instances the
instruc to rs  provided for the  courses were highly com peten t ,  and in some instances
the ranking au tho ri t ie s  in the ir  fields. M argaret Mead and Sir Bernard Pares, to
mention only two, ind icate  the quality  of professionalism to which the In s t i tu te
13aspired in conducting the  courses.
P rom inent speakers, both A m erican and Soviet, both in governm ent and 
out, addressed the  Ins ti tu te 's  regular gatherings. In 1944 Ralph B. Turner, 
Assistant C hief of th e  S ta te  D epartm ent's  recen tly  c rea ted  Division of Cultural 
Cooperation, outlined the  em erging governm ent ro le  in American-Soviet cultural 
re la tions a t an ARI dinner, stressing in his p resen ta tion  the past and fu ture  
im portance of th e  In s ti tu te  and similar p rivate  agencies.^'^ At the  sam e function 
Ambassador Andrei Gromyko em phasized his country 's  desire for closer cu ltu ra l 
relations, likewise pointing out the im portance  of private  cu ltural agencies and 
the  ARI in particu la r .^^  The following year  E rnest C. Ropes, stil l in charge of
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the  C om m erce  D epartm ent's  Russian Division, spoke to an Institu te  audience in 
the  sam e vein. The American people w ere largely ignorant of the  Soviet Union, 
Ropes s ta te d ,  and government agencies were a t  a disadvantage in trying to 
overcom e th a t  ignorance for such e ffo r ts  were instantly denounced as "com­
munistic." Therefore , he urged, the ARI must continue to perform th a t  vital task, 
must continue to  "gather and distribute inform ation about the  Soviet Union...in 
trade , cu lture , science and many other fields.""®
In la te  1943 a new organization devoted to  promoting American-Soviet 
cu ltura l friendship developed in New York C ity  and grew rapidly, a t t r a c t in g  
support from a wide segment of the  American public. The National Council of 
A m erican-Soviet Friendship, through its exhibits, cu ltural exchanges and speaker's 
bureau, perfo rm ed  many of the  same functions as the  ARI, but its public 
orien tation , mass rallies and, most im portantly , its  views on official Washington- 
Moscow rela tions, s e t  it apart .  Vvhereas the  la t t e r  stressed the im portance of 
increasing knowledge on the assumption th a t  this would naturally lead to b e t te r  
rela tions, th e  Council, follov/ing a philosophy similar to th a t  of the San Francisco 
ARI, was much more vocal in its  opinion th a t  the  relationship betw een the  two 
nations should—indeed must—be one of friendship and cooperation.
Its membership, like th a t  of the  ARI, was impressive. A lbert Einstein,
Judge L earned  Hand, Helen Keller, Mary McLeod Bethune, Raymond Robbins,
Lillian Heilman, L eve re tt  Saltonstall, George Vernadsky, Howard Mum ford Jones,
E. W. Burgess, Charlie  Chaplin and W. Rose Benet, to  mention only a very few
1 7members, ind icate  the  diverse nature  of the  people it a t t rac ted .  Equally 
impressive w ere th e  members of the  Council's numerous com m ittees .  Aaron
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Copland, Roy Harris, Benny Goodman, Andre K oste lane tz , F r i tz  Reiner and Serge
Koussevitsky belonged to  the  Music C om m ittee ,  as did A rthur Feidler and Bruno 
18Walter. Rockwell Kent, Paul Manship and Max Weber were members of the  Art
C o m m i t t e e . T h e  Book Publishers Com m ittee , headed by AÎ. Lincoln Schuster of
Simon and Schuster, included the presidents of Dodd, Mead and Company, L ittle,
Brown and Company and the  IV. W. Norton Company, with o thers  representing
20Brentano's and Doubleday. Walter B. Cannon and Irving Langmuir served with
other prominent sc ien t is ts  on the  Science C om m ittee ,  while individuals equally
well known in the ir  professions belonged to the Education C om m ittee  and the
01
A rch itec tu re  C om m ittee .
The various com m ittees  actively  prom oted cu ltura l relations during the
war. Through a r t  sales, donations from a r t  houses and individual contributions,
the  A rt C om m ittee  shipped a r t  supplies to  its Soviet colleagues, thereby
9 2establishing con tac ts  th a t  la s ted  throughout the war years. At the request of
VOKS the com m ittee  sent books, reprin ts  and m agazines portraying the  historical
development of a r t  in th e  United S ta tes ,  and in Septem ber, 1945, some one
hundred and fif ty  A m erican a r tis ts  sent eight hundred reproductions of the ir
works to  th e  Soviet Union in an effo rt,  as one con tribu tor  s ta ted  it, to fu r the r
23" the  mutual knowledge and friendship betw een  the  a r t i s ts  of the  two countries."
The Music C om m ittee  shipped works of contem porary  classical, jazz and folk
music to the  Music Section of VOKS; and the Womens C om m ittee  exchanged
books, photographs and child ca re  exhibits with Soviet womens' organizations.^*^
The Book Publishers C om m ittee  sent books to  rep lace  those destroyed by the
Nazis and one one occasion restored, largely through th e  e ffo r ts  of Mrs. Frank N.
25Doubleday, the  A m erican  sections of two libraries  destroyed by German armies.
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The Science C o m m ittee  both sent and received sc ien tif ic  publications, transla ting  
the  m a te r ia l  rece ived  and giving it  wide circulation through sc ien tif ic  journals in 
th e  United States.^®
The A rch itec tu re  C om m ittee  was especially  ac tive  in promoting con­
ta c t s  during the  war, hoping thereby  to  "c re a te  a basis for cons truc tive  coopera­
tion a f te r  the  w ar...leading eventually  to  exchange visits by a rch i tec ts ,  engineers,
97techn ica l personnel and students."  In collaboration with the  Office of V>"ar
Information the  com m ittee  sen t an extensive exhibit to  the  Soviet Union in the
fall of 1944. Designed to  provide both a rch i tec ts  and  laymen with a coherent
p ic ture of A m erican  a rch i tec tu ra l  development, th e  exhibit t ra c e d  the history of
American building from indigeneous designs through con tem porary  community
planning and development. Organized in part by the  Dean of the  Harvard School
of Design and professionals from the  Columbia School of A rch itec tu re ,  th e  display
28drev; warm praise  from the Soviets. In the spring of 1945 the  com m ittee
sponsored an A m erican-Soviet building conference, fea tu r ing  films, speakers and
exhibits from both nations. The conference, a Soviet offic ial wrote, was "a
trem endous contribution  to  the  exchanges of experiences betw een the  builders and
a rch i tec ts  of your country...and our men who were visiting in the United 
19S tates ."  In th e  fall of the sam e year some two hundred A m ericans a t tended  a
reception  a t  which s till another a rch i tec tu re  exhibit was p resen ted  to the Soviet
on
C onsulate-G eneral,  to  be shipped to  Moscow and thence to  o the r  Soviet cities.
In November, 1945, the  various com m ittees  of th e  Council cooperated 
in a widely publicized exhibit fea tu r ing  Soviet a r t ,  music, science and education. 
Noted au thorities  in each of the  fields conducted panel discussions to fam iliarize 
those a t tend ing  with Soviet ac t iv it ies  and accom plishm ents and th e  S ta te  D epart-
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m ent, dem onstra ting  its  support, sen t an official from its cu ltu ra l relations 
division to  explain Washington's developing role in cu ltu ra l co n ta c ts  betw een the
Ql
tw o countries.
A series  of mass rallies designed to publicize the  cause  of postwar 
friendship m ade the  Council highly visible. Held in Madison Square Garden, the 
rall ies  fea tu red  nationally  known speakers , drew large crowds and received 
messages of support and encouragem ent from the nation 's most powerful leaders, 
including th e  president of the United  S ta tes .
The firs t  rally, based on the  th e m e  th a t  v ic tory  was near and planning
39
for postw ar par tne rsh ip  im pera tive , was held in November, 1944. A large and 
fes tive  second rally  s taged  in May, 1945, ce leb ra ted  the v ic tory  in Europe and 
gave specia l honor to  the  e f fo r ts  of th e  Red Army. Tributes, praises and 
expressions of goodwill looking forw ard  to fu tu re  close re la tions  flowed freely. 
The U.S. A rm y Com bat Infantry  Band played Soviet marching songs, and gave a 
special perfo rm ance  of Prokofiev 's "March to  Victory." Paul Robeson, a con tro ­
versial figure in some q u ar te rs  because of his expressed adm iration  of th e  Soviet 
Union, sang Red Army songs." ' G eneral Joseph  St il well was scheduled to  be the 
fea tu red  speaker but m ilitary  duties kept him away, forcing the  audience to  s e t t le  
for a message read  by his wife.^^ S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  S te t t in ius ,  Henry A. 
Wallace, H arold  Ickes, Eleanor Roosevelt and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko 
likewise sent messages, as did President Truman. "We must now," the  president's
message read , "bend every  e ffo r t  to  work to g e th e r  to  assure th a t  these  sacrif ices
35shall not have been in vain."
A th ird  ra lly  was held in November, 1945, again in Madison Square 
Garden, and again P residen t Trum an sen t a message expressing his "continued
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in te res t  in all e ffo r ts  to continue the good relations betw een th is  country and the 
Soviet Union.'"^® G eneral Eisenhower wired his congratu la tions along with his 
conviction th a t  American-Soviet friendship was "one of the  corners tones  on which 
th e  edifice  of peace must be built."  Nothing was more im portan t ,  the general's 
m essage read, than "m utual understanding  on the  part of each of the institutions
07
and custom s of the  other." ' A lbert Einstein s tressed  the  necessity  of
"perm anent close collaboration" with the  Soviets and a number of others,
including Under S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  Dean Acheson, the  principal speaker,
38expressed similar sen tim ents. The D ean of Canterbury  flew  to the  United 
S ta te s  to  speak a t  the  rally, a f te rw ard  touring the  country  prom oting  A m erican-
og
Soviet understanding and visiting with President Trum an a t  the White House.
On the  west coast th e  San F rancisco  A m erican-Russian In s t i tu te  played
a similar role in prom oting w artim e cultura l con tac ts .  A rch itec ts ,  musicians,
th e a t r e  workers and movie cam eram en  con tribu ted  m a te r ia ls  and supplies to  the ir
Soviet coun te rpar ts  which the In s ti tu te ,  through the  use of a Lend-Lease plane, 
40flew to  Moscow. Over six thousand books, along with microfilm recording and
reading equipment, were shipped to Soviet libraries; and more than seventy
exhibits on various phases of Soviet life  were provided to  A m erican  museums,
schools, universities, a r t  galleries  and arm y o rien ta tion  centers. I ts  publication
Soviet C u ltu re  in W artime was reques ted  by public and university  libraries
42throughout the  nation. A film on w artim e Soviet medicine a t t r a c te d  eight 
hundred m edical people, including many from the  Stanford  and University of 
Californ ia  medical schools, both of which dismissed classes to  allow faculty  and 
s tuden ts  to  a t te n d  the  e v e n t . A f t e r  th e  war the  dem and for its m ateria ls  
rem ained  strong. In 1946 and 1947 the  In s t i tu te  received more than five hundred
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requests  for m a te r ia ls  from schools located  in every s ta t e  in th e  Union; on one 
morning alone, in Septem ber, 1946, requests arrived for such m ateria ls  from 
tw enty-six  c i ties  in seventeen states.^^
A highlight of the San Francisco  Ins ti tu te 's  ac tiv it ies  was its 
Shostakovich Music Festival, during which radio s ta tions played the composer's 
music, le c tu re rs  discussed his life  and musical contributions and the San Francisco 
Public L ibrary  fea tu red  exhibits based on his works. A forty-five minute 
shortw ave broadcast beamed to  Moscow a t  the  height of the  Nazi push on 
Stalingrad, fea tu ring  both Shostakovich's music and greetings from such eminent 
musicians as Leopold Stokowski, Serge Koussevitsky and Yehudi Menuhin, cul­
m inated th e  festival.^^
The In s t i tu te  also welcomed a number of Soviet officials during th e  war 
and postw ar years. During the  U nited Nations Conference a t  San Francisco the 
Ins ti tu te  held a recep tion  for Foreign Minister Molotov, a f te r  which the en tire  
Soviet delegation was honored a t  a banquet a t ten d ed  by Governor Earl Warren.
In turn, a  number of Soviet sc ien tis ts  in the  United Nations delegation hosted a
4 7reception for e ight-five  of the ir  American colleagues from the  Bay area . In
1946 Dr. V. V. Par in. Secre ta ry  General of the  Soviet Academy of Medical
Sciences was honored a t  an Ins ti tu te  dinner, as w ere a number of others such as
th e  poet and newspaper correspondent K onstantin Simonov, who voiced warm
appreciation for Am erica 's  contribution to  the  Soviet war e ffo r t  and expressed
hope for continued cu ltural cooperation even as the  postw ar divisiveness lessened
48the chances of those hopes becoming reality .
While the  organizations dedicated to A m erican-Soviet cultural relations 
took the  lead  in widening con tac ts  during the  war, o the r  A m ericans not formally
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com m itted  to such a cause con tributed  to  the  sam e end. W artim e conditions 
rendered  d irec t human co n tac t  d ifficult,  but music, films and prin ted m ateria l  
provided a link between the  people of the  two countries. And once the conflict 
was over, scores of individuals and organizations approached th e  S ta te  D epart­
ment with schem es for maintaining friendly rela tions betw een th e  form er allies 
through the  strengthening  of cu ltural in teraction .
Music served as a particu la rly  im portan t medium of cultural in te r ­
change. O rches tras  throughout the  United S ta tes  perform ed concerts  of aU- 
Russian and aU-Soviet music, prom pting  a t  leas t  one c r i t ic  to complain th a t  the 
outpouring of Russian music rep resen ted  less a tr ibu te  to  another nation and its
composers than  an a t te m p t  by ce r ta in  schools of music to prom ote the ir  
49preferences. Program s ded ica ted  to  Prokofiev and Shostakovich were par­
ticularly  prevalen t, bu t o thers  received  a t ten tion  as well. In some cities  such 
concerts  had been presen ted  before the  war but in o thers  they were something 
new. The Houston Symphony O rches tra  presented  an all-Soviet concert in 1943 
which one trade  magazine deemed, for instance, an historical event in the musical 
history of the  Southwest.
If A m ericans becam e fam iliar with Soviet music during the war, the 
same was true  of the  Soviet people regarding A m erican music. In th e  faU of 1942, 
American com posers and publishers donated the  com plete  orchestra tion for 
tw enty-one symphonies plus the  music and lyrics to  more than sixty popular songs 
which, a f te r  being reduced to microfilm, the  O ffice of War Information sent to 
Moscow. Years la te r ,  Americans in the  USSR were s till surprised to  hear such 
numbers as "Alexander's R ag tim e Band," "There's A Tavern in the  Town," "By the  
Light of the  Silvery Moon," "Over There," "Tea for Two," "Stardust," "White
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C hris tm as,” "Deep in the  H eart  of Texas," or any of a number of old favorites , all
p a r t  of the w artim e  shipment.^^ "Alexander's R ag tim e  Band" becam e a particu la r
favorite  in Moscow's nightclubs, and Moscow jazz  o rchestras  clam ored for scores
52of even more ja zz  tunes. In addition to hearing  American music the  Soviets—at
least a favored few —w ere afforded the opportunity  to  see the la te s t  movies via an
ambitious p ro jec t begun by Ambassador Standley in 1942.^^
Libraries also joined the e f fo r t  to  acquaint Americans with the culture
of the ir  w artim e ally. Throughout the war years local libraries  displayed m ateria l
on Soviet life, w ith  the e f fo r t  reaching its  peak in May, 1944, when the  A m erican
Library  Association, in conjunction with a "Russia Book Week" sponsored by th e
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, urged its members to  fea tu re
books, exhibits and posters  on the  Soviet Union.^'^ The Library of Congress used
the  occasion to  announce the  opening of i ts  new Slavic C en ter ,  made possible by a
Rockefe lle r g ran t and intended, s ta te d  lib rary  d irec to r  Archibald MacLeish, to
play a particu la rly  im portan t role in m eeting  the  postwar demands for more
55extensive m a te r ia ls  on th e  Soviet Union. To honor the  occasion th e  Soviets
presented  the Library  of Congress with a portfo lio  of p ic tu res  from an exhibit on
A m erican life shown in Moscow while th a t  city  was under seige.^® The following
month the L ibrary  of Congress fea tu red  ano ther  exhibit on the Soviet Union,
emphasizing par ticu la r ly  th e  developm ent of th e  USSR Academy of Sciences and
57its  role in Soviet society .
On a more academ ic level both  universities  and libraries  expanded the ir  
e ffo r ts  in order to  accom m odate  the  increased  dem and for knowledge of the 
Soviet Union. Army and Navy subsidies and p r iva te  foundation g ran ts  allowed
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scores of schools to  e i ther  expand existing  programs or c r e a te  new ones; by la te  
1947 the  dozen or so colleges and univers ities  teach ing  Russian language and 
l i te ra tu re  a t  the  beginning of the  war had grown to more than one hundred and 
fo rty ,  and th a t  number was climbing rapidly.^^
The increased academ ic in te re s t  forced both p rivate  and university 
l ib raries  to  devise b e t te r  methods of acquiring and distributing scholarly  m ateria ls  
re le v an t  to  the  USSR. As early  as 1943 the  Rockefe lle r  Foundation, concerned 
over th e  lack of knowledge of the  Soviet aUy and the  lack  of means to  acquire 
th a t  knowledge, sponsored a conference  to  discuss the dilemma. A resu lting  grant 
a c c e le ra te d  the  cataloging of the  Slavic C ollection  of th e  Library of Congress.^^ 
More significantly , a second gran t financed the  compiling of a checklist of 
m a te r ia ls  considered necessary  for th e  scholarly  study of th e  USSR. Upon 
com pletion  the  checklist showed th a t  many of the  necessary  i tem s were not 
available; th a t  the  United S ta tes  was l i t t l e  p repared  to  undertake  a serious study 
of the  Soviet Union.^^
In June, 1945, e ighteen  of th e  nation 's  leading university  lib raries  sent 
rep re sen ta t iv e s  to  Washington to  fu r th e r  deal with the  problem. In order to 
assure a reasonably  com ple te  collection of m ateria ls ,  the  librarians agreed, it was 
necessary  to  establish both a more e f fe c t iv e  system of exchange with Soviet 
agencies and a more sy s tem a tic  means of cooperation  am ong themselves. 
Individual ins ti tu tions , they  decided, must take  responsibility for building com­
p le te  co llections in specific  a reas  to  avoid duplication and delay. Moreover, they
agreed , Washington's help was essentia l in securing the  desired  m ateria ls  from 
61Soviet institu tions. Consequently a th ree  man delegation approached the S ta te  
D ep ar tm en t concerning the  m a tte r ,  finding th e re  both concern  and promises of
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assis tance; promises which, D epartm en t officials  were shortly  to find, were easier 
made then  fulfilled.
In November of the  sam e year  approxim ately  f i f ty  delegates rep resen t­
ing fo r ty - tw o  of the nation 's leading private  lib raries  m et in New York City to  
discuss the ir  particu lar problems re levan t to  the  acquisition and distribution of 
Soviet m ateria l .  Sponsored by th e  A m erican-Russian  Ins ti tu te ,  the  m eeting  
a t t r a c te d  delegates from such organizations as the  Hoover Institu tion on War, 
Revolution and Peace, th e  Council on Foreign R elations, th e  Foreign Policy 
Association, the  OWI and the  D epartm en t of A griculture. Leading newspaper and 
book publishing firms sent rep resen ta tives ,  as did universities  such as Brown, 
which was in the  process of building a collection covering Soviet m athem atics .  
Acting Librarian of Congress Werner Clapp a t ten d ed  to  answ er questions for his 
institu tion, the  sec re ta ry  of th e  Soviet Consulate  rep lied  to inquiries concerning 
exchange possibilities, and th e  Lenin Library wired its  willingness to  coopera te  
with the libraries  rep resen ted  a t  the meeting. Those a t tend ing  traded  inform a­
tion, established channels of com m unication and coopera tion  and generally
fi Q
inform ed them selves of th e  resources  and ac tiv it ies  of th e  others. Prior to  
adjournm ent the  delegates d ra f te d  a message to  be sen t to  Moscow through the  
S ta te  D epartm en t,  requesting  th e  Soviets, now th a t  th e  war was over, to resume 
the normal flow of publications betw een  the  two countries .^^
While the  lib rarians  sought to improve th e  availab ility  of m ateria ls ,  
o thers  concerned  them selves with transla ting  se lec ted  Russian ti t le s  into the  
English language. In 1944 th e  A m erican  Council of Learned  Societies, operating 
under a Rockefe lle r g ran t, began transla ting  distinguished Russian and Soviet 
works in the  humanities and social sciences in order, as i t  s ta ted ,  "to prom ote a
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b e t te r  understanding in America of Russian cu lture and the Russian mind."^^ By
1948 the undertaking, known as the  Russian Transla tion Pro ject,  had some th ir ty
full length works in various s tages  of completion, had already published a number
of artic les  and had agreed , a t  the  request of th e  S ta te  D epartm en t,  to  transla te
ce r ta in  Soviet newspapers and periodicals.^® The following year the Joint
C om m ittee  on Slavic Studies, established by th e  A m erican  Council of Learned
Socie ties  and the  Social Science R esearch  Council, began publishing the C urrent
Digest of th e  Soviet P ress . With Philip E. Moseley as chairm an and Ernest J.
Simmons as s ec re ta ry ,  the  C om m ittee  undertook the  transla tion  of most of the
a r t ic le s  in P ravda and Izvestia  as well as selec tions from forty  o ther magazines,
thus making availab le  to A m ericans within th ree  weeks a f te r  publication in
fi7Moscow im portan t sources of Soviet thought.
During the  war years numerous m agazines and periodicals likewise tr ied  
to  increase  A m erica 's  knowledge of its  Soviet ally. Publications ranging from 
popular to  scholarly  fea tu red  ar tic le s  and inform ation about the  USSR, and some, 
like Life and th e  A m erican Sociological R eview , devoted en tire  issues to the 
Soviets.^^
A m erican  scien tis ts  and medical specia lis ts  also maintained con tacts  
with Soviet colleagues during the  war, exchanging inform ation, publications and 
delegations and stressing the need for continuing such co n tac ts  in the postwar 
period. The A m erican-Soviet Medical Society, founded by W alter B. Cannon and 
housed in the  sam e building as the  New York A m erican-Russian  Institu te , played 
an especially  im portan t role in m aintaining re la tions  betw een non-government 
agencies. Drawing on the  Institu te 's  fac il i t ies  and connections, the  Medical
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Society  published the resu lts  of Soviet research  in its A m erican Review of Soviet
Medicine, hosted  visitors from the  Soviet medical com m unity and sponsored
similar visitors to  the  USSR. ' Dr. S tuart  Mudd of the  University  of Pennsylvania
Medical School, president of th e  Society, visited a number of Soviet institutions
during the au tum n of 1946, and in turn  Soviet physicians a t tended  the Society 's
70annual meetings during the  war and early postwar years.
The U nited S ta te s  Public Health  Service likewise maintained friendly
co n tac ts  with Soviet agencies. In January, 1944, Dr. Michael B. Shimkin, chief of
the  H ealth  Service 's O ff ice  of In ternational Relations, trave led  to Moscow to
study advances in a number of fields. Accompanied by H arvard professor A. Baird
Hastings, Shimkin found the  Soviets a l toge the r  friendly and frank. "The Soviet
m edical au thorities ,"  the  two wrote upon the ir  re tu rn , "made every effo rt  to
provide us with unsupervised con tac ts  with the ir  medical sc ien tis ts . . . to  accede to
our requests  for specific  inform ation on m a t te r s  perta in ing  to  medical 
71research."
For a tim e it  appeared as though A m erican  and Soviet researchers  
might co llabora te  on a cancer  research  project. During the  early th irties  the 
husband and wife team  of Nina Klyueva and Georgi Roskin developed a promising 
serum for cancer t r e a tm e n t ,  a t t r a c t in g  thereby  th e  a t ten tio n  of a number of 
A merican sc ientis ts .  In Septem ber, 1945, Dr. Theodore Hauschka of Philadelphia's 
Laukenau Hospital R esearch  Ins ti tu te  applied for a visa to  trave l to  Moscow to 
observe the Soviet experiments; in m id-October the  N ational Cancer Institute, 
increasingly intrigued by th e  researchers ' results, decided to  send doctors Michael 
B. Shimkin and Murray J .  Shear to accom pany Hauschka.^^ Ambassador Walter 
Bedell Smith also took a personal in te res t  in the  m a tte r ,  con tac ting  a number of 
high Soviet offic ials  about th e  possibility of A m erican  cooperation and personally
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visiting the  Soviet sc ien tis ts  in the ir  labora tory .^^  The Americans le f t  no doubt 
th a t  they were in te res ted  in the  Soviet serum and desired to  collaborate  in its  
fu rther  development, but the  desire was u ltim ate ly  to  prove more frus tra ting  than 
f ru i t fu l / '^
Scien tis ts  in non-medical fields coopera ted  with Soviet colleagues in 
their respec tive  specia lties  during the war and early  postwar years. In addition to  
the exchanges carr ied  on by the  Science C om m ittee  of the  National Council of 
Am erican-Soviet Friendship, the  N ational Academy of Sciences mailed its  Pro­
ceedings to over fo r ty  Soviet institutions, rece iv ing  in turn  the  publications of a
75varie ty  of Soviet agencies. ' In 1942 th e  A m erican Philosophical Society  e lec ted  
the  Soviet sc ien tis t I. M. Vinogradov to its membership, and four years la te r
e lec ted  Pavel Alexandrov, both of whom Prince ton  University invited to  visit its
7ficampus during the  early  postwar months. Individual scien tis ts  such as Harvard
astronom er Harlow Shapley carr ied  on personal correspondence with th e ir  Soviet
counterparts ,  exchanging in the process both  scientific  inform ation and non-
77scien tific  expressions of goodwill.
Jam es  B. Conant, Harvard president, scien tific  adviser and atom ic 
bomb researche r ,  form ally s ta ted  the inform al sen tim ents  of many of his fellow 
scien tis ts .  Vfashington should place sc ien tific  in terchange with the Soviet Union 
on a sy stem atic  and ra tional basis, he suggested to  Secretary  of S ta te  Byrnes in 
Decem ber, 1945; should sponsor a l te rna ting  annual conferences in the fields of 
agricu lture , medicine and physics and o the r  branches of science, betw een which a t  
leas t  two distinguished scientists , represen ting  th e  National Academ y of Sciences 
and the  Soviet Academy of Sciences, should work in the country  of the  o ther. 
Scientis ts  from each nation should periodically tou r  each other's  basic research
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labo ra to r ie s  and sc ien tif ic  a t ta c h e s  should be assigned to the  Embassies in each
country  to  fa c i l i ta te  th e  flow of inform ation from these  laboratories.
"Personally," Conant concluded, "I believe th a t  every th ing  th a t  can be done to
increase the  flow of basic sc ien tif ic  in form ation be tw een  Russia and the United
S ta te s  and the  in terchange of sc ien tis ts  wiU work for the  benefi t  of both
countries .. .indeed it seem s to  me th a t  it is through th e  medium of science,
education  and the a r ts  th a t  we can build bridges of com m unication between the 
78tw o countries."
The kind of sc ien tif ic  in terchange which Conant envisioned seem ed well
within the realm of rea l i ty  in the  early  postw ar period. In 1946 th e  Soviets
invited th i r ty  A m erican sc ien tis ts  to  help ce leb ra te  the  Two Hundred and
T w en tie th  Anniversary of th e  Soviet Academy of Sciences, to  begin in the  la t te r
p a r t  of June. Sixteen of the  sc ien tis ts  accep ted  the  invitation, along with
approxim ately  tw o hundred from o the r  countries , with IVioscow paying—or a t  least
79offering  to  pay—all expenses.
From the viewpoint of in ternational cu ltura l c o n tac ts  the  anniversary 
celebration  was a huge success. Each sc ien tis t confe rred  with colleagues in his 
own field; a t tended  m eetings and visited labora to r ie s  during form al sessions; 
enjoyed banquets, recep tions  and a var ie ty  of social pleasures during informal 
gatherings. The Soviet governm ent honored the A m ericans as special guests  at 
the  g re a t  victory ce leb ra tion  held in Moscow on June tw en ty -fourth , la te r  
en te r ta in in g  them a t  a special Kremlin banquet hosted by Stalin  and a t tended  by
o n
top  members of th e  Soviet heirarchy.
More im portan tly  the Soviets, accord ing  to delegation spokesman 
Harlow Shapley, appeared  eager to  open a new e ra  of coopera tion  with w estern
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scien tis ts .  The Soviet Minister of Education, th e  H arvard  scientist reported , 
expressed a deep in te re s t  in exchanging sc ien tis ts  and science students, and the 
Soviet Embassy confirm ed  tha t in te res t  upon his re tu rn  to  the United States.®^ 
Shapley th e re fo re  devised a plan to  rec ip roca te  the  Soviet invitations to  the 
anniversary  celebration . The American Philosophical Socie ty  and the National 
Academy of Sciences, he suggested to  S ta te  D epartm en t officials, should invite 
approxim ately  f i f ty  Soviet sc ien tis ts  to  the United  S ta te s ,  paying all expenses 
except tran spo rta tion ,  which was to  be the  responsibility of the  Army Transport 
Command. Both Frank  B. J e w e tt  and Thomas G ates, the  respec tive  presidents of 
the  sponsoring sc ien t if ic  bodies, Shapley assured D ep ar tm en t officials, favored 
the  proposal.
P residen t Trum an and S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  Byrnes, both  of whom listened
t o  Shapley's suggestions, endorsed the idea, ag ree ing  with S ta te  D epartm en t
official Elbridge Durbrow th a t  the  plan rep resen ted  a serious s tep  toward
83improved cu ltu ra l re la tions. Moreover, as Durbrow pointed  out, i t  was a plan
th e  Soviets would most likely accept, since i t  rep resen ted  a re turn  invitation to
P4their ea r l ie r  overture . '
But Shapley had ac ted  prem ature ly  in prom oting  his b ila tera l program. 
Though such invitations had been discussed, Frank B. J e w e t t  informed th e  S ta te  
D epartm ent, no s teps  had been taken to  im plem ent them because  many sc ien tis ts  
believed they  rep resen ted  the  wrong approach. D etlev  Bronk, foreign sec re ta ry  of 
the  National A cadem y of Sciences, best expressed th e  reasoning of the opponents. 
The Soviets them selves , Bronk argued, had se t  a b e t te r  exam ple by th e  multi­
la te ra l  na tu re  of th e i r  ea r l ie r  invitations; a b ila te ra l  approach might thus be 
considered l i t t le  m ore than  high level propaganda. Moreover, Bronk continued, a
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number of Soviet scholars  had expressed hopes of achieving the  same easy give
and take relationship w ith A m ericans as those enjoyed by o ther  nations and those
hopes might well be harm ed  ra the r  than helped by inviting Soviet scientists  to the
exclusion of others.®^
The S ta te  D ep a r tm en t remained neutra l concerning the  form and scope
of the  invitations, but adopted  a significant a t t i tu d e  toward the  larger issue. It
was the general policy of the  government to encourage as much scientific
in terchange with th e  Soviets as possible, a D epartm en t official wrote, but the
invitations should be worked out insofar as possible on a non-political basis; should
be handled from the  viewpoint of scien tif ic  re la tions  ra th e r  than th a t  of
86in ternational politics. U ltim ate ly  the  Bronk view prevailed. Only four Soviet
sc ien tis ts  were invited, along with rep resen ta tives  from o the r  nations, to  a t ten d
th e  1946 meetings of the  N ational Academy of Sciences and the A merican
87Philosophical Society. But despite the  small number of Soviet scientis ts  invited 
as compared to the ea r l ie r  invitations from the  USSR, th e re  were no political 
motives or anti-Soviet sen tim en ts  involved. Hopes for postwar cooperation 
rem ained high among influential segments of the  nation 's scien tis ts  during the 
early  postwar period.
Educators, ac to rs ,  producers, musicians, sports  promoters, universities 
and s tudents  also devised p ro jec ts  for furthering cu ltu ra l co n tac ts  during the  early 
postwar years. In O ctober, 1945, EUa Winter sought the assistance of both the 
S ta te  D epartm ent and th e  Soviet Embassy in trying to  bring th e  Red Army Chorus
go
to  the United S ta tes .  The following spring the  Boston Symphony O rchestra  
invited Eugene Mravinsky of th e  Leningrad Symphony to  visit Boston as its  guest
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conductor; shortly  th e re a f te r  i t  volunteered to give a serious of conce r ts  in the 
USSR, hoping thereby "to repay in some small part the  magnificent cooperation of
on
th e  Soviet Union during the war." ' In both instances it  o ffered  to  pay all
expenses; in the  l a t t e r  o ffered  to donate  all proceeds to  a Soviet-designated 
90agency. The Sol Hurok agency invited a Soviet ballet company to  p a r t ic ip a te  in 
th e  In ternational Dance Spring Festival a t  th e  M etropolitan Opera House, to  tour 
th e  United S ta tes , or to  do both.®^ The president of the  M etropolitan Opera 
Association con tac ted  D epartm en t officials  concerning means of establishing 
closer con tac ts  with the Soviet opera and ballet world, and the mayor of New 
York C ity  invited the  Soviets to  send e i ther  the  Moscow or Leningrad ballet 
companies or the Moiseyev Dance Ensemble to help ce leb ra te  the  c i ty ’s golden 
jubilee.^  ^
Movie producer Mike Todd devised one of th e  more ambitious postwar 
projects, proposing to  sponsor an American tour by the  composers Shostakovich 
and Prokofiev, the  Red Army Chorus, a Soviet symphony o rchestra  and a number 
of o ther groups. In arranging the  tour, Todd assured the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  he 
would spare no expense; v/ould present the  Soviet ar tis ts  with a dignity "com­
m ensurate with the ir  position, the ir  a r t  and th e  nation they represen t."  Millions 
of Americans, he envisioned, would a t ten d  the Soviet perform ances in large
outdoor stadiums and indoor auditoriums, promoting thereby  warm human rela-
93tions on all sides and "goodwill and understanding between the two nations."
The nation’s universities likewise joined the  e ffo rt .  The Association of 
American Colleges, rep resen ting  some six hundred colleges and universities, 
sought permission through Secre tary  of S ta te  Byrnes to  send a film crew  into the 
USSR to make docum entary  films and gather  m ateria ls  for educational purposes.
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assuring the Soviets while making the request of the objective and scholarly
na tu re  of the  proposed e n d e a v o r /^  Cornell University invited four graduate
s tudents  and a ranking professor of Soviet l i te ra tu re  to  le c tu re  on its  campus
during the  1946-1947 school year.®^ P rince ton  invited tw o em inent Soviet
sc ien tis ts  to  spend a year lec tu r ing  to  its students, and asked tw o other Soviet
9firep resen ta tives  to  a t te n d  its  b icentennial ce lebration . Yale geology professor
R ichard  Flint sought Moscov/'s permission to  work with Soviet colleagues on a
research  p ro ject in Siberia, the  National Colloid Symposium, m eeting  a t  S tanford,
invited a noted Soviet sc ien tis t to  be its principal speaker, and the  American
Society for Russian R elief,  ac ting  through Dr. Edward L. Young, o ffered  to  build
97a plant to produce penicillin on Soviet soil. The R ockefe lle r Foundation offered 
to  pay all expenses for a tr ip  to  th e  United S ta te s  by tw o  Soviet m a them atic ians ,  
and on behalf of a number of universities th e  United S ta te s  Comm issioner of
Education asked VOKS to  suggest a professor vfho would be willing to  spend a year
98in America, lec tu r ing  for varying periods of t im e  on a number of campuses. 
Several o ther universities, responding to  an officially  sponsored S ta te  D epartm en t 
proposal, indicated a willingness, indeed an eagerness, to engage in academ ic
qq
exchanges with Soviet institu tions. Dr. William G. C arr of th e  National 
Education Association made a plea for increased con tac ts  betw een the  two 
powers, arguing th a t  ca tas troph ic  consequences were likely if e i the r  p rac t iced  
"educational and cultura l isolation."^*^® An eleven m ember CIO delegation 
echoed the plea, urging an exchange of workers as well as students, while the  
YWCA drafted  a resolution a t  its 1946 annual m eeting th a t  both  commended the 
S ta te  D epartm en t for i t s  e ffo r ts  tow ard  cu ltu ra l rela tions and urged it to  broaden 
and strengthen  its  initiatives.^®^
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Large  numbers of students  also approached the  S ta te  D epartm en t in the
early  postw ar period, requesting inform ation about th e  possibility of studying in
the  USSR. Some w anted to study under specific  professors or in specific  fields,
bu t most desired  to  s tudy  in the  Soviet Union because  w artim e co n tac ts  had
increased  th e ir  in te res t  in Soviet affa irs  and heightened the ir  awareness of the
Soviet ro le in th e  postw ar world. Regardless of the motive, almost all expressed
an apprec ia tion  of the  role of cultural co n tac ts  betw een the  two powers of the 
102postw ar world.
The sports-m inded sought to  s treng then  cu ltu ra l cooperation through
a th le t ic  events. The Chicago Y MCA suggested  volleyball con tests  betw een the
tw o nations; A labam a coach Champ Pickens, undaunted by earlier  failures,
proposed to  tak e  college a th le te s  to  give exhibitions of football, baseball, track
103and swimming events. The Army and Navy Association suggested th a t  one 
thousand baseball te am s  be equipped and taugh t the  gam e, doubtless convinced 
th a t  the  v ir tues  A m ericans assigned the ir  national sport would accom pany the 
balls and bats to  Moscow, and in 1947 th e  New York A m erican-Russian Ins ti tu te
nego tia ted  an ag reem en t to  s tage a number of a th le t ic  con tes ts  between the  two 
countries.^^'*
Chess en thusias ts  m et a particu la rly  favorab le  recep tion  from the ir
Soviet coun te rpar ts .  As early  as 1942 Chess Review resum ed prew ar negotiations
aim ed a t  arranging  a series of m atches, but w artim e  trave l  conditions rendered
th e  p ro jec t im prac tica l.^^^  In la te  1943 the  A m erican  Chess Federation  tr ied  to
d e fe a t  th e  trav e l  problem by arranging a long d is tance match, th e  moves to  be
1 Ofit ra n sm it te d  by radio, but nothing cam e of the  in it ia tive  a t  the  t im e. Two years 
la te r ,  however, th e  radio m atch  was held, and even though the  A m erican team
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was badly bea ten  it  s tressed  the larger benefi ts  of the com petition. The match, a
spokesman s ta ted ,  was of g rea t  im portance "not only in the  chess world, but even
more so as one of th e  steps to promote re la tions  betw een the two nations in a
field o ther than  v/ar."^^^
In 1946 an A m erican team accep ted  a Soviet invitation to com pete  in
Moscow upon condition th a t  the  Soviets re tu rn  the visit the  following year. To
coordina te  the  m atches  a U.S.-U.S.S.R. chess co m m ittee  was organized, w ith the
president of th e  M anhattan  Chess Club serving as chairm an. A fte r  working our
plans to a l te rn a te  annual m atches  between th e  two countries , the  American team
trave led  to  th e  Soviet Union in the fall of 1946, finding itse lf  well rece ived  and
108well trea ted ,  but badly b ea ten . '  As earlier ,  however, both team s em phasized 
the  non-com petit ive  benefi ts  of the  com petit ion . "Such exchanges will help 
p rom ote  b e t te r  understanding between the  A m erican  and Russian people," the 
American chairm an of the  joint chess co m m it te e  s ta ted ,  and hopefully would 
"lead to o ther exchanges in the  whole sports  and cu ltu ra l field."^^^ The Soviet 
Embassy in Washington was more eloquent in i ts  opinion regarding the  possibilities 
of such m atches, seeing them as "another means of fu r the r  s trengthening the  ties  
of friendship betw een  the  two grea t peoples," and hoping th a t  this " la tes t in a 
growing series  of exchange visits from rep resen ta t iv e s  of various fields of culture 
and national l i fe  of the  two countries,"  would add to  th e  "growing understanding 
and good will be tw een  the  American and Soviet p e o p l e s . " ^ T h e  optimism on 
both sides was p rem a tu re .  The next chess m a tch  was held not in 1947, as 
scheduled, but in 1954.
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CHAPTER VI
WASHINGTON ASSUMES A ROLE: OFFICIAL CONTACTS, 1942-1946
That th e  A m erican  public took an increased  in te res t  in the  Soviet Union 
during the  war years  is not surprising. The Soviets were, a f te r  all, com rades in a 
common cause; fellow figh ters  against a deadly foe. But, significantly, the  public 
was not alone. O fficia l Washington shared i ts  in te res t  and, in many instances, 
took the in i t ia tive  in turning th a t  in te re s t  in to  action. In some instances 
congressional leg islation and Ju s t ice  D ep ar tm en t rulings hindered the f ree  flow of 
people and ideas, bu t regard less  what o the r  aim.s and ambitions Washington may 
have had vis-a-vis Moscow, th e  S ta te  D ep ar tm en t made a serious, sustained e ffo r t  
to  establish friendly cu ltu ra l con tac ts  with the  Soviet Union during the  war and 
early postw ar years.
Prior to  1938 Washington concerned i tse lf  l i t t le  with in ternational 
cu ltura l re la tions, largely  lim iting  its role to  th a t  of expediting or res tr ic t in g  
p riva te  in it ia tives  through its  control over visas and passports. But in th a t  year 
two small s teps  s tem m ing  from the  Pan A m erican  Conferences of the  th ir t ie s  
marked the beginning of an e f fo r t  destined to assume significant proportions. In 
May an In te rd ep ar tm en ta l  C om m ittee  of Cooperation with the  A m erican
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Republics linked a number of federal agencies for the  purpose of promoting 
cu ltural am ity  within the  w estern  hemisphere, and in July the Division of Cultural 
Cooperation was c rea ted  within the  S ta te  D epartm en t for the sam e purpose.^ In 
1942 the  program was extended to  China; in 1943 to  the Near East and Africa.^ 
And as Ralph B. Turner, one of the  principal a rc h i te c ts  of the  cultural relations 
program pointed out in a speech a t  th e  A m erican-Russian Institu te  in 1944, 
throughout the  war years  Washington sought the  means to extend its ac t iv it ies  to
3
the  European countries .
From the  beginning there  was a  split regarding the proper role of an 
officially sponsored cu ltu ra l re la tions program. Some considered it primarily a 
means to serve A m erica 's  national in te res t  abroad; a tool to  implement the 
nation's foreign policy. O thers strenuously opposed linking cu ltura l ac tiv it ies  to 
foreign policy, arguing th a t  such e ffo r ts  should serve no ulterior purpose; should 
do no more than prom ote  mutual knowledge and understanding among nations. 
Whatever benefi ts  such a program produced, they  contended, should be long term  
gains derived from the  a tm osphere of goodwill and understanding c rea ted  in the 
process of cu ltu ra l in terac tion .^
The G eneral Advisory C om m ittee  on C ultu ra l Relations a t tem p ted  to 
reconcile  these  opposing views. To the  ex ten t  th a t  American foreign policy 
sought to achieve mutual understanding by prom oting the  exchange of ideas and 
inform ation, the  co m m ittee  recom mended, cu ltu ra l re la tions should serve to  
im plem ent th a t  policy. But on the  other hand, it asserted , no program should try  
to  achieve non-cultura l objectives, nor be "an ins trum en t by means of which one 
people a t te m p t  to impose its  ideas and conceptions on another."^
Moreover, policymakers agreed, governm ent e ffo r ts  should fac i l i ta te  
p rivate  in itia tives, not supplant them. From the beginning the  S ta te  D epartm ent
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s tressed  th a t  its role was not to  replace or diminish the work being done by 
p riva te  individuals and institutions, but " to  assist them  in producing more 
e f fec t iv e  resu lts  tow ard  nation-v/ide cooperation."® As Under S ecre ta ry  of S ta te  
Sumner Welles noted, the  concept of an "official" cu lture  was alien to  American 
thinking; th e re fo re  the  proper function of th e  Cultura l R ela tions  Division was to 
serve as a clearinghouse, a coordinating agency  for the  p riva te  groups and
n
individuals in te re s ted  in promoting cu ltu ra l con tacts .
During the  war and early  postw ar years  Washington largely adhered to 
th e se  concep ts  in its cultura l re la tions  e f fo r ts  vis-a-vis th e  Soviet Union. There 
w ere exceptions to  be sure, but the  preponderant aim during the  period was to 
p rom ote  m utual knowledge and understanding, not to  propagandize American 
cu ltu ra l ach ievem en ts  in the  in te res ts  of political partisanship. The explicit 
s ta te m e n ts  of S ta te  D epartm en t officials, the  readiness with which D epartm ent 
officials f a c i l i ta te d  p rivate  e ffo r ts  and th e  D epartm en t 's  own initiatives in 
sponsoring cu ltu ra l re la tions  programs all bear witness to the  fact.
Throughout the  war years  various governm ent officials  made references  
to  the im portance  of postwar A m erican-Soviet cultura l re la tions, but none s ta ted  
the  case m ore explicitly than  Ralph B. Turner, A ssis tan t Chief of the  Cultural 
Relations Division of the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  and Dean Acheson, Under S ecretary  
of S ta te .
The sam e circum stances  th a t  had s tim ula ted  cu ltu ra l re la tions between 
A m erica and o th e r  countries. Turner told an A m erican-Russian  Ins ti tu te  audience 
in 1944, had s tim u la ted  closer cu ltu ra l re la tions  betw een the  A m erican and Soviet 
people as well. "The normal rela tions of these  people," Turner remarked, "is 
cultural:"
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Each has achieved resu lts  in ways th a t  can help the  other. They are  in 
the  fo refront of medical and o the r  scientific  advances. The agricu ltu re  
of each has much i t  can teach  the other; the ir  industrial technologies 
support each  other. Both can ta k e  pride in their  war e ffo rt ,  and in this 
shared leadership is the  guaran tee  of mutual understanding and mutual 
services betv/een th e  A merican and Russian peoples th a t  can be 
developed in a broad program of cu ltural exchange. The way to  do this is 
to  develop cu ltu ra l exchanges between the  two countries on an agreed  
basis.
"Indeed," Turner concluded, "the t im e  is now opportune for the  negotiation  of a 
b ila tera l  ag reem en t under which all kinds of exchanges may be ca rr ied  out
O
betw een the A m erican and Russian peoples."
Several months la te r  Dean Acheson, speaking a t  a rally  sponsored by 
th e  N ational Council of A m erican-Soviet Friendship, echoed Turner’s sen tim ents . 
One of the most im portan t  e lem ents  in friendship among nations, Acheson 
rem arked , was understanding: enduring friendship could be built only on under­
standing and trust,  not only betw een governments, but peoples as well. The 
problem was th a t  of how th e  A merican and Soviet people could com e to  knov/ and 
understand each other. Both wanted to know the  other b e t te r  y e t  both were 
strong  and proud, and both com m itted  to  their  own way of life, thus c rea ting  
barr ie rs  between them selves. "I confess," he continued, "I see no other way to 
draw people into closer understanding except by pers is ten t e ffo rts ,  on both sides, 
to  free  the lines of com m unication through the press and radio, through books and 
magazines, through th e  exchange of knowledge and cu ltu re ,  through trave l and 
personal acquain tance."  What the  A m erican and Soviet people need from each 
o ther, and a re  en ti t led  to  ask, the  S ta te  D epartm en t official w ent on, had been 
summed up by Marshal Stalin  in a conversation with Florida 's Senator Pepper. 
"Jus t judge us objectively," Acheson quoted Stalin as having rem arked  to  the  
senator, "do not e i the r  p ra ise  us or scold us. Ju st know us as we are  and base your
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e s t im a te  of us upon fa c t  and nor rumor." We have so much to learn  about each 
o ther,  Acheson concluded, th a t  only in an a tm osphere  of candor, knowledge and 
understanding could the  task  be accomplished.^
Ernest C. Ropes of th e  Just ice  D epartam en t,  long an advoca te  of closer 
ties with and g re a te r  understanding of the  Soviet Union, s tressed  the  sam e them e. 
The po ten tia l  existed  for a g rea tly  expanded trade  with the Soviets, Ropes 
rem arked  a t  th e  A m erican-Russian Institu te ,  but the po ten tia l  could becom e 
rea l i ty  only if  A m ericans knew more about the  Soviet people. We o f ten  alluded to 
them  as being m ysterious. Ropes told his lis teners , bu t they were not. We were 
simply ignorant of the  Soviets  and the ir  cu lture , and i t  was m andatory  th a t  we 
c o r rec t  th a t  shortcoming.^®
It was easy of course for official spokesmen to express such a 
coopera tive  a t t i tu d e  tow ard  cu ltu ra l con tac ts  during the war, but such expressions 
m eant l i t t le  if  not im plem ented  by action. But th e  S ta te  D epartm en t proved 
m ore than willing to  tu rn  rh e to r ic  into rea lity .  P r iv a te  individuals and organiza­
tions bringing p ro jec ts  and proposals to  the D epartm en t m et a favorable reception  
as th e  C ultu ra l R ela tions  Division encouraged and assis ted  in myriad ways the  
in itia tives  s tem m ing  from rising public in teres t  in broadened cu ltural re la tions 
with the  Soviets.
Perhaps the  most valuable form of ass is tance  cam e simply in the  
readiness with which th e  S ta te  D epartm ent t r a n sm it te d  and supported privately 
proposed pro jec ts . Messages in this vein t rav e led  betw een  Washington and the 
Embassy in Moscow in la rge  numbers, with correspondence concerning individual 
p ro jec ts  frequently  reaching  voluminous proportions. Mike Todd's proposal to
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bring Soviet a r t is ts  to  the  United S ta tes , for example, touched off an extensive
round of messages betw een  Todd, Washington and Moscow, and o ther  projects
followed a similar p a t te rn .  In tran sm itt ing  EUa Winter's proposal to  bring Soviet
perform ers  to  A m erica, th e  S ta te  D epartm ent in s truc ted  the  Embassy to inform
VOKS th a t  even though i t  was not involved in th e  invitation, i t  encouraged and
supported th a t  par ticu la r  p ro jec t as weU as aU o the rs  aimed a t  furthering cu ltura l
co n tac ts  between the  two nations.^^ Embassy officials  m atched those  in
Washington in the ir  support and encouragem ent, a t  t im es  going to  g rea t  lengths to
im plem ent the  proposals s tream ing  from the  U nited S tates . The A m erican
Council of Learned Socie ties ' pro jec t for securing and transla ting  Soviet m ateria ls
rece ived  fuU and en thusias tic  Embassy assistance, as did the e ffo r ts  of E rnest J.
12Simmons, whom th e  Council sen t to  Moscow in 1947. Embassy officers  assisted  
the  Yale University Library  in its effo rts  to  secure  academ ic m ateria ls  from 
Soviet ins titu tions and m ade ex tensive effo rts  to  im plem ent th e  library exchanges 
program as envisioned by the  th ree  man co m m ittee  th a t  had earlier  approached 
th e  D epartm ent.
Embassy officials  encouraged e f fo r ts  in o ther directions as weU.
Charge d'Affaires G eorge F. Kennan urged the  D epartm en t to invite  Soviet youth
delegates  to  A m erica  to rec ip ro ca te  Soviet inv itations to  A m erican youths, and
particu larly  supported  th e  Chicago YMCA proposal to  a rrange  American-Soviet 
14voUeyball matches. Ambassador H arrim an likew ise encouraged sporting events. 
"I wish to  endorse th e  idea th a t  in te rcountry  sports  con tests ,  particularly  with the 
Soviet Union," he wired in la te  1945, "are a  valuable contribution to  b e t te r  
understanding betw een  peoples." The United S ta te s  should do everything possible 
to  encourage such con tests ,  he continued, "so th a t  by mutual acquain tance and
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t rav e l  in our respec tive  countries, individuals may com e to have a broader 
knowledge of the  custom s and life  in each country."^^
In m a tte rs  concerning visas and passports the  S ta te  D epartm en t like­
wise proved coopera tive ,  frequen tly  instructing  the  Embassy to  do whatever 
possible to  fa c i l i ta te  the g ranting  of passports to  Soviets trave ling  to  the  United 
S ta tes  and th e  issuance of visas allowing Americans to  en ter  th e  Soviet Union. 
During the  war years th e  reg is tra tion  requirem ent for individuals ac t ing  as agents  
of the ir  governm ents was suspended in the case of allied countries, thus obviating 
the  necessity  of Soviet reg is tra tion , and, insofar as possible. S ta te  D epartm ent
officials sought during the war to  make it easier to  comply with th e  publications
1 fiprovisions of the  Foreign Agents R eg istra tion  Act.
At home too  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t was helpful and cooperative. 
D epartm en t spokesmen a ttended  the dinners and functions of the privately 
sponsored cu ltu ra l agencies, par t ic ipa ted  in panel discussions arranged  by those 
organizations and frequen tly  re fe rred  inquirers to them. And when answering the  
numerous questions and inquiries rece ived  from private  c itizens—many of which 
were adm itted ly  of a nebulous n a tu re—D epartm ent officials  invariably provided 
thoughtful answers th a t  provided fac tua l inform ation, expressed g ra t i tu d e  for the
17
inquirer's concern, and encouraged continued in te res t  in th e  same. To accom ­
m odate  the  numerous s tuden ts  who wished to  study in th e  U.S.S.R., Washington
placed a number of Soviet institu tions on the  list approved for study under the G.l.
18Bill, and the  D epartm en t took up the  details  of the  m a tte r  with Moscow.
An episode stem m ing  from the  Soviet invitation to  the  A merican 
sc ien tis ts  to  a t te n d  th e  anniversary celebration  of th e  Soviet Academy of 
Sciences well i l lu s tra tes  th e  lengths to  which Washington was willing to  go tow ard
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cooperation in cultural m a tte rs .  To encourage A m erican partic ipa tion  in the
ce leb ra tion  the  Soviets provided a plane to  transport the  delegates to  Moscow and
back, but a f te r  one quick inspection the  sc ien tis ts  refused to board the  craft.
Although tw en ty  people were scheduled to  make the  flight the  plan sea ted  only
twelve, contained no accom odations for food services, no san ita ry  facilit ies  and,
although scheduled to fly the  Alaska-Siberia rou te ,  contained no insulation against
the  cold.^^ Since the proposed tr ip  was a lready public knowledge the refusal of
the  sc ien tis ts  c rea ted  a poten tia lly  em barrassing s ituation for both Washington
and Moscow, which both wanted to avoid. Consequently, following a series of
m eetings involving Joseph Grew, Elbridge Durbrow, P res iden t Truman and a
number of others, the President ordered the Army Transport Command to provide
20the necessary  transporta tion . The resulting trip , largely made possible by the  
President 's  decision, turned into one of the  more rew arding instances of postwar 
cu ltu ra l con tac t.
The D epartm en t made a particu la rly  extensive e f fo r t  to satisfy  the
requests  of the co m m ittee  of librarians which sought its  ass is tance following the
21Washington conference of June, 1945. Pointing out the  problems and po ten tia li­
t ies  as determ ined  a t th a t  conference, the  co m m it tee  specifically asked D epart­
ment officials to  arrange for the exchange of a t  least one copy of every piece of 
printed m a tte r  published in each of the  two countries , to  assign an official to the
Embassy in Moscow to fa c i l i ta te  the flow of publications, and to place the  entire
22m a tte r  on the  Potsdam agenda. If the  D epartm en t would assist in ge tting  
Soviet m ateria l  to the United S ta tes ,  th e  lib rarians  explained, the  Library of 
Congress would assume responsibility for its  proper distribution, thus assuring the 
reasonably com plete  collection which the  Washington m eeting proposed.
16]
The com m ittee 's  request touched off a series of conferences in July
within th e  S ta te  D epartm en t.  A m eeting on the  th ir teen th  approved the idea of
coordinating the flow of publications through the  Embassy in the  manner
suggested, with Ambassador Harrim an cabling his consent from Moscow, but
considerations of t im e  and scheduling cancelled  the idea of placing th e  m a tte r  on
23the  Potsdam agenda. A subsequent m eeting, citing the  scope of the  task and
the d ifficu lty  of procuring ce r ta in  Soviet publications, likewise re je c te d  the
9 4suggestion of exchanging a t  least  one copy of all prin ted  m a tte r .  But the
d ifficu lties  of the  task  made i t  all the  more necessary  th a t  th e  D epartm en t play a
role: only through an offic ia l governm ent connection, the  partic ipants  concluded,
could a well coord ina ted  program of publications exchanges be devised and 
25im plem ented . To carry  th a t  decision into e f fe c t  the  D epartm ent assigned J.
W entworth Ruggles to  the  Embassy as a cu ltu ra l a t ta c h e  in early 1946 to
2ficoordina te  the  flow of publications betw een the re c e n t  w artim e partners.
While collaboration with p r iva te  individuals and organizations was an 
in tegral p a r t  of the  e ffo r t ,  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t also devised its own programs to  
advance its  aims. Ambassador William H. Standley took an early in te res t  in 
promoting friendly cultura l relations, managing to  transm it his in te re s t  and 
enthusiasm to  Washington, and Ambassadors H arrim an and Smith followed his 
lead. And S ta te  D epartm en t officials in Washington, both in an out of the  
Cultura l Rela tions Division, made a genuine e f fo r t  to  follow policies and devise 
programs to  broaden co n tac ts  between the  tw o countries.
As early  as mid-1942 Ambassador Standley devised one of the  most 
am bitious p ro jec ts  undertaken by Washington. Designed to  exchange inform ation 
and prom ote  understanding through the use of motion pictures, printed m ateria l
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and radio  broadcasts, S tandley 's  program adm itted ly  emphasized giving more than
receiving; o ffered  m ore inform ation about A merica than it e lic ited  about the  
27Soviet Union. But it  con ta ined  e lem ents  of recip rocity  as well, particu larly  in
the  a re a  of new sreels and fea tu re  films. And it was with these  th a t  the
Ambassador was p rim arily  concerned, th a t  comprised his "pet pro jec t,"  as he
te rm ed  it , to  "educa te  th e  Russian people about us through the  se lec ted  use of 
9ftmotion pic tures.""  The o the r  p a r ts  of his program were soon largely  fo rgo tten , 
but the  film pro jec t b ecam e a major fea tu re  in the  official e ffo r t  to  prom ote 
cu ltura l contacts .
In selling his program to the Soviets, S tandley ta lked  to the  heads of
VOKS, Tass, the  Soviet radio bureaucracy  and the  Soviet film co m m it tee ,  arguing
th a t  such an exchange of inform ation would p rom ote  b e t te r  understanding on both
9Qsides, and offering p rin ted , recorded  and filmed m ater ia l  for th a t  purpose." The 
Soviets expressed willingness, even eagerness, to  engage in th e  pro ject.  The head 
of VOKS was particu la rly  enthusiastic , observing, for example, th a t  the  program 
would solve his problem of constan tly  having to  re fuse  reques ts  for m ateria ls  on
on
American life which he did not have available. And as for the  Soviet public, 
Standley wrote a t  the  tim e, "my own observations confirm the  in te res t  of the
o i
Soviet people in all phases of A m erican life."
Having convinced the  Soviets of the  virtues of th e  pro ject,  Standley 
turned to  Washington, presen ting  his a rgum ents  both through cables from Moscov/ 
and personally during a  visit to  the  United S ta tes .  In his selling cam paign the 
ambassador ta lked  to  D ep ar tm en t officials and in te res ted  persons such as the 
Chief of Naval Operations, th e  Army C hief of S ta f f  and R obert  Sherwood of the  
O ffice of War Inform ation, s tressing to  aU the  prime im portance  of such a
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32program of inform ation exchange. In order to be successful, S tandley insisted,
it was necessary  to  develop the  program gradually and carefu lly , to  take  into
account the s tru c tu re  and peculiarities  of the  Soviet governm ent and, above all,
to  conduct i t  through the  Embassy and consider it an in tegra l part of its work, for
only in th a t  way could the  p ro jec t be controlled  and regu la ted  in accordance  with
33th e  degree of Soviet cooperation .
Standley's a rgum ents  convinced the S ta te  D epartm en t.  Considering th e  
im portance  the am bassador a t ta c h e d  to  the  p ro jec t,  the insistence with which he 
prom oted it  and its  possible im pact on future rela tions. D epartm en t officials  
recom m ended, the  program should be im plem ented , and, in keeping with 
Standley's suggestion, should be kept under s t r ic t  Embassy supervision and control 
in order to  properly respond to  the  level of Soviet reciprocity.^ '^
Standley quickly put the  p ro ject into motion, making arrangem en ts  
while in Washington for the  O ffice of War Inform ation  to  supply docum entaries  
and new sreel to the  S ta te  D epartm en t for overseas shipment, for the  Ferry  
Command to  provide transporta tion , and for the  viewing of com m ercia l films by 
Soviet rep resen ta tiv e s  looking tow ard possible purchase . ' ' By m id-Septem ber, 
1942, a number of new sreels  were on the ir  way to  Moscow, followed shortly  by
<> C
docum entaries  and som ew hat la te r  by fea tu re  films. To d irec t the  program in
Moscow Standley sought the  assis tance of Douglas Fairbanks, J r . ,  but failing in
th a t  d irec tion  chose Lt. C om m ander John Young, a public re la tions  specialist with
37whom he had worked as d irec to r  of th e  New York World Fair.
Standley l e f t  Washington confident of th e  value of his film p ro jec t and 
optim istic  about Soviet cooperation in fulfilling it .  A tem porary  stop a t  
Kuibyshev, where p a r t  of th e  Embassy s ta f f  was working during the w artim e
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em ergency, heightened the  optimism. At the  conclusion of a fea tu re  film 
screened  for a num ber of American and Soviet officials, Standley made a short 
speech explaining his program, then turned to the  Soviet offic ials  Zarubin and
O O
Lozovsky. "Here 's  why I brought Comm ander Young with me...," he remarked, 
"your people like our A m erican films. They could teach  you a lo t about America 
and Americans. We could learn  much about Russia from your films. I hope to see 
good A m erican films, both fea tu re  and educational pictures, screened every  week
gq
in the  Soviet Union." " In reply Lozovsky, accord ing  to  Standley's account, w’aved
his hands excidedly and s ta ted ,  " tha t would be wonderful, Mr. Ambassador. I wish
you all success in your plans. In fac t ,  I publicly challenge you to  the  fullest
cooperation in carry ing  them  out."^®
The film program progressed smoothly during the spring of 1943. In
la te  May, Young and th e  Soviet film agency Soyuzintorgkino signed a form al
agreem en t governing th e  exchange of sc ien tific , techn ica l and educational films,
under the te rm s  of which American companies ag reed  to  deliver films to  the
Embassy for t ra n sm it ta l  to Soviet au thorities, who in turn agreed to supply films
to the  Embassy, with th e  la t te r  having the  option of rejecting those it  considered
unsuitable.'^ ^  By June , 1943, the  Soviets had screened  eighteen fea tu re  films and
were negotia ting  for th e  purchase of eight, were regularly  forwarding newsreels
to  be incorporated into American news films, and were using excerp ts  from
A merican newsreels in the ir  fea tures; were in fa c t  asking for even more,
expressing a par ticu la r  desire for additional foo tage  on the North A frican
4 9cam paign and on everyday  industrial life  in th e  U nited  S tates.
By early sum m er the  film program was functioning so smoothly tha t 
Standley sen t Young back to  the  United S ta te s  where, repea ting  all the
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am bassador's argum ents  regarding the  m erits  of th e  film program, he persuaded 
both Washington and the film industry to  coopera te  even further.^^  Hollywood 
loaned forty  of its  la te s t  and best com m ercia l fea tures, the  OWI supplied 
docum entaries , th e  Army Transport Command provided a plane and Young, his 
four motored c r a f t  armed with over five thousand pounds of celluloid cargo, le f t  
Washington in early  July bound for Moscow via Cairo and Teheran.^^
In Septem ber Standley urged the  D epartm en t to allot the necessary 
money and manpower to  broaden the  scope of his program and to  reach  an 
ag reem en t with Moscow perm itt ing  regular air transporta tion  of the required 
m ateria l  and personnel. Specifically, he suggested, the  D epartm en t should 
continue the  film and newsreel program, should supply magazines, war posters, 
novels and scholarly works for Embassy distribution, and should consider publish­
ing a serious Russian language magazine devoted to cultural, scientific , historical, 
social and industrial topics. As an a l te rna t ive ,  or possibly a supplem ent, the  
D epartm en t should consider an il lus tra ted  popular magazine. But, he concluded in 
a caution worthy of consideration, any A m erican cultural and inform ational 
program should be based squarely on the ac tua li t ie s  of American life and thought, 
otherwise the  net result would be "distinctly  harm ful to the  cause of good 
rela tions betw een the two countries." Moreover, i t  was necessary to  avoid 
following the  d ic ta te s  of any particu la r  school of thought concerning the  Soviet 
Union, for a narrow approach would "provoke in ternal controversy in the  United 
S ta tes  and impair the  unity of desire on the  part of the  A m erican people to  go
forv/ard with a  program of collaboration with the  Soviet Union.""^^
Before Washington could respond to  Standley's suggestion the
ambassador resigned and Averell H arrim an took his place. Like Standley,
Harriman took a personal in teres t  in cu ltura l relations, particu larly  in promoting
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knowledge of the  United S ta te s  in the Soviet Union. Following Standley's lead, 
the new am bassador inform ed Washington shortly  a f te r  arriving th a t  he wanted to  
d is tribu te  a monthly magazine in Russian tex t ,  containing " s ta te  papers and 
speeches, au th o ri ta t iv e  a r tic le s  on war, science, agi’iculture, industry, music, 
th e a tre ,  painting  and motion pictures,"  to  be aimed primarily at Soviet leaders 
and secondarily a t  the  Soviet public through libraries  and c l u b s . C i t i n g  the 
necessity  of prin ting such a magazine in the  United S ta te s  and a t tendan t 
transporta tion  difficulties, Washington suggested instead a deliberately  unpreten­
tious il lu s tra ted  weekly or biweekly publication using cable and radiotelephone 
m a t e r i a l . U l t i m a t e l y  a magazine following the  popular fo rm at of Life and Look
was agreed upon, and in early 1944 H arrim an sought Molotov's permission to
48distribute the  publication, t i t le d  Amerika. A fter  several weeks the  Soviet
granted  permission, rece iv ing  in turn  the right to c ircu la te  an English language
49magazine in the  United S ta tes .  '
A m erika firs t appeared in October, 1944, and, judging from numerous 
observations and rem arks, was an im m ediate  and huge success. The a l lo t ted  ten  
thousand copies per issue sold instantly  upon appearance, worn copies becam e 
black m arket item s, and even single pages passed from person to  person.^^ "When 
Amerika appears  i t  is a g re a t  day in Moscow," a New York Times rep o r te r  w rote 
in October, 1945, and early  the  following year a Time correspondent e laborated  as 
to  why. "A m erika ," he wrote, "was hot s tuff .  Russians liked its  eye-filling 
pic tures of Arizona deserts ,  TVA dams, the  w hite s teep les  of Connecticu t towns, 
Radio City, th e  Bluegrass country, th e  senate  in session and M anhattan 's  garm ent 
district."^^ The circulation  figure of ten  thousand, i t  quickly becam e apparent, 
was far too lim ited  and consequently the  Embassy began pressing for permission
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to  d is tribu te  additional copies. In June, 1947, a f te r  a number of requests  by 
Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith th e  Soviets consented, allowing the c irculation 
to  inc rease  to fif ty  thousand copies per issue.
At the end of th e  war H arrim an, asserting  th a t  the  trem endous in te res t  
of th e  Soviet people in the  United S ta te s  rep resen ted  a powerful asset in dealing 
with Moscow, and observing th a t  Moscow was for the first tim e allowing 
A m ericans to  persent inform ation d irec tly  to  the  Soviet people, strongly urged 
Washington to  m ain tain  both the  publication of Amerika and the  o ther  cu ltural 
re la tions  e f fo r ts  being carr ied  out under Embassy direction. "I fee l it  im portan t,"  
he wired, " th a t  th e re  be no break in carrying out the  p resen t program," for though 
i t  was d ifficult to  g e t  high level Soviet approval of such projects , "once approved 
we find those  involved on th e  operational level a re  much in te res ted  to  coopera te  
in the  work."^^
H arrim an's message met a favorable  response, for Washington's thinking
ran in the sam e direction. Shortly a f te r  rece iv ing  the  ambassador's cable, William
Benton of th e  C ultura l R ela tions  Division, explaining th a t  the  S ta te  D epartm en t
wished to  make a public s ta te m e n t  concerning A m erican-Soviet cu ltu ra l relations
and the re fo re  needed more prec ise  views and inform ation from the  Soviets,
in s truc ted  George F. Kennan to  pose a  number of questions to  Soviet au thorities.
Specifically, Benton w anted to know when Moscow could send balle t,  th e a t re  and
o rches tra  groups, including th e  R ed  Army Chorus, when it could send exhibits of
a r t ,  a rch i tec tu re  and handicrafts , and when it  could p a r tic ipa te  in a series of
54conferences  to  a rrange cu ltu ra l in te rchanges  betw een  the two countries.
A month la te r  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  Byrnes, noting th a t  Molotov had 
welcomed increased co n tac ts  a t  a  function of the  San F rancisco  A m erican-
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Russian In s t i tu te ,  again instruc ted  the Embassy to  sound out th e  Soviets on the 
55m a t te r .  Accordingly H arrim an inform ed D eputy  Foreign M inister Andrei
Vyshinsky in mid-November th a t  the  United S ta te s  would welcom e a "frank
discussion" of the possibilities of cultura l exchanges, particu la rly  exchanges
involving s tuden ts  and teachers . Did the Soviet governm ent, H arrim an inquired,
have any "objections in principle" to  a s tu d e n t - te a c h e r  exchange program during
the  1946-1947 academ ic  year, and, if  not, which Soviet agency should he c o n ta c t
to  discuss deatils?^® The inquiry was no a f te r th o u g h t,  for a proposal along these
lines becam e  one of the D ep ar tm en t’s principal effo rts  tow ard  an official
exchange program during the m id-forties.
The deta ils  of the  proposed academ ic program were worked out during a
February , 1946, S ta te  D epartm en t conference  a t ten d ed  by various governm ent
officials , academ ic  figures and rep resen ta t iv e s  of th e  Ins ti tu te  of In terna tiona l 
57Education. As a first s tep , the  conference  concluded, th e  In s t i tu te  of
In terna tiona l Education should conduct a survey among several major universities
to  de te rm ine  the ir  willingness and ability  to  provide grants  to  Soviet s tuden ts  and
teach ing  positions for Soviet professors. Should the  replies be favorable, the
p ar tic ipan ts  decided, the  S ta te  D epartm en t would transm it the  offers to  Moscow,
indicating in the  process its ro le as sponsor and coordinator and asking for
rec ip roc ity  in th e  form of exchange scholarships from the  Soviets.^^ "All persons
who a ttended ,"  a D epartm en t com m unication noted, recognized tha t "a program
of cu ltu ra l exchange with the USSR was of the  g rea te s t  im portance in view of the
59necess ity  for b e t te r  understanding betw een th is country  and the  Soviets."
The universities  co n tac ted  by th e  HE responded enthusiasticaUy, some 
o ffering  teach ing  posts, some offering  s tuden t grants, and some offering both.
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Law rence Duggan, head of the Institu te , saw something significant in the
response. Though the universities con tac ted  did not represen t a fa ir  sampling of
Am erica 's  ins ti tu tions  of higher education, since they had over the  years
expressed a special concern for all aspects of in ternational relations, he v;rote,
the ir  favorable response furnished a clue to  the thinking of adm inistra tors  and
faculty  regarding cu ltu ra l interchange with th e  Soviet Union; gave an approxim ate
indication of the  readiness of higher educational institutions "to  do th e ir  bit in
a t tem p t in g  to  ge t to  know the  Soviet Union b e t te r  through exchanges of students 
60and professors." They wanted such exchanges, and wanted them badly enough 
to  take  the  necessary  s teps to  secure them. "Were the  Institu te  to  circu larize  all 
the  ins titu tions on the  acc red ited  list," Duggan concluded, "I am confident th a t  
the display of countryw ide in te res t  would be tru ly  astounding."
Having compiled the offers the  TIE sent them  to the S ta te  D epartm en t 
for t r a n sm it ta l  to  Moscow, optimistic th a t  the  rancor beginning to  pervade 
A m erican-Soviet re la tions  in o ther areas would pose no insuperable obstacle in the  
realm of academ ic exchange.
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CHAPTER Vn 
A COOLING RELATIONSHIP, 1944-1947
The optimism th a t  postwar Moscow would respond favorably to pro­
posals for form al exchanges was not unw arranted . Throughout the war years  the  
Soviets expressed both in word and deed a willingness to engage in closer cu ltura l 
con tac ts ;  in many instances they  took th e  in itia tive  in stim ulating those con tac ts .  
Those in the  United S ta tes  who hoped and planned for more in t im a te  postwar 
connections had jusitifable reason for doing so; had suffic ient cause to  believe 
th a t  both Moscow and the Soviet people shared the ir  hopes and plans.
But even during the war A m ericans in the  USSR encountered a number 
of frustra tions  and difficulties in im plem enting cu ltural projects, particu larly  if 
those p ro jects  w ere in any way connected  with the  Embassy, and the cum ulative 
e f fe c t  of those frustra tions  produced pessimism over postwar prospects among 
A m ericans resident in the  Soviet Union. By the war's end Embassy officials were 
urging Washington to  proceed cautiously; to  plan its  programs in accordance with 
Soviet actions ra th e r  than announcements; to re fra in  from encouraging expec ta ­
tions likely to  resu lt in illusion.
T hat the  majority of the  Soviet people wanted in t im a te  cultural 
connections with Americans seem s beyond doubt. Embassy officials, journalists
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and visitors com m ented  on the  fac t ,  and S talin himself confirm ed it. The Soviet
people, Stalin rem arked  to  War Production Board Chairm an Donald Nelson in
O ctober, 1943, "liked A m ericans b e t te r  than the  people of o ther countries...."^ A
year la te r  he gave similar assurances to  the  president of the  United S ta tes
Cham ber of Com m erce. "The Russian people," the red ru ler  rem arked  to Eric
2
Johnston, "have th e  highest regard  for Americans." Ambassadors Standley and 
H arrim an both alluded to  the Soviet in te res t  in and friendliness toward 
A mericans, and low er ranking officials such as F reder ic  Barghoorn found scholars, 
w riters, a r tis ts ,  l ibrarians and educators  surprisingly friendly and cooperative. 
Within the l im its  possible, Barghoorn w rote, Soviet professional people "did 
everything possible to  coopera te  and expand the area  of c o n ta c t  with the ir  foreign
3
counterparts ."  F riendliest of all were "ordinary non-in te llec tua l Soviet citizens," 
who seem ed to believe th e re  was an affin ity  be tw een  Russians and Americans 
based on common ch arac te r is t ic s .  Once one got to  know them  they were almost 
"pathetica lly  eager" to  rec ip ro ca te  friendlines. All groups from workers and 
peasants to  in te llec tua ls , a Soviet history professor assured the  Embassy official 
in 1944, wanted to  know more about the United  S ta tes .^
French correspondent Alexander Werth recorded  similar sentim ents. 
There were unmistakable signs of liberalization during the  war, he wrote, and the 
Soviet people held deeply cherished feelings th a t  the  regim e would be so f te r  when 
the  conflic t ended. "When the war is over," Werth quoted a P ar ty  official as 
saying a t  a VOKS function in 1944, " there  will be much coming and going and a lot 
of con tac ts  with the  W est... there will be exchanges of s tuden ts  and foreign travel 
for Soviet citizens will be made easy."^
Top Soviet officials  expresed the same a t t i tu d e .  During a speech a t the 
San F rancisco  A m erican-Russian  Institu te , Molotov expressed surprise a t  the
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A m erican  lack of knowledge of his country and a desire to  en ter  into a closer 
cu ltu ra l relationship, pa r ticu la r ly  in the  a rea  of academ ic exchanges, to  remedy 
th e  situation.^  S talin  rem arked  to Harold S t ass en on one occasion and to Elliot 
Roosevelt on ano ther  th a t  th e  Soviet Union welcomed more in t im a te  cu ltural ties, 
and lesser offic ials  routinely  made such s ta te m e n ts  in the ir  speeches both in the 
USSR and in th e  U nited  S t a t e s /
What th e se  said in short,  Ambasador Andrei Gromyko said in full. 
Sharing the  p la tfo rm  from which Ralph B. Turner in 1944 outlined America's 
cu ltu ra l re la tions  program  vis-a-vis the  Soviet Union, Gromyko tra c e d  in grea t 
de ta il  the  various ways in which th e  co llaboration  be tw een  the  tw o  countries 
expressed itse lf  not only in military, politica l and econom ic cooperation, "but in 
the  s trengthening  of the  cu ltu ra l re la tions betw een  our peoples and countries” as 
well. Capsulizing th e  en t ire  range  of cu ltu ra l con tac ts ,  th e  am bassador dwelt on 
the  rec ip roca l popularity  of Russian and American l i te ra tu re ,  on th e  Soviet 
enthusiasm for popular A m erican  music and th e  A m erican  ta s t e  for th e  Russian 
classics, on the growing trend  tow ard  sc ien tif ic  coopera tion  and on th e  festivals 
and exhibits being s taged  in each  country to  honor the  accom plishm ents  of the  
o the r .  There was no doubt, he concluded, th a t  th e  tendency  to  "study each other's
O
cultu ra l and sc ien tif ic  ach ievem ents  would grow stronger and stronger."
In a v a r ie ty  of ways th e  Soviets expressed in action what they 
procla im ed in words. W artim e festivals  and exhibits f ea tu red  A m erican art, 
a rc h i te c tu re  and music; Soviet agencies sent and rece ived  cu l tu ra l  delegates  and 
Soviet spokesmen m ade special e f fo r ts  to  honor A m erican  accomplishments. 
A m erican l i te ra tu re  rem ained  as popular as ever ,  as did adap ta tions  of A merican
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plays, particu la rly  those of Lillian Heilman.^ A merican movies, though rarely  
made available to  the general public, were in g rea t  demand.^® Soviet musicians 
perfo rm ed  music provided in the  OWI shipm ent, making particu la r  hits out of 
numbers like "Alexander's R agtim e Band" and "Tavern in th e  Town," while 
o rch es tra l  a rrangem en ts  popularized the  c rea tions  of Roy Harris, whom Moscow 
invited  for a visit in 1944.^^ A m erican  sc ien t is ts  received special a t te n t io n  a t  
th e  Soviet ce lebration  honoring its  A cadem y of Sciences, and Soviet acknowledge­
m ent of Lend-Lease contributions, though som ew hat slow in coming, ra ised  even
12higher the  repu ta t ion  of A m erican technique.
Fes tiva ls  and exhibits were p a r ticu la r ly  common. On July  fourth , 1943,
VOKS sponsored nation-wide concerts  fea tu r ing  A m erican jazz , popular, and
classical numbers. Obviously, w rote  A m bassador Standley, who accom panied New
York Tim es publisher A rthur Sulzburger to  the ce leb ra tion  staged in Moscow, "the
Russians spared no e ffo r t  to make the conce r t  a success; it  was a beautifu l t r ib u te
13to  A m ericans resident in Moscow." L a te r  in the  same year VOKS arranged  a
series of le c tu re s  and discussions honoring the  450th anniversary of the  discovery
of A m erica , a f te rw ard  shipping some of the  exhibits  marking the occasion to  be
fea tu red  a t  th e  Library of Congress.^^ Even Standley 's  film pro jec t grew out of
such a ce leb ra tion , receiving its im petus from a Soviet request for recen t
Hollywood films to  fea tu re  in a fes tiva l ded ica ted  to  the  A m erican motion p ic ture
industry.^^ Displays of a r t  and a rc h i te c tu re  shipped from th e  United S ta tes
appeared  in various Soviet cities, while on a  local level schools, clubs and lib raries
1 fiarranged  th e ir  own tribu tes  to  American cu ltu re .
As in the  prewar period th e  Soviets dem onstra ted  an omnivorous 
a p p e t i te  for A m erican w riters. In la te  1945 Jack  London still led th e  list in sales
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and popularity, followed by Mark Twain and Upton Sinclair. Theodore Dreiser and
Sinclair Lewis rem ained  highly popular; E rnest Hemingway, John Steinbeck and
17Erskine Caldwell were becom ing increasingly so. The Union of Soviet Writers,
w ro te  Barghoorn, c lam ored  for modern short s to ries , while less sophic tica ted
readers  dem anded d e te c t iv e  novels—a demand which Barghoorn met on occasion
18by trading th rille rs  for war posters.
The t r e a tm e n t  accorded A m erican visitors during the war and early
postw ar years  gave fu r ther  evidence of a coopera tive  and friendly a t t i tu d e .
Medical and sc ien t if ic  rep resen ta tives  praised th e ir  recep tion  in fulsome te rm s, as
did violinist Yehudi Menuhin, who perform ed before  enthusiastic  audiences a t
19Moscow's inv ita tion  in la te  1945. A delegation of religious leaders, including
among its  num bers the  president of th e  Southern B aptis t Convention, gave a
similarly favorable  re p o r t  on all a spects  of its trip, even managing kind words for
20the  s ta te  of religion under Soviet control. R ep resen ta tives  of the  business and
production world w ere particu la rly  well received. The ten  day visit of War
Production Board C hairm an Donald Nelson, th e  Embassy informed Washington,
"was marked by ex tre m e  cordia lity  and exceptional cooperation on the p ar t  of all
21Soviet officials  w ith whom he cam e in con tac t ."  Eric Johnston m et the  sam e
tre a tm e n t ,  trave ling  where he pleased, inspecting what he wished and asking what 
22he desired. Public Works A dm inistra tor Philip B. Flem ing found a surprising
degree of in te res t  in and friendliness tow ard  A m ericans, and Vice-President
Wallace publicly expressed  his g ra ti tude  for th e  t r e a tm e n t  accorded him in a
23le t t e r  prominently  published in the  Soviet press. The rem arks of a congres­
sional delegation typified  the  com m ents of all the se  visitors. "Our m ovem ents 
were unhampered," th e  members of a  House Foreign A ffairs  subcom m ittee  s ta ted
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upon re tu rn ing  in la te  1946, and on every hand we were t r e a te d  with g rea t  
friendliness."^^
The t ra f f ic  was not all in one direction. Soviet organizations sent
books, music and exhibits to  the United S ta tes  as well, largely for distribution
25through the cultural agencies dedicated  to th a t  purpose. R epresen ta tives  of
Soviet life  cam e as well, among them such well known figures as Sergei
Eisenstein, Ilya Ehrenberg and Konstantin Simonov. Vasily Parin, Secre tary
General of the  Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, spent th re e  months in the
country during la te  1946 and early 1947, turning over to A m erican  colleagues
while here  an unpublished two hundred and f if ty  page manuscript describing the
26cancer research  work of Roskin and Klyueva. Many of the visitors appeared at
functions across the country, some con tributed  artic les  to  A m erican  publications,
and all stressed the need for continued cu ltura l friendship. Simonov, for instance,
made a particu larly  s tirring appeal a t  the  San Francisco Ins ti tu te ,  and upon his
departure professor Parin noted tha t an exchange of cancer research  specialists
27was soon to  take  place between the  two nations.
Such public appeals and s ta tem en ts  by both Americans and Soviets, 
along with the  overt m anifestations of cu l tu ra l  cooperation in both countries, 
gave cause for optimism over fu ture  prospects; provided reason to  believe th a t  
the  d ifficulties  strain ing political and diplomatic rela tions in th e  postwar period 
would not lead to cultural es trangem ent as well.
But even a t  the  height of Soviet cooperation, A m ericans in Moscow 
experienced a number of difficulties in im plem enting cu ltural projects. Though 
the  Soviets worked closely with th e  A m erican-Soviet cultural organizations in the
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United S ta tes ,  in instances involving p ro jec ts  handled through the  Embassy the 
expressed desire to  coopera te  was not necessarily  followed by action  or, even 
more frustrating ly , any explanation of the lack of action. Many of the difficulties 
and irr i ta tions  were minor and would perhaps have been forgotten  had the  Soviets 
taken tim e to  explain themselves, but the ir  cumulative im pact discouraged 
Embassy officials, causing them to cable the ir  reservations to  Washington.
Embassy Charge d'Affaires George F. Kennan s ta ted  the reservations  
must fully. Noting th a t  Molotov's San Francisco  call for increased cultural 
cooperation had drawn a g rea t  deal of a t ten tion ,  Kennan advised Washington to  be 
wary; to  view the com m ents  in proper perspective  and not to  in te rp re t  them  as 
any basic sh if t in a t t i tu d e .  Such remarks, he wired in July, 1945, were by no 
means unusual; were in fac t  similar to  those made to  distinguished guests a t  VOKS 
functions. But S ta te  D epartm en t officials  should know from sad experience, 
Kennan continued, th a t  while it might appear th a t  th e  Soviets w ere promoting a 
new era  of cu ltu lra l friendliness, in rea l i ty  they were placing insuperable 
obstacles in the  way of even the  most rudim entary  con tacts ; were holding 
exchanges to  a minimum, carefully  censoring correspondence, im porting only 
those foreign plays containing no th rea ten ing  ideological germs and exporting only 
approved views of Soviet life. As far as s tuden t exchanges were concerned, few 
foreigners not ideologically acceptable  would be ad m itted  to the  country; only 
those approved and carefu lly  prepared allowed to go abroad, and then only under a 
system of controls  representing  the an tithesis  of genuine in te llec tua l and cu ltural 
exchanges. Especially would it be dangerous to  allow the  impression to  grow in 
in te llec tua l circles th a t  the  two nations were on the verge of a new era  of closer 
cultural re la tions, for to  do so would saddle th e  governm ent with an obligation it
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could not fulfill and place an even g rea te r  burden on A m erica 's  re la tions  with the 
Soviet Union. T herefo re ,  Kennan concluded, it  behooved the  S ta te  D epartm ent to 
find a way to  make c lear  exac tly  what Molotov's rem arks entailed  without, a t  the
no
sam e tim e, offending th e  Soviets.
Several months la te r  Ambassador Smith echoed Kennan's sentim ents. 
Prior to  arriv ing  in Moscow, he informed his superiors, he held many of the  same 
optim istic  ideas th a t  prevailed in Washington regarding the possibilities of 
cu ltu ra l exchanges, but those ideas had undergone drastic  changes. Smith was 
particu la rly  pess im ist ic  about s tu d en t- teach e r  exchanges. The availability  of 
tu ition  scholarships—a prim e consideration a t  th e  February  tw en ty -seven th  S ta te  
D epartm en t m eeting—was of l i t t l e  im portance, he cabled, for if Moscow con­
sidered it  politically  advantageous to  engage in academ ic exchanges it would 
gladly pay th e  expenses involved; if  not, i t  would refuse  under any conditions. 
Though living conditions and housing shortages posed a rea l  obstacle, the 
ambassador concluded, the  fundam ental problem was the  Soviet desire for 
security . Moscow simply would not allow unsupervised mingling of A m ericans and
Soviets, and th a t  fac t  e ffec tive ly  eliminated any rea l chances for an exchange 
29program.
The warnings and advice from Moscow, unfo rtunate ly  for th e  cause of 
cu ltu ra l re la tions, proved a l together  too  prophetic , and increasingly so as the  v.’ar 
wound down and the  tw o  nations began adjusting to  the ir  new roles as former 
partners.
Ambassador Standley's film project began experiencing d ifficu lties  as 
early  as mid-1943, providing a fo re ta s te  of some of th e  problems to  follow.
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Having convinced Washington and the film industry of the  value of an expanded 
program, Lt. Com m ander Young prepared to leave Washington with his load of 
films a t  the  end of June, expecting  a quick and uneventful flight to  Moscow. In 
early  July Standley applied for Young's visa, but con tra ry  to  expectations rece ived
Ofj
no au tom atic  response. On the  tw elfth  he applied again, asking permission for
Young to  en te r  the  USSR via Cairo and Teheran ra th e r  than through Alaska and
Siberia. On th e  sam e day he took up the issue with Zarubin, but still no response 
31cam e. On the  tw en ty -s ix th  an angry Standley ta lked  to  Lozovsky, accusing the
Soviets of failing to live up to the ir  ag reem en ts ,  but still no answer was 
32forthcom ing. On Sep tem ber eighth Standley in s truc ted  Young to  proceed as far
as Teheran and discharge his cargo there . "We will g e t  the  films to Moscow," he
33wired Young, "if need be can by can." As in s truc ted  Young s ta r te d  for Teheren, 
but a t  Cairo  was detailed  to  duty elsewhere. The film s finally arrived in Moscow 
in D ecem ber, but by th a t  tim e Averell H arrim an had rep laced  Standley as 
ambassador. Not until years  la te r  did S tandley learn  the  f a te  of the  cargo he 
valued so much.^^
Vrhatever the  reason for the delay—and Moscow never bothered to
explain it—the films served  the ir  purpose well for a number of months. The
Soviet Film C om m ittee  kep t each film for approxim ately  th re e  months, showing it
to  various organizations and individuals including, the  Embassy understood, Stalin 
35himself. The Hollywood fea tu re  films were p a r t icu la r  favorites, prompting 
considerable maneuvering to  obtain them , including o ffers  of bribes to  Soviet 
employees a t  the  Embassy. The A rtis ts  Club, Film Club, Actors Club, Red 
Army Club, Red Navy Club and the  Bolshoi T hea te r  club w ere all on th e  Film 
C om m ittee 's  approved list and there fo re  able to  see the  movies, as were the
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personnel of VOKS, th e  Soviet Information Bureau, th e  Soviet Foreign O ffice and
others  who, as Kennan cabled, were considered capable  of withstanding the
bourgeois wiles of B e t ty  Grable and Errol Flynn. That the  Film Com m ittee
purchased only six teen films betw een 1943 and 1945 was not viewed with g rea t
concern. More im portan tly ,  as Harriman pointed out, the  films served a valuable
38function by reaching the  opinion making audience in th e  USSR. Kennan
expressed even more explic it  sa tisfac tion  with the  program. "The amount of
3Pgoodwill gained in this  connection," he wired, "cannot be overestim ated ."  "
The coopera tive  a t t i tu d e  began to  change in the  fall of 1944. Accord­
ing to inform ation rece ived  a t  the  Embassy, H arrim an inform ed Washington, the  
Film C om m ittee  was under orders from political au thori ties  to  purchase far few er 
films than originally intended, and those purchased were to  po rtray  A merican life  
and society  in a bad light.^^ O ther reports  indicated th a t  dubbing and editing 
were to  be done in such a  way as to  give the impression th a t  an inferior product 
was being shown and indeed, Harriman confirmed, recen t  examples indicated
e ither  gross incom petence  or delibera te  bungling on the  p a r t  of Soviet film 
41technicians. A sim ilar sh if t was de tec ted  in the  newsreel exchange program. At
the  tim e of th e  N ormandy invasion the  Film C om m ittee  urgently  requested
newsreels of the landings, but once arrived, they were not publicly released.
F urtherm ore , H arrim an cabled, he had inform ation to  the  e f fe c t  th a t  no m ateria l
would be publicly shown which indicated the scope and magnitude of the Allied
42operations in the  West.
A month la te r  H arrim an confirmed his earlier  repo rts  and fears. High 
Soviet officials, he wired, indicated th a t  only one film, "Song o f  Russia," was to  
be purchased despite  ea r l ie r  plans to  buy as many as f if teen , explaining only th a t
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"conditions did not warrant" fu rther  purchases. The invasion newsreels were not
being used, and only negligible footage from other  news films was being shov:n.^^
By the  end of the  year the  Soviets were no longer supplying th e ir  newsreels for
American use, despite continued A merican shipments to  the  USSR under the
te rm s  of the ag reem en t signed between Young and Zarubin; were in fac t  avoiding
44th e  Embassy in all m a tte rs  pertain ing to  the  film program.
A changing a t t i tu d e  was expressed in another way as well. In response 
to  an earlie r  joint Anglo-American reques t for a  th e a te r  in which to show 
exclusively British and American films, the  Film C om m ittee  had compromised by 
giving permission to  show the films in five leading Moscow a r t is t ic  and in te llec­
tua l clubs. In Septem ber, s ta t ing  th a t  the  clubs had already  arranged their winter 
schedules and were in no position to  undertake the  p ro jec t,  it withdrew the  
permission.^^ Viewing the cancellation as represen ting  something more signifi­
can t  than  simply the denial of the  use of the clubs, H arrim an took the  occasion to  
express his thoughts concerning the  changing Soviet a t t i tu d e .  "It is obvious," he 
cabled, " th a t  the  explanation given is flimsy,
and is being used to cover up the  rea l s itua tion  and for some reason 
which is as yet not clear th e  political au thori t ies  have decided against 
the  project. The official who gave it to  me showed considerable 
em barrassm ent and indicated th a t  all these  decisions had been made on a 
higher and more political level and could be dea lt  with only by the 
British, myself and M olotov...these developm ents in the  motion picture 
field  are  paralle l to  a g rea te r  or lesser ex ten t  in o ther  fields of Soviet- 
A m erican rela tions and re f le c t  a developm ent which is fa r  g rea te r  in its 
im plications than the  mere dissemination of A m erican motion pictures. I 
can see it  only as a re f lec tion  of a trend  tow ard increasing restric tions 
on foreign influences and co n tac ts  within th e  Soviet Union and a t least 
partia lly  as a re tu rn  to  earlie r  a t t i tu d es  and policies. I have no way of 
knowing w hether this trend is tem porary  or one th a t  may expand and 
develop in the  coming months. It is, however, som ething th a t  should be 
born in mind in our relations with the Soviet Union and will be watched 
with the u tm ost care .
One reason for the changing Soviet a t t i tu d e  becam e evident in la te  
1944. While ignoring the  Embassy film program the  Soviets nego tia ted  a con trac t
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with RKO Studios which supplied A m erican films to the  Soviet Union, provided 
direct access to  A m erican m arke ts  for the ir  motion p ic tu res  and, most 
im portantly , gave Moscow almost to ta l  control over the acquisition and distribu­
tion of films, allowing it to  se lec t  both the  films im ported  from and exported  to 
the  United S ta tes .  RKO received  for its p a r t  the financial benefits  of being 
allowed to  p a r t ic ip a te  in what am ounted  to  a world-wide monopoly over the 
selling and purchasing of films for th e  USSR.^^
The agreem ent,  to  go into e f fe c t  on the  firs t of D ecem ber, c rea ted  a 
g rea t deal of consternation in Washington. Following a series  of meetings within 
the  S ta te  D epartm en t and with RKO executives, D epartm en t officials  decided to 
ask the Ju s t ice  D epartm en t to  begin a n t i t ru s t  action against RKO to  prevent the 
co n trac t  being finalized bu t the  film studio, disenchanted over financial and
business a rrangem en ts  as finally de term ined  in the  ag reem en t,  dropped out of the
48arrangem ent of its  own accord.
The a t te m p t  to bypass the  Embassy in favor of a program to ta lly  
controlled by Moscow did l i t t l e  to forw ard the cause of cu ltu ra l friendship. It 
could be argued of course th a t  the  Soviets  were only try ing  to  do the  same thing 
th a t  the Americans were doing through the ir  program; th a t  they were simply 
try ing  to  control the  Soviet image as portrayed  abroad through films in the same 
way th a t  the  United S ta tes  controlled  the  image it  p ro jec ted  through the  Embassy 
a rrangem ent. But the  fundam ental purpose of th e  Embassy program as operated 
in 1944 was not propagandistic, and had th a t  been its  purpose i t  would have 
operated  under such lim ita tions  as to  be ineffective. IVhile th e re  were elem ents 
of propaganda in the  program, the  principal aim was to fo s te r  understanding of 
and friendliness tow ard  the United S ta tes .  N either the  movies sen t in the  Young
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shipment nor those  shipped by o ther  means were se lec ted  for idological con ten t or
th e  lack thereof; they were simply the  best fe a tu re s  Hollywood had to  offer a t  the
time.^® Moreover, Soviet officials  in the  U nited  S ta te s  par t ic ipa ted  in the
process of se lec ting  the  films sent to  Moscow for screening and consideration of
purchasing.^® Film s to  which those officials  ob jected  never reached  the  Soviet
Union; those th a t  did arrive  were seen only by se lec ted  groups. But under the
te rm s  of the  new c o n tra c t  only RKO Studios had any influence on the  A m erican
side as to  the  quality  and con ten t of the  motion p ic tu res  sent and rece ived  by the
Soviets, and RKO officials  readily  adm itted  th a t  in rea l i ty  Moscow would make
the final decision regarding such m a tte rs .^^  The po ten tia l  of the  a r ran g em en t as
a propaganda tool was infinitely g re a te r  than  any such possible use of the  Embassy
program, and the  fa c t  th a t  the  Soviets n eg o tia ted  it c rea ted  a  wariness and
re s tra in t  among A m erican  officials  not p resen t before.
Failing  in the  e f fo r t  to  obtain films through th e  RKO connection the
Soviets again tu rned  to the  Embassy, rep ea ted ly  requesting  films during th e  next
several months. The requests , made personally on occasion by such highly placed
officials as the  heads of VOKS and the Soviet Inform ation Bureau, cu lm inated  in a
ra th e r  perem pto ry  note  from the head of SovExportFilm in June, 1946, pointedly
reminding Embassy officers  of the  length  of t im e  which had passed since the  last
52films had been made available. Still valuing th e  opportunity  to  reach  the  Soviet
opinion-making audience, th e  Embassy was willing to  m eet the  renew ed requests
bu t Hollywood, disturbed over the  d ifficu lty  of re tr iev in g  the  movies a lready sent, 
53was re luc tan t .  A t Embassy insistence, however, th e  films s ta r te d  flowing to  the 
USSR again, though under s t r ic te r  controls  governing usage and re tu rn .^^  Upon 
resum ption of the  flow the  demand for fe a tu re  films was as g rea t  as ever. Even
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" the  Minister" w anted to  see the movies, requiring special and com plicated
a rrangem en ts  by th e  Embassy s ta f f  to  accom m odate  his desire to  see th e  films a t
55his own convenience and in his own quarters .  Sunday night movies a t  Spaso
House, the  official residence of the  American ambassador in Moscow, became
regular and highly popular events, a t t r a c t in g  a s e lec t  crowd of Soviet in tellectua ls
along with guests from the  Embassies of a number of countries.^^
Minor ir r i ta tions  continued to plague the  program. In February, 1946,
for instance, rep resen ta t iv e s  of the  Film C o m m ittee  stopped the  screening  of
"Casablanca" a t  the  A ctors  Club, confisca ting  Bogart and Bergman and carry ing
them  off to  som e unknown place.^^ A fte r  re p e a te d  inquiries and requests failed to
secure  the  film's re tu rn  an ira te  Kennan w ro te  A ssis tan t Foreign Minister
Vladimir D ekanazov concerning the m a tte r .  "I am obliged to  te l l  you the  Embassy
sees in these  developm ents  not only an unjustified sequestra tion  of Embassy
58property ,"  Kennan wrote, "but also an a c t  of d iscourtesy  as well...." A month
a f te r  being seized th e  film was re tu rned  to the  Embassy by two messenger boys,
59unaccom panied by e i the r  explanation or apology. It was a minor incident in the 
re la tions  be tw een  the  two nations to  be sure, bu t nonetheless an ir r i ta ting  one 
which, along with s im ilar episodes in o ther  a rea s  of cu ltu ra l concern, heightened 
th e  pessimism over the  possibilities of recip rocal rela tions.
Similar d iff icu lties  befell the  publications program so optimistically  
envisioned by th e  l ib rarians  who gathered  a t  the  nation 's  cap ita l in June, 1945. 
Responding to  th e  librarian 's  request the  S ta te  D epartm en t agreed  to  coordinate 
th e  flow of publications between the  tw o countries , assigning J .  Wentworth 
Ruggles to  Moscow for th a t  purpose, bu t th e  p ro jec t  th a t  seem ed  so simple and
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expedient from the  A m erican side quickly ran into obstacles  from the  side of the 
Soviets.
During the  war Soviet officials worked closely with Embassy personnel
in the exchange of lib rary  m ateria ls ,  but once the  fighting was over the same
desire to avoid the  Embassy th a t  plagued the film program surfaced  in the  m atter
of publications as well. In July, 1945, for exam ple, Lenin Library officials
indicated th a t  if they had the proper microfilm equipment they  could supply more
printed  m a te r ia l  to  A m erican  libraries, but when th e  Library of Congress offered
to furnish the  needed machines the  Soviets declined. Not only was he not
in te res ted  in receiving such equipment, the ass is tan t d irec to r  of the  library told
Kennan in early  1946, he did not wish to even discuss the  m a tte r  with Embassy
officials. Nor, Kennan reported , did library officials  show any disposition to
fi 1discuss any other m a t te r  with the  Embassy.
Shortly th e re a f te r  the  library  confirm ed in writing what had become
evident in p rac tice .  The use of diplomatic channels for book exchanges had
served a useful purpose during the disruptions of th e  war years, th e  assistant
director informed the  Embassy, but now th a t  the conflic t was over the  Library
intended to  re-es tab lish  "normal" channels linking i t  d irec tly  with American
62institutions. The services of th e  Embassy were th e re fo re  no longer needed.
The system of exchanges desired by Moscow promised to work greatly  
to  its advantage, for by cen tra liz ing  its  operations in the  Lenin Library on the one 
hand while dealing with se p a ra te  A m erican libraries  on the  o ther  the  Soviets could 
exchange a  l im ited  number of t i t le s  for, in th e  aggrega te ,  a wide selection of 
A m erican publications. Embassy officials th e re fo re  insisted on the  right to 
cen tra l ize  and coord ina te  the  flow on the  American side as well, resulting in a
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voluminous and increasingly acrimonious correspondence between the  Embassy, 
th e  Lenin Library and the  Soviet Foreign Office. A ra the r  imperious note from 
Kennan to  the  head of the American Section of VOKS typified the exchange. "I 
wish to  make it clear,"  Kennan wrote in March, 1946, " tha t if the re  is any 
tendency  to inhibit this Embassy or any other organ of the United S ta tes  
governm ent in the  exercise of the ir  norm al par t  in the promotion of cultural 
exchanges or any other form of cu ltural collaboration, I would not be able to view 
this as consisten t v;ith a desire to  improve cu ltu ra l re la tions betv/een the two 
countries."®^
Confronted with such a situation upon his arrival in early 1946, cu ltura l 
a t ta c h e  Ruggles shortly suggested th a t  he be reca lled  and th a t  the  Embassy 
abandon its  e ffo rts  in the area of library  exchanges altogether. The Lenin 
Library, he wired in July, did not intend to  exceed the  s t r ic t  controls under which 
i t  was operating, and obviously resented  the p resence of an American official 
whose function was to  encourage it to  do so.^"^ O ther  Embassy officials fe lt much 
th e  sam e way, considering the ir  overtures and subsequent Soviet refusals  in the 
field of publications exchanges to  be demeaning as well as non-availing.^^
Despite Ruggles' suggestion the  Embassy e ffo r t  continued. In O ctober 
the  Lenin Library again confirm ed its refusal to  deal with the  Embassy, prompting 
Ruggles to  try  a new approach in early  1947. Reasoning tha t American 
ins titu tions should be allowed the sam e approach to  individual Soviet institutions 
as th a t  perm itted  the Lenin Library in the  United S ta tes ,  th e  publications officer 
inform ed VOKS th a t  the  Library of Congress wished to  a rrange an exchange of 
a t lases  and maps on physical geography with th e  Geography D epartm en t of 
Moscow University.^^ The Soviets refused th e  request,  pointedly rem arking tha t
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th e  Lenin Library was properly responsible for such exchanges, th a t  the  request 
had been forw arded to  th a t  institution, and th a t  it would directly  con tac t the  
Library of Congress concerning the  m a tte r .  "I think," the  Soviet official handling 
the  m a tte r  wrote, " th a t  you share my opinion of the  im practicab ility  of se tt ing  up 
in te rm ed ia te  s tages  for a ffec t ing  exchanges of geographical publications, con­
sidering the  fac t  th a t  it  will be much simpler and fa s te r  to  decide these  questions
R7direc tly  betw een the  Lenin Library and the  Library  of Congress." Certain ly , 
Ruggles replied, he shared th a t  opinion, and th a t  was why th e  Library of Congress 
wanted to engage in d irec t exchanges with the  Moscow University faculty . "That 
the  Lenin Library should ac t  as an in term ediary  as you propose is not in accord," 
he wrote, "with the  principle of d irec t re la tions  upon which we agree .. .jus t as your 
grea t ins titu tions enjoy direct relations with numerous American organizations, so 
would the Library of Congress like to  exchange publications directly  with la rge  
numbers of the ir  Soviet counterparts ."
To no avail. The Soviets maintained the ir  insistence on centra liz ing  
their  end of publications exchanges while carrying on open-ended arrangem ents  on 
the o ther side. As the  irr i ta tions  s tem m ing from political disagreem ents mounted 
and the frus tra tions  a t ten d an t to  the cu ltu ra l program accum ulated, the  s trained 
rela tions betw een Embassy officials and the  Lenin Library grew accordingly. 
Though exchanges betw een th e  library and individual American institutions never 
ceased com pletely, a phone caU in la te  November, 1947, put an end to any hopes 
for an inclusive, coordinated program operating  under Embassy auspices. All 
fu tu re  business betw een  the  Embassy and the  library, a Soviet official informed 
Ruggles, must be handled through the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To Ruggles’ 
p ro tes ta tions  th a t  th e  Embassy had always dea lt  d irectly  with the library, the
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official, s ta t in g  th a t  new instruc tions had been received, abruptly  ended the 
69conversation. "It is the  opinion of this Embassy," Ruggles cab led  concerning the  
conversation,
th a t  the  developm ents in th e  case of the Lenin Library are indicative of 
what can be ex p ec ted  from  Soviet ins ti tu tions  in general.  If th e  Lenin 
Library has new instruc tions  which forbid d irec t co n ta c t  with the 
Embassy, it must be assumed th a t  the  o ther  ins ti tu tions  with which the  
Embassy h a ^ a t t e m p t e d  to  fos ter  exchange rela tionships also have such 
instructions.
The assumption, developm ents  were to prove, was well founded.
Even m ore fru s tra t in g  was Moscow's a t t i tu d e  tow ard proposals involving 
individuals and groups. In th e  p ro jec ts  re la ted  to books and movies the  Soviets 
coopera ted  a t  leas t  to  a degree, but in instances involving individual exchanges 
they  overwhelmingly refused  all invita tions tendered  through the  Embassy, 
regardless w hether those invitations were privately  sponsored or officially pro­
posed. Some of th e  overtu res  they  re jec ted  outright, some they  ta lked to death, 
others they ignored a l together .
Cornell University 's invitation to  a Soviet professor and several
graduate  s tuden ts  to  le c tu re  on its  campus during th e  1946-1947 school year well
i l lu s tra tes  the  p a t te rn  and the  problem of dealing with the Soviets on such issues
in the  early  postw ar period. Cornell's simple and s tra igh tfo rw ard  proposal,
containing provisions for salaries, living accom m odations and required dates of
arrival, was one th a t  could have been e i the r  readily  accep ted  or easily refused
with a simple explanation and an expression of apprec ia tion  for its being 
71offered. Embassy offic ials  ce r ta in ly  an t ic ip a ted  no problems in receiving some 
so r t  of answer to  such a simple com munication.
On August th i r ty - f i r s t .  Embassy o ff ice r  Elbridge Durbrow made his first 
a t te m p t  to  deliver the  proposal to  Deputy Minister of Education Samarin, but on
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th a t  day the  Soviet offic ial was unable to  e ither  see Durbrow or, despite a
specific  request,  re tu rn  his call. Advised by Washingrton on S ep tem ber fourth  that
Cornell must soon rece ive  a def in ite  ansv.’er  or cancel its invitation, Durbrow 
79t r ied  again. On the  second e ffo r t  he succeeded in ta lking to  Samarin, who
7 ^promised to con tac t the  Embassy about the  m a tte r  on th e  seventh. But on the
seventh  no call cam e, so the  Embassy tried, unsuccessfully, to  co n ta c t  the  deputy 
74m in is te r . '^  On th e  th i r te e n th  Samarin again failed to co n tac t  the  Embassy as 
promised, making it necessary  for Embassy officials t o  call him. He could not say
anything on th a t  day, Samarin said, but if Durbrow would call th e  following day he
75would have some inform ation. On the following day Samarin delivered as
promised. Four students, he s ta ted ,  had been se lec ted  and passports  were being
76prepared. All would be ready within a few days. Having rece ived  no further
word by th e  eighteenth , however, the  Embassy again tr ied  to c o n tac t  Samarin, to
77 78no avail. A call on the  n ine teen th  produced the  sam e resu lts .  On the
tw en t ie th  Samarin's office  prom ised inform ation on the  tw en ty -f i rs t ,  but no call 
79cam e on th a t  day. On the  tw en ty - th ird  Embassy officials  inform ed the  Soviet
Ministry th a t  Cornell must cancel th e  p ro jec t if the re  were fu r the r  delays,
requesting  th a t  th e  Ministry a t  le a s t  confirm th a t  th e  professor and the  students
80had been se lec ted  and th a t  preparations  were being made for departure. 
Receiving no response th e  Embassy called again on the  tw en ty -fo u r th  and on the 
tw en ty -f i f th ,  but was unable to  ta lk  to  any responsible offic ial in Samarin's 
office.^^
Despite the  delays, Dean Acheson advised Durbrow on O ctober fourth,
Cornell still wanted to  go through with th e  pro ject,  even though it  would have to
82be postponed until th e  following sem ester .  A week la te r  an ir r i ta ted  and
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disgusted Durbrow suggested cancelling th e  invitation a l togethe r ,  pointing out 
th a t  despite  his calls, le t te rs  and personal conversations no progress had been
Q 0
m ade over a two month period. Finally, in February, 1947, Samarin con tac ted
th e  Embassy concerning the m a tte r .  The Minister of Education, Samarin said,
favorably  regarded  the  Cornell invitations—but it would be d ifficu lt to  accep t 
84them  th a t  year .  The professor and th e  g radua te  students never made it to  
Cornell.
Much the same pa t te rn  of inquiries and delays marked the a t te m p ts  of 
the  m edical researche rs  Hausehka, Shimkin and Shear to trave l to  th e  USSR to
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observe the  cancer  studies being conducted  by Roskin and Kluyeva. Hausehka
applied for a visa in m id-Septem ber, 1946; Shimkin and Shear, representing  the
86N ational C ancer Institu te ,  shortly th e re a f te r .  D espite  rep ea ted  Embassy efforts
to  fa c i l i ta te  th e  applications th e  Soviets took no action. On November s ix teenth ,
following a number of com munications betw een  Washington, th e  Embassy and the
Soviet Foreign Office, the  la t t e r  was still unable to  make a decision on the visa
87requests, but promised to do so within a  few  days. Four phone calls from the
Embassy to  th e  Foreign Office failed to  elicit a response by the eighteenth ,
88however, nor was any answer fo rthcom ing during th e  following week. On the
tw en ty -s ix th  Washington again urged th e  Embassy to  take  up the  m a tte r ,  but
oq
Embassy com pliance still produced no visas. '
O th e r  overtu res  met a similar fa te .  The R ockefeller invitation to  the
Soviet m a them a tic ians  Pontrijagin and Vinogradov went unanswered even though
i t  was tendered  twice, nor was any answer rece ived  to the  proposal to  a Soviet
sc ien tis t  to  make the  principal speech a t  the  N ational Colloid Symposium a t
90Stanford  University." The sam e was t ru e  in the  case of Alexandroff and
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Kolmogoroff, invited by Princeton to spend a year a t its Ins ti tu te  for Advanced
Study.®^ D espite  the  fac t th a t  the  two scien tis ts  had earlier received permission
to spend a year  in the  United S tates , the d irec to r  of the  Princeton program WTOte
00
the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  they had neither a rr ived  nor con tac ted  the school. At 
Princeton 's  request Washington checked into the  m a tte r ,  discovering th a t  the  two 
had never applied for visas, nor had they done so tw o months la te r  when the
qo
D epartm en t checked again.' Like the others, the  two never made the trip.
Likewise th e  proposals of Mike Todd and Ella Winter w ent unanswered, 
as did, insofar as D epartm en t records ind icate , New York City 's request th a t  a 
Soviet balle t company appear a t  its Golden Jubilee celebration  and Sol Hurok's 
o ffe r  to arrange  for an A merican tour of a Soviet ballet.^'^ Some of th e  other 
offers  eventually  received answers, but all were unfavorable.^^
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CHAPTER Vin 
FINAL EFFORTS, 1947
N ineteen fo rty -seven  produced fu r th e r  A m erican e ffo r ts  tow ard 
cu ltu ra l re la tions  w ith  the  Soviets. As earlier ,  th e  new e ffo r ts  rep resen ted  a t 
leas t  in p a r t  a response to  encouraging Soviet rem arks, but the  new overtu res  m et 
th e  sam e fa te  as the  old. Washington’s policies, however, particu la rly  its 
insis tence on reg is te r ing  Soviet visitors under th e  provisions of the  Foreign Agents 
R eg is tra tion  Act, did l i t t l e  to  forw ard the success of the  A m erican  effo r ts ;  
indeed, they  provided Moscow with a  p a ten ted  reason for doing th a t  which in all 
likelihood i t  would have done anyway.
Stalin  himself provided the im petus for a new Embassy e ffo r t .  The 
Soviet Union, he told Elliot Roosevelt in D ecem ber, 1946, was willing, even eager, 
to  p a r t ic ip a te  in a cu ltu ra l exchange program with the  United S ta tes .^  Respond­
ing to  S ta lin ’s published rem arks . Ambassador Smith sent a l e t t e r  to  Foreign 
Minister Molotov on Feb ruary  3, 1947, subm itting  again the  various proposals 
made ea r l ie r .  Although th e  t im e  lim it had expired on the  o ffers  and overtures 
already  extended, th e  am bassador w rote, they  would undoubtedly be renewed 
should Soviet au tho ri t ies  show any inclination to  accep t them . "I should be very
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glad," Smith concluded, " to  have your views with regard  to  th e  foregoing proposals 
and particu la rly  if  anything can be done to fu r the r  the im portan t m a tte r  of
9
sc ien tif ic  and cu ltu ra l exchange."
The aroused hopes were p rem ature .  Three months passed before the 
Soviets m entioned th e  proposals in Smith's le t te r ,  and then only in an incidental 
and incom plete  way. The "proper authorities,"  Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei 
Vyshinsky in form ed  Smith, were examining the  o ffers  made by Mrs. Dickensen,
Q
th e  Boston Symphony and the  scientifists  Hausehka, Shimkin and Shear. As for 
Yale geologist R ichard  F lint 's  request to  work with Soviet colleagues in Siberia 
and the trans-B aikal region, no field investigations were planned for th a t  area.^  
The offer of Dr. Young and Russian War R elief to  build a penicillin-producing 
labora to ry  m e t a similar reception, degenerating  into a series of accusations of 
bad faith  on both sides.^ N either  Dr. Young's p ro jec t or any of the o thers were 
carr ied  out.
Nor did an April, 1947, Embassy proposal th a t  approxim ately fif ty  
Am erican and Soviet scholars exchange visits m e e t  with a  favorable response, 
though in all fa irness to th e  Soviets th e re  were ex traneous considerations th a t  
com plicated th e  issue.
The suggestion th a t  A merican and Soviet scholars rec ip roca te  visits 
s tem m ed  from th e  February , 1946, S ta te  D epartm en t conference and the sub­
sequent survey conducted by th e  In s ti tu te  of In terna tiona l Education.® Despite 
the  favorable response from American universities the  p ro jec t had been long 
delayed, la rgely  a t  the  urging of Ambassador Smith, who pointed out th a t  both
security  concerns and postwar living conditions in th e  USSR assured a Soviet
7re jec tion  of any o ffe r  of academ ic  exchanges.
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Toward the end of 1946 the project was renewed, but this tim e it 
involved professors only, and depended on the  governments of each  country, not
O
the  generosity of individual institu tions, to  pay the  costs involved. A fte r  lengthy 
correspondence concerning details, Washington ins truc ted  Smith to  present the 
proposal in early January, 1947.^ But again Smith delayed, pointing to  an obvious 
problem which, he argued, must necessarily be resolved before the  Soviets would 
even consider the  p r o j e c t . A n d  indeed, from the  Soviet point of view the re  was 
reason for pause.
The problem developed from the Ju s t ice  D epartm en t 's  application of 
the  Foreign Agents R eg is tra tion  Act. During the war th a t  p a r t  of the  a c t  calling 
for reg is tra tion  of individuals had been suspended in the  case of allies, but in early 
October, 1946, A tto rney  General Clark, acting  on orders from P residen t Truman, 
removed the suspending clause and ordered a number of Soviet c itizens to  e ither 
reg is ter as agents  of the ir  governm ent or face fines and imprisonment.^^ "Your 
position as a member of a delegation from a foreign organization and the 
activ it ies  in which you have engaged since your en try  into the  United S ta tes ,"  the 
Ju s t ice  D epartm ent informed the members of two sep a ra te  delegations on the 
sam e day th a t  the  A tto rney  General announced the  rem oval of the  suspending 
clause, "makes you subject to  th e  regu la to ry  provisions of the  a c t  as the  agent of 
a  foreign principal." Therefore  unless an "im m ediate response" w ere forthcoming, 
the  Just ice  D epartm en t would be "forced to conclude th a t  your delibera te  refusal 
to  comply with the  ac t  cons ti tu tes  a  violation of the  crim inal provisions 
thereof."^  ^
The Ju s t ice  D epartm en t requirem ent was aim ed la rge ly  a t  a delegation 
of five Ukranians, in the  United S ta tes  a t  the invitation of th e  Music C om m ittee
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of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, and a six member 
delegation to  an All-Slav Congress being held in A m erica. Both delegations 
contained distinguished Soviet citizens. Among the Ukranians were two in terna­
tionally known singers, a m em ber of the  Supreme Soviet, a professor of 
Jurisprudence a t  Lwow University  and a war correspondent; among the  second
1 O
delegation similar rep resen ta tives ,  including the w rite r  Alexander Korneichuk.
The Ukranian singers had a lready appeared in concerts  in New York City  and were
scheduled for fu r ther  appearances across the country  when the  announcement 
14came.
The reg is tra tion  requ irem ent touched off a flurry of protests.  Aaron
Copland, Serge Koussevitsky and th e  heads of the  Eastm an School of Music and
the  Columbia University Music School sent le t te rs  of p ro tes t  to  President Truman
and A tto rney  General Clark; New York Times music c r i t ic  Olin Downes com-
15plained even more vociferously, as did the  A merican Civil L iberties  Union. The 
Soviet Embassy natura lly  opposed the  action, condemning it as ’’compatible 
neither  w ith the personal dignity of these  outstanding people or v/ith the self- 
respect of the  country which they rep re sen t ,” and s ta ting  th a t  it would make even 
’’more d iff icu lt the establishm ent of cu ltura l ties between us and the people of the 
United S ta te s .”^^ Despite the  p ro tes ts  the  reg istra tion  requirem ent rem ained in 
e ffec t .
When the S ta te  D ep ar tm en t ins truc ted  Ambassador Smith to deliver the 
invitation to  th e  fif ty  Soviet scholars it  was unable to  say defin ite ly  w hether they 
would be required  to reg is ter  under the  ac t .  Its "preliminary view” was th a t  the 
visitors would not be required to  reg is te r  so long as they confined themselves to 
professional in te res ts  and re fra ined  from political ac tiv it ies ,  but it was still
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17discussing the  m a tte r  with the  Ju s t ice  D epartm en t.  Because of the uncerta in ty
Smith recom m ended  th a t  the  invitation be fu r the r  postponed, and Washington 
1 Aagreed.
On Feb ruary  10th the  Ju s t ice  D epartm en t confirm ed the  earlier
opinion. As long as the  Soviet scholars confined them selves to  scientific ,
academ ic and scholarly  pursuits, i t  s ta ted ,  th e re  could be no question of the ir
having to  reg is te r .  The exem ption derived not from  the  genera l s ta tu s  of the
Soviet academ ics, however, but was based upon th e ir  ac tua l ac tiv it ies  while here.
Therefore  any scholar who engaged in politica l pursuits  or ac tively  p a r t ic ip a ted  in
public meetings of a political c h a ra c te r  would have to  reg is te r  as an agent of the 
19Soviet governm ent.
On April 7, 1947, Smith, delivered the  S ta te  D epartm en t invitation,
being care fu l to  explain in th e  process th e  J u s t ic e  D ep a r tm en t position regarding
reg is tra tion . The U nited  S ta te s ,  th e  message read, would welcom e the  arriva l of
approxim ately  f if ty  scholars to  confer with th e ir  A m erican colleagues and, in
view of th e  g re a t  in te res t  of A m erican scholars in visiting th e  Soviet Union, would
in turn w elcom e the  early  rece ip t  of corresponding invitations to  A m erican
scholars. Ideally th e  Soviet visitors should arrive  in groups of five or six and
spend fo r ty -f ive  to  sixty days in the  United S ta tes .  Each of the  two nations
should pay i ts  own expenses. For its  pa r t ,  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t was willing to
fac i l i ta te  t rav e l  a rrangem en ts ,  place Soviet scholars in touch with American
20coun terparts  and help in various ways to  assure the  success of th e  endeavor. 
Though Specific fields of scholarly in te res t  w ere m entioned in the  invitations, a t 
Smith's suggestion no specific  names were subm itted . To invite individual Soviet 
scholars, th e  am bassador reasoned, would provide th e  Soviets the  sam e
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opportunity, which they would use to  se lec t  politically sym pathe tic  Americans 
ins tead  of rep resen ta t iv e  scholars. Moreover, Smith argued, th e  Soviets would not 
allow any scholar to  trave l abroad unless politically secure, regardless how 
. distinguished in his specia lty .^^  T herefo re  the  S ta te  D ep ar tm en t invitation 
specified fields in which scholars should be exchanged, but m entioned no names.
The proper au thori t ies ,  Vyshinsky replied two v;eeks la te r ,  were ca re ­
fully studying the  proposal. But " the  p rac t ices  of the  organs of the  D epartm en t of 
J u s t ice  with re sp ec t  to  Soviet c itizens arriving in th e  U nited S ta tes ,"  he
continued, " c rea te s  d ifficu lties  in the  development of cu ltu ra l re la tions  between
22our countries , ir respec tive  of th e  opinion of th e  A tto rney  General."  The recen t 
exam ples of the  tw o delegations in the  U nited S ta te s ,  th e  Soviet official
OO
concluded, "speak for them selves."
The Soviets never agreed to the  exchanges. Only they  know whether
the  reg is tra tion  requ irem en t played a role in the refusal, but had the  situation
been reversed and had A m erican  scholars been subject to  reg is tra tion  as agents of
the  United S ta te s  governm ent if  they  made rem arks in te rp re te d  as political, it is
readily  apparent th a t  such a requ irem en t would have posed a major obstacle . But
given the  ea r l ie r  p a t te rn  of Soviet re fu sa ls  and the  growing tensions betw een  the
tw o  countries  by early 1947, i t  is highly doubtful th a t  the  reg is tra tion  provision
was the  determ in ing  fac to r .  In the  final analysis it is d ifficult to  disagree with
Ambassador Smith's assessm ent. The S ta te  D epartm en t 's  inability  to  give Moscow
absolute assurance th a t  the  visitors would not have to  reg is te r  as foreign agents
might be used as a  reason for not en tering  into an exchange ag reem en t,  the
ambassador wired, bu t "such a  consideration would not be a de term in ing  factor
24but ra the r  a convenient out for th a t  governm ent if it  wanted one."
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Many were s til l  unwilling to abandon the  e ffo r t ,  convinced th a t  the
Soviets could be induced to  coopera te  if only the  co rrec t  formula could be found.
In the  summer of 1947 the  A m erican Council of Learned Societies sen t Ernest J.
Simmons to  Moscow in a la s t-d itch  a t te m p t  to  establish an exchange program.
Financed by the  R ockefe lle r  Foundation, the  en tire  venture was deliberately
planned with minimum connections to  Washington in the  belief th a t  th e  Soviets
might respond more favorably  to  p rivate  overtures  tendered  through academ ic
circles than  to  o ffic ia l e fforts .
That th e  Council chose Ernest J .  Simmons to  represen t it said a g rea t
deal about the  program and its  sponsors. Simmons was perhaps the  ranking
A m erican scholar on Russian and Soviet affairs; certa in ly  among the  se lec t  few.
Chairm an of Columbia's D epartm en t of Slavic Languages, au thor of numerous
books and a r t ic le s  and chairm an of the Executive Board of the New York
A m erican-Russian Ins ti tu te ,  Simmons had spent most of the  previous f if teen  years
25try ing  to  improve cu ltu ra l re la tions  between the  two countries. Like th e  others 
connected  with th e  New York A merican-Russian Ins ti tu te ,  Simmons viewed 
cultura l re la tions  not as a means to  a political end, but as an end in itself; an end 
which, pursued in th e  proper way, could produce understanding and reduce fear. 
In te res t  in the  cu lture  and the  aspirations of ano ther  country did not necessarily 
imply adm iration  or approval, Simmons and the  like-minded believed, but it did 
rep resen t a  quantum leap over the ignorance th a t  resu lted  from  lack of such 
in te res t .  Simmons' repu ta tion  within academ ic circles, his fluency in the 
language, his acqua in tances  and con tac ts  with Soviet in te llec tua ls  and his concept 
of cu ltura l re la tions  m ade him the  p e rfec t  choice to  present th e  proposals of the  
A m erican Council of Learned Societies in Moscow.
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He had reason to be optimistic  about the  outcom e of the  venture. In 
th e  process of obtaining a visa he ta lked to a number of high-level Soviet officials 
in the U nited S ta tes , all of whom offered encouragem ent and support. Soviet 
Ambassador Novikov assured him of Moscow’s desire for b e t te r  cu ltura l relations, 
observing th a t  although postwar conditions made s tuden t exchanges impossible the
OR
situation would hopefully soon change. And as Simmons himself rem arked  upon
receiving his visa, " the  very fa c t  th a t  1 was granted  one a t  all, which is usually not
done without an accep tance  on the  part of the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
app lican t’s reason for applying, gave me a slight feeling of hope th a t  some of my
97requests  might be favorably received by Soviet officials."
An added feeling of hope cam e from the enthusiastic  response of the 
academ ic ins titu tions co n tac ted  by the  A m erican Council of Learned Societies as 
po ten tia l  partic ipan ts  in the program. As on the  earlier occasion when the 
In s ti tu te  of In terna tiona l Education con tac ted  a number of schools regarding their 
willingness to par t ic ip a te  in an exchange program, the  replies were overwhelm­
ingly positive, prompting Simmons to rem ark  on the  seriousness of the schools and
the  ex ten t of the ir  readiness to make im portan t com m itm ents  tow ard  improving
28con tac ts  with the  Soviets. From the  various replies and offers received
Simmons se lec ted  five, deliberately  choosing those which required no quid pro quo
arrangem ents .  In addition, the  Library of Congress asked Simmons to  present a
oq
number of proposals on its  behalf, and Simmons readily agreed. "
Thus equipped with a visa, a rm ed  with a  number of proposals and 
backed by a prestigious academ ic body, Simmons trave led  to Moscow in mid-July, 
1947. Given the  credentia ls ,  the s incerity  and the  lack of u lterior motive on the 
p a r t  of both Simmons and his sponsors, the  Soviets, had they been equally sincere
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in the ir  s ta te m e n ts  favoring cu ltura l re la tions, could hardly have ignored the new 
overture . But like the earlier  a t te m p ts ,  Simmons proposals met delay, f rus tra tion  
and failure. Even a token degree of in te res t  and a reasonable explanation of the ir  
re luc tance  could have changed the  outcom e of Simmons' mission and produced a 
more favorable  reac tion  among those supporting the  e ffo r t  in the  United S tates , 
but even th a t  token in teres t  was not forthcom ing.
On the  morning of th e  s ix teen th  Simmons met w ith Sm ith  and Ruggles
a t th e  Embassy. Although Smith o ffered  to  a rrange interviews and appointm ents
and assist in any manner possible, all agreed  th a t  in keeping with the  p riva te
nature  of the visit Simmons should work as independently of the  Embassy as
possible. But if  Simmons met with l i t t l e  success in ta lking to  rep resen ta t iv e s  of
cu ltu ra l agencies, the  ambassador insisted, th e  Embassy would arrange  for him to
m eet with high level officials  a t  the  Ministry of Foreign A ffairs  to  assure th a t  his
30proposals rece ived  a hearing. While a t  the  Embassy Simmons also examined the 
records  of the  earlier  a t te m p ts  to  improve cultural contacts , expressing both
O 1
surprise and sa tisfac tion  a t  the e x ten t  of the effo rt.  Prior to  th a t  tim e. Smith
wired Washington, Simmons and presumably others in the  academ ic community
were unaw are of the  extensive e f fo r ts  which Embassy Officials had already
undertaken in the  cause, and some means should there fore  be developed to keep 
32them  informed. The record as w ritten  in th e  Embassy's files proved, however, a 
p o r ten t  of Simmons' success.
On the  second day of his visit Simmons outlined a  number of his 
proposals to  VOKS vice-president Karaganov. Karaganov rece ived  Simmons 
cordially, expressed in teres t in his ideas and asked for a w ritten  memorandum
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33covering spec if ic  aspects. Accordingly, Simmons prepared the  requested  docu­
m ent, explaining in de ta il the various m easures which he desired  to  submit, and 
sen t it to  the  VOKS official.^'^
In his memorandum Simmons first p resented  th e  proposals subm itted  by 
C hief Librarian  of Congress L u ther B. Evans. The Library of Congress and the 
Lenin Library, he suggested, should jointly  com pile a com prehensive bibliography 
covering the  cu ltura l,  h is torical and economic re la tions  betw een the  tw o  countries 
during both  the  revolutionary  and pre-revo lu tionary  periods. For preliminary 
purposes, he continued, th a t  p ro jec t might be linked to  one calling  for the 
exchange of tw o lib rarians  from each  of the  ins ti tu tions  as a means of fam iliar iz­
ing them with the  problems and procedures of the  o ther. And th e  Library of 
Congress, Simmons concluded, was both  in te re s ted  in receiving a num ber of Soviet
publications not on its lis t  and willing to  re s to re  to  the  Soviet Union a pa r t  of the
35Yudin Collection, valued by many because  i t  contained works Lenin once used.
In the  rem aining proposals Simmons ex tended  invitations from a number
of A m erican  universities. Columbia, Yale and the University of Chicago, among
others, reques ted  th a t  Soviet scholars spend e i the r  a sem ester  or a y ea r  lec turing
to  the ir  s tudents. Several o ther  schools, including Stanford, th e  U niversity  of
Kansas, N orthw estern  and Bryn Mawr, asked th a t  those scholars, once in the
36United S ta tes ,  spend a t  leas t  a short t im e  on th e ir  campuses.'
To fa c i l i ta te  his mission in Moscow, Simmons continued in his m em o­
randum, he would ap p rec ia te  K araganov arranging  for him to m eet w ith  the Soviet 
Minister of Education, the  head of th e  A cadem y of Sciences, the  d irec to r  of the 
Lenin L ibrary  and the  d irec tor of the  Marx-Engels-Lenin In s ti tu te .  Also, he 
specified, he would like to  m eet with c e r ta in  scholars in the field  of Russian
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l i te ra tu re  and Slavic philology, and with the  head of the  Foreign Section of the 
W riters Union.^^
Five days passed—very valuable days considering Simmons’ lim ited  time
in Moscow—before he was invited back to Karaganov's office, and then only af te r
0 0
considerable te lephone prom pting on his par t .  A ppropriate au tho ri t ies  were
studying the  m emorandum, Karaganov told Simmons, but it appeared he would be
unable to m e e t with som e of the  officials  whom he had specified. The M inister of
Education was aw ay for several days and thus not available, and it was highly
39doubtful th a t  th e  head of the  Academ y of Sciences would agree to  a meeting.
Simmons and Karaganov nex t discussed the  possibility of a broadened 
exchange of books and periodicals. The VOKS official expressed some in te res t  in 
receiv ing  such popular A m erican periodicals as L ife , Time and Newsweek as well 
as new books on l i te ra tu re ,  a r t ,  music and th e a te r ,  but when Simmons suggested 
th a t  the  en t i re  process of publication exchanges be cen tra lized , explaining past 
A m erican d iff icu lties  with book exchanges as presently  carried  out, Karaganov 
dem urred. R evert ing  to  the  sam e position as expressed to  Ruggles and Embassy 
offic ia ls  earlie r ,  K araganov argued th a t  the  Soviets would rece ive  few er publica­
tions under such an arrangement."^*^ Upon Simmons’ suggestion for an over-all 
exchange betw een the Lenin Library and the  Library of Congress, however, the  
VOKS off ice r  displayed an active  in te res t ,  prompting Simmons to  im m ediately  
send a te leg ram  to  Washington asking for fu r th e r  instructions and information."^^ 
Despite  the g lim m er of hope on th e  la s t  point Simmons was discouraged by the 
m eeting. "Obviously,” he la te r  wrote, "som ething had happened betw een my first 
and second in terv iew s to  lower the  te m p e ra tu re  of his in te res t  in my mission, 
probably a ta lk  w ith  the  au thori t ies  in the  Ministry of Foreign A ffairs .^^
214
Five more days passed before Simmons received the  opportunity to 
proceed  fu r ther  with his mission, and then only in a minor way. On July 26th 
Simmons m et w ith the d irec to r  of th e  Marx-Engels-Lenin Institu te ,  but only for 
the  purpose of bringing the  American up to  date  on developm ents within th a t  body 
since his last v isit some ten  years  earlier. Upon Simmons’ query the  d irector 
expressed a mild in te res t  in the  re tu rn  of th e  Yudin Collection from the  Library 
of Congress, but as for exchanging s tuden ts  and professor, he volunteered, the  
t im e  was not ye t ripe.'*^
Still ano ther  five days lapsed before Simmons, hearing nothing fu rther  
concerning his proposals, was able to  co n tac t  Karaganov. The Lenin Library was 
stil l  considering th e  parts  of the memorandum perta in ing  to  it, th e  VOKS official 
inform ed Simmons, and hopefully an appointm ent could soon be arranged, but on 
th e  o ther points he had no inform ation. On the  same day Simmons discussed his 
problems with Ambassador Smith. If no resu lts  were forthcom ing within a  few 
days, the  two agreed, th e  ambassador would try  to  a rrange an in terv iew  for 
Simmons a t th e  Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'^
Yet ano ther  five days slipped away before Simmons was again afforded 
the  opportunity  to  ta lk  to  Karaganov, and then all the  answers he received were 
negative. The VOKS official confirm ed what he had earl ie r  hinted; i t  would not 
be possible to  ta lk  to  e i the r  th e  Minister of Education or the  head of th e  Academy 
of Sciences. The fo rm er had just le f t  on vacation; the  l a t t e r  was too busy.^^ 
"The im plication was c lear,"  Simmons wrote, "if Mr. Karaganov had informed Mr. 
K aftanov and Mr. Vavilov about my proposals for Soviet professors to  visit and 
te a c h  in the United S ta te s ,  and these  two gentlem en had found it impossible to  
see me, the obvious answer to  the  proposals from these  quar te rs  was no."'^^
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During the next few days Simmons called on Karaganov's office at
VOKS on several occasions to  discuss the  pro jec ted  visit with the  d irec to r  of the
Lenin Library and, in th e  meanwhile, provided the Embassy with m a te r ia l  for an
aide mémoire for th e  proposed interview a t  th e  Ministry of Foreign A ffairs .  On
each occasion Karaganov tr ied  to  be helpful, expressing surprise—eith e r  rea l or
conjured—th a t  ce r ta in  Soviet agencies, particu larly  the  Lenin Library, were
making so l i t t l e  e f fo r t  to avail them selves of the  opportunities p resented  by
Simmons' p resence.^^ On August ninth Karaganov finally inform ed Simmons th a t
an interview had been arranged for th a t  day a t  th e  Lenin Library. But it  would be
necessary to  ta lk  to  the  acting  d irector; th e  d irec to r  of th e  Library had just le f t  
48on vacation.
During his in terview  with the  ac ting  d irector, M adame K am enetskaya,
the  two covered point by point the  re levant item s as outlined in Simmons' 
49memorandum. Concerning the proposal for a joint bibliographical en terprise , 
K amenetskaya s ta ted ,  th e  Lenin Library was involved in revamping its  biblio­
graphical fac ilit ies  in connection with the cu rren t five year plan, and there fo re  
could not undertake any new projects a t  the  tim e, though perhaps the  schem e 
might be considered again once the  revam ping was completed. And since the  
proposal for a  joint bibliographical en terprise  was linked in Simmons' m em o­
randum with the  proposal for exchanging librarians, the  l a t t e r  idea would also 
have to  be dismissed for the  time. Upon Simmons' rejoinder th a t  th e re  was no 
absolute need to connect the  two, th e  ac ting  d irec tor replied th a t  the  m a tte r  
would have to  be taken  up with the d irector, bu t m ost probably th e  full assis tance 
of all the available lib rarians  would be needed for the  five year  plan. As for the  
local, provincial and bibliographical item s which th e  Library of Congress indicated
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i t  would like to  receive from the  USSR, K am enetskaya continued, the  Lenin 
Library's means for exchange were lim ited , but it would do what it could to  supply 
th e  desired item s. As for the  re tu rn  of the  Yudin Collection, K am enetskaya 
indicated, her institu tion might be in te re s ted  in receiving some of the  m aterials, 
but was by no means anxious for the re tu rn  of all.^®
Having received a cable  from Washington urging him to  explore further 
the  idea of an over-all exchange program betw een the two libraries, Simmons next 
alluded to  th a t  possibility. U nfortunate ly , K am enetskaya replied, the  Lenin 
Library simply did not have the  books to em bark on a bigger or more inclusive 
exchange program , e ither on an over-all basis or in specific ca tegories .  T herefore  
the  exchange rela tionship  would have to  rem ain  as it  presently  stood, though 
e f fo r ts  could be made to improve the  procedures within the  fram ew ork  already 
established.^^
Simmons’ long aw aited  visit with Lenin Library o ffic ia ls  thus 
accom plished l i t t l e  of a positive na tu re .  The outcom e was indicated  beforehand 
by the  f a c t  th a t  it was necessary to  ta lk  to  an assis tant ra th e r  than  th e  d irector 
himself. It v/as c lear, Simmons wrote, th a t  the  answers to  each of th e  points had 
been decided upon earlier  and th a t  K am enetskaya had no au thority  to  do anything
CO
other than  follow those decisions.
On the  sam e day th a t  he ta lked  to  Kamenetskaya, Simmons and 
Ambassador Smith discussed the  A m erican  proposals w ith Vice-M inister of 
Foreign A ffairs  Jaco b  Malik. The in terv iew  s tem m ed from a  com m ent th a t  Smith 
had made a few days earlier, during a  discussion with Vyshinsky involving m a tte rs  
of a  politica l nature . At the  end of th e  m eeting the  ambassador reminded the 
v ice-m inister  th a t  Simmons was in Moscow on a mission to  prom ote cu ltural
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re la tions, th a t  he rep resen ted  the highest academ ic  c irc les  in the  United S ta tes ,
and th a t  he was ac t ing  in a com plete ly  p r iva te  capacity .  Since a  cu ltu ra l
re la tions  program betw een the  tw o nations was of u tm ost im portance. Sm ith
observed, and since i t  was beneath  the  dignity of th e  U nited S ta te s  governm ent to
fu r th e r  pursue the possibilities, having been rebuffed  on so many ear l ie r  effo rts ,
he would consider it a personal favor i f  Vyshinski would agree  to  discuss with
Simmons the  co n cre te  proposals brought from A m erica. Vyshinski replied  th a t  he
would do w hat he could regarding the  m a t te r ,  though since Molotov was aw ay he
53was very busy a t  the  time.
A few days la te r—and a f t e r  more prom pting on Smith's p a r t—the  
Foreign M inistry inv ited  Simmons and Smith to  discuss th e  m a tte r ,  though it 
would be necessary , th e  invitation pointed out, to  ta lk  to  Malik r a th e r  than 
Vyshinsky.^'*
Smith began th e  interview with a s ta te m e n t  of the  im portance which 
the  United  S ta te s  a t tach e d  to  cordial cu ltu ra l re la tions  with th e  Soviet reg im e, a 
resum e of e f fo r ts  made to th a t  point, and an explanation of Simmons' position and 
im portance . Malik in turn  assured his visitors of his governm ent's  in te re s t  in 
m aintain ing friendly cu ltu ra l contacts . The tw o sides then quickly got to  the  issue 
a t  hand.^^
R ealiz ing  th a t  th is was his last chance, Simmons used his most 
persuasive pitch. A m erican academ ic in te re s t  in th e  Soviet Union, he  began, had 
grown trem endously  since the  outbreak of th e  war. Prior to  th a t  t im e  scarcely  a 
ha lf-dozen  A m erican  universities were teach ing  nor m ore than a hundred students  
were studying th e  Russian language, bu t s ince the  war began some th i r ty  thousand 
s tuden ts  had enrolled in language courses taugh t by more than  one hundred
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schools. A similar increase had taken place in th e  a rea  of Soviet studies. But the  
s tuden ts '  learning would be incom plete  a t  best,  Simmons argued, unless they were 
allowed to  finish the ir  studies by spending some tim e in the  Soviet Union. 
M oreover, Simmons continued, he was prepared  to  extend invitations to  Soviet 
professors  of l i te ra tu re ,  history, economics, jurisprudence and in ternational 
re la tions  if  the  Soviets were willing to  accep t.  The American rep resen ta tiv e  then 
concluded his p resen ta tion  with a rec i ta t io n  of his proposals, th e  negative
responses they  had elicited, and an implied plea to  prompt the various agencies
. . 56into action.
To Simmons' s ta te m e n t  concerning the  growing in te res t  in Soviet 
studies am ong American universities Malik expressed both surprise and g ra t i f ic a ­
tion, though, he observed, the  number of Soviet s tuden ts  studying English was far 
g rea te r .  But as far as student exchanges were concerned th e  possibilities seem ed 
slight. Over one hundred s tudents  applied for every  available spot in Soviet 
universities , the  v ice-m inister rem arked , and moreover the  war had c re a te d  
te rr ib le  housing difficulties. And for the  sam e reason th a t  it could not accep t 
s tudents , Malik continued, the  Soviet Union could not send its  professors abroad: 
th e  dem and for them a t  home was simply too g rea t .  Upon Ambassador Smith's 
re jo inder th a t  the  crowded conditions were understood and appreciated , bu t th a t  
i t  was common knowledge th a t  the Soviets w ere accep ting  foreign s tuden ts  from 
countries  o the r  than the  United S ta tes ,  and th a t  simply to  accep t as few as four 
or five A m ericans  as  a token of goodwill would do much to improve th e  s ta te  of
cu l tu ra l  re la tions  betw een th e  tw o nations, Malik simply rem arked  th a t  he hoped
S7th is  could be done in the  future.
The Soviet v ice-m inister then raised  the  issue of the reg is tra tion  
requ irem en t,  observing th a t  scholars g rea t ly  fea red  what might happen to  them
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under the  provisions of the  Foreign A gents  R eg istra tion  Act. Smith's explanation 
th a t  those engaged in cu ltu ra l pursuits were not required to reg is ter  unless they 
par t ic ipa ted  in politica l ac tiv it ies ,  and his re i te ra t io n  of the  lengths to which he 
had gone to  obta in  an au thori ta t ive  ruling on th a t  point still le f t  Malik 
unconvinced, a t  least outwardly. The ac t ,  Malik repea ted , c rea ted  a g rea t 
"psychological fear"  of visiting the  U nited States.^® Earlier a VOKS official had 
raised the sam e point with Simmons, p ro tes t ing  strongly  against the t re a tm e n t  of 
the  Ukranian visitors and the  delegates to  the  All-Slav Congress. "We are  proud," 
the  official rem arked  to Simmons, "and though i t  is possible th a t  the  law might 
apply to  visiting historians and economists, we do not see how it  could apply to
gq
Soviet w riters  and a r t is ts  in your country."
A t the  conclusion of the  conference Malik promised, a t  Simmons
request,  to  provide defin ite  answers to  the  various proposals discussed during the
interview. But no fu r th e r  word cam e from e i th e r  VOKS or the  Ministry of Foreign
A ffairs. On August fo u rteen th  Simmons le f t  Moscow on schedule without talking
fu rthe r  w ith any Soviet official; on th e  tw enty-second the  Embassy received an
aide-m em oire  acknowledging the interview and noting th a t  the  various proposals
fif)had been re fe r re d  to com peten t au thorities.
Simmons eventually  received an answer, but the  form and substance 
was far d if fe ren t than th a t  an tic ipa ted  upon his a rr iva l in Moscow in mid-July.^^
Simmons' e ffo r ts  marked the  las t  major a t te m p t  to  improve cultural 
re la tions during th e  1940's, and its failure had an im pac t both  in Washington and 
among academ ic  circ les. The lack of response, th e  delaying tac t ic s  and the 
outright refusals  based on flimsy excuses, Smith cabled  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent,
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followed almost exac tly  the  same p a t te rn  of Soviet reac tions  to  earl ie r  proposals 
made by Embassy officials. "The fa c t  th a t  Simmons was ac t ing  in the  capacity  of 
a rep resen ta t iv e  of the highest organs of learning in the United S ta te s  and that 
until the  last stages of his visit he worked quite independently of the  Embassy," 
the  ambassador continued, "provides discouragingly conclusive evidence tha t the 
Soviet government does not intend within the  forseeable fu ture  to  accep t any 
overtures  from the  U.S. regard ing  ac tua l and concre te  p ro jec ts  in the field of
CO
cultura l and scholarly exchanges." Moreover, Smith urged. D epartm ent 
officials  should make sure th a t  in the  fu ture, scholarly and educational circles 
w ere made aw are  of Embassy effo rts  toward improved co n tac ts .  Had those 
c irc les  been aware of past effo rts ,  he asserted , they v.'ould have b e t te r  understood 
the  reasons for the  lack of success; would have been less c r i t ica l  in the ir  a t titude . 
Particu larly  in the  field of publications exchanges, the  ambassador recommended, 
th e re  should be more com m unication betw een private and offic ia l bodies; had 
Simmons known of ce r ta in  files and documents beforehand, he contended, the 
scholarly institu tions which he rep resen ted  would have been m ore to le ran t  of the
CO
Embassy's perform ance.
Simmons drew his own conclusions from the  experience. For the 
m om ent, he wrote, the re  could be no hope of negotiating cu l tu ra l exchanges with 
Moscow. Since the Soviets still needed vast quantities  of A m erican  information 
and printed m ateria l they would maintain a thin facade of re la tions, but there 
could be no free  exchange of people, ideas and cultures. Only if  a t  some future 
d a te  the  Soviets deemed it to  the ir  advantage would extensive  co n tac ts  be 
possible. "If such a t im e  ever comes," Simmons concluded, " they  will make it 
abundantly clear, and then th e re  will be no g rea t  difficulty in nego tia ting  cultural
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exchanges with the Soviet Union." Such a t im e  was to  come, but th e  negotiations 
were not without difficulties.
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CHAPTER IX
COLD WAR AND CULTURAL CONTACTS, 1947-1952
Simmons' fa ilure  coincided with the beginning of a rapid de teriora tion  
in the cu ltu ra l re la tionship  already grown tenuous. Within weeks of his departu re  
the  Kremlin, killing any rem aining hopes of organized exchanges, e rec ted  e f fe c ­
tive  barrie rs  to  co n tac ts  betw een  Soviet and foreign citizens, intensified its 
campaign against w estern influences already within, and turned its cultural organs 
into weapons to  a t ta c k  those influences without. Books, magazines, newspapers, 
films and plays praised the glories of Soviet culture; ridiculed American p re ten ­
sions in the sam e direction. Only socialist realism, the  message read, could aspire 
to  t ru e  art; decadent capita lism , for all its riches, could neither  purchase nor 
produce it. For the  m om ent, Moscow's actions made clear, hostility  and isolation 
b e t te r  served its purpose than did con tac ts  and cooperation.
The U nited S ta tes , perceiving a th re a t  in Stalin's measures a t  home and 
in his ventures abroad, sought pro tec tion  in its own version of cultural isola­
tionism and in te rna l purges. As American anger and apprehension rose over 
Soviet ac t iv it ies  in eas te rn  Europe and over reported  m achinations aimed a t Iran, 
Turkey and G reece, th e  S ta te  D epartm ent increasingly abandoned the  reciprocal 
and educational aspec ts  of cultural relations in favor of a un ila tera l "campaign of
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t ru th"  against communism, Congress passed laws preventing non-official Soviet 
citizens entering the  country  and th e  House U n-Am erican A ctiv ities  C om m ittee  
roo ted  out signs of communist con tam ination  a t  the  slightest sign of infection. 
O fficers  of th e  N ational Council of A m erican-Soviet Friendship went to jail; the 
New York A m erican-Russian Institu te ,  even less fo rtunate , went to  its grave. As 
the  successive shocks of the  Berlin blockade, th e  com munist v ic tory  in China and 
th e  outbreak of war in Korea increased A m erican-Soviet tensions, cu ltu ra l 
es trangem en t kept pace  with political a lienation: except for the  s lim m est of
threads, cu ltu ra l co n ta c ts  between the  fo rm er war partners  becam e non-existen t. 
By 1950 th e  people of th e  tw o nations looked upon each o ther as alien and hostile  
beings, each deeply suspicious of the  other. The cu ltural cu r ta in  had becam e as 
im penetrab le  as th a t  of iron.
During the  l a t t e r  half of 1947 Moscow effec t ive ly  e lim inated all non­
official co n tac ts  betv.'een its  citizens and fore igners. A June  decree  went far 
tow ard  th a t  end; a November one com pleted  it .  And to assure th a t  it plugged all 
loopholes, Moscow renew ed and extended  its w artim e  trave l  controls during the  
following year. Com m unication becam e d iff icu lt  a t  best on the  official level; 
next to impossible on the  cultural.
The S ta te  S ecre ts  A ct announced in June categorized , in e f fe c t ,  all 
m a te r ia l  not a lready  in print as a s e c re t  of the  s ta te ,  particu la rly  m ateria l  
perta in ing  to  techn ica l,  m ilitary  and industrial m a tte rs .  S ta t is t ic s  and figures 
routinely  published in th e  United S ta te s  becam e classified data , as did inform ation 
re la t in g  to  foreign policy and foreign trade .  ^
Since the  a c t  contained harsh  penalties  for anyone violating its  provi­
sions, Ambassador Smith informed th e  S ta te  D ep ar tm en t,  m ost Soviet citizens
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viewed i t  as a warning to  avoid foreigners. Embassy personnel suddenly found old
2
c o n tac ts  d is tan t and evasive; old sources of inform ation  silent. The a r t is ts ,  
in te l lec tu a ls  and en te r ta in e rs  who frequen ted  the ambassador's weekly movies a t
O
Spaso House s topped coming; even stopped speaking a t  social functions. On a t 
le a s t  one occasion Sm ith refrained  from speaking to an old acquain tance in the  
lobby of the  Bolshoi T hea te r  to  avoid em barrassing  him—or perhaps worse, for 
some of those who form erly  a t tended  Embassy functions were being a rres ted .^  
Newsmen rep o r te d  the  sam e p a t te rn ,  noting th a t  a t  t im es they nodded to fo rm er
5
friends, but did not speak.
If the June decree  was insufficient to  e lim inate  all connections betw een 
Soviets and foreigners, a D ecem ber lav/ requiring th a t  all ordinary c o n ta c ts  be 
arranged  through the Ministry of Foreign A ffa irs  went far tow ard co rrec t in g  the  
defic iency. Foreigners  could no longer d irec tly  approach Soviet individuals or 
institu tions, nor could Soviet c itizens  reply should such overtures be made in 
violation of th e  law. All oral approaches, th e  law stipulated , w ere to  be re je c te d  
and reported  to  the  proper authorities. A num ber of institutions whose ordinary 
functions requ ired  foreign con tac ts  w ere exem pted , but cultural, sc ien tif ic  and 
educational ins ti tu tions  were not among those specified. Only in ins tances  
involving fire, police and hospital cases w ere  fo re igners  perm itted  d irec t c o n ta c t  
w ith  Soviet c i t izens  without prior approval.^ Foreign correspondents, required  to 
a rrange  all c o n ta c ts  through the  Foreign Ministry 's press departm en t ,  were
7
lim ited  by th e  sam e restric tions.
In th e  fall of 1948 Moscow added m ore provisions, placing ce r ta in  a reas  
of the  USSR off l im its  to  foreigners, lim iting  trav e l  in the  vicinity of Moscow to a 
radius of f i f ty  k ilom eters ,  and requiring prior no tif ica t ion  of trave l  beyond those
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g
lim its. In p rac t ice  the  lim ita tions  were even more severe than on paper. Though 
legally applying only to  diplomatic and consular officials , adm inistra tive  
procedures largely extended the  l im ita tions  to  non-official foreigners  as well, 
since the  necessity  of trave ling  through forbidden zones closed many of the areas 
theo re tica l ly  open, and police barricades routinely  reduced the  f if ty  k ilom eter 
l im it around Moscow to fif teen .^  In 1952 and again in 1953 Moscow redrew the 
re s t r ic te d  zones, opening som e areas  formerly closed while simultaneously closing 
zones previously open, and in 1954 precisely s tipu la ted  the  objects  and areas  
which foreigners could photograph within the  open zones.
A t the  sam e t im e  tha t it isolated th e  Soviet people from foreigners, 
Moscow waged a cam paign to  e rad ica te  the  alien cu ltural influences which had 
in f i l tra ted  the  country . A succession of decrees  from th e  C en tra l  C om m ittee  of 
the  Comm unist P a r ty  a f fe c te d  every fa c e t  of cu ltura l life. A ttack ing  the 
bourgeois sym pathies of "homeless cosmopolitans" who "toadied to  th e  West" and 
providing guidelines for th e  crea tion  of proper Soviet a r t ,  th e  decrees  educated 
and exhorted  those willing to  conform; pressured and punished those who proved 
re luc tan t .  G overnm ent and par ty  publications joined the  crusade, providing 
fu r the r  guideposts to  d irec t Soviet a r t is ts  along the  path  to  socialis t realism and 
marking p itfa lls  along the  way.
The Kremlin began cautioning against cultural subservience to the  West 
as early  as 1944, warning th a t  the  nation must re tu rn  to  "Leninist purity" in all 
m a tte rs  and consequently c rea ting  rumors of an im minent cu ltu ra l p u r g e . I n  
August, 1946, the  rum ors turned  to  reality . On the  fou rteen th  a party  decree 
a t ta c k e d  a  number of Leningrad writers and l i te ra ry  magazines, pointing to  the ir
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"servility  before con tem porary  bourgeois culture" and urging them to co rrec t 
12their  errors. Resuming the  role he had played briefly in the th ir t ies ,  Stalin's
handpicked cu ltura l c leanser Andrei Zhdanov stepped up th e  a t tack ,  charging tha t
the  Leningrad w riters  encouraged defea tism , pessimism and anti-Sovietism;
im ita ted  the a r t  and l i te ra tu re  of the  bourgeois West; had nothing in common with
13the  Soviet people and th e  Soviet s ta te .  Subsequently the W riters Union expelled
tw o of the v/riters, reorgan ized  one magazine and liquidated another.^"^ The
message was clear: Soviet w riters  existed  to serve the  s ta te ,  not to  explore
individual them es d ic ta ted  by personal p refe rences  and emotions. "A rt for ar t 's
sake," procla im ed the  Resolution on the  Journals Leningrad and Zvezda, was
"alien to l i te ra tu re  and harm ful to  the  in te res ts  of the Soviet s ta te ."^^
A host of similar decrees and a r tic le s  followed th e  dictum aimed a t  the
Leningrad writers. The f irs t issue of Culture and L ife , inaugurated during the
purge by the A gita tion D epartm en t of the  C en tra l  C om m ittee ,  explicitly  s ta ted
the  task of Soviet cu ltu ra l organs. "All the  form s and means of ideological and
cultura l ac t iv it ies  of th e  P a r ty  and the  S ta te ,  whether the  press, propaganda and
agitation, science, l i te ra tu re  and art ,  th e  cinema, radio, museums or any cultural
and educational estab lishm ent,"  the  m agazine asserted , "must be p laced in the
1 Aserving of the  masses." O ther decrees  and resolutions warned against "false
films" and films without ideological con ten t,  urged th e a tre  groups to  sharpen their
17social message, and cautioned  a rch i tec ts  against slavishly im ita ting  the  West. 
Accusing dance pavilions and sum m er parks of succumbing to  the  pernicious 
influences of ballroom dancing and the evils of Am erican jazz, w ith  being "hot­
beds of all kinds of tangos, blues, one-steps and fox-tro ts ,"  Evening Moscow
1 8warned them to  p lace more emphasis on Russian folk songs. Even vaudeville
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ac to rs  drew critic ism  and advice. They must, an official proclaimed, give tim ely  
reac tion  to  in terna tional events, expose corrupt w estern  culture and, above all, 
p rom ote  the v ir tue  of Soviet reality.
Soviet sc ien tis ts  received similar advice and instruction. Their func­
tion, Minister of Higher Education K aftanov inform ed them in a  1947 issue of 
Culture and L ife , was to  serve the Soviet s ta te ,  not to  pursue sc ien tif ic  knowledge 
for the advancem ent of mankind in general. U nfortunate ly , the  m inister noted, 
the re  were still some who liked to cast glances abroad; for whom an a r t ic le  in a 
foreign journal carr ied  more weight than the  praise of fellow Soviet scientis ts .  To 
such sc ien tis ts  who could not ’’erase  the psychology of servility  and obsequious­
ness” toward the  West, Kaftanov quoted Zhdanov’s admonition of the  Leningrad
writers. "Does this slavish a t t i tu d e ,” Zhdanov had asked, "befit  us who have built
on
th e  Soviet regim e a hundred tim es higher than any bourgeois regim e?”
For two years music escaped the reg im en ta tion  imposed in o ther  areas,
but in early  1948 Zhdanov turned his a t ten tion  in th a t  direction, shortly reducing
the proud and famous Soviet composers to  functionaries  of the  s ta te ; forcing them
to adm it the ir  musical e f fo r ts  and to  conform to the  party  concept of proper
Soviet music. Shostakovich, Miaskovsky, Prokofiev, and K hachaturian—the "big
four” of Soviet composers, pride of Soviet cu l tu ra l  achievem ent and winners of
numerous Stalin  prizes—cam e in for especially harsh criticism . Their works,
s ta ted  a party  decree ,  vividly dem onstrated  the  unsound, anti-public, form alis tic
trend in music composition; led to an ti-d em o cra tic  tendencies th a t  separa ted
Soviet music from th e  Soviet people; strongly reeked  of modern bourgeois
compositions which re f le c ted  the "marasmus of bourgeois culture, the  fuU denial
21of a r t ,  its im passe.” The solution was obvious. Those composers re ta in ing
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"vestiges of bourgeois ideology, nourished on influences from the  decadent V»’est,"
must "p erm ea te  them selves with the high demands of the musical crea tion  of the
22Soviet people," in order to  w rite  worthwhile compositions. W hatever their
p rivate  thoughts might have been, the  com posers, with varying degrees of
humility, adm itted  the error of the ir  ways and promised to  do b e t te r  in th e  cause 
23of socialist realism.
Once sufficiently  purged, Moscow used its  cu ltural organs as weapons 
against the  U nited S tates , portraying A m erica  as an aes the tica l ly  barren  w aste­
land dominated by greedy cap ita lis ts  and populated by cu lturally  deprived people. 
An a r t ic le  in Soviet Music, though specifically  a im ed a t  A m erican music, typified 
the Soviet p ro traya l of A m erican cu lture  as a  whole. Music businessmen 
in te res ted  only in p ro fit  and reviewers who could be bought and sold, the  a r tic le  
asserted , s e t  s tandards  and tastes ;  like eveything else in America, a r t i s t ic  acclaim  
was gained by the  dollar. Musical A m erica , Musical Q uarterly  and similar 
publications contained "all the  vices of reac tio n a ry  ideological thought.. .sham e­
less propaganda for idealess formalism and cosm opolitanism —all those fea tu res
24which are ch a ra c te r is t ic  of contem porary  A m erican cu lture  on the whole." And 
Soviet Music found a deeper meaning in all this. "Thus one may comprehend," it 
concluded, "the rapacious tendencies of m ili tan t im perialism ...revolting  in its 
shameless nudity. All a t te m p ts  to  engulf the  world with the scan ty  products of 
the  venal A m erican muse are  nothing but f ro n tie r  ideological expansion of 
American im perialism , propaganda for reac tionary -obscu ran t is t  misanthropic 
ideas."^^
A m erican  l i te ra tu re  and scholarship drew similar epithets . John 
Steinbeck, Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair and o the r  A m erican w riters  form erly
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praised and popular in the  USSR becam e, in th e  pages of Soviet l i te ra ry
magazines, corrup t agen ts  of the  bourgeoisie; p e t ty  cap i ta l is ts  who sold the ir
26souls for the  dollar. But the  most sca th ing  rem arks  were saved for Ernest J .  
Simmons.
It was d ifficu lt to  te ll,  Izvestia a sse r ted  in a leng thy  review in October,
1947, w hether  the  works of this "learned servan t of the Yellow Devil" contained
97more "ignorant jauntiness  or delibera te  lies." In mid-November the same 
review er re tu rned  to  th e  a t ta c k  in L i te ra ry  G a z e t te , labeling Simmons' newly 
published study of Tolstoy "an insult to  th e  g re a t  w riter"  and charging th a t  the
no
author broke all reco rds  of sensationalism to insure the  sa le  of his book. In
February, 1948, a second rev iew er took up the  charges in th e  same magazine, this
tim e a t tack in g  both  Simmons and Sir Bernard Pares ,  who had defended Simmons'
works against ea r l ie r  Soviet denunciations. The c r i t ic  em phatically  re jec ted  what
he in te rp re ted  as an o ffer from Pares to  "ex tend  to  us his senile hand from across
the  ocean.. .w ere we to accep t,  falling on our knees," every th ing  American. "Such
a handclasp," he w rote , "will never ta k e  place. Such 'm utual understanding' will
29not occur betw een us."
The a t ta c k s  consti tu ted  the reply to  his proposals which Simmons had
30earlier sought but never received . "Even should th e re  have existed a slight
possibility th a t  any of th e  proposals Dr. Simmons brought to  the  Soviet au thorities
would be accep ted ,"  Elbridge Durbrow wired from th e  Embassy afte r  the  first
a t ta c k  on Simmons, " it  is now prac tica l ly  inconceivable th a t  a Soviet official
would r e a c t  favorably to  a program of cu l tu ra l  coopera tion  p resen ted  by a person
31now belonging in th e  Soviet ideological rogue's gallery." A firm lock. Embassy
officials concluded from th e  denunciations, had been p laced "on a door long ago 
39
slam m ed shu t." ' '
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Following a  1946 resolution making the  writing of anti-A m erican  plays
3 3a p a tr io t ic  duty, Soviet motion pic tures  and s tage  productions joined th e  chorus.
K onstan tin  Simonov's b i t te r  condem nation of th e  American press in "The Russian
Question" led the  way. Before being transfo rm ed  into a motion pic ture , Simonov’s
production, playing in over five hundred th e a te rs  throughout the Soviet Union,
a t t r a c te d  one of th e  largest audiences ever to  see a s tage  play.^^ Subsequent
s tage  productions ridiculed President Truman, racism , Hollywood, th e  Marshall
Plan, th e  House Un-Am erican A ctiv ities  C om m ittee ,  the  Voice of A m erica, and
35numerous o ther aspec ts  of A m erican life. On occasion as many as tw elve an ti-
A m erican  plays ran simultaneously in Moscow th e a te rs .
Two s tage  productions, rem arkab ly  sim ilar in them e, well i l lu s tra te  the
use to  which the  Soviets pu t the  th e a tr e .  Both eloquently spoke th e  Soviet
a t t i tu d e  tow ard  the  exchange of sc ien tis ts  and sc ien tif ic  information, and both
served as a warning to  Soviet sc ien tis ts  inclined toward coopera ting  with
foreigners, particu la rly  Americans. N either  mentioned by name the  American
doctors  Hauschka, Shimkin and Shear, th e  Soviet researchers  Roskin and Klyueva,
or the head of the  Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, Dr. Vasily Parin, who
gave A m erican  colleagues an unpublished m anuscript detailing the  cancer
37research  of Roskin and Klyueva, but th e  parallel v/as obvious.
In "C ourt of Honor," first as a s tage  play and la te r  as a movie, two 
Soviet sc ien tis ts ,  both believers in humanism and in ternational scientific  coopera­
tion, p e rm it te d  an American m agazine to  f irs t disclose a new medicine they  had 
developed. A Red Army colonel, learn ing  of th e  foul deed while leafing  through 
A m erika , rushed to  th e  Soviet labora tory  to  reprim and the  tw o scientists . Upon 
arriva l th e  colonel found two A m erican visitors, from whom he demanded the
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se c re t  of a medical process they had pa ten ted  in exchange for the Soviet 
knowledge which they  sought. Sorry, the  Americans replied, but they had already 
sold the ir  pa ten t  to  a la rge  company and could not reveal its  secre t .  To the 
colonel the co n tra s t  and the inequity was obvious. Soviet scientis ts  worked for 
the  benefit  of the  Soviet people, even shared the ir  knowledge with foreigners, but 
A merican researche rs ,  in collaboration with grasping capitalists , worked only for 
them selves. So much for the  in ternational responsibilities of science.
Moreover, one of the  A m ericans proved to  be a spy, as was to  be 
expected  of those  masquerading under the  guise of cu ltura l cooperation, and th a t  
fa c t  n ecess ita ted  a t r ia l  of the  Soviet sc ien tis ts .  One recan ted  and was forgiven 
by a benevolent Stalin; th e  o ther refused and was barred  from the laboratory . As 
the  curta in  closed the  repen tan t one was exclaiming his determ ination  to  publish 
his findings only in the  Soviet Union and to use his knowledge only to heal the  
Soviet people, not to  enrich corrupt A m ericans in te res ted  only in the ir  own 
welfare.^^
K onstantin  Simonov's "Alien Shadow" followed the  same them e. 
Trubnikov, d irec to r  of a bacteriological in s t i tu te ,  made a discovery which could 
g rea tly  advance medical science, but before he could publish his results  an old 
friend from Moscow appeared and, with cunning ta lk  of "universal science" and 
"humanism," persuaded him to turn over the resu lts  of his research to a visiting 
A merican delegation. Only then  did Trubnikov discover th a t  his friend was an 
A m erican spy, and only then did his true  friends inform him of the  real na tu re  of 
th e  in ternational s truggle and the ro le  of sc ience  in th a t  struggle. The 
Americans, Trubnikov’s rea l friends told him, w anted his s ec re t  because it  could 
be used to  destroy as well as heal. As one colleague told him, "you see how good
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and evil clashed, tw o worlds, theirs  and ours, over this discovery. You thought 
th a t  humanism means to  stand aside and love everyone. No. Humanism for the 
sc ien tis ts  means fight. Be a soldier in the struggle for the  fu ture of aU people, all 
science, all cultures, against the  darkness th a t  is moving down on us from th a t  
half of the  world."^®
Only a very courageous or a very foolhardy scholar would have 
exchanged inform ation with an American colleague a f te r  a message such as tha t.
Only the  Soviet leaders—and perhaps only The Leader—knew precisely 
why Moscow re je c te d  th e  A merican overtures, iso la ted  the  Soviet people and 
a t tack e d  A m erican  culture. But undoubtedly the  massive exposure of Soviet 
c itizens to  w estern  cu ltu re  during the war c rea ted  enormous fears  in the Kremlin 
and g reatly  in tensified  the  isolationist urge th a t  had begun building in the  th irties, 
and which the  v;ar had only tem porarily  in te rrup ted . For se lec ted  Soviet 
rep resen ta tives  to trav e l  to the West or for foreign engineers to expose the Soviet 
population to  w estern  technology was one m a tte r ;  for massive numbers of Soviets 
to observe w estern lifes ty les  in a capacity  beyond the control of the Kremlin was 
quite  another. The unfo rtunate  end of the  Soviet prisoners of war and forced 
laborers whom the fa te s  took to  the  West before re tu rn ing  to  Stalin provides only 
one measure of the  lengths to  which Moscow was willing to  go to  p ro tec t  the  
nation against what it deem ed foreign contam ination, and i t  is highly unlikely th a t  
any amount of persuasion or concession by the  w estern  nations could have a l te red  
th a t  determ ination. Moreover, the  level of e f fo r t  required to rebuild the 
sh a t te red  Soviet economy promised to  benefit  from a foreign villian whose 
dangerous designs jus tif ied  the necessary sacrif ices  by th e  Soviet people, and total
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isolation made th a t  villian easier to  depict. A people convinced tha t they were 
struggling "against the  darkness th a t  is moving down on us from th a t  half of the  
world," as Trubnikov's friends said they must, were undoubtedly more pliable and 
submissive than  a people who were still influenced by the  praise of all things 
A m erican during the  recen t  war.^^ But w hatever the  rull range of their  
reasoning, th e  Soviets w ere the ones who repea ted ly  refused  American in itia tives 
during the  im m edia te  postwar years, and those re fu sa ls  had an im pact in the 
U nited S ta tes .
C ultu ra l re la tions  exist, of course, within the  fram ework of th e  to ta l  
re la tions be tw een  nations, and the  growing po litica l tensions of the  postwar period 
obviously exe r ted  a s trong  influence in the  cu ltu ra l sphere. Only the  Soviets knew 
for sure th e  ex ten t  to  which the ir  ac tions  re f le c te d  dom estic  as opposed to  
in terna tional concerns and aims, and to  which they perceived  the ir  policies as 
reac tions  ra th e r  than initia tives, but as la te  as August, 1947—a f te r  the  Truman 
D octrine and the Marshall Plan had delineated the depths of diplomatic division— 
A m erican officialdom was stil l  supporting Simmons' e f fo r ts  in Moscow. Perhaps 
Soviet acc ep tan c e  of th e  scholar's proposals would have had l i t t le  e f fe c t  in the 
non-cultural realm , but as Ambassador Sm ith rem arked  to  Vice-Minister Malik, 
even a token e f fo r t  would have indicated a willingness on the Soviet pa r t  to  
coopera te  in a t  leas t  one area  of the ir  re la tions.^^  If the  United S ta tes  was 
willing to  continue making overtures a t  th a t  point, th e  Soviets, had they possessed 
an equal desire  to  ease the  mounting tensions, could have responded in some 
symbolic manner. At the  least they  could have o ffe red  a pa la tab le  refusal; a t  the  
bare  minimum could have refra ined  from crucifying th e  beare r  of the  message. If 
ne ither  side was a l to g e th e r  blameless in th e  burgeoning political, m ilitary  and
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econom ic problems dividing the  two, the  Soviets, even a f te r  considering the ir  
w artim e devas ta tion  and a t te n d a n t  postwar disruptions, must bear  the  burden of 
the  blame for the  cu ltu ra l im passe of the la te  fo r ties  and early f if t ies .
But not th e  en t ire  blame. While many in Washington and in the  
A m erican public desired  and worked for more in t im a te  cu ltural in tercourse, the 
actions  and rh e to r ic  of o the rs  did l i t t l e  to  establish conditions conducive to  such 
collaboration. For like th e  Soviets, the  United S ta te s  began staging its own 
version of cu ltura l isolationism and national purifica tion  during the  postwar 
period, and in tensified  th e  e ffo r t  a f te r  the in ternational a rgum ent turned to 
ac tion  in Korea. T ha t bo th  Stalin 's course in th e  la te  fo r t ie s  and th e  outbreak of 
war in 1950 rendered  c o n ta c ts  virtually  impossible doesnot obv ia te  the  f a c t  th a t  
c e r ta in  A m erican  actions  and measures of the sam e period con tr ibu ted  to  the 
sam e end.
As the  po litica l tensions of the  Cold War grew, the  division within the
S ta te  D epartm en t over th e  proper aim of a  cu ltu ra l re la tions  program grew 
42accordingly. For severa l months a f te r  the war those  viewing cu ltu ra l re la tions 
as a long te rm  e ffo r t  tow ard  rec ip rocal education and m utual understanding held 
the  upper hand—or a t  leas t  held the ir  own.^^ But the  diplom atic  d ifficu lties  of 
the  day proved too much for long range, nebulous goals. Congressmen and 
diplomats c lam ored fo r  a weapon with which to engage the  Soviets in the  struggle 
for men's minds, and t h a t  clamoring produced th e  U nited  S ta te s  Inform ation and 
Educational A ct of 1948, commonly known as th e  Smith-M undt A ct.^^  A fte r  1948 
Washington thus had a com prehensive cu ltural program to deploy, but from the 
firs t i t  was expec ted  to  produce results  in one direction. The fundamental
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prem ise  of its  ex istence, as Thompson and Laves wrote, was th e  conviction th a t
"if o ther people understood us, they would like us, and if they liked us, they would
do what we wanted them to  do."^^ R eciprocity  in cultural re la tions  thus gave
way to dispensing "information" about A m erica and Americans. Teaching became
more im portan t than learning; th e  conviction of possessing the  t ru th  so s trong  as
to  largely o b li te ra te  the  urge to  understand  what it meant to  o thers . And only
within the  newly em erging view of in te rna tiona l  cultural re la tions  is it possible to
understand  A m erica 's  subsequent cu ltu ra l re la tionship  with th e  Soviet Union.
Those who favored the educational, rec ip rocal view of cu ltu ra l re la tions
urged from th e  beginning tha t tw o ass is tan t sec re ta r ie s  be appointed within the
S ta te  D ep ar tm en t to adm inister th e  two functions, which they  considered
sep ara te  and d istinct,  implied in the  t i t le  of the  inform ation and educational
exchange ac t .  But instead of two s ep a ra te  agencies, two advisory commissions—
th e  Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and the  Advisory Commission
on Inform ational A ctiv it ies—were c rea ted  to provide guidance to th e  sec re ta ry  of 
46s ta te .  Subsequently the  inform ational aspec t ,  drawing the  major share of the
budget and the  bulk of a tten tion , overshadowed the  educational function. Both in
Washington and in the  field, public re la tions  experts  and advertis ing  specialists
held the top positions, controlling those tra ined  in education and re la ted  fields
47who carr ied  on cu ltura l activ it ies .
In 1950 the  cultural re la tions  program shifted  still fu r ther  in the
d irection  of inform ation  and propaganda. In January , shortly  a f te r  the  Soviets
exploded the ir  a tom ic  bomb, the N ational S ecurity  Council called for an enlarged
and more pow erful propaganda program  to  help s treng then  the nation's 
48defenses. T hree  months la te r  P res iden t Truman proposed a  world-wide
"campaign of tru th "  to  fight the fo rces  of communism.'^^
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The phrase, like similar catch-phrases, caught on quickly. By the
middle of th e  year America's cultural rela tions e f fo r t  had become, in essence, the
"Campaign of Truth."^^ Under Assistant S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  William B arre t t ,  who
originally penned the  phrase, the program becam e well organized and sharply
focused. By O ctober, 1951, both its  educational and inform ational aspects  had
becom e in teg ra te d  into the military and economic programs of national defense as
outlined by th e  National Security  Council and approved by President Truman.^^
To fit its  new function the  Advisory C om m ittee  on Educational Exchange even
re s ta te d  its aims. Originally emphasizing th e  promotion of mutual understanding
through educational exchange, the  new purpose becam e th a t  of promoting
coopera tion  among "free" nations and s trengthening resistance to communism in
52areas  already dom inated by the  USSR. Overseas lib raries  becam e "information
cen ters ,"  carefu lly  designed to im part par ticu la r  knowledge pertain ing to  se lec ted
53subjects to  ce r ta in  citizens. ' Student exchange programs increasingly focused
on foreigners  who made decisions and influenced opinions ra ther than  on bona-fide
students. As S ecre tary  of S ta te  Acheson explained, th e  primary task  was to bring
to the  United S ta te s  people such as editors, com m entators , labor leaders  and
o the rs  "who will yield results  right away."^^ Many in charge of funding and
direc ting  A m erica 's  cultural rela tions program would have agreed with the report
of tw o officials  who w rote th a t  "culture  for culture 's  sake has no place in the
United S ta te s  inform ational and educational exchange program. The value of
in terna tional cu ltu ra l exchange is to  win respec t for the  cultural achievem ents  of
our free society, where th a t  respect is necessary  to  inspire cooperation in world
affa irs.  In such a situation, cultura l ac t iv i t ie s  a re  an indispensable tool of 
55propaganda." C ultural re la tions had becom e for Washington, as for Moscow, a 
cold war v/eapon.
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Washington likewise e rec ted  its  own barrie rs  to  co n tac ts  with Soviet 
citizens, f irs t through adm in is tra t ive  procedures, la te r  through legislation.
In early  1949 th e  National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, an 
organization of prom inent Americans chaired by H arvard  as tronom er Harlow 
Shapley, invited a number of Soviets to a t tend , along with thousands of others 
from the U nited  S ta tes  and abroad, a New York conference on world peace.^*^ 
Seven, including composer D mitri Shostakovich, novelist Alexander A. Fadeev, 
film d irec to r  Sergei Geriasimov and biologist A lexander Oparin, head of the 
Biological Sciences section of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, accep ted  the offer 
and applied for visas to  en te r  the  United S ta tes .
The applications touched off a f lurry  of conferences in the S ta te  
D epartm en t,  a spa te  of warnings in the  newspapers and a round of denunciation in 
Congress. W alter WincheU, demanding th a t  the Soviets be barred on the grounds 
they would spread communist lies, urged his lis teners  to  w rite  the ir  congressmen
CO
and demand action. The United Press urged D epartm en t officials  not only to bar
CO
entry , bu t to  "crack down" on the  sponsoring organization as well. A ttorney 
G eneral Tom Clark feared  the Soviet delegates might "ac t  as transmission points 
for espionage agen ts  in this country." But none s ta ted  the  case  as colorfully 
and succinctly  as California Congressman Donald L. Jackson. Shostakovich and 
his fellow "p rostitu tes  of Soviet a r t ,"  th e  congressman proclaim ed to  his 
colleagues, severa l of whom had already  expressed th e ir  indignation over the 
possibility of Soviet citizens defiling American soil, "have the sam e right in this 
land of freedom as ra tt le snakes  in a Baptist Church."^^
Since by 1949 Washington was s tr ic t ly  applying the im migration laws 
governing admission to  the  United S ta tes ,  the  Soviet delegates  could en ter  the
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country  only if  the  J u s t ic e  D epartm en t p e rm itted  i t  under the te rm s of Proviso 
Nine of the  Im m igration and N ationality  Act of 19]7. D espite his reservations, 
A tto rney  G eneral Clark agreed to  apply Proviso Nine action if the S ta te  
D epartm en t reques ted  it in the  national in te res t .  A S ta te  D epartm ent s ta f f  
meeting, following the advice of the Advisory C om m ittee  on Educational 
Exchange, concluded th a t  visas should be g ran ted  on th e  premise th a t  the visit 
posed no th r e a t  to  the  national security  and, m ore im portantly , provided the  
opportunity to  prove th a t  no iron curta in  ex is ted  here.^^  Having made th a t  
decision, the  D ep a r tm en t decided th a t  the m a tte r  should be exploited to the  
fullest to  co n tra s t  the  A m erican  and Soviet positions regarding such matters.®^ 
Consequently, on the eve of the  conference the  D ep ar tm en t issued a leng thy  
s ta te m e n t  describing both the  American e ffo r ts  to  establish  cu ltu ra l co n ta c ts  and 
the  Soviet rebuffs  to  those  efforts .  By allowing "notable  communist p ropa­
gandists" to  a t te n d  th e  peace conference "in acco rdance  with the  A m erican view 
of freedom and in te l lec tu a l  in terchange,"  the s ta te m e n t  concluded, the  nation had 
dem onstra ted  the  vast d ifferences  be tw een  the  policies of the tw o govern­
ments.*’®
The Soviet de legates  arrived a t  New York C ity  on March tw enty-th ird ,
im m ediately  ran in to  a barrage  of repo rte rs ,  and quickly fled to  the residence of
fi7the  Soviet delegation  to  th e  United Nations. When the  conference opened two
days la te r  a crowd of noisy, sign-carrying pickets  surrounded the  Waldorf-Astoria
68Hotel, p ro tes t ing  the  p resence of the  Soviets. When the  m eeting moved to 
Madison Square G arden to  accom m odate  a ga thering  of e ighteen  thousand people, 
some tw o thousand "jeering, shouting, and booing," m archers , as the  New York 
Times described them , followed. Inside the  G arden shoving m atches  e rup ted
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between de legates  and photographers, but the  massive number of policemen
70assigned to  the  conference  kept the m eeting orderly. To the  dismay of many of
those present, particu la rly  th e  sponsors, some of th e  Soviet delegates, including
Shostakovich, could not re f ra in  from e ither  overtly  or im plic itly  a t tack ing  the
policies and ins ti tu tions  of the  U nited S ta tes .
At the  conclusion of the  conference the  Soviet visitors prepared to
par t ic ip a te  in sim ilar functions scheduled for Newark, D e tro it ,  St. Louis, Los
Angeles and Philadelphia. The planned appearances  s t ir red  even more debate  and
controversy. Yale would not allow Shostakovich to  perform  a concert  on its
campus, Philadelphia denied the  use of its  town hall, and its  Blackwood Hotel
72cancelled  a dinner to  be given in the  composer's honor. On March tw enty-n in th  
the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  pointing out th a t  the purpose for which the Soviets had
70
been allowed to  en te r  the  country  had been fulfilled, cancelled  the ir  visas. 
Shortly th e re a f te r  the delegation le f t  the  United S tates .
Had the  World P eace  C onference been held a year  la te r  Shostakovich 
and his companions could not have a t tended , for beginning in 1950 Congress added 
new res tr ic t io n s  designed to  p revent all but the  most desirable aliens entering the 
country. In addition to  establishing the  Subversive A ctiv it ies  Control Board to 
control in ternal dissent and au thoriz ing  the  S ta te  D epartm en t to  deny passports to  
American c itizens  on the  basis of political beliefs, th e  Subversive A ctiv ities  
Control Act of 1950—popularly known as the  M cCarran A c t—denied admission, in 
e f fec t ,  to all non-offic ial Soviet Bloc citizens, including th o se  flee ing  to ta l i ta r ian  
control.^^ Two years la te r  th e  Imm igration and N ationality  A ct of 1952—also 
popularly known as the  M cCarran  A ct, and consequently th e  source of a lo t of
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confusion re la ting  to  the m easures—repea ted  the 1950 res tr ic t io n s  and added even 
75more. Significantly, th e  1952 ac t rem oved the  non-quota provisions of the 1917 
a c t  which allowed re la tive ly  easy entry  for scholars and, even more significantly, 
required th a t  all persons applying for visas be fingerprinted. P residen t Truman 
condemned the measure both  verbally and officially, but Congress over-rode his 
veto  of the bill.
Washington next established regula tions re s tr ic t in g  th e  trave l of Soviet
officials  in th e  United S ta tes .  In March, 1952, the S ta te  D epartm en t required
th a t  all Soviet diplomats and employees of agencies such as Tass and Am torg
hencefo rth  provide fo r ty -e igh t hours notice  befo re  trave ling  more than  tw enty-
77five  miles from the  cen te rs  of Washington and New York. In January , 1955, it
ex tended  the  regulations to  include all Soviet citizens, non-official as well as
official, and placed la rge  a rea s  of the  United S ta te s  off lim its  to anyone from the
USSR. Four s ta te s  were com plete ly  closed, as well as specific regions, counties
78and c ities  in th ir ty -fo u r  more. And, like Moscow, Washington placed detailed 
res tr ic tions  on areas  and objects th a t  could be photographed or sketched. 
Buildings of cu ltu ra l and a rch i tec tu ra l  in te res t  such as schools and th ea te rs  could 
be photographed, as could urban and ru ra l scenes. With prior permission 
foreigners could photograph industrial en terprises  engaged in producing civilian 
products, ra ilroad sta tions  and com m ercia l a irports , bu t  bridges, tunnels, labora­
tories, radio and television s ta t ions  and any insta lla tions  or item s rem otely 
connected with the  m ilita ry  w ere  s tr ic t ly  forbidden. Likewise th e  taking of
p ic tu res  while flying, the  purchasing of non-com m ercial maps and the  securing of
7Qdetailed  developm ent plans for industrial c ities  were all prohibited.
In th e  early  f if t ie s  the  U.S. Post O ff ice  added its  own res tric tions , using 
th e  power of a 1940 J u s t ic e  D epartm ent ruling relevant to  postal distribution of
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foreign mail to  destroy without notice certa in  Soviet publications addresed to 
particu la r  people, while simultaneously allowing others to  receive those sam e 
publications. U niversities of known standing using the  m ateria l for study purposes 
and ce r ta in  researche rs  who provided proof of the na tu re  of the ir  work, postal 
au thori t ies  explained, were not denied the publications, which they  es tim ated  to 
amount to  no more than th ree  per cen t of the  propagandistic m a te r ia l  coming
on
from Soviet Bloc nations. And in July, 1952, the  S ta te  D epartm en t,  arguing
th a t  th e  Soviets had unofficially bu t e ffectively  reduced the c irculation of the
magazine so low th a t  i t  served no useful A merican purpose, stopped publishing
A m erika , ordering Moscow a t  the sam e tim e to  stop distributing its  Inform ation
81
Bulletin in the U nited  S tates .
Both the  official measures coming from Washington and the  atm osphere 
of fear and repression spreading across the  country disturbed many Americans. 
Those in the  academ ic  community particu larly  denounced the M cCarran Acts, 
pointing out th a t  their  wording preven ted  many of the ir  foreign coun te rpar ts— 
including those non-communist and even an ti-com m unist—entering  the  country 
and thus having a  deleterious e f fec t  on in ternational scientific  knov.'ledge. The 
sam e knowledge, they  pointedly observed, th a t  had contributed so much to the
QO
winning of World IVar n and American advancem ent in general. The October,
1952, issue of th e  Bulletin of the  A tom ic Scientists  devoted itse lf  en tirely  to  the
m a tte r ,  carry ing  cr i t ica l  com m ents by America's most em inent scientists . "The
very crim e against freedom with which the  Soviet Union is rightly  charged," wrote
special ed ito r  Edward A. Shils, "is one which we, too, in a less thorough fashion, 
83are  com m itting."  Such p e t ty  behavior on the  part  of a powerful country like 
the  United S ta te s ,  A lbert Einstein added, "is only a peripheral sympton of an
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84a ilm ent which has deeper roots." Eight days a f te r  the  1952 a c t  went into e f fec t  
the  President's  Commission on Immigration and N ationality  issued a th ree  hundred 
and seven page report  strongly condemning it, charging th a t  it violated Am erica 's  
principles, handicapped its economic development, endangered its  foreign policy
oc
and weakened its  security . To no avail. The M cCarran A cts  becam e the  laws of
the  land, providing s t r ic t  controls over "subversive" groups within and guarding
the  gates  against the enem y without. Nor did the  A m erican Civil L iberties Union
succeed in its e ffo r ts  against postal discrimination in the  distribution of Soviet
publications or win many official converts  with its argum ent th a t  the  fundam ental
issue was not the  small amount of m a te r ia l  involved but the  right of Washington
86to  decide which Americans could read m a te r ia l  not officially approved.
While som e A m ericans waxed indignant over Soviet th e a tr ic a l  t r e a t ­
ment of the ir  country, o thers  looked first to the nation 's own transgressions in the  
sam e areas. In the  spring of 1948 some th ree  hundred A m ericans signed a l e t te r  
p ro tes ting  the  re lease  of T w en tie th  C entury  Fox's "The Iron Curtain," charging 
th a t  the film, designed "to inc ite  anti-Soviet sen tim en t by falsely presenting the 
Russian people as enemies of the American people, bent on destroying us by
atom ic w arfare,"  could only increase "the a tm osphere  of hysteria  leading us down 
87to road to  war." Even Ambassador Kirk in Moscow indirectly acknowledged the
point. While he would like to  lodge a form al p ro te s t  over th e  "grossly insulting"
tre a tm e n t  of P resident Trum an in "The Mad H aberdasher,"  he wired, "such a
p ro tes t  would p resen t th e  Soviets with an undesirable opportunity  for...protesting
in turn against United S ta te s  th e a tr ic a l  rep resen ta tions  of Stalin." Consequently,
88he concluded, "I re luc tan tly  recom m end th a t  no p ro te s t  be made."
A m ericans who e i th e r  p ro tes ted  too vigorously or indicated a particular 
in te res t  in maintaining co n tac ts  with Soviet institu tions and individuals ran a t
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le ast som e risk o f o ffic ia l disfavor, or worse. The A m erican  Council of Learned 
Societies was th e  ob ject of a t  le ast a cursory  investigation  by a specia l agent who, 
a f te r  noting in his rep o rt th a t th e  organization rece ived  five copies of th e  Moscow 
News in August, 1944, m ade th e  sage observation th e  Council was a "club" whose 
m em bers were "rep o rted  to be of high standing and well known in educational
on
circ les." And even th e  p riv a te  individuals who had ea rlie r  rece ived  apprec ia tive  
and encouraging responses when approaching th e  S ta te  D epartm en t for inform a­
tion perta in ing  to  cu ltu ra l re la tions  or volunteering  th e ir  serv ices in th a t  d irection  
could no longer be sure of the  sam e tre a tm e n t. Indeed, those  who w rote ran the  
risk of having th e ir  nam es placed in th e  files of e ith e r th e  F ed era l Bureau of 
Investigation , m ilita ry  in te lligence , or both.
While D ep artm en t o ffic ia ls  usually rep lied  to  th e  le t te r s  of th e  la te  
fo rtie s  in a perfuncto ry  m anner, in som e instances th ey  fo rw arded  th e  inquiries to  
investigating  agencies. T here seem s to  have been no p a rticu la r p a tte rn  in doing 
so, for th e  le tte rs  forw arded  provided no more reason to  suspect th e  loyalty  and 
m otives of th e  inquirers th an  did any of th e  o thers. In May, 1947, for exam ple, a 
chem ist with a g raduate  degree , having read  about A m bassador Sm ith's e ffo rts  
tow ard  cu ltu ral re la tio n s  in th e  New York T im es, asked about th e  possibilities 
regarding an exchange of chem ists. The D epartm en t rep lied  politely , expressing 
apprec iation  for th e  w rite r 's  concern and explaining th a t  it  was doing everything
possible to  co opera te  in the  cu ltu ra l fie ld—and th en  sen t th e  le t te r  to  J . Edgar 
90Hoover. In F ebruary  of th e  sam e year an arm y p riv a te  w ro te  to  prom ote a plan 
fo r sending Russian speaking coaches to  th e  USSR to  te a c h  fo o tb a ll to  th e  Soviets, 
whereupon the  D ep artm en t sen t his le t te r  to  bo th  th e  FBI and m ilitary 
in telligence.^^ And when th e  following February  a Purdue U niversity  civil
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eng ineering  g rad u a te  sought in s tru c tio n s  as to  how he could estab lish  a co r­
respondence w ith a Soviet co u n te rp a rt in order to  discuss com m on profesional 
problem s, th e  D epartm en t forw arded  his le t te r  as well. "While th e re  is no 
ev idence to  show th a t  the  w rite r has any subersive in ten tions," an o ffic ia l w rote 
in an accom panying n o te  to th e  FBI, " it is thought th a t this request m ight be of
no
in te re s t to  you a t  som e fu tu re  date ."
If those who made such seem ingly innocent inquiries ran  th e  risk of becom ing a 
file num ber in an investiga ting  agency, those who continued to  a c tiv e ly  prom ote 
cu ltu ra l c o n ta c ts  w ith  the  Soviets could be  sure th e ir  nam es occupied prom inent 
p laces in those  files.
A t th e  end of World War n  th e  tv;o principal o rgan izations devoted to 
fu rth erin g  A m erican-S oviet cu ltu ra l re la tio n s  fe lt  proud and op tim is tic . Their 
goals had becom e W ashington's goals as well; th e ir  functions p raised  and 
encouraged, th e ir  positions seem ingly  secure. Both th e  A m erican-R ussian 
In s titu te  in New York C ity  and the N ational Council of A m erican-Soviet F riend­
ship confiden tly  envisioned th e  possib ilities ahead.
But not for long. As early  as A ugust, 1945, th e  H ears t p ress in New 
York charged  th a t  both w ere "com m unist-fron t"  organ izations using th e ir  in- 
serv ice  courses for public school te ach e rs  to  in jec t p ro -S talin ist propaganda into 
th e  school system . The papers p a rticu la rly  a tta c k e d  th e  N ational Council, 
charg ing  th a t th e  com m unists were using it  to  secure a  foothold  fo r th e ir
no
l i te ra tu re  in schools and co lleges th roughou t th e  nation. The a tta c k s  
succeeded. D esp ite  th e  fa c t th a t  highly com p eten t professionals conducted the 
courses, th e  New York C ity  Board of E ducation  cancelled  th e  program .
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The press cam paign and the  s teep  decline in the  w artim e in te res t in
Soviet a ffa irs  fo rced  th e  A m erican-R ussian  In s titu te  to  reduce its  s ta ff  and
e lim in a te  many of its  functions during 1947. In M arch the In s titu te  employed
th ir ty  people; in D ecem ber only four.^^ In May, 1948, A tto rney  G eneral Clark
d ea lt a fu r th e r  blow by inadvertan tly  p lacing  th e  In s titu te  on the list of subversive 
9 6organ izations. New board chairm an E rnest C. Ropes co rrec ted  the erro r during
a m eeting  with C lark, but shortly  th e re a f te r  th e  In terna l R evenue Service
crippled  th e  In s titu te  by rem oving the  tax -e x em p t s ta tu s  it had enjoyed since 
971937. In A pril, 1949, th e  a tto rn e y  genera l again  placed the In s titu te 's  nam e on
th e  subversive lis t , th is tim e  fo r rea l, though no specific  charges or accusa tions 
98w ere made. And since its  nam e was on th e  lis t , In ternal R evenue offic ia ls
9 9in form ed ARI o ffice rs, its  tax -ex em p t s ta tu s  could not be res to red . The 
d ifficu ltie s  proved too much. In S ep tem ber, 1950, th e  New York A m erican- 
R ussian In s titu te  closed its  doors; a v ic tim , as an In s titu te  spokesman mildly put 
it ,  "of th e  tem p er of the  tim es."^^^ The N ational Council of A m erican-Soviet 
F riendship  su ffered  even g re a te r  problem s, bu t refused  to  bow to  the  sam e fa te .
On N ovem ber tw elfth , 1945, tw o  days before P resident Trum an, 
G eneral E isenhow er and o ther top governm ent o ffic ia ls  sen t m essages of support 
and encouragem en t to  the huge C ouncil-sponsored rally  a t Madison Square 
G arden, and tw o days before Under S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dean Acheson made his 
no ted  speech  on the  im portance of A m erican-Soviet cu ltu ra l am ity  a t the  sam e 
ra lly , th e  H ouse U n-A m erican A ctiv ities  C o m m ittee  ordered  th e  Council to  turn  
over the  nam es of its  donors and a lis t of i ts  expenditu res for the  past tw elve 
m onths. The C om m ittee  w anted to  know if  th e  Council was a "loyal" organiza- 
t i o n . l '"
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The Council's board of d irec to rs unanimously refused  the order, pointing
out th a t the  o rgan ization 's  tw o hundred d irec to rs  and sponsors included som e of
the  nation 's most em inent and respec ted  citizens, including several congressm en,
th a t  in the  past it had co llaborated  w ith th e  U.S. Army, th e  OWI, the  S ta te
D epartm en t and o ther governm ent agencies, and th a t th e  highest ranking o ffic ials
in th e  land had been its  speakers, guests and w ell-w ishers. If th e  Council w ere
subversive, board chairm an  Corliss Lam ont w rote, th e  U nited S ta te s  governm ent
1 Q2
must face  the  sam e charges.
L am ent's le t te r  touched  off a  chain  of legal b a ttle s  th a t  em broiled the
Council fo r over ten  years . In April, 1946, th e  C om m ittee  c ited  L am ent and
R ichard M or ford, th e  C ouncil's execu tive o ffice r and thus th e  person responsible
103for its  records, fo r co n tem p t, and in March, 1948, Mor ford was convicted . The 
U nited S ta te s  Suprem e C ourt rem anded the  decision to  th e  low er co u rts  on a 
techn ica lity , bu t in 1950, th e  case  having w orked its  way to  th e  top again, upheld 
the  verdict.^^"^ In A ugust, 1950, M orford en tered  a fed era l prison to  begin a th ree  
month term.^®^
M orford's tr ia l and im prisonm ent constitu ted  only a p a rt of the
Council's problem s. In N ovem ber, 1947, th e  A tto rney  G eneral placed th e  Council
106on th e  lis t  of subversive organizations, w here it  rem ained  despite  appeals. 
Because th e  Council was on th e  subversive lis t, and because th e  U n-A m erican 
A ctiv ities  C om m ittee  was investigating  th e  ac tiv itie s  of Edward Condon, d irec to r 
of th e  N ational Bureau of S tandards and fo rm er m em ber of the Council's 
Executive C om m ittee , th e  T reasury  D epartm en t rem oved the tax -exem pt s ta tu s  
it had ea rlie r  g ran ted  th e  Council's Science C om m ittee . Having lost its  ta x -  
exem pt s ta tu s  the Science C om m ittee  lost a tw en ty -fiv e  thousand doUar 
R ockefe lle r grant; having lo s t th e  R ockefe lle r g ran t it was no longer able to
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continue its  work o f tran s la tin g  and publishing Soviet a rtic le s  for th e  sc ien tific
107com m unity. Shortly  th e re a f te r  the  co m m ittee  ceased  to  function.
The C ouncil's problem s w ere s till no t over. In April, 1953, th e  a tto rn ey  
genera l asked th e  Subversive A ctiv ities  C on tro l Board to  requ ire  th e  Council to
1 n n
re g is te r  as a "com m unist-fron t"  organization . The Council again  appealed,
and, following a year of p relim inary  b a ttle s , won a fu ll-scale  hearing  befo re  SACB
m em ber David J . Coddaire.^®^ Upon th e  conclusion of the hearing, which lasted
from  May to  D ecem ber, 1954, th e  Council fe lt  op tim istic  about th e  outcom e, but
early  the  following year C oddaire recom m ended th a t reg is tra tio n  be requ ired , and
th e  fuU board  a g r e e d . ^ T h e  Council, i t  ruled, was a "com m unist-fron t"
o rgan ization  and must reg is te r  as such.^^^
D espite its  d ifficu lties  th e  Council continued to function, tak in g  the
offensive against th e  various fed e ra l agencies questioning its  loyalty ; sponsoring
dinners, ra llies , exhibits and program s to  p rom ote  th e  cause of A m erican-Soviet 
112cu ltu ra l friendship. A dm itted ly  its  critic ism  of A m erica's foreign policy grew 
m ore s trid en t as th e  cold war deepened and i ts  own problem s grew , but critic ism  
is far from subversion. In the  final analysis it  is d ifficu lt to  disagree w ith th e  
assessm ent of th e  W ashington Post regard ing  th e  organization 's natu re  and its  
a c tiv itie s . "W hether wisely or m istakenly ," th e  paper ed ito ria lized  in praising the  
Council for challenging th e  a rb itra ry  righ t of th e  A tto rney  G eneral to  place the 
nam es of organizations on the  subversive lis t, " it has sought to  p rom ote friendly 
re la tio n s  betw een  th is  country  and the  USSR — ce rta in ly  not a subversive purpose 
in itse lf  — and has pursued its  ob jectives by wholly law ful and peacefu l 
means."^^^
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By la te  1952 the  chances for norm al cu ltu ra l re la tio n s  betw een  the two 
nations seem ed rem ote , Moscow's o ffic ia l a t titu d e  precluded th e  possibility  on 
th e  Soviet side, while in th e  U nited S ta te s  bo th  the  po litical c lim a te  and the  legal 
ba rrie rs  had much the sam e e f fe c t .  Only a change in the  rela tionsh ip  betw een 
W ashington and Moscow, i t  was apparen t, could p e rm it th e  kind of cu ltu ra l 
in te rac tio n  th a t ex isted  betw een th e  A m erican and Soviet people prior to  th e  la te  
fo rties . S talin 's death  provided the  possibility  of changing th a t rela tionship .
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CHAPTER X
RESTORING CONTACTS, 1953-1955; MOSCOW TAKES THE LEAD
From  early  1953 through the middle of 1955 th e  U nited S ta tes  and the 
Soviet Union slowly repaired  th e  lines of cu ltu ra l com m unication cut during th e  
darkest days of th e  cold war. A m erican s tuden ts, journalists, fa rm ers  and 
o ffic ia ls  trav e led  to  Moscow, while Soviet sk iers, scholars, chess p layers and 
ag ricu ltu ris ts  v isited  the U nited S ta tes . Though m inute in com parison to  th e  p re- 
World War 11 period, th e  num bers involved rep resen ted  a sign ificant s tep  aw ay 
from  th e  cu ltu ra l es tran g em en t of the preceding years.
Moscow took th e  in itia tiv e  in res to rin g  th e  co n tac ts . W hether doing so 
because i t  deem ed renew ed re la tions advan tageous in securing  A m erican techno­
logy, or becasue i t  really  w anted to  reduce th e  leve l of in terna tional tensions, as 
i t  claim ed, Moscow m ade th e  f irs t moves. In som e in stances th e  Soviet took  th e ir  
cue from  individual A m erican requests and suggestions, bu t nonetheless w ere the  
ones who ac ted  co n cre te ly  to  tu rn  those suggestions into policy.
W ashington did not rush to  em brace th e  overtu res. By the  early  fifties  
bo th  o ffic ia l A m erica  and a la rge  p a r t of th e  A m erican  public had becom e so 
afra id  of com m unism , so convinced of its  constan t and evil designs, th a t  they 
la rge ly  viewed the  changing Soviet a t titu d e  as a new  form of th re a t, a lb e it a  more 
sub tle  one. L ife succinc tly  expressed a widely held  opinion in assessing Moscow's
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reasons for allow ing a sm all A m erican delegation  to  e n te r  th e  USSR in early  1953. 
Why th e  A m ericans w ere  p e rm itted  en try , th e  m agazine w ro te , "was p a rt of th e  
bigger question  of why th e  glow ering Russia of y e s te rd ay  had suddenly becom e 
mild." One likelihood was th a t  th e  Soviets "w ere try in g  to  divide th e  West and luU 
it  into repose." A no ther possib ility  was th a t  Moscow w anted a re s t on th e  cu ltu ra l 
fron t while its  le ad e rs  fought over S talin 's pow ers. But th e  le a s t likely  answ er. 
L ife assured its  read e rs , was " th a t Russian was ready  fo r an enduring peace.
While th e  A m erican and Soviet people grew  increasing ly  a lien a ted  
during th e  la te  fo r tie s  and early  f if tie s , Moscow, like  W ashington, ca rried  on an 
ever-w idening program  of cu ltu ra l co n tac ts  w ith th e  re s t of th e  world. Concen­
tra tin g  on th e  Soviet bloc in th e  la te  fo rtie s , th e  e f fo r t  extended inself beyond the  
sa te llite s  a t  th e  tu rn  of th e  decade. As early  as 1951 Soviet perfo rm ers  appeared  
in w estern  European and A sian cities , Soviet exh ib its  advertised  th e ir  nation 's 
ach ievem en ts a t in te rn a tio n a l festiva ls  and Soviet te ch n ic ian s  took th e ir  ta le n ts
to  the  underdeveloped. And Moscow rece ived  as well as gave, welcom ing
2
studen ts, to u ris ts  and delegations from around th e  globe.
S talin 's  dea th  hastened  the process, producing changes both in the  
in terna l workings o f Soviet cu ltu ra l life  and in its  re la tio n s  w ith  cou n tries  abroad. 
Like a springtim e M innesota riv e r which slowly com es to  life  w ith  g rea t m oaning 
and groaning, as H arrison  Salisbury w ro te , life  in th e  Soviet Union began slowly 
moving again. And as Soviet a r tis ts  shook off th e  f re e z e  o f Zhdanovism they  
becam e m ore outspoken in th e ir  critic ism  of th e  reg im e. Ilya Ehrenbrug told 
Soviet po litic ians th a t  a r t is t ic  works could n to  be tu rned  out like fac to ry  
products, and A ram  K hachaturian  told them  th a t  c re a tiv e  problem s could not be
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solved by b u re a u c ra tic  means. "I think," w ro te  th e  acclaim ed com poser, decrying 
re c e n t works "w ritte n  w ithout c re a tiv e  elan  w ith a cau tious g lance over th e  
shoulder," th a t  th e  tim e  has com e "to  give up th e  wrong p ra c tic e  of in te rfe rin g  
with th e  c re a tiv e  process."^  The S ta lin is t approach to  a r t,  added an anonym ous 
w rite r in P rav d a , o b lite ra ted  individualism , bred tr iten ess  and im ita tio n , and 
deprived th e  a r t is t  of the  joy of exp loration .^  Taking his cue from  th e  P ravda 
a r tic le , Shostakovich joined th e  p ro te s to rs , c r itic iz in g  p a rticu la rly  th e  bu reau- 
c ra tic  vices of th e  Union of Soviet C om posers. O thers voiced sim ilar c ritic ism s, 
herald ing  a  new degree  of a r t is t ic  freedom  and earn ing  for th e  period the  label 
adop ted  from  E hrenburg 's new novel, The Thaw . The thaw  was n e ith e r  com ple te  
nor long la stin g , as b u reau c ra tic  con tro ls  over cu ltu ra l expression w ent on and off 
during th e  rem ain d er of the  decade, bu t fo r th e  m om ent a t le a s t Soviet a r t is ts
7
enjoyed a freedom  not known for many years .
Som e w ent beyond c ritic iz in g  b u reau c ra tic  con tro ls to  suggesting  th e  
resum ption of c o n ta c ts  with th e  U nited  S ta te s . In March, 1954, Shostakovich 
suggested  th a t  exchanges betw een th e  tw o nations m ight help them  becom e b e tte r  
friends, and when th e  New York T im es te n ta tiv e ly  ag reed  in an e d ito ria l blam ing 
th e  Soviets for th e  lack  of such exchanges, th e  com poser rep lied  th a t  his country
Q
intended to  b roaden  its  re la tions w ith all co u n tries  including th e  U nited  S ta tes . 
Shortly  th e re a f te r  K hachaturian  w rite  in a  sim ilar vein. "It is our duty," he s ta ted  
in an appeal fo r A m erican-Soviet friendship , " to  do every th ing  in our pow er to  
p rom ote  norm al cu ltu ra l re la tio n s  betw een  our coun tries, to  s tren g th en  respec t,
g
confidence and  friendship  among our peoples." Both coun tries , Ehrenburg added 
in a New R epublic  a r tic le , had much to  lea rn  from  each other.^^
A t the  sam e tim e th e  Soviets in d ica ted  by actions th a t  th ey  w ere ready, 
a t  le a s t on a  sm all scale , for renew ed c o n ta c ts . A m ericans applying for visas to
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e n te r  th e  U.S.S.R. suddenly and surprisingly found th e ir  applications approved and 
th e ir  v isits a rranged . For w hatever reason, w hether as a p a rt o f a "cu ltu ra l 
offensive" against th e  West, as suggested by som e w riters , or w hether as an 
indication  of a genuine desire  to  lessen th e  te rr ib le  tensions of th e  tim e, Moscow 
took a new course sho rtly  a f te r  Stalin 's death.
Even a t  th e  height of the  cold w ar, c u ltu ra l com m unication betw een th e  
tw o coun tries  never ceased  en tirely . S c ien tific  and scholarly  in s titu tio n s  con­
tinued  to  exchange publications and m ate ria ls , though deliveries on both sides 
w ere e r ra t ic  and unpred ic tab le , and each  continued supplying m etero log ical 
in form ation , drawn from  scores of w eather s ta tions  s c a tte re d  across both  nations, 
to  the  o ther.^^
On ra re  occasions th e re  w ere personal c o n tac ts  as well. In 1950 th e
Soviets inv ited  th e  U nited S ta te s  women's chess co-cham pions to  p a rtic ip a te  in a
Moscow m atch  and one, to  th e  dismay and dire pred ic tions of fam ily  and friends,
accep ted . D espite th e  warnings th e  Soviet hosts tre a te d  th e  chess cham pion
cordially , and, as fa r  as she was concerned, conducted  the tou rnam ent a lto g e th e r 
13fairly . In 1952 Moscow invited  tw o hundred A m erican business leaders, 
including such well known co rpo ra te  figures as C harles  Wilson, M arshall F ield  and 
Jam es  T. W arburg, to  an in te rn a tio n a l econom ic conference in th e  Soviet cap ita l, 
and tw elve accep ted  desp ite  S ta te  D epartm en t denunciations of th e  conference as 
an in teg ra l p a rt of a  Soviet peace offensive designed to  p ierce  the  W est's fron t 
against com m unism . F lam boyant, se lf-s ty led  "spokesm an fo r cap italism " Oliver 
V ickery, w rangling his own inv itia tion , spoke and a c te d  free ly  in Moscow — one 
m ight even add ado lescen tly  and overbearingly  — conducting  him self generally  in
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a  m anner th a t perhaps would not have been p e rm itted  a Soviet "spokesm an for 
com munism" in th e  U nited  S ta tes  in 1 9 5 2 . But  such personal glim pses rem ained  
ra r it ie s  and the Soviet Union such a forbidden bastion th a t Newsweek deem ed it 
new sw orthy to  give space to  th e  im pressions of a few  A m erican m erchantm en who 
had been allowed to go ashore a t  Odessa to  sneak a peak behind the  dreaded iron 
curta in .^^
The f irs t indication of a s ign ifican tly  changing Soviet a tt i tu d e  in deed
as well as word cam e in April, 1953, when te n  smaU town new spaper and radio
owners trav e lin g  in Europe unexpectedly rece ived  visas to  en ter th e  Soviet Union.
During th e ir  subsequent visit th e  A m ericans found both  friendly tre a tm e n t and a
surprisingly la rg e  degree of freedom  to ask questions, ta k e  photographs and move
about in an u n re s tr ic ted  m anner. And, like many o thers  who followed, th ey  found
1 fi
much about life  in th e  U.S.S.R. th a t fa iled  to  f i t  th e ir  preconceptions.
The April v isit touched off a round of sim ilar trips. In Sep tem ber th re e
college new spaper ed ito rs , rep resen ting  O berlin and th e  U niversities of Colorado
and M innesota, v isited  Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Like those who w ent ea rlie r
th e  th ree , in th e ir  words, " trave led  free ly , or seem ed to," film ed largely  as they
pleased, even inside th e  K rem lin, and d eb a ted  w ith Soviet studen ts, encountering
17lively discussions bu t no hostility . L a te r in th e  year seven m w e studen ts  spent
th re e  weeks trave ling  betw een  Moscow and Baku, managing along th e  way to
18engage th e ir  Soviet coun terparts  in sandlo t basketball gam es. M arshall 
M acD uffie, who had served  with a U nited N ations mission in th e  U kraine seven
years ea rlie r, secured  perm ission to  make a  long tr ip  through th e  country , as did a
19num ber of U nited S ta te s  sena to rs  and rep resen ta tiv e s . IN May, 1954, Jam es
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Wicks, the  spokesm an fo r th e  original group th a t  en te red  the USSR in April of th e
previous year, accom panied a second delegation  num bering six teen  m em bers,
20finding tre a tm e n t and conditions sim ilar to  th e  firs t visit. N ationally  known
p o litica l co m m en ta to r, p residen tia l speech w rite r and presiden tial aide Em m et
Jon Hughes m ade th e  tr ip  early in 1954, follow ed by fe a tu re  w riter C lifton  D aniel
21a t th e  end of th e  year.
While som e A m ericans went to  th e  Soviet Union, o thers  approached
W ashington w ith suggestions for cu ltu ra l p ro jec ts  and organized en terp rises .
Movie producer D arryl Zanuck suggested one of th e  ea rlie s t p ro jec ts, seeking th e
assis tance  o f p resid en tia l press s e c re ta ry  Sherm an A dam s to  secure  perm ission to
film  a day in th e  lives of th e  new Soviet leaders . Specifically , Zanuck inform ed
Adams, he w anted  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t to  a rran g e  an agreem ent guaran teeing
th a t he could film  in th e  Kremlin, in various Moscow churches, and in o ther
specified  places. While such a proposal m ight have seem ed  fan ta s tic  only a few
22m onths ea rlie r , Zanuck w rote, the  trend  seem ed to  be in th a t  d irection.
S hortly  a f te r  Zanuck m ade his proposal, national radio com m enta to r 
Leon Pearson asked his listeners to  express th e ir  opinions on the  subject of 
A m erican-Soviet exchanges. N oting th e  tr ip s  m ade by various groups and 
individuals, Pearson suggested th a t i t  m ight be weU for th e  U nited S ta te s  to  make 
a  m ore fo rm al e ffo r t to  expand its  co n ta c ts  w ith  th e  Soviets. Would th e  
A m erican people, he asked, w elcom e a b a lle t or choir group, or would i t  just
AO
c re a te  ano ther in te rn a tio n a l incident, w ith p ickets and ro tten  eggs? Having
m ade th e  inquiry of his listeners, Pearson turned  to  Sherm an Adams, asking
W ashington's a t t i tu d e  tow ard  such co n tac ts , p a rticu la rly  tow ard exchanging an
23A m erican symphony o rch es tra  for th e  Bolshoi B allet.
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N either Adam s nor th e  S ta te  D epartm en t was en th u sias tic  or op tim istic
about the proposals. Responding th a t  Zanuck's desire  to  film th e  Soviet leaders
was "strik ing  and a  l i t t l e  shocking," Adams sen t th e  p roducer's  le t te r  to
D epartm en t o ffic ia ls  who, though replying th a t  w ith proper safeguards such a
p ro jec t "probably" would not co n flic t w ith D epartm en t policy, refused  to prom ote
it  or en ter in to  correspondence concern ing  i t .  R a th e r, they  suggested , Zanuck
should co n tac t th e  Soviet Em bassy concerning th e  m a tte r.^^
Adams replied  in th e  sam e vein to  Pearson 's inquiry. Personally , he
w rote, he favored th e  idea of exchanging an A m erican  o rch es tra  for a Soviet
ba lle t, but past e ffo r ts  in th a t d irec tion  prom ised l i t t l e  hope. "The conclusion
th a t  one must draw from  th e  Soviet opposition to  an  exchange of s tuden ts,
professors, exhibitions and exponents of th e  fine a r ts ,"  he s ta te d , "is th a t  th e
Soviet governm ent fea rs  exposure of its  people to  ideas and am bassadors from
26dem ocra tic  nations."
A cting  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  W alter Bedell Sm ith, to  whom Adam s passed
Pearson's no te , said much th e  sam e thing, explaining his unsuccessfu l a tte m p ts
tow ard  such co n tac ts  w hile am bassador to  th e  USSR and adding th a t  th e re  was no
evidence to  ind ica te  th a t  the  Krem lin had changed its  mind. M oreover, Sm ith
continued, a new hurdle now ex isted  in th e  form of congressional leg islation
requiring all persons applying to  en te r th e  U nited  S ta te s  from  com m unist
coun tries had to  be personally  approved by th e  a tto rn e y  g en era l and, like all
foreign visitors, had to  be fingerprin ted . And those req u irem en ts , the fo rm er
am bassador w rote, posed an alm ost insuperable o bstac le  to  exchanges under 
27existing  conditions.
Pearson answ ered  Adam s and Sm ith publicly. The e ffo r ts  alluded to , he 
to ld  his audience, had been m ade sev era l years ago. T here  was now a new se t of
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ru le rs  in Moscow and a new  adm in istra tion  in W ashington. It was tim e, he insisted
2 8over national rad io , to  try  again.
Wfishington^s-i*estrictions7“ar+iandfulnof“Sovret“Teitiziens^^rt^ red“
th e  coun try  in 1954, though a 1953 a tte m p t ended in refu sa ls  and verbal reprisals.
In May, 1953, a  Sov iet chess team  of f if te en  players, responding to  an A m erican
inv ita tion  to  a t te n d  a  New York C ity  m atch , applied for visas to  en te r the  
29
country . A fte r  a delay  of sev e ra l weeks W ashington approved the  visit, and the 
Soviet team  flew  to  P aris  to  ready  itse lf  for d ep artu re  to  th e  U nited  States.^*^ On 
th e  eve of departing , how ever, th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t announced th a t th e  team  
would be s tr ic tly  confined  to  New York C ity  and could not, as it  planned, s tay  a t  
th e  Glen Cove residence of th e  Soviet U nited N ations delegation , lo ca ted  som e 
th ir ty  m iles from  dow ntow n and tw elve m iles beyond th e  c ity  lim its.^^  A fte r 
s tro n g  Soviet p ro te s ts  th e  D ep artm en t re len ted  som ew hat, ag ree ing  th a t th e  team  
could visit G len Cove, bu t could n e ith er s tay  th e re  nor trav e l back and fo rth
OO
betw een  the  residence and the  s ite  of th e  m atch. D esp ite  the  slight concession, 
Moscow, accusing  th e  U nited  S ta te s  of "in to lerab le  m easures v io lating  all ru les of 
h osp ita lity  and courtesy ,"  cancelled  both  the  trip  and th e  m atch.^^
The following y ea r a few  Soviet re p re se n ta tiv e s  did en te r the country . 
In F ebruary  a Soviet sk ie r a rrived  to  p resen t a  trophy  to  th e  A m erican Ski 
A ssociation on th e  occasion of its  f if t ie th  anniversary , in May tw o  Soviet scholars 
p a rtic ip a ted  in  C olum bia U niversity 's b icen tenn ial ce leb ra tio n , in Septem ber a 
Soviet surgeon a tte n d e d  a  m edical conference in W ashington, D .C ., and in June 
th e  Soviet chess team  finally  arrived  to  play i ts  long delayed m atch.^'^ Since they  
w ere s till lim ited  to  a tw e n ty  five m ile radius and allow ed only to  visit Glen Cove,
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the team traveled largely under the same restrictions as those rejected the 
previous year, but whatever their feelings about the limitations the Soviets 
conducted themselves in an ingratiating manner. ’’Quite self-consciously spread­
ing goodwill," Newsweek wrote, "they dutifully enthused over the Empire State
OC
Building, big town traffic jams, and hot dogs." But when a group of Soviet 
student editors applied for visas in response to an invitation from an American 
student organization the Department refused admission on the grounds that the 
schools were closed for the summer, and, Pravda complained, the Department 
refused visas to a delegation of Soviet radio engineers invited to a technical
OC
conference in the United States.
Nineteen fifty-five was a pivotal year in American-Soviet cultural 
relations. As the year progressed the contacts begun during the previous months 
grew more widespread and increasingly accepted as individuals and delegations 
entered the country of the other in growing numbers. And in July the Geneva 
Conference gave the entire matter of cultural contacts an importance previously 
lacking by placing it alongside the questions of disarmament and German 
reunification as one of the three major items on the Geneva agenda.
A growing number of Americans traveled to the Soviet Union during the 
first half of the year. A three man ice skating team performed in Moscow, 
William Randolph Hearst, Jr., and a number of associates talked with top officials 
in the Soviet capital, two Columbia professors returned the Soviet visit of the 
previous year by attending Moscow University’s bicentennial celebration, a 
Harvard law professor spent a month conferring with Soviet colleagues, and 
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, traveling most of the way in the
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com pany of R obert F. Kennedy, m ade an ex tensive to u r of th e  Soviet h in ter- 
37lands. . A delegation  of A m erican jou rnalists  v isited  w ith Soviet editors, th e  
chairm an  of th e  C hicago c ity  planning com m ission studied Soviet p rac tices  in his 
a re a  o f ex p ertise , and an arm y physician, whose visit was instrum ental in 
a rrang ing  a fo rm al exchange of m edical film s, tou red  dozens of Soviet hospitals 
and clinics.38
As th e  individual co n tac ts  continued, e ffo r ts  tow ard more form al and
organized  exchanges p roceeded apace. In th e  fa ll of 1954 th e  Soviet studen t
ed ito rs  e a r lie r  denied en try  to  th e  U nited S ta te s  applied  again  for visas, but by
early  1955 th e  S ta te  D epartm en t had taken  no ac tion  on th e  applications. In la te
February  William Randolph H earst, speaking b efo re  th e  N ational Press Club in
W ashington, D .C ., c r itic ized  the  delay, pointing ou t th a t  the  issue had been
broached  to  him everyw here he trav e led  in th e  Soviet Union and th a t Soviet
39propagandists w ere m aking cap ita l out of W ashington's h esita tions. Two weeks 
la te r ,  on M arch ten th , A tto rney  G eneral H erb ert Brownell approved the visas.*^^
The announcem ent th a t th e  s tuden t ed ito rs  w ere com ing to  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  touched off a spa te  of ac tiv ity  and ex c item en t throughout th e  nation. A t 
th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's  request th e  In s titu te  o f In tern a tio n a l Education began 
co n tac tin g  a  num ber of un iversities to  a rrange an itin e ra ry , but quickly found its  
in itia tiv e  unnecessary  as o ffers  poured in from  across th e  nation . Over n inety  
colleges and un iversities  s c a tte re d  across th ir ty  four s ta te s  extended invitations 
and offers  to  th e  ed ito rs , as did business organ izations, labor rep resen ta tiv e s  and 
congressmen.*^^ M innesota Senator Edward Thye, for exam ple, personally  w rote 
to  P residen t Eisenhow er, pointing out th e  advan tages to  both the  U nited S ta te s  
and th e  USSR of a v is it to  his s ta te  in an  e ffo rt to  influence th e  itinerary .^^
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N ew spapers across the  country  provided ed ito ria l support for the
ven tu re . If th e  Soviets w ere willing to  expose th e ir  s tuden t ed ito rs to  a close-up
view of th e  country , th e  New York Tim es w ro te, it  would be wise to  accep t th e
challenge.^^ The Philadelphia Enquirer reasoned  th a t th e  Republic would not
to t te r  because  th e  Soviets spent a few  days here , and the  Louisville T im es argued
th a t  since th e  coun try  was its  best spokesm an, we had to  le t  people com e and look
a t  it  if  we w anted  to  convince them  of its  v irtues. The H earst papers
ed ito ria lized  th a t,  desp ite  som e reserva tions about th e  a ffa ir , much good could 
44com e from  the  v isit.
The itin e ra ry  as finally decided was based on visits to  a dozen 
cam puses, ca re fu lly  se le c te d  to  rep resen t a  c ro ss-sec tio n  of higher education  
from  la rge  s ta te  un iversities to  sm aller p riv a te  schools from New York to  
C alifo rn ia . The N ational S tudent A ssocation arranged  dinners and forum s, while 
s tuden ts  and te ach e rs  rearranged  schedules and classes to  tak e  advantage of th e  
ed ito rs ' p resence, going to  g rea t lengths to  provide ac tiv itie s  and sem inars fo r 
th a t  purpose.^^ And all th is  for eleven studen t ed ito rs whom th e  nation w anted to 
w elcom e and im press.
The ed ito rs  never arrived. On A pril seven teen th , tw o days before th e ir  
scheduled a rriv a l, Moscow announced th a t th e  S ta te  D epartm en t had inform ed 
them  th a t they  m ust subm it to  th e  fingerp rin ting  requ irem en t of th e  Im m igration 
and  N ationality  A ct of 1952, and th a t  they refused  to  do so on the  grounds th a t  
fingerprin ting  was a process f it  for crim inals. The ed ito rs had not an tic ip a ted  
such a  dem and, th e  Soviets claim ed, fo r the  sk iers and th e  chess team  visiting th e  
U nited S ta te s  in 1954 had not been requ ired  to  com ply w ith th a t provision.*^^ 
Moscow, th e  S ta te  D epartm en t ad m itted , was c o rre c t; through "adm in istra tive
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inadvertence" th e  ea rlie r  v isitors had been allow ed in to  the  country  w ithout being 
fingerprin ted . N everthe less , i t  insisted , th e  ed ito rs  m ust fu lfill th e  requ ire­
ment.'^^ Moscow adam an tly  refused , and the p ro jec t was cancelled .
The can ce lla tio n  had repercussions in a num ber of a reas. A veterans ' 
o rganization  com posed of p artic ip an ts  in th e  World War n  Elbe link-up had invited 
a  num ber of its  Soviet co u n te rp a rts  to  a  reunion in W ashington and nine had 
ind icated  they would a tten d , bu t six days a f te r  th e  ed ito rs ' cance lla tio n  th e  Soviet 
ve terans ind ica ted  th ey  would c e le b ra te  th e  occasion in Moscow instead , and
invited  the A m ericans to  th e ir  country. Subsequently, nine A m ericans trav e led  to
48th e  Soviet c a p ita l for th a t  purpose. And fo r aw hile it  appeared  th a t  th e  
fingerprin ting  requ irem en t would doom a p ro jec t th a t  had drawn even more 
exposure and favo rab le  pub lic ity  th an  th e  proposed visit of th e  ed ito rs .
On Jan u ary  25, 1955, F irs t S ec re ta ry  of th e  C om m unist P a r ty  N ikita 
Khrushchev, speaking before  th e  P a rty  C en tra l C o m m ittee , recom m ended th a t his 
country  in c rease  e igh t fold the  am ount of land i t  devoted to  grow ing corn, 
doubling thereby  its  c ap a c ity  to  produce pork for Soviet consum ption. The United 
S ta tes , he rem arked , had g rea tly  expanded its  g rain  production  through corn 
cu ltiva tion  and th e  Soviet Union m ust do th e  sam e.^^
In Iowa, th e  ed ito r of the  D es Moines R eg is te r read  K hrushchev's speech 
and responded to  it . The Soviets, Lauren Soth w ro te  in th e  F ebruary  te n th  edition 
of his paper, should send a  delegation to  his s ta te  to see how low ans ra ised  corn, 
c a t tle ,  hogs, sheep and chickens. "Everything we low ans know about corn , o ther 
feed  grains, fo rage crops, m ea t anim als and th e  dairy  and poultry  industries,"  he 
ed ito ria lized , "will be availab le  to  th e  R ussians fo r th e  asking. We prom ise to
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hide none of our 's e c re ts . ' We will le t  the  Russians see how we do it...w e  ask
noth ing  in re tu rn . We figure th a t  m ore know ledge about the  m eans to  a good life
50in R ussia can only b en efit th e  world and us."
T hree weeks la te r  th e  Soviets accep ted  the  o ffer. Soviet farm ers,
rep lied  Selskoye K hozyaistvo, th e  daily pub lica tion  of th e  Soviet M inistry of
A gricu ltu re , w ere ready  to  go to  Iowa to  study its  farm ing  m ethods, provided of
51course  th a t W ashington would allow them  to  e n te r  th e  country .
The response surprised  and pleased the  Iowa new spaper. Frankly, it
responded on th e  second of M arch, i t  was surprised  a t  th e  reac tio n  to  its  l i t t le
"essay  in to  diplom acy," but was com plete ly  s incere  in its  o ffer and hoped th a t  th e
S ta te  D ep artm en t would not tu rn  th e  R ussians down out of hand. Even if  th e
S oviet G overnm ent thought it had som thing to  gain from  the  venture , th e  U nited
S ta te s  and th e  fre e  world could gain too. "This g rea t and pow erful country ,"  it
concluded, "would appear to  be overcom e by silly  fea rs  if i t  refused  ad m ittan ce  to
a  few  ag ricu ltu ra l te ch n ic ian s ...le t th e  R ussians com e to  Iowa, and le t an  Iowan
52d elegation  go to  Russia. N othing but good could com e of i t  for bo th  coun tries ."
Soth's suggestion and th e  Soviet acc ep tan c e  rece ived  favorab le com ­
m ents from  th e  p residen t down to  th e  Iowa fa rm e rs  whose m ethods and p roducts 
stood  to  be sc ru tin ized  and perhaps copied. The day a f te r  th e  Soviet reply  vjas 
p rin ted  and Soth  responded in th e  above ed ito ria l, P resid en t Eisenhow er, "his eyes 
ligh ting  up," accord ing  to  a  New York Tim es re p o rt, approved th e  idea. A dozen 
d iffe re n t d ifficu ltie s  stood in  th e  way, including th a t  of ad m ittin g  com m unists 
b a rred  by law , Eisenhow ever rem ark ed  w hile reco llec tin g  th e  avid curiosity  about 
A m erican  m ethods am ong th e  w orkers on th e  co llec tiv e  farm s he visited a f te r  
World War II, b u t if  those d ifficu ltie s  could be overcom e, "good and only good"
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would re su lt from  such a  v isit. Business Week ag reed  w ith the  P residen t's
assessm ent. We couldn 't lose, th e  m agazine suggested , fo r "how a re  th ey  going to
54keep  them  down on th e  co llec tiv e  a f te r  they 've  seen Des Moines?"
low ans, a cursory  Newsweek survey ind icated , seem ed to  favor th e  idea 
overw helm ingly. "There a re  too many hungry peoply in the  world," one Iowan 
responded, " to  th ink about keeping our fa rm ing  m ethods to  ourselves." A nother 
rep lied  th a t, w ith  old Abe Lincoln, he believed  th a t th e  best way to  destroy  an 
enem y was to  m ake a friend  of him. And when N ation phoned Soth to  lea rn  the  
d ire c t rea c tio n  to  his proposal it  found th a t th e  new spaper had been inundated 
w tih com m uncations from  individuals and o rgan izations prom ising ass is tan ce  and 
cooperation .^^
O th er pub lications likew ise expressed approval of Soth 's sugggestion,
som e urging W ashington not only to  a c t upon th a t  p a rticu la r opportun ity  b u t to
ta k e  a more positive  a t titu d e  tow ard  c o n ta c ts  w ith the  Soviets in o th e r a rea  as
w ell. N ation lauded  the  Des Moines R eg iste r fo r res to rin g  A m erica 's rep u ta tio n
for being good n a tu red  and hospitab le, and th e  H earst papers endorsed th e  idea
bu t w ondered why p riv a te  c itizens had to  ta k e  th e  in itia tiv e  and why th e  adm inis-
57tra t io n  did not a tte m p t to  l i f t  th e  iron cu rta in  by proposing m ore such visits. 
The Wall S tre e t  Journal likew ise urged g re a te r  exchanges, arguing th a t  while 
rec ip ro ca l v is its  of fa rm ers, ed ito rs, doctors and to u ris ts  would not by them selves 
ease  our re la tio n s  w ith th e  Soviets, th e re  would be one less avenue to  under­
stand ing  if  W ashington insisted  on keeping low ered  th e  iron cu rta in  th a t  Moscow 
was willing to  l i f t  a  l i t t le .^ ^  The New York Tim es was even m ore c r it ic a l of 
W ashington's a ttitu d e . We had becom e so preoccupied  w ith rep roach ing  the 
Soviets for th e ir  iron cu rta in , th e  paper a sse rted , th a t we had provided them  th e
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m ateria l to  throw  th e  reproach back on us; had c rea ted  an unfavorable im pression 
by obstructing  th e  exchange of persons and ideas a t  th e  very tim e  th a t  Moscow 
was p erm ittin g  m ore A m ericans to  v isit th e  Soviet Union. The co n tra s t, it  
concluded, did th e  country  no cred it.^^  But Com m onweal was the  m ost c ritica l. 
Our o ffic ia l obduracy regarding fingerp rin ting  and the  resu lting  cancella tion  of 
th e  studen t ed ito rs ’ v isit, i t  a sse rted , provided th e  Soviets w ith a strik ing 
propaganda v ic to ry  and an ’’unparalleled  opening” in th e  unrelenting cold war. The 
world now wonders, i t  surm ised, ’’w hether it  was not th e  U nited S ta te s  its e lf  th a t 
was opposed to  th e  Soviet ed ito rs v isiting  here  in th e  firs t p lace .” And apparen tly  
Com m onweal was no t convinced itse lf . "Does th is  nation, which finds th e  idea of 
an Iron C urta in  so reprehensib le ,” it  asked while observing th a t th e  S ta te  
D epartm en t apparen tly  in tended to  apply th e  fingerprin ting  requ irem en t to  the  
ag ricu ltu ris ts  as w ell, ’’really  want to  increase  personal co n tac ts  betw een  th e  
peoples o f th e  Soviet Union and the  U nited S ta te s  or not?"®®
On M arch ten th , th e  day th a t W ashington announced th a t i t  would allow 
th e  Soviet s tu d en t ed ito rs  to  en ter the  country , Moscow form ally approached th e  
S ta te  D epartm en t concerning the  ag ricu ltu ra l v isit. N oting the favorable 
a tten tio n  given th e  m a tte r , including P res id en t Eisenhow er’s com m ents, th e  
Soviets ind icated  th e ir  o ffic ia l approval. They were prepared  to both send and 
rece ive  specia lists  in th e  a rea , th e  Soviet no te  read , and would ’’like to  know how 
th e  U nited S ta te s  G overnm ent regards th e  question of exchanging ag ricu ltu ra l 
delegations betw een  th e  U nited S ta te s  o f A m erican and th e  USSR.”®^
The S ta te  D epartm en t in itia lly  re a c te d  in a  noncom m ital m anner, 
publicly  ind icating  th a t  i t  would give th e  m a tte r  serious consideration in view of
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th e  p residen t's  expressed in te res t and approval, but noting th a t  the u ltim ate
decision would be based on such questions as who and how many w anted to  com e
fi 9and w hat they  would w ant to  see.
B efore i t  could make th a t decision, how ever, Moscow cancelled  the 
planned trip  of th e  s tu d en t ed ito rs and, i t  appeared , doom ed th e  ag ricu ltu ra l 
exchange as well. The Soviets b itte rly  denounced th e  A m erican  stand, charging it 
w ith the  sam e accusa tions th a t W ashington leveled  against Moscow. On th e  firs t 
of May, Pravda fe a tu re d  a  five  panel cartoon  ti t le d  "Behind the  Iron C urtain ," 
depicting  th e  U nited  S ta te s  e rec tin g  barrie rs aga in st foreign co n tac ts . A t the  
en trance  to  th e  coun try  stood a  sign reading  "E ntrance P rohib ited  to C u ltu ra l and 
A gricultural D elegations, War veterans, and Editors of S tuden t N ew spapers of the  
Socialist Cam p." One panel depicted  an arm ed guard w atching over a stalk  of 
corn growing behind a  barbed wire fence; ano th er po rtray ed  Lincoln being 
fingerprin ted . An accom panying verse proclaim ed th a t "hencefo rth  en try  is 
prohibited to  sports cham pions, w orkers, peasants."  Colum bus him self would be 
denied en trance  today , and even th e  peacefu l corn s ta te  of Iowa is forbidden, 
Pravda ended on a je s tin g  note. "It makes the  cows laugh."
D esp ite  th e  Soviet expressions of indignation and th e  fea rs  of some 
A m ericans th a t W ashington's regulations would doom th e  p ro jec t, W ashington and 
Moscow ta lked  out a  com prom ise which, by designating  th e  Soviet delegates as 
"official" visitors, allow ed th e  S ta ted  D epartm en t to  surm ount th e  fingerprin ting 
clause by issuing o ffic ia l visas free  from the  requirem ent.® ^ Moscow in turn
invited tw elv e  A m erican farm  specia lists , and both  sides m ade final arrange-
* 65 m ents.
From m id-Ju ly  to mid-August th e  re sp ec tiv e  delegations gathered  
inform ation  across v ast a rea s  of each  o th e r's  farm lands. The Soviet visitors
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inspected  farm s, m achine fac to ries , ag ricu ltu ra l industries and processing p lants
from  Iowa to  C alifo rn ia  and back to  W ashington, while th e  A m ericans v isited
sim ilar fac ilitie s  and ag ricu ltu ra l in sta lla tio n s  from  th e  U kraine to  Siberia.
P ress coverage on bo th  sides was full and p reponderan tly  favorab le . The New
York Tim es Index lis ted  th ree  pages of news item s devoted to  th e  exchange, and
fi7re p o rte rs  from  num erous publications follow ed th e  Soviets by the  busloads.
Soviet papers and m agazines likew ise rep o rted  ex tensively  on th e  v isits, including
in th e ir coverage both  th e  Soviet delegation 's  p ra ise  of A m erican  ach ievem ents
and the  A m erican  delegation 's  critic ism s regard ing  Soviet p ra c tic e s  and sho rt- 
68com ings. Minor incidents flaw ed th e  v isits on occasion, bu t caused  no re a l
problem s. A few  dem onstra to rs  p icketed  th e  Soviets, and the  A m erican  saw som e
69an ti-A m erican  signs in a Soviet park, bu t th e  inc iden ts  had no repercussions.
Beyond th e ir  specific  function  of g a th e rin g  in form ation , both dele­
gations a c te d  as am bassadors of goodwill. The Soviets in g ra tia ted  them selves by 
playing touch  foo tba ll, ea tin g  hot dogs, m aking an aw kw ard a tte m p t a t  golf, and,
to  th e  aston ishm ent o f all, a tten d in g  Sunday se rv ices a t  th e  F irs t P resb y terian
70Chuch of Je ffe rso n , Iowa. One observer noted th a t the  le ad er of th e  Soviet
delegation , F irs t D eputy  M inister of A gricu ltu re  V ladim ir M atskevich, ac ted  m ore 
like  an A m erican  p o litic a l cand ida te  th an  a Soviet delegate , and M atskevich
ce rta in ly  m ade no enem ies in Texas by te lling  th e  natives th ey  deserved to  brag
71even m ore than  th ey  did. But perhaps m ore im p o rtan t than  th e  d e lib e ra te
a tte m p ts  a t  am iab ility  w ere th e  sm all a c ts  th a t  revea led  e ssen tia l s im ilarities
long obscured by ideological d ifferences. W atching one Soviet d e leg a te  te s t th e
quality  of oa ts  by rubbing th e  grains in his palm s seem ed, fo r exam ple, a
rev e la tio n  to  one Iowan. "Look a t him ," th e  fa rm e r rem arked , " th a t 's  th e  sam e 
7 9
w ay 1 do i t ."
278
No one assum ed o f course th a t exchanging tw o dozen fa rm ers  was going 
to  bridge th e  ideological gap  sep a ra tin g  th e  tw o nations, but i t  was a s ta r t ,  and a 
prom ising one. C ollier's  eloquently  expressed both  the possib ilities and the  
lim ita tio n s  in such exchanges. While th e  Big Four pow ers w ere facing  each  o ther 
across th e  tab le  a t  G eneva, th e  m agazine w rote, "a  low er lev e l of exchange was 
tak ing  place in th e  p igsties and haym ows of Iowa and th e r M idw estern s ta te s ."  
While i t  would be foolish to  asusm e th a t  th e  "folksy rapprochem ent" would g rea tly  
a f fe c t th e  hard  issues a t  th e  sum m it, th ey  could have a profound and cum ulative 
m eaning; could,
be a continuing  rem inder th a t  ben ea th  th e  high question  of national 
policies lie  sim ple hum an goals; th a t  on e ith e r  side of th e  iron cu rta in  
m illions of p la in  folks share  an overw helm ing bond of hum aness—of hope 
for a m ore tranqu il w orld. The friendly  ta lk  am ong ord inary  people 
about ordinary problem s, th e  A m erican  d e leg a te  playing w ith Russian 
children, th e  R ussian e x p e rt rubbing oa t kernels in his palm on an Iowa 
farm —all th e se  can  help c re a te  th e  c lim ate  of goodwill fo r th e  p a tien t 
nego tia tions to  com e. They a re  th e  im ages of th e  asp ira tions of aU men, 
th e  sm all coin th a t  passes from  hand to hand, from  nation  to  natiog.
They a re  th e  pennies o f peace , and pennies can add up fa s t som etim es.
Such expressions m ight of course  be considered well m eaning and well 
sounding, bu t a l i t t le  p ra c tic a l value. Only the  diplom ats and s ta te sm en  who deal 
w ith the hard  issues of in te rn a tio n a l ex istence , som e might argue, have the  full 
grasp of rea lity  th a t  allow s for th e  ordering  of hum an a ffa irs . But from  the  
evidence p resen ted  a t  G eneva concern ing  cu ltu ra l m a tte rs , th e  diplom ats could 
w ell have lea rn ed  som e th ings from  th e  farm ers.
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CHAPTER XI
GENEVA CONFERENCE: CONTEST OVER CONTACTS
On th e  sam e day th a t  the  Soviet farm  delegation  landed in Des Moines, 
Soviet and w estern  s ta tem en  gathered  a t G eneva to  apply th e ir expertise  to  the  
problem s plaguing th e  re la tionsh ip  betw een th e  com m unist and cap ita lis t worlds. 
The w eighty issues of d isarm am ent and G erm an reun ification  occupied c e n te r  
s tag e , but just s ligh tly  to  the  rea r the  question of East-W est c o n tac ts  held a 
position of i ts  own, confirm ing and increasing  the reb y  th e  ro le of cu ltu ra l 
d iplom acy in world a ffa irs .
If those  who went to  Geneva had ti t le s  and expertise , they  lacked  
wisdom su ffic ien t to  surm ount th e ir  d ifferences. In th e  a rea  of cu ltu ra l c o n tac ts  
each side had a purpose to  serve, and ne ith er was w illing to  com prom ise to  the 
point of consen t. The U nited  S ta te s , England and F ran ce  w anted access to  Soviet 
minds; th e  Soviets to  increased  w estern tra d e  and technology. In the  push to 
fu lfill those fundam en ta l dem ands th e  m ore com m only considered form s of 
cu ltu ra l in tercou rse—exchanges of a rtis ts , a th le te s , scholars and sc ien tis ts—w ere 
la rge ly  tre a te d  as in truders.
N either side go t w hat it w anted, fo r as th e  conference progressed the  
high minded rh e to ric  o f in te rna tional accord  d egenera ted  in to  acrim onious
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argum ent and in sisten t e ffo rts  to  cast th e  o ther in th e  ro le of villain. The 
delegates le f t  Geneva s til l  leveling accusations, bu t beneath  th e  dealings of the  
diplom ats th e  process of exchange and in te rac tio n  steadily  grew.
The four nations rep resen ted  a t the  sum m it conference form ally  began 
th e ir  discussions on Ju ly  eighteenth . For five days P residen t Eisenhower, B ritish 
P rim e M inister Anthony Eden, F rench  P rem ier H enri F aure  and Soviet P rem ier 
Nikolai Bulganin de linea ted  the issues, s ta te d  th e ir  positions and, by th e  sim ple 
fa c t of th e ir  p resence, ind icated  th e  im portance they  a ttach e d  to  th e  proceedings.
Each of th e  lead ers  alluded to th e  im portance of increased  co n ta c ts  
betw een E ast and W est, bu t none s ta te d  the  case  as fully and em phatically  as did 
Eisenhower. The A m erican  people, th e  p residen t s ta te d  in his opening address, 
w anted to  be friends with th e  Soviet people. No n a tu ra l d ifferences, te r r i to r ia l  
conflic ts  or com m ercial riva lries  sep ara ted  them , and trad itionally  th ey  had been  
a t  peace. But th a t  was not enough: friendly  understanding  could grow and develop 
only when th e  a r tif ic ia l b a rrie rs  th a t  re s tr ic te d  free  m ovem ent and com m unica­
tion w ere rem oved. All cu rta ins, w hether of guns or laws or regulations, m ust 
com e down.^
Four days la te r  the  p residen t re tu rn ed  to  th e  sam e them e, th is tim e  
w ith specific  suggestions to  o ffer. Since re s tric tio n s  of all kinds caused m utual 
d is tru st, he rem arked , c o n c re te  s teps should be taken  to
(1) low er th e  barrie rs  which now im pede th e  in terchange of inform a­
tion and ideas betw een peoples.
(2) low er th e  b a rrie rs  which now im pede the  opportunities to  trave l 
anyw here in th e  w orld for peacefu l, friendly  purposes, so th a t all 
will have a  chance to know each o ther fa c e -to -fa c e .
(3) c re a te  conditions which will encourage n a tio n s  to  increase the  
exchange of peacefu l goods throughout th e  world.
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Bulganin responded to Eisenhower on th e  sam e day, expressing g ra titu d e  
for his com m ent th a t  th e  A m erican people w anted to  be friendly with th e  Soviet 
people, and assuring the  d e legates  of his com plete  ag reem en t w ith th e  p residen t's  
suggestions. "We have been and s till a re  in favor," th e  Soviet leader s ta te d , "of 
broad developm ent in the  field  of cu ltu re  and science and th e  rem oval of 
obstacles to  in te rco u rse  am ong nations." But, he added in a  qualifying note , his 
governm ent believed th a t in try ing  to  im prove re la tio n s  betw een them selves, th e  
coun tries  a t  th e  co n ference  should "pay due a tte n tio n  to  th e  problem  of 
s treng then ing  econom ic tie s  betw een them , and in  p a rticu la r to  th e  developm ent 
of trade ."  The a r tif ic ia l  con tro ls p laced on th e  sa le  o f goods to  th e  Soviet Union,
3
he concluded, posed a serious th re a t to  th e  re la tio n  of in tern a tio n a l tensions.
Bulganin's pointed  com m ents, aim ed a t th e  A m erican-inspired  regu la­
tions th a t con tro lled  the shipm ent of w estern  goods to  th e  Soviet bloc nations, 
in troduced  an argum en t th a t becam e increasingly  im p o rtan t in the  m a tte r  of 
cu ltu ra l co n tac ts . For w ithout norm al trad e  re la tio n s , th e  Soviets insisted, th e re  
could be no norm al co n tac ts  in o ther a rea s  of cu ltu ra l concern .
From th e  early  postw ar period the U nited  S ta te s  had em bargoed war 
m a te ria l to  Soviet bloc nations and had con tro lled  th e  export of o ther item s 
through a  com plica ted  system  of licenses.'^ The M utual D efense A ssistance 
C ontro l A ct of 1951, popularly known as th e  B a ttle  A ct, regu larized  and ex tended  
th e  system  and its  procedures, and, sign ificantly , es tab lished  a degree of con tro l 
over th e  tra d e  re la tio n s  betw een th e  U.S.S.R. and A m erica 's  allies as well. Any 
nation  th a t e ith e r sold war m ateria l to  the  Soviet bloc powers or refused  to  
co opera te  w ith th e  U nited S ta te s  in controlling  th e  sa le  o f goods not specifically  
listed  as war supplies au tom atica lly  fo rfe ited  A m erican  m ilitary, econom ic and
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financia l ass is tan ce , and even those  coun tries  th a t  rece iv ed  no assistance were 
inv ited  to  join in th e  com m on e ffo r t to  co n tro l exports to  com m unist s ta te s .^  It 
was to  th e se  co n tro ls  th a t  Bulganin objected.
On th e  tw e n ty -th ird  th e  leaders  of th e  four nations, having s ta ted  th e ir
positions on th e  various issues in general te rm s, issued a d irec tiv e  to  guide th e ir
foreign m in isters in d e ta ile d  considera tion  of th e  broad  questions which th e y
defined. The th ird  item  in th e  d irec tive  d ea lt w ith E ast-W est co n tac ts . The
foreign m inisters of th e  four pow ers, i t  read,
should by m eans o f ex p erts  study  m easures...w hich  could (a) bring about 
a progressive e lim ination  of b arrie rs  which in te r fe re  w ith free  com­
m unication and p eac e fu l tra d e  betw een people and (b) bring about such 
fre e r  c o n tac ts  and exchanges a re .  to  th e  m utual advan tage  of the 
coun tries and th e  peoples concerned.
The d irec tiv e  having been issued, th e  heads of s ta te  adjourned the  conference and
re tu rn ed  to  th e ir  re sp e c tiv e  cap ita ls , leaving it  to  th e ir  subord inates to  in te rp re t
and im plem ent its  phrases.
The fo re ign  m in isters  re tu rned  to  G eneva on O cto b er tw enty-seven th ; 
took up th e  top ic  o f E ast-W est co n tac ts  on th e  th ir ty - f ir s t .  A fte r  each of th e  
m in isters r e i te ra te d  his na tion 's  goals and solutions, F rench  F oreign  M inister 
A ntoine P inay su b m itted  a  d ra f t  proposal on behalf of th e  w estern  nations, and 
M olotov did the  sam e for th e  Soviet Union. B oth th e  in tro d u c to ry  speeches and 
th e  d ra f t proposals in d ica ted  a wide d ivergence in em phasis and am bition  betw een 
th e  Soviets and th e ir  w estern  coun te rp arts . O nce past th e  g en e ra litie s  m arking 
th e  f irs t s tag e  of th e  co n ference , th e  foreign  m in is te rs  quickly discovered, they  
faced  obstacles th a t  be lied  th e  easy optim ism  o f July.
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M olotov im m ed ia te ly  re tu rned  to  th e  m a tte r  of tra d e  and econom ic 
tie s . The re fusa l of som e coun tries  to  se ll c e r ta in  goods to  th e  USSR and th e  
v io lation  of norm ally acc ep ted  p rac tices  in th e  fie ld  o f c red it, he contended, 
c re a te d  m istru st w hich im periled  econom ic and o th e r re la tions . T herefore  in 
accordance w ith the d irec tiv e  th e  co m m ittee  of experts  estab lished  to deal w ith 
th e  question of co n ta c ts  should, "in th e  firs t in stan ce ...ex am in e  th e  question of 
liqu idating  existing  m easures which hinder th e  developm ent of c o n tac ts  and tie s  
betw een  s ta te s ,"  for rem oving  those re s tric tio n s  would lead  to  th e  "streng then ing  
of confidence betw een  coun tries  and th e  developm ent of co n tac ts  and tie s  
betw een  peoples." It is our view, M olotov concluded in w ords w hich le f t no doubt 
as to  th e  way in which th e  Soviets looked a t  th e  issue, " th a t th e  developm ent of 
c o n ta c ts  betw een  E ast and West w ill be succesfu l only if  i t  is based on th e  
developm ent of econom ic re la tio n s  betw een s ta te s , which is unthinkable w ithout
7
the  norm al developm ent of tra d e  betw een them ."
Only a f te r  dealing  a t  length  w ith  the  m a tte r  of tra d e  did M olotov 
m ention o th e r form s of c o n ta c ts , and then  he firs t em phasized  in te rac tio n  in such 
a rea s  as industry, ag ric u ltu re , m edicine and technology. Though calling  for 
increased  exchanges in tourism , l i te ra tu re  and o the r fie lds of cu ltu ra l endeavor,
Q
th e  prim ary  concern , his address ind icated , lay  in th e  a rea s  of p ra c tic a l benefit.
The proposal w hich M olotov subm itted  to  th e  c o m m ittee  of experts  for 
form al considera tion  follow ed closely  th e  p a tte rn  of his speech. The f irs t tw o 
provisions ca lled  for rem oving re s tric tio n s  on in te rn a tio n a l trad e  and the  applica­
tion  o f the  m ost favored  nation  principle, th e  th ird  suggested  m easures " to  
broaden in te rn a tio n a l sc ie n tif ic  and tech n ica l re la tions,"  and th e  fourth  alluded to  
cooperation  w ith the  U nited  S ta te s . The f if th , divided in to  severa l p arts , ca lled
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fo r increased  exchanges of delegations, but again em phasized firs t the  " recip rocal 
visits of rep re sen ta tiv e s  of industry, ag ricu ltu re  and trade"  in order to  exchange 
experiences and learn  of th e  achievem ents of o the r countries in th e se  fields. A t 
th e  end of his proposal, Molotov caUed for exchanging publications betw een 
"in stitu tions  of sc ien tif ic  research , lib raries , sc ie n tif ic  and cu ltu ra l associations, 
cu ltu ra l o rgan izations and individuals," for increased  tourism  and fo r "sports 
re la tions."^  But while w illing to  engage in co n ta c ts  of th e  la t te r  so rt, th e  rea l 
concern  lay  in th e  areas  of trad e  and technology.
The w estern  s ta tesm en  were in te re s ted  not in trad e , bu t in rem oving 
the  o b stac les  th a t  barred  th e  Soviet population from  access to  "ideas and 
inform ation" com ing from  th e  West. For as S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  D ulles im plied a t  
Geneva and s ta te d  rep ea ted ly  during the m onths a fte rw ard , Soviet exposure to  
w estern  ideas could hasten  th e  changes a lready  underw ay in th e  Soviet Union and 
could u ltim a te ly  resu lt in a m ore liberal reg im e. Like th e  Soviets, th e  w estern  
pow ers w ere w illing to  discuss o ther types of cu ltu ra l co n tac ts , bu t th e  core of 
th e ir proposals lay  in th e  realm  of exchanging w hat they  consisten tly  re fe rre d  to  
as "ideas and inform ation ."
Both D ulles' opening rem arks and the  fo rm al proposals subm itted  by th e  
F rench  delegation  on behalf of the w estern  s ta te s  ind icated  th e  th ru s t o f w estern  
aim s. D ulles began by dividing th e  sub ject of E ast-W est con tac ts  into sep a ra te  
a rea s, then  noting th e  problem s and p re fe rred  solu tions in each. In th e  a rea  of 
exchanging ideas and inform ation , he rem arked , th e  w estern  nations im m ediately  
encoun tered  basic  obstab les, am ong them  th e  "system atic  jam m ing of rad io  
b roadcasts" to  th e  Soviet Union, and an "a ll-em brac ing  Soviet censorship of press
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and radio." M oreover, the  a r tif ic ia l ruble exchange ra te  posed a b a rrie r  to 
increased  tra v e l and th e  exchange of persons. "We hope," Dulles em phasized, 
" th a t steps will be in itia ted  a t th is conference looking to th e  rem oval of these  
obstacles."^®
Turning to  the  m a tte r  of trad e , D ulles in jected  a new term  into the
argum en t. The th ird  aspect of th e  d irec tive , he insisted, re la te d  to  peacefu l
tra d e , and not to  th a t  aspect of s tra te g ic  tra d e  perta in ing  to  goods which the
U nited  S ta te s  em bargoed to  th e  Soviet Union.^^ S tra teg ic  trad e  was a m a tte r  of
secu rity  concern  and outside th e  purview  of th e  d irec tive . Nor could the  Soviets
blam e the  em bargo fo r th e  lov; leve l of tra d e , he continued, fo r th e  goods placed
in th a t  ca tego ry  rep resen ted  only a m inute portion of th e  products in which trad e
could be m ain tained . The re s tr ic tio n s  w ere a consequence, not a cause , of
tensions. Soviet p ra c tic e s  and policies, no t A m erican re s tr ic tio n s , were
1 9responsib le fo r th e  low level of trad e .
On th e  sam e day th a t  Dulles outlined his country 's position, th e  French 
delegation  subm itted  a lis t of w estern  proposals for fo rm al considera tion . The 
seven teen  poin ts in th e  list, following closely  the line of reason ing  Dulles 
espoused, a re  w orthy of enum eration  for th ey  form ed the  fram ew ork  of the  
A m erican  concep t of cu ltu ra l re la tio n s  w ith th e  Soviets both a t  G eneva and during 
th e  m onths a f te r  th e  conference.
The f irs t of th e  seventeen  proposals called  for m easures to  fa c i l i ta te  a 
f re e r  exchange of in form ation  and to  rem ove th e  obstacles ham pering  " th e  free  
flow  of full fa c tu a l in fo rm ation  and varied  com m ent" betw een th e  w estern  and 
Soviet nations. The second ca lled  for each  of th e  four powers to  open 
" in fo rm ation  cen ters"  in the cap ita l c itie s  of the  o thers, w ith  all c itizen s
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guaran teed  the  righ t to  use those  cen te rs  w ithout d isturbance or hindrance by
th e ir  governm ents. Points th re e  through five proposed th e  rec ip rocal d istribu tion
o f o ffic ia l publications, books, new spapers and periodicals, to  be "availab le  for
genera l and unim peded sale in th e  Soviet Union on one hand and the  w estern
coun tries  on th e  o ther."  N um bers six through ten  condem ned the jam m ing of
rad io  b roadcasts  as incom patib le  w ith  th e  d irec tiv e , ca lled  for uncensored
exchanges of rad io  b roadcasts, and proposed g re a te r  access by w estern journalists
in th e  Soviet Union to  "norm al sources of in form ation ."  Proposals eleven through
fif te e n  d ea lt w ith more personal and individual form s of cu ltu ra l in terchange in
professional, cu ltu ra l, sc ien tif ic  and tech n ica l fields, fo r m eetings of ou tstand ing
sc ien tis ts  a t  " repu tab le"  in te rn a tio n a l congresses, for sporting  exchanges,
exchanges of s tu d en ts , and increased  tourism . The la t te r ,  th e  proposal noted,
would requ ire  more lib e ra l Soviet procedures regard ing  trav e l re s tric tio n s  and
ad m in is tra tiv e  p rac tice s  and, above all, m ore reasonab le ra te s  of cu rrency
exchange. The la s t tw o points in th e  w estern  lis t ca lled  fo r g re a te r  freedom  of
m ovem ent fo r d ip lom atic personnel in th e  USSR and for ag reem en t in principle
13regard ing  d irec t a ir  tran sp o rta tio n  betw een Soviet and w estern  cities.
A fte r  enum erating  th e  specific  points, th e  w estern  d ra f t proposal d ea lt 
b rie fly  and in broad te rm s w ith  th e  m a tte r  of trad e . "So far as tra d e  is 
concerned," it  s ta te d , " the  w estern  pow ers sincere ly  desire  to  see  an im provem ent 
in com m ercial re la tio n s  betw een th e  countries of E astern  Europe and them selves," 
and  w ere p repared  to  "consider sym pathetica lly  any proposals which seem  likely 
to  lead  to a m utually  benefic ia l developm ent of trade."^'^
By th e  tim e  th e  opening speeches w ere finished and th e  d ra ft proposals 
in troduced  i t  was obvious th a t  th e  tw o sides w ere fa r a p a r t in w hat they
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considered  v ita l to  th e  c rea tio n  of c loser co n tac ts . Both m entioned areas  in 
which th ey  m ight possibly find som e basis for ag reem en t, b u t both  em phasized 
a re a s  in which they  had most to  gain and in which, a t  th e  sam e tim e , they  were 
m ost unlikely to  com prom ise.
From  N ovem ber second through the  te n th  the  co m m ittee  of experts
held  e igh teen  m eetings to  discuss th e  proposals sub m itted  by th e  tw o sides.^^
Follow ing the  m eetings bo th  sides subm itted  d ra f t proposals of form al d éc la ra -
16tions to  be adop ted  by th e  conference concern ing  E ast-W est co n tac ts . Both
d ra f ts  re f le c te d  th e  orig inal argum ents and proposals, fo r no com m on ground was
reached  during th e  co m m ittee  sessions.
E xactly  w hat tran sp ired  during th e  m eetings is im possible to  determ ine,
17for o ffic ia l reco rds a re  unavilable and public re fe re n c e s  a re  few  and obscure. 
But an analysis o f th e  speeches made by th e  foreign  m inisters when they  resum ed 
th e ir  discussions follow ing th e  m eetings provides a reasonably  good idea of th e  
ten o r and d irec tion  of those  proceedings.
The d eb a te  in th e  com m ittee  of exp erts  followed th e  line of reasoning 
la id  down by th e  fo reign  m in isters of th e  resp ec tiv e  sides. The w estern  powers 
refused  to  com prom ise on th e  m a tte r of tra d e  and th e  Soviets re jec ted  the 
w estern  req u es ts  fo r exchanges in th e  a re a  of in fo rm ation  and ideas. Both 
p rofessed  an in te re s t in th e  type  of cu ltu ra l c o n ta c ts  th a t  seem ingly afforded 
opportun ity  for ag reem en t, bu t by the  tim e  th e  fo re ign  m in iste rs  took up the  
m a tte r  again both  sides seem ed more in te re s ted  in castin g  b lam e than  in reaching  
ag reem en t. The w estern  pow ers, and p a rticu la rly  S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dulles, 
seem ed especially  ben t on proving th a t th e  Soviets re je c te d  all th e  suggestions 
which they  o ffered .
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B ritish  Foreign S e c re ta ry  H arold MacM illan su cc in c tly  s ta te d  the 
g en era l te n o r of the  co m m ittee  m eetings. The longer th e  sessions continued , he 
observed, th e  c le a re r  it  becam e "no t m erely th a t th e  w estern  and Soviet 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  had a  rad ically  d iffe re n t point of view of w hat sub jects  i t  would 
be im p o rtan t to  discuss, bu t a  rad ica lly  d iffe ren t approach to  th o se  sub jects on 
which i t  m ight have been thought th a t  we would have som eth ing  in com m on. Even 
when we w ere ta lk ing  about th e  sam e thing, we did not m ean q u ite  th e  sam e by
it.til8
But M acMillan had no doubt as to  where th e  b lam e lay. The only
b a rrie rs  which th e  Soviets though t im p o rtan t to  discuss, he charged , w ere  those
th a t  lev ied  con tro ls  on s tra te g ic  goods, which, he claim ed, "w ere c learly  excluded
from  th e  d irec tive ."  Out o f e ig h teen  m eetings th e  Soviet ex p erts  could be
persuaded  to  devote only tw o to  m a tte rs  such as censorship and con tro ls  on
individuals, and excep t for th e  m a tte r  of trad e , "w here they  harped  continually  on
th e  s tra te g ic  controls," he concluded, " they  sought to  avoid a  discussion on
1Qsub jec ts  which they  said w ere no t com m on ground betw een  us."
D ulles was even m ore d e term ined  to prove th a t  th e  Soviets w ere to 
b lam e fo r lack  of ag reem en t. On N ovem ber fo u rteen th  he accused  th e  Soviets in 
g en era l te rm s of blocking progress w ith  th e ir  selfish  a ttitu d e , and on th e  following 
day specified  Soviet ob jections to  p a rticu la r  item s in th e  sev en teen  point w estern  
proposal. The Soviet delegation , he enum era ted , re je c te d  item  one, calling  for a 
f re e r  exchange of ideas and in fo rm ation , as they  did num ber tw o, requesting  th e  
es tab lish m en t of in form ation  cen te rs  on a recip rocal basis. Likew ise, he asserted , 
th ey  re je c te d  points th re e  and four, asking fo r rec ip ro ca l d is tribu tion  and sale  of 
books and periodicals, seem ed to  r e je c t  item  five, s tip u la tin g  th e  exchange of
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governm ent publications, and refused  to  accep t num ber six, which dea lt w ith the
exchange of com m ercial film s a t  norm al p rices and on norm al te rm s. They also,
he continued, re je c te d  item s e igh t through ten , dealing with jam m ing, censorship
and jo u rn a lis tic  freedom . C oncerning tourism , he s ta ted  in re la tio n  to  point
eleven , th e y  adm itted  the  possibility  but denied the  rea lity  by refusing  to  change
th e  rub le  exchange ra te . And, Dulles concluded, they  likew ise re je c te d  points
six teen  and seven teen , calling  fo r freedom  of m ovem ent by m em bers of diplo-
20m atic  m issions and fo r d irec t a ir tran sp o rt betw een w estern  and Soviet c ities.
The Soviet delegation , he sum m arized, "seem s to  have picked out of our proposals
only four or five suggestions which it  deem s to  its  in te re s t, and to  have re je c ted
all o thers, w ithou t any sp irit of give and take , and with a com plete  omission of
21anyth ing  of substance in the  realm  of exchange of ideas. The Soviet stand on
th e  m a tte r  of East-W est c o n tac ts  th e re fo re  did not adequately  fu lfill th e
req u irem en ts  of th e  d irec tive  in th a t it  con ta ined  "nothing, or p rac tica lly  nothing,
22designed to  p erm it an exchange of ideas and inform ation."
T he Soviets did not deny D ulles’ charges. R ather they  defended th e ir  
position  and in turn  leveled  th e ir  own accusa tions against the  w estern stand on 
m a tte rs  of tra d e  and econom ic ties .
The w estern  proposals to  which th e  Soviets re jec ted , M olotov s ta te d  on 
th e  f if te e n th , w ere unaccep tab le  because th ey  in te rfe red  with th e  in terna l a ffa irs  
o f th e  S ov iet s ta te . In th e  m a tte r of censorship and jam m ing, he rem arked  for 
exam ple, "we in th e  Soviet Union do not disguise th e  fac t th a t  we never have in 
th e  past nor will in the  fu tu re  p ic tu re  to  ourselves such a 'freedom  in th e  
exchange of ideas' which would consist o f 'f re e  war propaganda' or th e  
m isan throp ic  propaganda of a tom ic a tta c k ... ."  As for allow ing foreign radio
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s ta tio n s  to  b roadcast d irec tly  to  his country , "nobody who is a supporter of 
d em o cra tic  principles can ...a rgue  th a t  rad io  s ta tions , even though th ey  a re  
disguised by fa lse  slogans such as 'F ree  Europe' rea lly  serves th e  in te re s ts  of 
peoples." R a th e r they  served  th a t  "black reac tio n  which fans the  flam es o f 
enm ity  betw een  peoples, is harm ful to  peace, and m akes for new war." As for th e  
opening of "inform ation cen te rs ,"  he continued  while noting in an aside th a t  it  had 
been explained th a t such cen te rs  w ere aim ed p recise ly  a t his country, "we cannot 
allow th is  to  pass unchallenged." S im ilar c e n te rs  c re a te d  in C zechoslovakia, 
Poland, H ungary and R um ania had been closed because they  had been used fo r 
espionage, and, he em phasized, "in so fa r as th e  Soviet Union is concerned , it  has 
no in ten tion  of opening such cen te rs ."  R egarding tourism , th e  Soviet spokesm an 
continued , w estern  dem ands w ent fa r beyond th e  sim ple question of to u ris t trav e l 
to  an unaccep tab le  insistence th a t  his country  am end its  adm in is tra tiv e  regu la­
tions and change its  ra te  of ruble exchange. And as fo r d irec t a ir tran sp o rt, he 
concluded, his governm ent by no means opposed the principle; indeed, i t  had an air 
ag reem en t w ith F rance  and was beginning nego tia tions w ith England on th e  
sub ject. But it was im possible, as th e  w estern  delegations dem anded, to  work out
an im m ed ia te  ag reem en t a t G eneva, fo r "w ithou t th e  necessary  specia lists  one
23cannot discuss such a  proposal a t  a m eeting."
On th e  o ther hand the  Soviets had th e ir  own com plaints. It was no 
acc iden t, M olotov insisted , th a t th e  d irec tive  gave prim e im portance to  rem oving 
th e  b a rrie rs  to  trad e  by m entioning th a t  top ic f irs t, and his delegation  had 
fo rm u la ted  its  proposals accordingly. But th e  w estern  rep resen ta tiv e s  had sh ifted  
th e  question  to  la s t place and then obscured th e  issue by ta lk ing  about " s tra te g ic  
trad e ,"  w hich, he co rrec tly  observed, th e  d irec tive  did not even m ention. His
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coun try  was no t proposing anything specific  in th e  a rea  of trad e , bu t only asking 
th a t  th e  w estern  nations recognize th e  necessity  of e lim inating  b arrie rs  to  its  
norm al developm ent, for, th e  foreign  m inister re ite ra te d , unless those  barrie rs  
w ere elim inated  th e re  could be no norm al developm ent o f c o n ta c ts  betw een East 
and West."^'^
D esp ite  th e  charges and coun ter-charges, th e re  w ere s till a rea s  in
which th e  tw o  sides could have agreed  had they  been anxious to  do so. The
accusa tions th ey  m ade against each o ther la rge ly  concerned a rea s  in which each
had a spec ific  in te re s t and hopes fo r advan tage. On th e  o the r hand th e re  was
l i t t le  discussion of th e  type of co n ta c ts  com monly considered cu ltu ra l in na tu re .
In th e ir  fo rm al proposals both sides ca lled  for exchanges of a r tis ts ,  a th le te s ,
scholars and sc ien tis ts , but th e re  is l i t t le  ind ication  th a t  those  a rea s  rece ived
serious considera tion  a t  th e  working level. Nor is th e re  any ind ication  th a t  th e
Soviets objected  to such a r tis tic  and scholarly  exchanges. In enum era ting  th e
Soviet objections to  sp ec ific  item s in the  seven teen  point proposal, Dulles skipped,
significantly , points tw elve through f if teen , which w ere p recise ly  tho se  th a t d ea lt
w ith increased  in te rac tio n  am ong persons engaged in professsional, cu ltu ra l,
25sc ien tific , scho larly  and a th le tic  pursuits. T hat D ulles skipped those points, 
given th e  leng ths to  w hich he w ent to  prove Soviet re c a lc itra n c e  in o the r a reas, 
seem s to  in d ica te  th a t the  Soviet delegation raised no fundam ental objections 
regard ing  those  p a rticu la r  proposals.
The Soviets, m oreover, w ent to  som e leng th s to  p rofess a specific  
in te re s t in precise ly  th e  type exchanges th a t  Dulles o m itte d  in his enum eration . 
The original Soviet d ra f t  called  for such co n tac ts , and M olotov rep ea ted ly  claim ed
298
his country  favored  them . On th e  f if teen th , m oreover, th e  Soviet Foreign 
M inister s ta te d  th a t  his coun try  was willing to  accep t as a basis fo r ag reem en t a 
d ra f t  proposal subm itted  by F rench  P rem ier F au re  a t  th e  H eads of G overnm ent 
C onference in Ju ly . The m ajo rity  of F aure 's  points, which d ea lt alm ost exclu­
sively  with the type  a r t is t ic  and scholarly  exchanges m entioned in the  above 
paragraph, w ere a cc ep tab le , M olotov s ta te d , and his coun try  was ready to  use 
them  as a basis for ag reem en t provided the w estern  nations w ere w illing to  do th e  
same.^®
But, the  Soviet spokesm an contended, th e  w estern  delegations might
no t now be willing to  acc e p t th e  F rench  proposal, fo r since its  fo rm ulation  the
w estern  dem ands had assum ed a  new d irection . W hereas F au re 's  nine points were
a t  le a s t filled  w ith th e  sp irit of ag reem en t, th e  seven teen  point program  form ally
subm itted  by th e  w estern  pow ers was perm eated  w ith an en tire ly  d iffe ren t sp irit
and did not, M olotov suggested , rea lly  aim a t  achieving accord . "One g e ts  the
im pression," he continued in  a vein th a t  incensed the  w estern  rep re sen ta tiv e s  and
edged th e  discussions tow ard  a low er and m ore personal level, " th a t th e  proposals
o f th e  Three Pow ers of O ctober 31 w ere fo rm ulated  as if the  au thors  th e reo f did
27not wish to  reach  an ag reem en t."  M oreover, he im plied, w estern  rh e to ric  a t  th e
con ference  was aim ed a t  accom plishing—or fa iling  to  accom plish—th e  sam e thing.
"For purposes o f burying th e  proposals subm itted  on th e  question  o f co n tac ts ,"  he
s ta te d  in th e  sam e speech , " it seem s to  me th a t  we do not need any more a rtfu l
28speeches than  those we have ju st heard ."
M olotov's accu sa tio n s  brought a  sw ift re jo inder from  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te
D ulles. To suggest th a t  th e  seven teen  point proposal was d e lib e ra te ly  drawn so as
to  be refused, he rep lied  em phatically , "is a  charge th a t  I r e je c t  in th e  most
c a teg o rica l m anner." M olotov had made many s ta te m e n ts  of a sim ilarly  frivolous
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n a tu re  to  which he would like to  rep ly  in kind, D ulles rem arked  as th e  debate  grew
29m ore rancorous, b u t he would deny him self th a t  p leasure.
If w illing to  deny h im se lf th a t p a rticu la r  p leasure , he p e rm itted  him self
an o th er. He had though t, he com m ented  to  M olotov in a ra th e r  taun ting  tone,
th a t  socialism  was so fully  estab lished  th a t i t  would not topp le perchance some
co n tra d ic to ry  ideas found th e ir  way into th e  Soviet Union. But apparen tly  th a t
was not th e  case, and th e  West m ust reconc ile  itse lf  to th e  position taken  by th e
Soviet de legation  th a t  it  was dangerous to  perm it en try  to  any ideas th a t  did not
p recise ly  conform  to  Moscow’s. ’’T hat nervousness on behalf of the  Soviet
G overnm ent for its  own fu tu re ,” Dulles concluded, was ’’som ething  which we will
have to  ta k e  in to  accoun t and ev a lu a te  when we consider th e  possib ility  of fu rth e r 
qn
co n ta c ts .”
D ulles was being coy, fo r he had well taken  in to  accoun t th a t  supposed 
nervousness and fe a r  long befo re  com ing to  G eneva. Indeed, th e  w este rn  e ffo rt to  
in troduce ’’ideas and in fo rm ation” in to  the  USSR was no t only a considered e ffo rt 
a t  th e  con ference  to  c a p ita liz e  on perce ived  possib ilities w ithin th e  Soviet Union, 
as D ulles was to  m ake abundantly  c lear, but was to  rem ain  th e  basis for 
W ashington’s c u ltu ra l re la tio n s  policy vis-a-v is th e  Soviets for th e  following tw o 
y ea rs  as well.
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
FOOTNOTES
^U. S. D epartm en t of S ta te , The G eneva C onference of Heads of 
G overnm ent, Ju ly  18-23, 1955, Pubn. No. 6046 (1955), pp. 18-22.
^Ibid., pp. 63-64.
^Ibid.
^For P residen t Trum an's p roclam ation  extending th e  lis t of goods 
em bargoed to  Soviet bloc countries, see  NYT, M arch 27, 1948, pp. 1-2. For th e  
C om m erce D epartm en t's  "cata logue" of goods which those coun tries  could pur­
chase in th e  U.S., see  Ibid., May 13, 1948, p. 37.
^ M utual D efense A ssistance C ontro l A ct of 1951 (B attle  A ct), S ta tu te s  
a t  L a rg e , LXV, secs. 101-105, 201-203, pp. 644-646 (l951). O th er ac ts , par­
ticu la rly  th e  Export C ontro l A ct, Trading with the Enemy A ct, and Munitions 
C on tro l A ct, provided even m ore con tro ls. For an in fo rm ative  a r tic le  by the  
D eputy D irec to r for M utual D efense A ssistance C ontrol, see W alter S. DeLany, 
"E ast-W est T rade C ontrols," S ta te  D ep artm en t B ulletin , XXXIII (D ecem ber 5,
1955), pp. 918-924.
g
G eneva C onference of H eads of G overnm ent, pp. 67-68.
7
U.S. D epartm en t of S ta te , The G eneva M eeting of Foreign  M inisters, 
O c to b er 27-N ovem ber 16, 1955, Pubn. No. 6156 (1955), p. 235.
^ Ib id , pp. 237-238.
^Ibid., pp. 239-240.
^^Ibid., p. 242.
^^Ibid., p. 243.
^^Ibid., p. 244.
jUU
301
^^I b id , pp. 2 42-248 .
^^Ibid., p. 248.
^^U.S. D epartm ent of S ta te , A m erican Foreign Policy; 1950-1955; 
Basic D ocum ents, II, G eneral Foreign  Policy Series Pubn. No. 6446 (1957), p. 
2021, n. 3.
1 fi G eneva M eeting of Foreign  M inisters, pp. 266-267; 269-270.
17 Even th e  press re leases  con ta ined  a t  th e  Eisenhower L ibrary  a re  s ilen t 
on th e  m eetings. The re leases  provide a g re a t deal of in form ation  to  Saturday, 
N ovem ber 12th, bu t skip from  th a t  d a te  to  W ednesday, N ovem ber 16th. During 
tho se  days th e  m a tte r of East-W est co n ta c ts  was discussed. M cC ardle Papers, 
Box 3, "Mr. Suydham's B riefings, G eneva—O ctober, Novem ber, 1955." Eisenhow er 
L ibrary .
18 G eneva M eeting of F oreign  M in isters, p. 249.
^^Ibid.
90 Ibid., pp. 257-258; 270-272.
^^Ibid., p. 272.
9 9
^^Ibid., p. 271.
^^Ibid.
94
Ibid., pp. 272-277; see also pp. 253-255.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 275.
9 7
Ibid., p. 274.
^^Ibid., p. 272.
9Q
Ibid., pp. 277-278.
^^Ibid., p. 278.
CH A PTER X n
CONTINUED CONTACTS AND FORMAL AGREEMENT, 1955-1958
D esp ite  th e  fa ilu re  a t G eneva, th e  individual c o n ta c ts  begun before th e  
sum m it continued on an increasing  but sporadic basis for th e  follow ing tw o years, 
cu lm inating  in a fo rm al exchange ag reem en t in early  1958. As was the  case  prior 
to  th e  conference , Moscow and p riv a te  A m erican  c itizen s  took th e  in itia tiv e  in 
arranging  personal exchanges and human c o n tac ts , w hile o ffic ia l A m erica 
rem ained  re tic e n t .  W ashington’s goal rem ained  th a t  of in jec tin g  ’’ideas and 
in fo rm ation” in to  th e  USSR, not exchanging individuals and delegations on a 
rec ip ro cal basis. Indeed, a S ta te  D epartm en t proposal to  exchange rad io  and 
te lev ision  b roadcasts  becam e the  im m ediate  ca ta ly s t fo r th e  1958 ag reem en t, bu t 
th a t p ac t, ironcia lly  enough, gave th e  U nited S ta te s  l i t t le  th a t it sought while 
g ran ting  to  th e  Soviet Union much of th a t which i t  had long been pursuing.
The c o n ta c ts  begun before G eneva continued even w hile th e  diplom ats 
debated  a t  th e  co n ference . D elegations o f Soviet housing specia lis ts , newsm en, 
and engineers tou red  the  leng th  and b read th  of th e  U nited  S ta te s  during th e  la t te r  
half of 1955, and th e  following y ear Soviet v isito rs a tte n d e d  conferences, studied 
sc ien tific  advances, exam ined food p repara tion  p ra c tic e s  and conferred  w ith
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A m erican  church  leaders . By S ep tem ber som e one hundred Soviet v isitors, all 
trav e lin g  as "o ffic ia l"  d e leg a tes  to  obv ia te  th e  fingerprin ting  requ irem en t o f the  
1952 im m igra tion  a c t ,  had arrived  in th e  U nited  S ta te s .^
M ost of th e  v is ito rs  drew scan t no tice , bu t th re e  in terna tionally  known 
m usicians drew  w idespread a tte n tio n  and c r it ic a l acc la im . P ian ist Emil G il els, 
violinist D avid O istrakh  and ce llis t M tsislav R ostropovich , appearing  in th e  w inter 
of 1955 and th e  spring  of 1956, proved enorm ously successfu l w ith a t le a s t a 
c e r ta in  segm en t of th e  A m erican public. C ap ac ity  audiences applauded th e ir  
p erfo rm ances, c r it ic s  p ra ised  th e ir ta le n ts  and m usic com panies vied for th e  rig h t 
to  reco rd  th e ir  rend itions. The sam e M usical A m erica th a t  had only m onths 
ea rlie r  c r it ic iz e d  th e  d irec tion  of Soviet cu ltu re  nea tly  cap tu red  the  com m ents of 
a  num ber of pub lications regard ing  th e  v isits , and in so doing unw itting ly  
illum inated  th e  deg ree  of es tran g em en t be tw een  th e  A m erican  and Soviet people. 
N oting th e  "g rea t an tic ip a to ry  ex c item en t"  caused  by th e ir  com ing, th e  "sensa­
tional c h a ra c te r  of th e ir  recep tion" and the universal adm iration  of th e  men as 
a r tis ts ,  th e  m agazine saw a deeper sign ificance in th e  m a tte r . Though i t  was 
unlikely any lis te n e r  le f t  th e  con ce rts  co n v erted  to  com munism, i t  reasoned, 
audiences did leave aw are  th a t  th e  Soviets loved and supported g rea t music, and 
th a t  fa c t both  re-hum anized  them  and m ade A m ericans aw are th a t  th ey  were 
"just people like us."^
D uring la te  1955 and most of 1956, som e tw en ty  five  hundred 
A m ericans re tu rn e d  th e  Soviet visits.^  W riters, educa to rs , religious leaders, 
e n te r ta in e rs , sc ie n tis ts  and to u ris ts  trav e led  to  various lo ca tions throughout th e  
USSR, and so  m any C ongressm en m ade th e  tr ip  th a t  T im e com plained th a t  
Moscow had becom e C ongress’s fav o rite  vacation ing  spot.^  The d irec t flow of
304
books, period icals and new spapers betw een A m erican  and Soviet in stitu tions
likew ise in creased  as a re su lt of an ag reem en t n eg o tia te d  by H arvard  professor
M artin  M alia on behalf o f the L ibrary  of C ongress and a  num ber of m ajor
u n iversities . If th e  Soviets w ere unwilling to  deal w ith  Simmons in 1947, they
proved ag reeab le  to  sim ilar suggestions in 1955.®
As was tru e  in th e  reverse  in stance, th e  m ost visible A m ericans in th e
USSR w ere m usicians and s tag e  perform ers. In la te  1955 th e  Everym an O pera
Com pany's p roduction  of "Porgy and Bess," playing to  wildly en thusiastic  crowds
in Leningrad and Moscow, becam e A m erica 's  f irs t th e a tr ic a l production in th e  
7Soviet Union. T he Soviets, as L ife noted, lionized th e  play 's c a s t bo th  on and o ff 
stag e , and Moscow, d esp ite  S ta te  D epartm en t fea rs , re fra in ed  from  using th e  play
Q
to  propagandize th e  p light o f A m erica 's blacks. In May, Isaac  S tern  rece ived  th e  
sam e kind o f w elcom e during th e  tour of six Soviet c itie s , and opera s ta r Jan
Û
P eerce  follow ed w ith sim ilar success. The Boston Symphony O rchestra 's  
Sep tem ber v isit was th e  crow ning appearance. Like th e  o thers, th e  Boston 
o rch es tra , which had been try ing  to  go to  th e  Soviet Union for over a y ear, 
rece ived  rav e  rev iew s fo r its  perfo rm ances and ap p rec ia tiv e  words for its  
presence.^®
P resid en t E isenhow er continued to  provide verbal support to  th e  
increasing  c o n ta c ts . The long im penetrab le  iron c u rta in  which had p reven ted  us 
from  sharing  th e  a r t  and sports  of th e  com m unist coun tries , he to ld  a 1956 Cow 
P a lace  audience w hile accep tin g  his p a rty 's  p res id en tia l nom ination, was showing 
signs of giving way to  a  friend ly  in tercourse; to  an  in te rch an g e  of ideas, books, 
m agazines, s tu d en ts , a r t is ts ,  rad io  program s, te ch n ica l ex p erts , religious leaders 
and governm en tal o ffic ia ls . We m ust, he urged, t ry  " to  bridge th e  g re a t chasm
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th a t  sep a ra te s  us from  the  peoples under com m unist ru le ...,” for the  a lte rn a tiv e
was "m ore m isunderstanding  and an ever deepening division in th e  w orld.”^^
T hree w eeks la te r  the  P residen t r e ite ra te d  the  m essage in phrases
w orthy of quoting fo r the  m anner in which th ey  cap tu red  som e of th e  m ore w orthy
reasons for o ffic ia lly  sponsored in te rn a tio n a l cu ltu ra l endeavors. We must,
Eisenhower com m ented  a t  a S ep tem ber P eop le -to -P eop le  C onference, "widen
every  possible chink in th e  Iron C urta in  and bring  th e  fam ily  of Russia, or of any
o th e r country  behind th a t  Iron C urta in ...c lo ser in to  our circ le ,
to  show them  how we do it, and then to  s i t  down betw een us to  say, 
'Now, how do we im prove th e  lo t o f bo th  of us?
In th is  way, I believe, is the  tru e s t p a th  to  peace. All of th e  o ther 
things a re  m e re  pa llia tives or th ey  a re  holding th e  line while construc­
tiv e  fo rces of th is  kind tak e  e ffe c t.
Every bom b we can  m anufacture , every  plane, every  ship, every  
gun, in th e  long run has no purpose o th e r than  negative: to  give us tim e  
to  p reven t th e  o ther fellow from s ta r t in g  a  war, since we know we 
w on't.
The rec ip ro ca l appearances of A m erican  and Soviet perfo rm ers, the
growing A m erican to u ris t tra f f ic  to  th e  Soviet Union and Eisenhower's expressed
in te re s t all seem ed to  portend  a  frien d lie r e ra  in  th e  realm  of cu ltu ra l re la tions,
prom ising re lie f  in a t  le a s t one a re a  from  th e  te rr ib le  tensions pervading o the r
aspects  of A m erican-S oviet re la tions. Increasing  num bers in th e  U nited  S ta te s
seem ed in te re s te d  in prom oting such co n tac ts , and  Moscow appeared  willing to
accom odate  th a t in te re s t.
The prom ise was p rem atu re . In th e  fa ll of 1956 H ungarian nationalists
rebelled  again st Soviet dom ination, Moscow rep lied  with tanks and troops, and th e
hopes for expanded co n ta c ts  m om entarily  vanished. The S ta te  D epartm ent
cancelled  its  e f fo r ts  tow ard  o ffic ia l co n ta c ts  through rec ip roca l exchanges of
13inform ation , and discouraged co n tac ts  by p riv a te  c itizens. For th e  following
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sev era l m onths, cu ltu ra l co n tac ts  betw een  th e  tw o nations w ere p rac tica lly  non­
ex is ten t.
If Moscow’s actions in H ungary dim inished the chances for co n tac ts  in 
la te  1956 and ea rly  1957, its  a t titu d e  and ac tions in la rg e  p a rt accoun ted  for the 
burgeoning cu ltu ra l in te rac tio n  betw een G eneva and the H ungarian eruption . For 
Moscow continued  to  tak e  th e  lead  in th e  m a tte r  of individual co n tac ts , 
expressing  both  through word and deed a  desire for more in tim a te  cu ltu ra l 
re la tio n s  w ith both th e  A m erican people and those  of o ther w estern  nations.
Even as the  form al conversations continued a t  Geneva, A m erican 
en trep en eu rs  n eg o tia te d  in Moscow for th e  righ t to  p resen t G il els, O istrakh  and 
R ostropovich in th e  U nited S ta te s , and only th e  A m erican fingerp rin ting  req u ire­
m ent p rev en ted  th e  appearance of th e  one hundred m em ber M oiseyev D ance 
Ensem ble, signed by Sol Hurok to  appear in th e  fa ll of 1 9 5 6 . At  th e  sam e tim e 
th e  Soviets inv ited  th e  Philadelphia Symphony O rchestra  to  appear in th e ir  
country , and verbally  signalled a willingness to  arrange o ther fo rm s of co n ta c ts  as 
w ell.^^ In la te  1955 Moscow ind icated  th a t  i t  favored a week long film festiva l, 
fea tu rin g  th e  exchange of film s and film  s ta rs , and in August of th e  follow ing year 
D eputy  M inister o f C u ltu re  V ladim ir Surin, in Hollywood to  exam ine th e  
possib ility  of film  purchases and exchanges, s ta te d  th a t his country  was willing to
1 C
consider any  A m erican  p ro jec ts  for expanding exchanges on a rec ip ro ca l basis.
In A pril th e  C ounselor of th e  Soviet Em bassy in W ashington to ld  a Colum bia 
U niversity  audience th a t  his country  considered  th e  tim e  ap p ro p ria te  for all types 
o f exchanges, and ano ther Em bassy s ta f f  m em ber, re fe rrin g  to  th e  en thusiastic  
recep tio n  given "Porgy and Bess," w ro te  th a t  his country  hoped such exchanges
307
17would be broadened  in th e  fu tu re . F rench  Foreign M inister C hristian  Pineau,
ju s t re tu rn e d  from  nego tia tin g  in Moscow, to ld  an  A m erican  audience much th e
sam e thing. Though not w illing to  make concessions on major in te rn a tio n a l issues,
he rem arked , th e  Soviets w ere willing to  ra ise  th e  iron cu rta in  to  escape the ir
cu ltu ra l iso la tion , and i t  would be m alad ro it of th e  U nited S ta te s  to  try  to 
18m ain tain  i t .  Even V ice-P residen t Nixon acknow ledged Moscow's readiness to
allow m ore in tim a te  in te rac tio n  w ith th e  U nited  S ta te s . "Today," he com m ented
19in June, 1956, "we can  have such co n tac ts  for th e  asking."
In January , 1956, th e  K rem lin provided even more co n cre te  evidence of
its  desire fo r increased  connections by proposing a tw en ty  year t r e a ty  of
friendship  and cooperation , th e  h ea rt of which la y  in th e  a rea  of sc ien tif ic  and 
20a r t is t ic  co n tac ts . R ecalling  E isenhow er's G eneva s ta te m e n t regard ing  th e  
h is to rica l friendship  betw een th e  tw o countries, po in ting  out past exam ples of 
th e ir  coopera tion  and expressing re g re t over th e  d e te rio ra tio n  of th e ir  re la tio n ­
ship, Bulganin personally  appealed to th e  P residen t to  approve the  tre a ty . "I am 
sure," he w ro te , " th a t you, like m yself, a re  convinced th a t  th e  social d iffe rences 
o f the  U nited  S ta te s  and the  USSR should no t p rev en t our coun tries  from
m aintain ing  th e  po litica l, econom ic and cu ltu ra l re la tio n s  in which our people a re  
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in te res ted ."
S kep tica l A m ericans, rem em bering  th e  d iscrepency  betw een Soviet 
words and deeds in th e  la te  fo rtie s , w ere ju stified  in tre a tin g  th e  Soviet 
suggestions and o v ertu res  warily, but a  num ber of considerations ca lled  for 
exam ining th e ir  s in cerity . In th e  post-S ta lin  years  th e  Soviets w ere increasingly  
opening th e ir  coun try  to  a t  le a s t c e rta in  kinds of c o n tac ts , and th a t openness was 
becom ing even m ore m arked as Moscow ca rried  on ever-w idening  co n tac ts  with
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England, F rance , Belgium , Jap an  and num erous o the r coun tries  during th e  months 
22follow ing G eneva. Had W ashington really  w anted  broadened individually con­
ta c ts ,  i t  could have a t  le a s t pursued the  possib ilities ra ised  in th e  Soviet o ffers 
and in tim ations, and could have tak en  a  minimum m easure of in itia tiv e  itse lf .
But W ashington was l i t t le  in te re s ted  in  increasing  form al exchanges
betw een  individuals and delegations. Though i t  co o p era ted  in perm ittin g  sm all
sca le  personal c o n ta c ts  arranged  betw een Moscow and individual A m ericans, it  did
nothing to  p rom ote  them , and ac tiv e ly  discouraged  exchanges involving la rg e
num bers. Anyone looking to  W ashington to  ta k e  th e  lead  in opening th e  iron
cu rta in  to  hum an tra f f ic  could only be disappointed.
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  D ulles le f t  l i t t le  doubt as to  his lack  of enthusiasm
for personal exchanges. When queried  as to  his opinion of th e  1955 ag ricu ltu ra l
exchange, fo r exam ple, th e  S ec re ta ry  rep lied  th a t  th e  rec ip rocal v isits w ere, on
th e  w hole, "probably" desirab le , bu t expressed rese rv a tio n s  about many asp ec ts  of
23th e  m a tte r , p a rtic u la rly  th e  em otionalism  surrounding it .  Nor did his com m ents
im m ediate ly  p rior to  Isaac  S te rn ’s Soviet to u r c o n s titu te  a  ringing endorsem ent.
While exchanges of "genuine" a r tis ts  was probably  a good thing, he rem arked , " if
24th e  a r tis ts  a re  spies in disguise th a t’s an o th e r m a tte r ."  M oreover, Dulles 
cau tioned , A m erican  had to  be ca re fu l le s t its  exam ple have an adverse e f fe c t on 
sm aller nations, fo r while th e  U nited S ta te s  could w ithstand  w hatever harm ful 
consequences m ight accom pany cu ltu ra l exchanges, w eaker coun tries following
O C
our lead  m ight be su scep tib le  to  subversion.
W ashington rev ea led  its  re lu c tan ce  in a num ber o f ways. Im m ediately  
a f te r  G eneva th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t cancelled  th e  scheduled  a rr iv a l of a  second
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te n  man S oviet a g ric u ltu ra l delegation, ap p aren tly  u n c e rta in  as to  its  own policy,
a fra id  th a t  th e  Soviets would gain m ore th an  they  gave, and picqued a t  th e  Soviet
a t t i tu d e  a t  G eneva. The delay in fu ria ted  th e  low ans who invited  the Soviets; the
D ep artm en t, they  cla im ed , was less than  candid in its  rem arks re la tin g  to  the  
26m a tte r . L ikew ise th e  D epartm en t frow ned on th e  suggested  exchange of th e  
Bolshoi B alle t for an  A m erican  symphony o rch es tra , and th rew  su ffic ien t cold
w a te r on th e  planned v isit of a Soviet tra c k  and fie ld  team , as diplom at C h este r
27Bowles expressed  i t ,  to  cause its  cancella tion . Even Dr. Paul D udley W hite,
E isenhow er's own h e a r t spec ia lis t, found l i t t l e  encou ragem en t for a planned trip
to  Moscow a t  th e  in v ita tio n  of th e  Soviet M inistry  o f H ealth . While th e
D epartm en t would no t p reven t his going. W hite w ro te  in an  appeal for aid to
p residen tia l a s s is ta n t Sherm an Adams, he would p re fe r  making the  trip  w ith its
28blessings and approval.
D ep artm en t o ffic ia ls  were even more re lu c ta n t to  encourage or assist
th e  ap pea rance  of la rg e  A m erican groups in th e  Sov iet Union. Upon receiv ing
inv ita tions to  perform  in th e  USSR, bo th  the  m anagers of "Porgy and Bess" and
th e  Philadelphia Symphony O rchestra  approached  W ashington for assistance  from
funds designated  fo r  overseas cu ltural ap p earances and both, desp ite  having been
subsidized on e a rlie r  occasions, w ere tu rn ed  down. Such appearances in th e  Soviet
Union, D ep artm en t o ffic ia ls  reported ly  to ld  th e  "Porgy and Bess" m anagers, would
29be p o litica lly  inap t a t  th e  tim e. C onsequently  th e  Philadelphia Symphony never 
m ade th e  1956 tr ip , and th e  Soviets them selves reap ed  a  la rge  p a r t of the  
propaganda benefit in heren t in th e  Porgy perfo rm an ces by providing th e  financial
o n
g u aran tees  req u is ite  to  th e  venture.
One reason  for th e  re luc tan ce  to  assist such groups becam e evident in 
th e  a t te m p ts  by th e  Boston Symphony O rch es tra  to  tra v e l to  Moscow. D espite
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diligent e ffo rts  since the  sum m er of 1955 by both  th e  o rch estra 's  m anagers and by 
p residen tia l aide C. D. Jackson , a tru s te e  of th e  o rch estra , th e  Boston m usicians 
had m ade l i t t le  progress by th e  spring of 1956. In early  M arch, Jackson explained 
th e  lack  of success to  H enry C abot, p residen t of th e  o rch estra 's  board of tru stees. 
"I had an unoffic ia l v is it from USIA on the  sub ject o f th e  Russian trip ,"  Jackson 
w rote.
and find th a t th e  basis for the  S ta te  D ep artm en t's  foot-dragging is rea lly  
qu ite  p ra c tic a l. They a re  really  te rr if ie d  th a t  if  a U.S. cu ltu ra l 
o rgan ization  num bering a  lo t of people, like a  symphony o rchestra , w ere 
to  be allow ed to  perform  in Russia, the  im m ed ia te  coun ter would be a 
request for a sim ilarly  la rge  num ber of R ussian  a r tis ts  to  come here. 
Then th e  com plica tions would im m ed ia te ly  begin—fingerprin ting, 
M cC arran A c t, supervision, e tc . So long as th e  exchange is lim ited  to 
one man a ffa irs  lik e  G il els and O istrakh th^y  fee l they  can  handle it, bu t 
they  dread the  p rospect of la rge  numbers.
If less th a n  en thusiastic  about la rg e  scale  personal exchanges,
Washington rem ained  ready  to  rec ip ro ca te  "ideas and inform ation" with the  Soviet
Union. The A m erican  a t t i tu d e  tow ard c o n ta c ts  w ith th e  Soviets rem ained  the
sam e as a t  G eneva, P residen t Eisenhower to ld  a  May, 1956, press conference, and
in la te  June th e  P resid en t proclaim ed th a t  policy m ore o ffic ially . In keeping with
a N ational S ecu rity  Council recom m endation regard ing  th e  m a tte r, an official
press re lease  s ta te d  on th e  tw en ty -n in th , i t  was th e  policy of th e  U nited S ta tes  to
seek exchanges w ith  the  Soviets "along th e  lines of th e  seven teen  point program"
32put forw ard  by th e  w estern  powers a t Geneva. A ccording to  colum nist A rthur 
Krock, during 1956 th e  S ta te  D epartm en t p a rticu la rly  pursued points eight, nine 
and ten , dealing w ith  rad io  and te levision exchanges, and according to  S ecre tary  
of S ta te  Dulles, th a t  pursu it extended in to  1957 as well. Throughout the  
eighteen  m onths follow ing Geneva, Dulles s ta te d  in  June, 1957, th e  U nited S ta tes
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had pressed the  Soviets "off and on, w ith consistency ," for rec ip roca l rights to 
discuss con tem porary  concerns through regu larly  scheduled b roadcasts and te le -  
casts.^"^ Exchanging ideas and inform ation , not people, rem ained  the principal 
concern  of W ashington's policy.
The S ta te  D epartm en t took one s tep  in th a t  d irec tion  even while th e  
n ego tia tio n s  w ere proceeding a t  Geneva. In S ep tem ber, 1955, Washington 
approached th e  Soviets w ith  a proposal to  resum e th e  d istribu tion  of an uncen­
sored  A m erika , and o ffered  sim ilar righ ts for a Soviet m agazine in th e  United
S ta te s . The K rem lin consented, and according to  a  subsequent agreem ent each
35nation  rece iv ed  the  righ t to  c ircu la te  fifty  thousand copies per issue. The firs t 
copies of th e  re juv ina ted  A m erika, appearing in July , 1956, fea tu red  a tw o page 
spread displaying D e tro it 's  new est models in fu ll color, undoubtedly accom plishing
qe
th e reb y  a le a s t  a p a r t of th e  purpose of supplying "ideas" to  th e  Soviet public.
The Soviet m agazine U.S.S.R. coun tered  with Moscow's la te s t  passenger plane, but
since few people dream  of owning a  four m otored  fly ing m achine, A m erika
37undoubtedly took  th e  firs t round in the  new com petition .
In th e  fa ll of 1956 W ashington provided th e  Soviets in form ation  through
a d iffe ren t m eans. In Septem ber th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t inv ited  Moscow to  send
e lec tio n  observers to  w itness th e  quadrennial process of picking a  p resident and
38th e  Soviets prom ptly  accep ted . In la te  O ctober th re e  d e legates  a rriv ed  for th a t
purpose, but som e g ree ted  even th is type ac tiv ity  w ith skepticism . The "E lection
39observers, "The Saturday  Evening Post suggested , w ere rea lly  spies in disguise.
W ashington was less successful in its  e ffo r ts  to  convey inform ation via 
th e  air w aves. D esp ite  A m erican indignation and p ro tes ts , Moscow continued 
jam m ing th e  Voice of A m erica and the  lib e ra tio n  sta tions, and refused  reciprocal
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exchanges of b roadcasts. Given W ashington's rep ea ted  pronouncem ents regarding 
its  aim s, th e  Soviet a ttitu d e  was not a lto g e th e r  illogical. For one of A m erica's 
p rincipal goals v is-a-v is th e  USSR, D ulles m ade c lear, was to  refo rm  the  Soviet 
s ta te ;  to , as he explained it ,  make it a norm al ra th e r  than  an abnorm al m em ber of 
th e  soc ie ty  of nations.
D ulles explained his th inking on a  num ber of occasions during th e  post- 
G eneva m onths. While Moscow had m ade m any changes in its  fo reign  policy a f te r  
S ta lin 's  death , his line of reasoning began, th o se  changes had not been voluntary 
nor had they  a lte re d  its  u ltim a te  goal of w orld conquest. R a th e r, th e  determ ined  
fre e  world re s is tan c e  to  com m unist expansion had fo rced  the  K rem lin to  e ith e r 
abandon its  aim s or a lte r  its  m ethods, and i t  had op ted  for th e  la t te r .  Thus the  
new  look in foreign  policy.
But th e  new friendliness and accom m odation in in te rn a tio n a l a ffa irs , 
D ulles' reasoning continued, necessarily  requ ired  a re laxation  of th e  rig id ity  and 
co n tro ls  w ithin th e  USSR, and th a t fac t provided possib ilities. As th e  Soviet 
people experienced  a sligh t ta s te  of personal freedom  they  w ere sure to  dem and 
m ore, and th a t  dem and could fo rce  sign ifican t changes in th e  Moscow regim e. 
Thus when Soviet policy began to  sh ift in th e  spring of 1955, D ulles to ld  a  
Ph iladelph ia  audience in F ebruary , 1956, "we determ ined  to  do all th a t  we safely  
could to  m ake th a t  change a first in s ta llm en t tow ard  a Russian s ta te  th a t  would 
be a  norm al, no t an abnorm al, m em ber of th e  socie ty  of nations." One m ajor s tep  
was " to  join w ith B rita in  and F rance to  inv ite  th e  Russian ru lers to  a C onference 
of th e  H eads of Government."^® And th e  success of th a t  conference , Dulles 
reca lled  having rem arked , depended in la rg e  p a r t upon w hether or no t "it s e t  up 
w ithin th e  Soviet Union fo rces th a t m ight becom e irrev e rsib le ."^ ^
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In F eb ru ary  D ulles was not convinced th a t th e  irreversib le  tren d  had
begun, b u t by May K hrushchev's rev e la tio n s  concern ing  S talin  m ade him m ore
positive . The even ts  inside the  USSR, he s ta te d  a t  a May f if te e n th  news
co n fe ren ce , w ere  a b a ro m e te r m easuring th e  dem and for increased  personal
freedom , secu rity , goods and a  governm ent "m ore responsive to  th e  basic w ishes
of th e  S ov iet people." And th a t  dem and, he reasoned, m ust be s trong  and deep,
fo r to  destro y  S talin  and som e of th e  sacred  creeds of com munism was a
dangerous thing; once such fo rces w ere le t loose, they  w ere d ifficu lt to  con tro l.
If  th o se  fo rces  continued  to  g a th e r m om entum , "we can, I th ink , reasonab ly
hope ...w ith in  a  decade or perhaps a genera tio n , th a t  we will have w hat is th e
g re a t goal of our policy, th a t  is, a R ussia th a t  is governed by people who are
responsib le to  th e  w ishes of th e  Russian peop le ...and  who conform  to  th e
42princip les o f c iv ilized  nations."
By th e  following sum m er D ulles was even more convinced th a t  th e  
irrev e rs ib le  tren d  had s e t in. The strugg le  be tw een  "m odernists" and "funda­
m en ta lis ts ,"  he s ta te d  in re fe ren ce  to  th e  K hrushchev shake-up in th e  K rem lin, 
again  proved how strong  w ere th e  fo rces fo r change and  how d ifficu lt i t  m ust be 
for th e  Soviet ru le rs  to  sim ultaneously  cope w ith  tho se  fo rces and m ain tain  th e ir  
ab so lu te  pow er. And, he rem arked  s ign ifican tly , "I th ink  we have done qu ite  a  b it 
to  p rom ote  th is trend ."  The "big beginning," he a sse rted , was m ade a t  G eneva and 
a fte rw ard , w hen th e  S ta te  D epartm en t sen t ou t a c ircu la r le t te r  "explaining th a t  
con ference  and ind icating  we fe lt  th e re  was such an irreversib le  trend  which had 
begun and suggested  various ways we m ight p rom ote  it."^^  Though Dulles did not 
spec ifica lly  link th e  in jec tion  of " ideas and in form ation" in to  th e  USSR as a p a r t 
of th e  e f fo r t  to  p rom ote  the  tren d , th e  idea was im plic it in many of his
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com m ents. As th e  S ov iet people becam e b e t te r  ed u ca ted , he rem arked , for 
exam ple, " th e ir  minds becom e inquiring. They g e t, som etim es through under­
ground channels, l i te ra tu re  which is o therw ise o ffic ia lly  denied to  them , and there  
a re  qu ite  a  few  p rocesses going on which we believe A m ericans can, to  som e 
ex ten t, help."^'^
A ssistan t S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  for Policy P lanning R o b ert R. Bowie made 
exp lic it w hat Dulles im plied . S ince th e  U nited S ta te s  m ust "as a final objective" 
do w hat it  could to  fo s te r  th e  evolution of com m unist s ta te s  tow ard  more libera l 
p a tte rn s , th e  D ep artm en t o ff ic ia l w ro te , its  f irs t aim m ust be " to  try  to  c re a te  a 
s e t of conditions to  which th e  Soviet Union will have to  ad just its  conduct." And 
one m odest m eans to w ard  th a t  goal was exchanging in form ation , for such 
exchanges a c ted  to "open up th e  com m unist world to  ideas and influences from 
abroad and to  s tren g th en  th e  fo rces fo r change within.'^^
Moscow, of course, had its  own goals in p rom oting  co n tac ts , and it 
could be argued  th a t  W ashington was only rep ly ing  in kind. But in pursuing its  
la rg e r ends, Moscow a t le a s t had th e  sagacity  to  em phasize th e  m utual b en efits  of 
cu ltu ra l in te rac tio n  and to  re fra in  from  announcing th a t  i t s  purpose was to  drive a 
wedge betw een W ashington and th e  A m erican people. The Soviets were well
aw are  of th e  A m erican s ta te m e n ts , and resen ted  them . It was not particu la rly
a s tu te , to  say  th e  le a s t , to  te ll the  Soviet lead ers  th a t  we desired  to exchange 
ideas and in form ation  w ith them  in order to  encourage th e  Soviet people to  rise  
against th e ir  leadersh ip .
In one re sp e c t D ulles was co rrec t. M oscow's re lax ed  a ttitu d e  did 
encourage dissent and rebellion , bu t th e  ou tw ard  expression  cam e not in th e  
USSR, but in Hungary. Moscow replied  with fo rce , dashing any im m ediate  hopes
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for increased  A m erican-S oviet cu ltu ra l in terac tion . From th e  fa ll of 1956 to the 
sum m er of 1957, cu ltu ra l a c tiv ity  betw een  th e  tw o nations becam e v irtually  non­
ex isten t.
The c o n ta c ts  so precip itously  te rm inated  by th e  H ungarian crisis
resum ed during th e  sum m er of 1957. In June a Soviet delegation  traveling  on
o ffic ia l visas a tten d ed  O klahom a's f if t ie th  anniversary  ce leb ra tion , and in Moscow
Sol Hurok co n tra c te d  for a num ber o f Soviet a r tis ts  to  appear in A m erican 
47c itie s . In add ition  to  G il els and O istrakh, Hurok signed violinist Leonid Kogan,
com poser Aram  K hachetu i’ian, ballerina G alina Ulanova, and, fo r its  firs t
A m erican appearance, th e  Bolshoi B allet. The M oiseyev D ance Ensem ble,
p reven ted  from  m aking its  scheduled appearance th e  previous fa ll by th e  Soviet
a t t i tu d e  tow ard  fingerprin ting , again agreed to  com e. While an tic ip a tin g  no
fingerprin ting  problem s in bringing solo perfo rm ers and sm all groups, Hurok
arranged  the  c o n tra c ts  to  span a tw o year period, a n tic ip a tin g  th a t Congress
would shortly  am end th e  troublesom e clause to  perm it en try  to  la rg e r ensem bles 
48as well. Soviet w illingness to  arrange  favorable financial and transpo rta tion
arran g em en ts , the  im presario  rep o rted  of his experience in th e  Soviet cap ita l,
ind icated  th a t  Moscow was m ore eager than  ever to  engage in la rg e  scale 
49co n tac ts .
As th e  individual co n ta c ts  slowly resum ed, CBS te lev ision  sent a crew 
to  Moscow to  ta p e  an in terv iew  w ith  Soviet P arty  boss N ik ita Khrushchev. On the 
second of June  an e s tim a ted  five million A m ericans w atched the  Soviet leader on 
a "F ace th e  N ation" appearance th a t  was to  have im portan t consequences for the 
developm ent of A m erican-Soviet co n tac ts .
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The in terv iew  touched on a num ber of topics, but when asked w hat he 
considered  to  be th e  "m ost pressing points th a t  m ust be solved betw een the  tw o 
coun tries ,"  Khrushchev rep lied  th a t th e  "m ain  thing" was to  norm alize re la tions 
through e lim inating  tra d e  barrie rs  and increasing  th e  level of cu ltu ra l exchanges. 
"There must be," he responded, "m ore co n ta c ts  betw een our peoples, betw een 
businessm en. T hat is th e  main thing." But, he contended, th e  U nited S ta te s  was 
p lacing  obstac les  in the  way of co n tac ts  and d iscrim inating  against his country  in 
th e  m a tte r  of trad e . "You m ust," he rem arked  in a s ta tem en t th a t  surely 
surprised  many of his lis ten ers , "do aw ay w ith your Iron C urta in ...."  As for his 
country 's  jam m ing of th e  Voice of A m erica, th e  Soviet leader rep lied  to  ano ther 
question, i t  was done only when th e  b roadcasts ceased to tru ly  be the  voice of the  
A m erican  people; when it  stopped playing p re tty  music and began to  "cu t on the  
ear."50
Four days a f te r  K hrushchev's appearance on A m erican television, 
Moscow sub m itted  a broad-scale  proposal calling  for m ore ex tensive cu ltu ra l 
exchanges betw een  the tw o  countries. Under its  te rm s, Soviet b a lle t groups, 
te ch n ica l delegations and sc ien tis ts  would tour th e  U nited S ta tes , while sim ilar 
A m erican groups would v isit Soviet c itie s  and insta lla tions. P articu la rly , th e  
Soviet no te  ind ica ted , it  would like th e  Philadelphia Symphony, w ith whom G il els 
had perfo rm ed  while in the  U nited S ta te s , to  appear in th e  Soviet Union.^^
The Soviet moves seem  to  have caught W ashington unprepared. 
E isenhow er in itia lly  dismissed K hrushchev's te le c a s t by rem ark ing  th a t  CBS was 
sim ply looking to  its  p ro fits , and Dulles responded th a t  w hile he favored 
exchanges along the  lines of the  seven teen  point G eneva proposal, he did not 
necessarily  approve of such co n tac ts  along th e  lines th a t  Moscow suggested.^^
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In th e  absence of e ith e r a positive adm in istra tion  response or co u n te r­
proposal to  th e  Soviet suggestions, Senate  M ajority  le ad er Lyndon B. Johnson 
responded w ith a suggestion of his own. Q uoting th e  Bible and Thom as Je ffe rso n , 
th e  T exas po litic ian  ca lled  for a new kind of cu rta in , an  "open cu rta in"  through 
which th e  tru th  would flow freely , and through which ideas would "c leanse  evil 
ju st as fresh  a ir c leanses the poisoned, s tag n an t mass of a long-closed cavern ." 
The U nited  S ta te s , Johnson to ld  a  U nited Jew ish  A ppeal audience in New York 
C ity , should tu rn  K hrushchev's appearance  back upon him by insisting th a t th e  
USSR provide rad io  and te levision fac ilitie s  through which A m erican  spokesm en 
could speak w eekly to  th e  Soviet people on m a tte rs  of con tem porary  concern. 
W ashington would of course be obligated to  rec ip ro ca te , but th a t posed no 
problem  to  a na tion  too wise to  succum b to  Soviet blandishm ents. "No dem agogue 
is going to lead  th e  lean  spare Texan who runs th e  c a t t le  on my ranch," 
p rocla im ed  th e  Jeffe rso n -lean in g  Johnson, "and N ikita K hrushchev is not going to  
convert him to  a C om m unist. H e's just plain go t too much sen se ....1 believe th a t 
m ost A m ericans a re  like th a t."  And if  A m ericans w ere too wise to  be fooled by 
propaganda, th e  Soviet people w ere equally a s tu te  when given th e  opportunity . 
"The Russian people," th e  sen a to r assured  his lis ten e rs  while citing  th e  B iblical 
maxim th a t  men shall know the  tru th  and i t  shall m ake them  fre e , "are  capable of 
rcognizing  th e  tru th  when it is o ffered  to  them ." The U nited  S ta te s  should not le t 
a single day go by w ithout raising  th e  issue of b roadcast exchanges, Johnson 
concluded; indeed, "should insist upon it every  tim e  a Russian rep resen ta tiv e  is 
w ithin earsho t."
C alling  Johnson's speech th e  most in te llig en t he had heard  in a long 
tim e, A rkansas S enato r J . William F ulbright in serted  it in to  th e  Congressional
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R eco rd , w hile num erous o thers id en tified  them selves w ith  i t  and quoted  local 
e d ito r ia ls  to  prove th e  popularity  of its  recep tio n . Though m ost of th e  sen a to rs  
and th e  ed ito ria l w rite rs  who praised Johnson’s suggestions saw  no possib ility  th a t  
Moscow would a g re e  to  them , they  deem ed it ju s t as well, fo r Soviet re fu sa l would 
m ean an A m erican  propaganda v ic tory .^^  But if by som e m irac le  th e  Soviets did 
a c c e p t th e  o v e rtu re  th e  re su lts  would be even  b e t te r ,  fo r, as th e  Waco N ew s- 
T ribune s ta te d  in an  ed ito ria l th a t expressed d irec tly  w hat o thers said  subtly , such 
an  exchange of opinion could be used "as a springboard to  pu t som e p ressu re  on 
th e  C om m ies."
Two weeks a f te r  Johnson's speech, W ashington form ally  proposed such 
an exchange. In o rder " to  prom ote a f re e r  exchange of in fo rm ation  and ideas on 
im p o rtan t w orld developm ents," a  te rse ly  worded th re e -se n te n c e  S ta te  D ep a rt­
m en t m essage to  th e  K rem lin read, th e  U nited S ta te s  "proposes th a t  th e  Soviet 
and U nited  S ta te s  G overnm ents reach  an ag reem en t in p rincip le  a t  an early  d a te  
fo r th e  reg u la r exchange of uncensored rad io  and te lev ision  b roadcasts."
T hree days la te r  Vice P residen t Nixon strong ly  a tta c k e d  th e  Soviet 
position  regard ing  cu ltu ra l co n tac ts , labeling  as "h y pocritica l double-talk" 
K hrushchev 's accusa tions th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  was blocking broadened 
exchanges and challenging  him to  support his words w ith deeds. To prove its  good 
fa ith , th e  v ice -p res id en t s ta te d  in a  speech  th a t  R um inated th e  continuing 
A m erican  concep t o f c u ltu ra l co n tac ts , Moscow should, in addition  to  accep ting  
th e  A m erican  proposal on b roadcast exchanges, s to p  jam m ing and censoring, 
rem ove all trav e l re s tr ic tio n s  w ithin th e  USSR, allow  Soviet c itizens to  free ly  
v is it th e  U nited  S ta te s , and p e rm it them  to  free ly  pu rchase  fo reign  publications, 
including A m erican  new spapers and m agazines. Taking those  s teps, Nixon
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a sse rted , would prove th a t  the  Soviets w ere sincere  in th e ir  expressed desire to
reduce tensions and p rom ote  b e tte r  understanding  betw een  th e  com m unist and
cap ita lis t w orlds, but refusing  would "p lace th e  responsib ility  on th e  Soviet
57lead ers  alone fo r blocking th e  road to  peace."
Moscow rep lied  to  W ashington’s o vertu re  in la te  July. It was willing to  
discuss th e  question  of rad io  and te lev ision  exchanges, Moscow s ta te d  a f te r  
re c itin g  its  own version of in itia tiv e  and re je c tio n  in th e  m a tte r  of co n tac ts , but 
only "in conjunction  w ith o the r problem s in th e  developm ent of broad tie s  betw een  
th e  Soviet and A m erican  peoples." P a rticu la rly , th e  n o te  m ade c lear, finger­
p rin ting  posed a problem  th a t  m ust be solved. But if  th e  U nited S ta te s  was ready  
to  discuss th e  developm ent of "co n tac ts  and tie s  in th e ir  en tire ty ,"  the  leng thy
C O
Soviet response said in essence, Moscow was likew ise p repared . D espite th e
fa c t  th a t th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t's  in itia l public response made it  appear th a t
Moscow had a c c e p te d  its  overtu re  w ithout re se rv a tio n s , th e  D epartm en t agreed  to
th e  Soviet conditions, thus se ttin g  the  s tag e  for th e  firs t form al b ila te ra l
59nego tia tions on A m erican-S oviet c m ta c ts .  But th e re  was l i t t le  chance for
6 0success as long as th e  fingerp rin ting  requ irem en t rem ained  law.
The req u irem en t to  which th e  Soviets so adam an tly  ob jected  had begun
draw ing increasing  A m erican  c ritic ism  as well. The W ashington S ta r , no ting  th a t
th e  U nited S ta te s  was tak ing  a  propaganda flogging over th e  m a tte r , urged its
repea l, as did a New sw eek com m en ta to r who observed th a t while the  Soviets had
61opened a door in th e  iron cu rta in , we had p laced  a bar across our side. And 
even P residen t E isenhow er, poin ting  out th a t  som e coun tries  viewed the procedure 
w ith disfavor and th a t i t  did not sign ifican tly  add to  e ith e r  our national sa fe ty  or 
secu rity , tw ice  urged C ongress to  am end th e  law  so as to  allow e ith e r the
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S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  or th e  A tto rney  G eneral to  w aive i t  in th e  case  of tem porary  
62visitors. But by m id-sum m er, 1957, Congress had fa iled  to  a c t on such an
C O
am endm ent subm itted  by Senator Dirksen of Illinois.
In ligh t o f th e  new developm ents and th e  pending b ila te ra l talks. New 
York S enator Jaco b  Ja v its , who had already  been pushing fo r increased  A m erican- 
Soviet co n tac ts , in troduced  in early  August both a biU to  am end the im m igration 
law and a co n cu rren t reso lu tion  urging th a t th e  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  begin 
exchanging persons w ith th e  Soviet Union under th e  auspices of th e  Inform ation 
and E ducational Exchange A ct of 1948.®^ E arly  th e  follow ing m onth Congress 
finally am ended th e  im m igra tion  law, and on O ctober te n th  th e  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  
and th e  A tto rney  G eneral, ac ting  under th e  au th o rity  conferred  upon them  by 
C ongress's actions, au thorized  th e  waiving of th e  fingerp rin ting  requ irem ent in 
th e  case  of m ost non-im m igrant aliens who planned to s ta y  in th e  country  less 
than  a year.®^ T hat au th o riza tio n  provided a t le a s t th e  possibility  of success in 
th e  nego tia tions which began in W ashington tw o weeks la te r .
The opening speeches a t  th e  conference le f t  no doubt as to  th e  positions 
and p rio ritie s  of th e  tw o sides. N either had forsaken  its  Geneva proposals nor 
a lte red  th e  ob ject of i ts  aim s. The U nited S ta te s  s till w anted  to  exchange ideas 
and in fo rm ation  and the Soviets, desp ite  reduced em phasis on th e  im portance of 
trad e  and a  m arked willingness to  engage in in te lle c tu a l and a r tis tic  exchanges, 
s till p laced  a prem ium  on co n ta c ts  in industry, sc ience and technology.
A ssistan t S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  for East-W est A ffa irs  William S. B. Lacy, 
leader of th e  A m erican  delegation , quickly got to  th e  poin t in a  ra th e r  brusque 
and accu sa to ry  address. His country , he s ta te d  in no u n certa in  te rm s, s till
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considered the exchange of ideas and inform ation  to  be th e  "necessary  ingredient" 
to  b e t te r  understanding  and reduced tensions: progress tow ard  rem oving obstruc­
tions to  such exchanges, he em phasized while quoting  Dulles' G eneva rem arks and 
citing  exam ples o f Soviet in transigence since th e  sum m it, was an im portan t 
A m erican ob jec tive  in th e  negotiations. Even in those  instances in which the  
Soviets had been som ew hat cooperative, such as allowing th e  distribution of 
A m erika and changing th e  ruble ra te  to  encourage tourism , Lacy com plained, the 
resu lts  had been less than  sa tisfac to ry , for the  c ircu la tion  arrangem ents  for the  
m agazine w ere inadequate  and foreign v isitors to  th e  USSR were s till re s tr ic te d  
as to  w here they  could trav e l.
If th e  A m erican  delegation had any sp ec ific  aim s or proposals o ther 
than  those in th e  a re a  of radio and te lev ision  b roadcasts, th ey  did not appear in 
Lacy's rem arks. Soviet Am bassador Zaroubin on th e  o ther hand cam e prepared 
with both a  d iffe re n t approach and a sw eeping a rray  of specific suggestions. 
Em phasizing th e  a rea s  of ag reem en t and accord  since  th e  sum m it in a diplom atic 
and concilia to ry  address, th e  Soviet spokesm an dw elt on th e  im portance which his 
country  assigned th e  talks as a s tep  tow ard  norm alizing  Soviet-A m erican co n tac ts  
and reducing in te rn a tio n a l tensions. One could surm ise of course th a t Zaroubin's 
in g ra tia tin g  s ty le  m asked self-serv ing  goals, bu t tak en  a t  face  value his approach 
placed th e  Soviet delegation  in a  positive position while m aking Lacy's com m ents 
sound negative  and carping.
The wide ranging Soviet proposals dw elt f irs t on exchanges in th e  fields 
of industry , engineering and technology. Specifically , Zaroubin s ta ted , Moscow 
desired exchanges in such fields as m etallurgy , mining, chem istry , radio, 
e lec tron ics, p lastics , au tom obile m anufacturing  and various types of construction .
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including bridge and industrial design. In ag ricu ltu re , his country  wanted 
exchanges in anim al-husbandry, ho rticu ltu re , vegetab le  farm ing  and in other 
specified  areas. And, he continued, Moscow a ttach e d  "g re a t im portance" to 
estab lish ing  "close connections and cooperation  betw een Soviet and A m erican 
sc ien tis ts ,"  including those  whose ex p ertise  lay in th e  fie ld  of m edicine.
Zaroubin 's proposals w ent fa r beyond th e  tech n ica l and th e  p ractica l. 
F or the  a r tis tic a lly , a th le tic a lly  and scholarly  inclined, Zaroubin m entioned broad 
proposals fo r exchanging a r tis ts , perfo rm ers, w rite rs , com posers, ac to rs , singers, 
symphony o rch estra s, te ach e rs , professors, studen ts, a th le te s , social and women's 
o rgan izations, to u ris ts  and o th e rs . In th e  po litical realm  th e  Soviets favored 
exchanges betw een  m em bers of th e  USSR Suprem e Soviet and th e  U nited S ta tes  
Congress, fo r such an exchange, Zaroubin com m ented, "would co n trib u te  to  the  
estab lishm en t of useful co n ta c ts  betw een th ese  le g is la tiv e  bodies and prom ote 
v isits of th a t  kind in th e  fu tu re ."  As for exchanging rad io  and telev ision  
b roadcasts, Zaroubin approved th e  idea, bu t was care fu l to  specify  b roadcasts  in 
such fields as science, techn ique, sports, industry, ag ric u ltu re , music and the 
a r tis t ic  fie lds while om itting  m ention of po litica l topics. His country  was also 
prepared  to  discuss " th e  question  of concluding a convention on cu ltu ra l coopera­
tion," the  Soviet le ad e r s ta te d  in  conclusion, and would like  to  know th e  U nited
fi7S ta te s  position regard ing  th e  sam e.
The nego tia tions follow ing th e  in troductory  addresses, la sting  from
O ctober tw en ty -e ig h th  to  Jan u ary  tw en ty -seven th , covered  alm ost every
68im aginable a rea  of exchange. If, as Lacy la te r  claim ed, th e  Soviets arrived 
hostile  bu t underw ent a  palpable change and le f t  friend ly , th ey  had su ffic ien t 
reason fo r th e  reversa l, for alm ost all of Zaroubin 's suggestions as outlined in his
gq
in itia l rem arks w ere w ritten  in to  th e  final ag reem en t.
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As finally  fo rm ulated  the ag reem en t ca lled  for rec ip ro ca l v isits of
sc ien tis ts , in d u stria lis ts , ag ricu ltu ris ts , s tu d en ts  and  scholars; for rec ip ro ca l
p e rfo rm an ces by th e a tr ic a l,  a r t is t ic  and m usical groups; for a th le tic  com petitions;
fo r v is its  by c u ltu ra l, civic and youth groups, and  fo r exchanges of publications
and exhib its. B oth sides accep ted  the princip le of d ire c t a ir fligh ts  w ith sp ec ific
n ego tia tions to  follow , ag reed  to  prom ote tou rism , and consented  to  pursue th e
possib ility  of exchanging  m em bers of C ongress and th e  Suprem e Soviet. With the
excep tion  o f those  a rea s  in which final a rran g em en ts  w ere le f t  to  th e  fu tu re , th e
70ag reem en t spec ified  d a tes, num bers, d estina tions  and sim ilar details .
If th e  S ovie ts got much of th a t  which th e y  suggested  a t  th e  beginning of
th e  nego tia tions, th e  U nited S ta te s  rece ived  l i t t l e  of th a t  which i t  had publicly
pursued. While ca llin g  for exchanges of rad io  and te lev ision  b roadcast "on th e
su b jec ts  of sc ience , technology, industry , ag ricu ltu re , education , public h ea lth  and
sports,"  and for s im ilar exchanges of film ed m usical, l i te ra ry  and th e a tr ic a l
productions, th e  ag reem en t provided few  o pportun ities  to  provide "ideas and
71inform ation" of a p o litic a l or econom ic n a tu re  to  th e  Soviet public. For th e
purpose of "s tren g th en in g  m utual understanding  and developing friendly  re la tions,"
it  specified , th e  tw o  nations w ere to  "organize from  tim e  to  tim e  an exchange of
b ro ad casts  devo ted  to  discussion of such in te rn a tio n a l p o litic a l problem s as m ay
be ag reed  upon betw een  th e  tw o  p artie s ,"  bu t even  th a t  opening was largely
n eu tra lized  by le t te r s  of understanding  signed by bo th  and a ttach ed  to  th e
com ple ted  a g re e m e n t. The te x ts  of all b ro ad casts, both ag reed , w ere to  be
exchanged in advance and discussed a t  th e  w orking level: should e ith e r p a rty
consider th a t  th e  e f fe c t  of a b roadcast would no t "co n trib u te  to  th e  b e tte rm e n t of
79re la tio n s ,"  th e  b roadcast would be cancelled . The le t te r s  of understanding
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p ro te c te d  the  A m erican  public from  Soviet propaganda, bu t th ey  also precluded 
th e  possibility  of reach ing  th e  Soviet public w ith w hat many in th e  U nited S ta te s  
considered  " th e  tru th ."  And in agreeing  to  such a lim ita tio n , W ashington 
au to m atica lly  relinquished  an im portan t p a rt of its  post-G eneva policy regard ing  
A m erican-S oviet c o n ta c ts . On th e  o ther hand, th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  Soviet 
Union now had, for th e  firs t tim e, a sweeping and sign ifican t cu ltu ra l re lationship .
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CHAPTER X m
A NEW CULTURAL RELATIONSHIP
The 1958 ag reem en t d ram atically  changed th e  na tu re  of A m erican- 
Soviet cu ltu ra l re la tions . During th e  following tw o y ears  thousands of A m erican 
and Soviet c itiz e n s  passed through the now porous iron cu rta in , tak ing  th e ir  
knowledge, skills and cu rio sities  to  a  b rief exposure on th e  o th e r side. By th e  end 
of the  first e igh teen  months, 1,674 A m ericans com prising 107 delegations had 
trav e led  to  th e  U.S.S.R., w hile 1,637 Soviets connec ted  w ith  100 p ro jec ts  had 
visited  the  U nited  S ta tes .^  A pproxim ately seven ty  five  per cen t of the  p ro jec ts  
specified  in th e  ag reem en t had been com pleted  and th e  p rospects appeared  good, 
th e  S ta te  D ep artm en t rep o rted , th a t  v irtually  all the  scheduled program s would be 
com pleted  by th e  end of th e  tw o y ear period covered by th e  ag reem en t. A 
com prehensive publications exchange program  had been se t in motion, th e  film 
industries of th e  tw o  nations had neg o tia ted  th e ir  own rec ip ro ca l arrangem ents, 
and the U. S. N ational A cadem y of Sciences and the  Soviet A cadem y of Sciences, 
operating  under th e  auspices of th e  la rg e r ag reem en t, had drawn up th e ir  own
O
program  of sc ie n tif ic  ac tiv itie s . "The fu tu re  of the  program ," S ta te  D epartm en t 
o ffic ials  w ro te  a t  th e  tim e, "seem s assured, probably on an increasing basis.""^
Most of th e  exchange ag reem en ts  w ere fu lfilled  w ithout fan fare , but a 
few cap tu red  th e  a tte n tio n  of both nations. Bob Hope found an apprec ia tive
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audience in th e  K rem lin, proving thereby  to  skep tica l A m ericans th a t th e  Soviets 
could laugh and prom pting C hristian  C entury  to  wonder w hether it  was trag ic  or 
ludicrous th a t  it  should so surprise us th a t  th e  Soviet people could enjoy a joke.^ 
Van C liburn 's success a t  th e  Tchaikovsky Music F estiva l brought bo th  fam e to  
him self and heigh tened  apprec ia tion  to  his a r t ,  while th e  Philadelphia Symphony 
won a ffec tio n  in Soviet c ities , and Leopold Stokowski, the  f irs t A m erican to  
conduct a Soviet symphony, proved a popular figure in th e  USSR. But th e  biggest 
A m erican a t tra c t io n  was its  Moscow F a ir, which was a huge success despite  
K rem lin com plaints th a t  it  over-em phasized A m erican consum er goods and an
7
A m erican  Congressm an's a tta c k s  upon its  a r t  as being com m unist-insp ired . 
A lm ost th ree  million Soviet c itizens pushed through its  g a te s  during th e  la te  
sum m er of 1959 and m any m ore would have done th e  sam e had tim e and tic k e ts
Q
p erm itted .
The M oiseyev D ance Ensem ble, on th e  o ther hand, proved a sm ashing
success in th e  U nited  S ta te s , and th e  long aw aited  Bolshoi B allet an even  g re a te r
one.^ Like th e  Moscow A rt T heatre  som e th ir ty  five years ea rlie r , th e  Bolshoi
sold out all perfo rm ances weeks before i ts  a rr iv a l—even a t f if ty  dollar p rices for
opening night sea ts  and f if te e n  for subsequent ones—prom pting som e A m ericans
to  sym path ize w ith  Soviets who com plained th a t  it  was easier to  g e t out of the
Lubianka Prison th an  into th e  Bolshoi B alle t.^^  Shostakovich re tu rn ed  to  a fa r
d iffe ren t w elcom e th an  th a t  which g re e e te d  him te n  years ea rlie r , and in New
York C ity  th e  Soviets s taged  the ir own exhibition  which, though sm aller than the
A m erican ex travaganza  in Moscow, drew la rg e  crowds as th e  firs t to  appear in
11
A m erica since th e  1939 World Fair.
But th e  1958 ag reem en t was only a  beginning. Since th a t d a te  the tw o 
nations have signed sim ilar pacts  every tw o  years, providing a t  le ast one stab le
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e lem en t in an uneasy rela tionsh ip  th a t  occasionally  becom es vo la tile . D espite 
m inor problem s w ith th e  exchanges them selves and regard less of d iplom atic 
d ifficu ltie s  over the U-2, Berlin, C uba, V ietnam , and a host of le sse r episodes, the  
exchanges have continued, keeping open a t  le a s t one avenue of aw areness to  tens 
o f thousands of people in both coun tries . Though the ag reem en ts  haven’t  solved 
th e  g re a t problem s sep a ra tin g  th e  tw o  nations, th e  human in te rac tio n  under th e ir  
auspices has a t  le a s t to ld  the  tw o peoples much m ore than  th ey  fo rm erly  knew 
about each  o ther.
For one fa c t  em erges c learly  from  th e  accoun ts of those  who trav e led  
to  th e  USSR during th e  period  betw een  S talin 's death  and th e  signing o f th e  1958 
ag reem en t: if th e  tra v e le rs  re f le c te d  A m erican  knowledge and percep tio n  as a 
w hole, th e  A m erican people knew very  l i t t le  about th e  re a litie s  o f everyday 
ex isten ce  in th e  Soviet Union. W hat the  v isito rs found was not w hat they  
ex pec ted , and th ey  said so. They expec ted  to  find rig id  inspections a t th e  borders 
and, once w ithin, an tic ip a ted  surveillance , propaganda, con tro ls, grim ness, isola­
tion , suspicion and perhaps hostility . Those who had been th e re  in th e  th ir tie s  
ex p ec ted  to  find th e  sam e country  th e y  had le f t  tw o decades ea rlie r , and those
who had no t been th e re  a t  aU, as C lifto n  D aniel observed, im agined Moscow as
12Tolstoy described i t  and N apoleon f irs t saw  it.
They found th e  opposite. C ustom s offic ia ls  tr e a te d  them  courteously ,
13checked  th e ir  baggage cursorily , and o the r su rprises quickly follow ed. Instead  
of Tolstoy 's Moscow th ey  found subways, boulevards, and a surprising am ount of 
tra f f ic . The tran sfo rm a tio n  since th e  th ir tie s , w ro te  M erle Fainsod, H arvard 
p ro fesso r of governm ent and au thor o f know ledgable books on th e  Soviet system .
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was astounding. "Then," he observed, "Moscow seem ed like a spraw ling village.
Today it looks like  a world cap ita l."^^  Instead  of a b ea ten  and dow ntrodden
people, they  found a re la tiv e ly  re laxed  and prosperous population th a t ta lked  back
to  policem en, com plained  like humans everyw here and even, as A labam a Senator
John Sparkm an to ld  A m ericans in w hat apap ren tly  was a rev e la tio n  to  him,
"seem ed well fed ."^^ Nor did the  v isito rs find th e  an tic ip a te d  con tro ls on trav e l
and com m unication . While som e com plained th a t th ey  w ere not allow ed to  v isit
p laces th a t  th ey  requested , m ost com m ented  on th e  freedom  they  had to  w ander
free ly , to  ask questions, to  ta k e  photographs and to  purchase w hatever they  could
afford.^® N ational po litica l co m m en ta to r, p res id en tia l speech w rite r and
Eisenhow er a ss is tan t Em m et John Hughes, for exam ple, w as surprised  not only
th a t  his bags w ere never opened a t th e  border, bu t th a t,  once in Moscow, he could
walk alone for hours while tak ing  de ta iled  no tes on p rices and o ther fa c ts  of 
17Soviet life . A 1956 Quaker delegation  found m uch th e  sam e freedom . "With
only a  few  excep tions," th e  de lega tes repo rted  in an observation  th a t  typ ified
many o th e rs , "we w ere able to  w ander a t  w ill and alone around th e  cities ,
observing w ithout in te rfe ren ce  th e  showplace and th e  slum, th e  new and the  old,
18th e  rich  and th e  poor." The expec ted  propaganda devices w ere likew ise
conspicuously absen t, as Hughes and many o th e rs  no ted . Instead  of signs, slogans
and loudspeakers th e  v isito rs found, as one observer com m ented  "only th e
inconspicous and rem arkab ly  uniform  signs ad v ertis in g  s ta te  in stitu tions and
19sto re s , th e a tre s  and concerts ."  One understands a t  once, w rote scholar 
F red erick  L. Schum an a f te r  observing th e  changes in th e  country  since his la st 
v isit and th e  d isparity  betw een re a lity  and A m erican  p reconcep tions, "why many 
A m erican  to u ris ts  ca ll on th e  ta ll Em bassy building on Tchaikovsky Boulevard to
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ask  why every th ing  is wholly d iffe re n t from  w hat they had been led to  expect."
Los A ngeles T im es owner N orm an C handler and his wife found many of th e ir
p reconcep tions  so erroneous, in fa c t ,  th a t upon retu rn ing  to  th e  U nited S ta tes
Mrs. C handler urged W ashington to  engage in m ore ex tensive a r t is t ic  exchanges
w ith  th e  Soviets, to  rem ove th e  fingerp rin ting  requ irem ent, and to  encourage
91m ore A m ericans to  make th e  trip  to  Moscow.
But by fa r  the  most w idely noted discovery m ade by th e  v isito rs was the  
w arm th  and friendliness which th e  Soviet people displayed tow ard  A m erica and 
A m ericans. Few  failed  to com m ent on the  fa c t ,  including those  severely  c r itic a l 
of th e  Soviet reg im e and its  m achinations. The Soviet people, they  rep ea ted ly  
w ro te  in one form  or another, expressed a genuine friendliness tow ard  them , a 
cu rio sity  about them , and an a rd en t desire  to  live in peace with them .
I t is to  be expected  of course th a t people of a p a rticu la r  persuasion 
would find favorab le  things to  say about th e  Soviet Union. But those who went in 
th e  f if t ie s—and p a rticu la rly  those whose com m ents have been considered for 
p resen t purposes—w ere not o f th a t persuasion. Indeed, m ost w ere ca re fu l to  be 
su ffic ie n tly  c r it ic a l to  estab lish  th e ir  cred ib ility . Nor is th e  purpose here to  
p ra ise  Soviet life . But it is to  suggest th a t if  th e  visitors w ere surprised  a t w hat 
they  found, th e  average A m erican  would have been more so, for presum ably th e  
p res id en tia l a ss is tan t, th e  Suprem e C o u rt Ju s tic e , th e  rad io  and te lev ision  sta tion  
ow ners, th e  scholars, relig ious lead ers , businessm en, congressm en and the  o thers 
who w en t w ere in a position to  know m ore about th e  rea litie s  of every  day Soviet 
life  th a n  was th e  ordinary c itizen . It is also to  suggest th a t if  A m ericans knew so 
l i t t l e  abou t th e  USSR, th e  Soviet m asses knew no m ore, and perhaps much less, 
about th e  re a lity  of A m erican  life . And while recognizing  th e  lim ited  ro le  of such
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in tangib le e n titie s  as m utual understanding  and cu ltu ral friendship in in tern a tio n a l 
a ffa irs , and  while acknowledging th a t policy is made in W ashington and Moscow, 
not in public p laces, th e re  is s till l i t t le  to  be said for the people of tw o  g re a t 
nations knowing so l i t t le  about the  day to  day ex istence of the  o ther.
The exchange ag reem en ts  have undoubtedly im proved the degree of 
m utual know ledge, but th e re  is s till much to  be learned , as illu s tra ted  by a 
personal experience. In th e  spring of 1976 th e  w rite r a ttended  a Houston 
recep tio n  honoring a  Soviet delegation  headed  by Georgi A rbatov, th en  D irec to r 
of the  In s titu te  on U. S. S tudies of the  Soviet A cadem y of Sciences, and today  one 
of B rezhnev 's top advisers on A m erican  affa irs . Im m ediately  ahead in th e  line to  
m ee t th e  Soviet o ffic ia l was th e  proverb ia l l i t t le  gray haired lady w ith  a kindly 
countenance who, upon being in troduced  to  A rbatov, asked a question th a t  brought 
a tw inkle to  his eyes and indulgent sm iles to  all w ithin hearing. When, she 
ea rn estly  asked, a re  you com m unists going to  ge t to  w here you have to  sleep only 
one hour a  night?
Amusing, perhaps, but even though most A m ericans know th a t com ­
m unists sleep  much like cap ita lis ts , do we, on a  d iffe ren t plane and in a d iffe ren t 
con tex t, s till think th a t th e  Soviet aim is to  sleep only one hour a n ight? And do 
th e  Soviet people think the  sam e about us? The answ er in both instances appears 
a lto g e th e r  too o ften  to  be yes—and th a t  fa c t alone co n s titu te s  a pow erful 
argum ent for continued c o n tac ts  betw een th e  A m erican and Soviet people.
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